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ABSTRACT
A POETICS OF RECONCILIATION:
T H E AESTHETIC MEDIATION OF CONFLICT
by
Cynthia E. Cohen 
U niversity of New Hampshire, D ecem ber, 1997
This dissertation, a philosophical inquiry into the significance o f  the aesthetic 
dom ain for reconciliation, addresses the following question: W hat is the nature o f  
reconciliation, and what is the nature o f  the aesthetic domain, that aesthetic form s and  
processes should  be uniquely well-suited to the educational tasks and challenges 
inherent in the work o f  reconciliation? The question is answ ered through the m ethods 
o f  conceptual analysis, with examples from the author's practice o f  conflict resolution, 
oral h istory  and cultural work.
T he first section o f the dissertation identifies 'reconciliation1 as an ethical and 
educational concept. The educational tasks of reconciliation — through which form er 
enem ies m ust com e to understand their own and each others' suffering, acknow ledge 
injustices, and becom e trusting and trustworthy -  are made difficult by  challenges 
created by violent conflict. The challenges result from the ethical and epistem ic 
interem beddedness o f individuals and their groups; the ethical anu epistem ic 
interrelatedness o f enemies; and the extent to which violence itself im pairs necessary 
capacities.
T he second section proposes an original conception o f the aesthetic dom ain, 
based on W estern philosophical theories and their fem inist and A fricanist critics, 
analysis o f expressive patterns o f pre-literate collectivities, and tw o Eastern theories.
T he definition builds on categories that em erge from W estern philosophy -  the 
integration of the sensuous and the rational; apprehension o f  formal qualities; and non­
utilitarian response -  and corrects for cultural bias. The aesthetic dom ain is defined by
xiii
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the pleasurable reciprocity between the organization of elements in a  formal structure 
and the perceptual capacities and sensibilities of perceivers.
T he third section o f the dissertation demonstrates that aesthetic form s and 
processes are uniquely well-suited to  accomplish the educational tasks and meet the 
educational challenges inherent in reconciliation. Both reconciliation and aesthetic 
transactions involve transformations that also respect the integrity o f all parties. 
A esthetic forms and processes cultivate the precise sensibilities — receptivity, respect, 
em pathy, creativity, vitality, and m etacognitive self-awareness -- that are required for 
reconciliation. Finally, rituals and other collective expressive forms offer non-violent 
but viscerally compelling means through which hum an com m unities might substantiate 
large-scale fram ing assumptions, including new relationships im agined and created 
through efforts at reconciliation.
xiv




A Poetics o f  Reconciliation: The Aesthetic M ediation o f Conflict is a philosophical 
inquiry into a conviction. The conviction is one I have evolved through years o f work as a 
com m unity oral historian and cultural worker. I believe that folklore and the a rts -an d  the 
crafting o f the processes involved in their creation and appreciation--can be especially 
useful in bringing people together across all kinds o f  socially constructed barriers, 
including differences created by political conflicts, m isunderstandings exacerbated by 
dynam ics of oppression, and even enm ity reproduced by  violence.
This study addresses the question o f why this conviction m ight be accurate. 
Specifically, I ask: What is the nature o f  reconciliation, and w hat is the nature o f  the 
aesthetic domain, that aesthetic fo rm s and processes should be uniquely well-suited to the 
educational tasks and challenges inherent in the work o f  reconciliation?
M y original intention had been to answer this question in two modes: aesthetic and 
analytic. First, I intended to present a compelling illustration of an aesthetic mediation o f a 
conflict, using juxtapositions o f an array of form s, including stories, poem s, and im ages of 
folk arts representing the history and culture o f  two groups who perceive each other as 
enem ies. I intended to follow the aesthetic presentation with analysis, explicating the 
theoretical interconnections among the political, educative and aesthetic dim ensions of such 
a  work. A  prelim inary step, I thought, would be the relatively m inor task of defining the 
key term s: W hat do w e mean by 'reconciliation?' W hat do we m ean by 'aesthetic?'
Defining the terms represented a far greater challenge than I had ever imagined. In 
fact, conceptual analyses o f ’reconciliation1 and 'the aesthetic' have com e to fill a total of
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2ten chapters, two of the three sections that comprise the body o f this work.
'Reconciliation' and 'the aesthetic dom ain' have revealed them selves to be such rich and 
generative concepts, however, that answers to my central question em erged through their 
definitions them selves.
A Poetics of Reconciliation: The Aesthetic M ediation o f C onflict, therefore, 
articulates a theory at quite a high level of abstraction. It presents a thorough analysis of 
'reconciliation,' and the educational tasks and challenges inherent in it. It also constructs 
an original conception o f 'the aesthetic domain,' a conception that builds on the insights o f 
W estern philosophical literature and corrects for its culturally biased lim itations. The 
argum ent o f  the dissertation is that the aesthetic domain, understood in term s o f those 
features that distinguish aesthetic transactions from other kinds of expression and 
interpretation, offers uniquely useful resources to the educational w ork of reconciliation. 
This general theory invites elaboration, in many ways, specifically on the ways in which 
specific art form s, genres, traditions and artists' works can be m arshaled in support o f the 
peaceful resolution o f conflicts and the establishm ent of respectful relations across 
differences.
This dissertation does not include, as I had originally intended, a finely honed 
m ulti-m edia illustration o f an aesthetic mediation of a conflict. It offers instead, exam ples 
drawn from several different projects, and concludes w ith an extended exam ple o f a w ork 
in progress. N either does this study include an analysis o f the contributions to 
reconciliation o f  particular art fo rm s-su ch  as poetry or drama, for in s tan ce -o r the thinking 
o f many im portant artists who assess the potential o f  their own artw ork, genre and form , in 
term s that are relevant to the dissertation's question.
I hope that the theory laid out here, demonstrating connections betw een the 
aesthetic dom ain in general with the educational tasks inherent in reconciliation, prepares 
the ground for the future works, including inquiries into the potential contributions o f each 
o f the different arts and particular traditions and genres within them.
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The extended example o f  an aesthetic mediation that ends the final chapter of this 
study takes the place o f what, in a more traditional dissertation, might be a chapter on 
implications o f  the work or applications o f the theory. In lieu o f  a more extended, chapter- 
length discussion, I w ould like to suggest here the implications of this study for scholars, 
practitioners, educators and policy-m akers in three fields: (1) the arts; (2) education; and 
(3) conflict resolution, co-existence and peace studies.
At a time when this country's prisons are bulging and when gang violence 
continues to be a m ajor problem, public discourse about funding for the arts and the 
importance o f arts education barely acknowledges the potential contribution o f  the arts to 
the resolution of conflicts, the reduction o f violence, and the cultivation o f the sensibilities 
needed for reconciliation. M ore often than not, arts education is justified by research that 
documents a connection between involvem ent in the arts and cognitive development.
Public funding for the arts, in recent years, is as likely to be discussed in terms o f benefits 
to a region's economy as enhancem ents to the quality of life or mutual understanding. I 
believe that as a society, we could m ake more informed decisions about the nature and 
extent o f  public funding for the arts, and better use o f our cultural resources, if the 
connections between aesthetic sensibilities and the capacities required for reconciliation 
were more deeply explored and understood.
In responding to increases in  the rate of violent incidents in schools, and, 
especially, to increases in the use o f  lethal weapons by young people, educators have 
reacted in a num ber o f  ways, ranging from  w eapons detectors and police presence to 
mediation programs and diversity training. W ithout com m enting on the efficacy o f such 
program s, I believe that educational leaders could make use of aesthetic mediations o f 
conflicts to take a proactive stance. As educators, we can look to the arts and to the 
folklore of our students' com m unities for resources to  help our students engage with 
conflicts constructively, and to cultivate the sensibilities required for tolerance, mutual
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be enacted before violence erupts, to surface underlying tensions in ways that invite 
creative responses. As educators, I believe that we have a responsibility to do more than 
sim ply suppress or manage violent conflicts. W e can transform  them  into productive 
exchanges, opportunities for students to develop capacities and sensibilities that will serve 
them well as citizens of a pluralistic democracy.
The responsibilities o f citizens of this particular pluralistic democracy, the United 
States, have never been more pressing than at the present m om ent in history. W ith the end 
o f  the C old W ar, the United States is, at least for the time being, the only rem aining 
superpow er. The Cold W ar's termination has revealed a world o f rapidly changing 
political configurations, extravagantly armed, in which long-standing ethnic conflicts 
(w ithin and across state boundaries) account for the great m ajority of the world's most 
costly and dangerous conflagrations. Conflicts based on ethnicity find the majority of their 
casualties among civ ilians-prim arily  women and children. Such conflicts often result in 
m assive dislocations, sometimes the outcom e o f deliberate "ethnic cleansing," sometimes 
w hole com m unities of refugees fleeing in fear.
If political leaders and diplomats ever could have claimed to achieve meaningful 
peace by the signing of formal treaties, the resolution o f ethnic conflicts will inevitably 
require transform ations as much educative as political. For this reason, and because of 
how well suited aesthetic forms and processes are to the educational tasks and challenges 
inherent in the work of reconciliation, I believe that the arts should be considered an 
integral com ponent of the emerging professional and scholarly field o f conflict resolution • 
and coexistence. Consideration o f  the potential of aesthetic m ediations should inform 
education and training program s, research, and practice.
I believe that these are among the m ost im portant applications of the theory 
articulated in the pages and chapters that follow. I intend to develop them  more fully in
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resolution.
This Introduction proceeds with an overview o f the three sections that com prise the 
body of the study, follow ed by an explication of the term 'poetics' and the rationale for 
using it in the dissertation's title. The chapter ends with a summary of w hat I consider the 
work's m ost im portant contributions.
Overview
Follow ing this introductory chapter the dissertation is divided into three sections:
(1) Reconciliation; (2) The Aesthetic Domain; and (3) Distinctive Contributions o f  the 
Aesthetic Dom ain to the W ork o f Reconciliation.
Reconciliation
The first section defines 'reconciliation' for the purposes of this study as the 
creation, or re-creation of a  moral fram ew ork for a  relationship am ong form er en em ies-a  
relationship in which the acknowledgem ent o f suffering and injustice enable a deepening 
reciprocity o f  w arranted trust and respect. 'Reconciliation' refers not to a set of activities or 
to a stage o f a  process, but rather to a set of criteria towards which those involved in the 
resolution o f conflicts can aspire. 'Reconciliation' is both a process and an outcom e; it 
does not assum e the absence o f conflict, but rather a com m itm ent to engage in conflicts in 
ways that recognize and enhance the integrity of all parties. Because it involves 
transform ative processes that sim ultaneously must recognize (and when necessary enhance) 
capacities needed for integrity, as a concept 'reconciliation' has close affinities to 
'education .'
The educational tasks o f  reconciliation-i.e., adversaries com ing to understand each 
others' suffering, acknow ledge injustices, learn to trust and be trustw orthy, etc.—are m ade 
difficult by several challenges. The first challenge arises because it is not only individuals 
but also collectivities—including both states and amorphous collectivities like ethnic groups- 
-that m ust engage in reconciliation. To understand the implications of this circum stance I
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w hich they belong, understood w ithin the rubric o f 'intersubjectivity.'
The second challenge arises due to another set o f ethical and epistem ological 
relationships: in this case the interdependence o f enemies themselves. Upon analysis, it 
becom es clear that enemies are implicated in each other's ability to understand and to act. 
The very qualities o f presence adversaries bring to their attempts to understand each other 
can have an important impact on the trajectory o f the conflict and its resolution. 
'Transsubjectivity’ refers to the ethical and epistemic interrelatedness o f  enemies.
The third and final set of challenges to the educational work of reconciliation arise 
because violence-including both overt desUuction o f life and property and'the ongoing 
structural violence o f oppression—often impairs the very capacities needed for 
reconciliation. The physical and psychological wounds of oppression and o f war often 
leave people less able to listen well to each other, to express them selves, to feel sympathy, 
to im agine new solutions, and to take the risk to  trust.
T o summarize, then, Section One proposes a conception o f 'reconciliation' defined 
as the creation of a moral fram ework for the relationship between former enemies, a 
transform ation made possible through processes that are educative in nature. It 
dem onstrates, however, that those who seek to engage in and/or facilitate efforts at 
reconciliation face daunting educational challenges.
The Aesthetic Domain
Philosophical literature about 'the aesthetic' is volum inous. A t its best, it is 
com plex and generative; at its worst, it can seem impenetrable, contradictory and 
dam agingly ethnocentric. In the second section o f this dissertation, I propose an original 
conception o f 'the aesthetic dom ain,' grounded in the categories that em erge from  W estern 
philosophical literature, but em bracing also the expressive form s and patterns o f response 
o f cultures throughout the world, including the experiences o f collectivities as well as 
individuals.
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aesthetic' and 'art.' A lthough these two concepts are related, not all aesthetic experience 
takes place in relation to art, and not all responses to art can be understood as aesthetic. To 
dem arcate the aesthetic domain, then, w e are com pelled to seek an explicit understanding of 
the features of a transaction between subject and object that distinguish it as 'aesthetic.1 
Precisely what is it about some transactions between perceiver and perceived that lead us to 
characterize them as aesthetic?
My answer to this question begins w ith a synthesis of several W estern 
philosophical conceptions of 'the aesthetic.' The literature points to a dim ension of human 
experience that can be demarcated in reference to three clusters of ideas: (1) the integration 
of the sensuous and the rational; (2) attention to the form al qualities of objects of 
perception; and (3) special attitudes or qualities o f  response, generally described in terms of 
non-utilitarianism  and disinterestedness.
Next, I present a challenge to the W estern philosophical conception o f the aesthetic 
dom ain. The challenge emerges from the w ork o f  the sociobiologist Ellen Dessanayake 
(1988, 1992), and from the perspectives of A fricanist and fem inist scholars. They argue 
that W estern philosophical aesthetic theories make universal claim s for patterns o f 
expression and response that in fact are linked to  the relatively limited—and, in 
sociobiological terms, recent—technological innovation o f  w idespread alphabetic literacy. 
A fricanist and fem inist theories appropriate the word 'aesthetic' to refer to patterns o f 
expression that are collective in nature, and patterns o f response that are more likely to be 
ecstatic and com m itted than detached or disinterested, the qualities of response 
paradigm atically associated with 'the aesthetic' by the philosophers of the W est.
Having clarified the contrast betw een two com peting notions o f the aesthetic 
dom ain, I seek to resolve the conceptual conflict following two trajectories. First, I 
exam ine in close detail several exam ples o f both material and performative expressive 
form s o f non-literate cultures. I argue that they can be described and dem arcated in terms of
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although in some cases the ideas must be expanded or m ade more abstract. The specific 
ways in which the Western categories are inadequate becom e useful in articulating a 
conception o f the aesthetic that embraces the experiences both o f literate individuals and 
non-literate collectivities. Then, I briefly consider theories o f the aesthetic that emerge from 
two Eastern, but literate, cultures. This inquiry highlights the inevitably intersubjective 
nature o f aesthetic experience: as human beings, we necessarily refine our perceptual 
capacities and develop perceptual sensibilities in the context of culture.
U sing insights from  these two trajectories o f inquiry, I propose an original 
conception o f the aesthetic domain, based on the pleasurable reciprocity that can be 
established between the organization of elements in expressive form s and the perceptual 
capacities and sensibilities o f those who behold and participate in them. The pleasure o f 
aesthetic engagem ent results from (1) the integration o f  the sensuous and the rational; (2) an 
intensity o f engagem ent w ith bounded forms; and (3) tendencies towards the m ean along 
several different dim ensions, including, for instance, a balance between chaos and rigidity 
and between innovation and tradition, and between the im pulses of individuals and the 
imperatives o f  collectivities.
The section on the aesthetic domain concludes with an inquiry into the ethical 
possibilities and risks inherent in aesthetic transactions, understood to include the 
experiences o f  individuals, of collectivities, and o f persons intersubjectively inscribed with 
the perceptual sensibilities of their cultures.
Distinctive Contributions o f the Aesthetic Domain to the W ork o f  Reconciliation
Although it is inevitable that my reading o f  the literature on both 'the aesthetic' and 
'reconciliation ' was influenced to some degree by my question about the relationships 
betw een them , m y intention has been to analyze each concept independently o f the other. 
Each o f the first two sections o f this work should, theoretically, be able to stand on its
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discourses on the nature o f  reconciliation and of the aesthetic domain.
It is in the third section of the dissertation that I bring the two conceptual analyses 
into relationship. First, at a purely conceptual level, I show how each o f  the defining 
elem ents o f  the aesthetic domain are uniquely well-suited to specific educational tasks and 
challenges that are inherent in the work of reconciliation.
Follow ing an analysis of the conceptual links between 'the aesthetic' and 
'reconciliation,' I draw on exam ples from my own practice and the work o f colleagues to 
illustrate how aesthetic forms and processes can be crafted to further three general goals of 
reconciliation. I offer specific exam ples in which aesthetic forms and processes contribute 
to (1) the restoration of capacities; (2) the imagining and substantiating of a future moral 
relationship; and (3) learn in g -ab o u t one's self, one's people, and one's enem ies.
The dissertation ends with an extended example o f a w ork in progress, an aesthetic 
m ediation o f  the conflict between Jewish and Palestinian people. The stories o f  six 
Palestinian and Jewish wom en have been selected, edited, and rendered in poetic form. 
Strands from each o f the six stories are woven into a script for a dram atic presentation, to 
be accom panied by projected images o f their folk art. The perform ance of the script will 
create a new and integrated whole out of strands of stories that once seem ed disparate or 
disconnected, inviting audiences to appreciate their resonances and to becom e feelingfully 
aware o f  the history and culture they represent.
A Poetics
I call this study a 'poetics.' The word 'poetics' paradigm atically  refers to a 
concept, system  or theory o f literature. According to Rom an Jakobson (1988 [1958]), 
poetics deal prim arily with the question, "W hat makes a verbal m essage a w ork of art ?" 
Poetics differ in the extent to which they focus on the poet, the work, the text, the poem  
and the reader.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
In some cases, the word is used more narrowly, to refer specifically to poetry; in 
o ther cases, it is applied more broadly, not ju st to literature, but to all forms o f  aesthetic 
expression. Som e theorists use the w ord m ore abstractly, to refer not to a theory of 
literature, per se, but to theories of criticism . In its m ost expansive definition, 'poetics' 
refers to the conventions that implicitly govern the poetic, literary or aesthetic dimensions 
of phenom ena not typically characterized as aesthetic (such as 'the poetics of military 
occupation,' 'the poetics o f need,1 'the poetics o f disaster,' 'the poetics o f  resistance,' 'the 
poetics o f  ex p erien ce ,'e tc .) .1
In calling this study A Poetics o f Reconciliation. I draw on three related meanings 
of the word. The precedents are: (1) Aristotle's Poetics and its interpreters (Halliwell, 
1987); (2) Gaston Bachelard's theory about the nature of poetic understanding, as 
articulated in his book The Poetics o f  Space (1994 [1958]) and (3) the em erging field of 
anthropological poetics.
Aristotle's Poetics
In the m ost general of term s, Aristotle's Poetics is a systematic descriptive and 
prescriptive theory about the nature o f drama. Aristotle examines the strategies 
poet/playwrights use to evoke feelings for the purpose of engendering moral action, 
drawing on specific dram atic works as exam ples. Em bedded within Aristotle's poetics is 
an im plicit theory about w hat com prises human goodness: it is to be found in human 
actions. Thus Aristotle's theory em phasizes mimesis, or the ways in which dram a 
convincingly portrays (imitates) human actions; he analyzes in particular how tragedies 
depict hum an characters who "miss the m ark "-w h o  fail to achieve moral goodness because 
of unethical actions, for which they may or may not be blam eworthy. The purpose o f  such 
tragedies, according to Aristotle, is to evoke feelings o f pity and fear within m em bers of the 
audience; these feelings are intended to rem ind people of their own vulnerability. 
(References to Aristotle's theories and several o f his interpreters can be found in Chapters 7 
and 11.)
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Unlike Aristotle's Poetics, the theory of reconciliation I construct relates not only to 
drama, but to the entire aesthetic domain. Like Aristotle, however, theorize about how the 
arts help people learn about and feel others' suffering, in ways that engender moral 
sensibilities and dim inish impediments to moral action. I share with him  a usage of the 
term 'poetics' that invokes moral purposes. Also like his Poetics, this dissertation is 
prim arily a conceptual, rather than empirical, study. It does, however, include illustrations 
o f aesthetic forms and processes crafted to engage people's sensibilities toward the 
particular moral ends of reconciliation. In a political and social climate that minimizes and 
dem eans the im portance of the arts, a poetics o f reconciliation, like Aristotle's theory, 
asserts a role for artists and the arts in the moral education of adults.
B achelard 's Poetics
According to the French phenom enologist Gaston Bachelard (1994 [1958]), poetic 
im ages are those images that create reverberations within people who hear or see them.
The poetic act is the sudden image, the "flare-up of being" in the im agination (xviii). "At 
the level o f the poetic image, the duality o f subject and object is iridescent, shimmering, 
unceasingly active in its inversions," he writes (p. xv). To apprehend som ething poetically 
means to be receptive to it, to open ourselves to the reverberations it creates within us. We 
cannot understand a poetic image without attending to how it reverberates in our beings.
This kind o f  'transsubjectivity' (xix) --the sim ultaneously deepening understanding 
o f self and other, in relation to each other—that Bachelard identifies w ith the w orkings o f 
poetry is also what Aristotle described at the level o f dramatic action, through the evocation 
o f pity and fear. W e understand the suffering o f the other when we feel it in ourselves, or 
w hen we fear its possibility in our own lives. And it is this kind o f understanding, of 
oneself and the other, that is central to the w ork o f reconciliation.
It is at first surprising to discover that com ing to know an enem y is very m uch like 
com ing to know a poetic im ag e-in  that both require us to re-exam ine our understanding of 
ourselves and to re-experience ourselves in new ways. In this dissertation, in C hapter 5 , 1
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extend Bachelard’s term 'transsubjectivity,' to refer, in a general way, to the 
epistemological and ethical interrelatedness o f enemies.
Aesthetic mediations of conflict strive to engender qualities o f receptivity, so that 
enem ies can feel both their own and each other's stories reverberate within their beings. 
Juxtapositions of stories, poem s and pictures, plays and m urals, songs and dances, invite 
their audiences into processes o f  reconciliation, through the deeply-felt reverberations o f 
rhythms and harm onies, im ages and textures, tensions and resolutions. They ask of those 
who participate in and behold them to suspend the constructs that define their identities and 
their political positions-constructs that may be construed as "knowledge" but in fact are 
impediments to understanding.
Anthropological Poetics
In addition to the theories o f  A ristotle and Gaston Bachelard, the use o f 'poetics ' in 
this study draws on a third, related precedent: as the word is invoked by anthropologists 
and folklorists to refer to the poetic, literary and aesthetic dim ensions of representing 
cultures. This relatively new body o f work focuses on the inevitable links between political 
and aesthetic dim ensions o f  cultural representation, as well as on questions o f m eaning- 
making, interpretation and pedagogy.
For instance, essays in C lifford and M arcus' (1986) Writing Culture: The Poetics 
and Politics o f  Ethnography describe how the rhetorical and literary devices used in w riting 
about cultures com m unicate assum ptions about them. The book challenges those who 
describe cultures to "find diverse w ays o f rendering negotiated realities as m ultisubjective, 
power-laden and incongruent" (p. 15); and to encourage the reader's participation in the 
creation o f  meaning.
In another collection, entitled Anthropological Poetics, we find poetry written by 
anthropologists, based on their cultural research. The introduction to the anthology states 
that "some things said poetically about anthropological experience can't be said w ith equal 
effectiveness any other way.... A m ature poetics allows the use of various textual form s to
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salvage m uch more from the meaningful realities of the people studied than is contained in
the standard text" (p. 5). W hile all ethnography entails a textual dim ension, not a few
anthropologists have turned to poetry, novels and other literary forms to docum ent their
cross-cultural inquiries, and to represent what they have learned about those of other
cultures. In reviewing the poetry o f  Stanley Diamond, for instance, anthropologist Dan
Rose (1991) writes that it fuses the
sensibilities o f self and the cultural Other....Indeed a m arriage o f  cultures has 
been performed at the level of poetics. The collision o f cultural realities has 
within it the possibilities for a new nexus of feeling, insight, awareness, and a 
new political statement about the politics of cultural d ifferences-the politics o f 
reality" (p. 220).
Just as anthropologists can use poetic forms to understand and to represent what 
they have learned about cultures other than their own, so those who are engaged in the 
w ork o f  reconciliation, as participants and as facilitators, can use a whole array o f aesthetic 
forms to  express and interpret cultural contexts and historical events in ways that are 
uniquely "effective." To illustrate this possibility, in Chapter 14 o f this study, I present an 
exam ple o f an aesthetic mediation o f a conflict, in which I render the narratives of 
Palestinian and Jewish wom en into poetry. Not surprisingly, as I have sustained my own 
poetic interest in each story, in some cases new images arose w ithin me and found their 
w ay into the poems. My hope is that the political significance o f the poem s is one o f 
"possibility for a new nexus o f feeling, insight and awareness" and that my poetic 
encounters w ith the stories invite readers to engage in poetic encounters o f  their own. My 
intention is to engage readers with the historical and cultural dim ensions o f the stories with 
the qualities of receptivity and self-reflection suggested by Bachelard's term 
'transsub jectiv ity .'
The poetic renderings of the Palestinian and Jewish w om en's narratives are 
presented as a script intended to be performed accom panied by im ages of folk art projected 
onto screens. Perform ances o f this work will aspire towards w hat Stephen Greenblatt
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(1991) refers to as "resonant wonder" (p. 54), in which viewers are invited into the 
interpretive space between w ord and image, poem  and music, sound and silence.
In calling m y dissertation a poetics of reconciliation, then, I am  asserting som ething 
about reconciliation, about the theory I will construct, and about the aesthetic mediation 1 
illustrate.
About reconciliation. I am  suggesting that the sensibilities and qualities of attention 
required to understand one's self and one's enemy can be cultivated in uniquely effective 
ways through transactions between perceiver and perceived that we describe as aesthetic.
By describing the theory I construct as a poetics, I draw  on the deep resonance that 
A ristotle's Poetics evokes as the foundational theory within W estern literary tradition.
M ost im portant, like Aristotle’s theory, a poetics o f reconciliation asserts a strong 
relationship between the aesthetic and the ethical. Starting with an conceptual exploration 
o f  a particular kind o f moral action, reconciliation, the theory I construct calls for the 
education o f people in conflict through engagem ent with artistic forms and processes.
Finally, by calling my dissertation a poetics I am  also referring to the use o f 
aesthetic forms and processes in the mediation of conflicts. The aesthetic mediation 
illustrated in the final chapter of this study is meant to convey a reverence for life, an 
appreciation o f its textures and o f  the intricate patterns o f simple daily living. People's 
aspirations and identities are celebrated not in the language o f national legitimacy and self- 
determ ination, but rather in the delicate ornamentation o f  the Bedouin coffee pot and the 
shtetl’s sturdy m ortar and pestle. It is in these small details that readers are invited to find 
them selves and each other, and to recognize that among war's casualties are the delicate, 
sturdy textures women weave daily in our homes and communities.
By rendering the wom en's narratives into poetic form s, and by interw eaving their 
stories in a particular order and illustrating them with im ages o f folk art, I hope to create an 
interpretive space into w hich audiences are invited—to be still, to reflect, to think and to
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feel. I hope to engender a quiet urgency, a peaceful resolve towards action, a heart-felt 
yearning for reconciliation.
Significant Contributions
The theory constructed in this dissertation is an attempt to answ er questions that 
em erge from a somewhat idiosyncratic practice o f  community cultural work, a practice that 
blends adult education, community arts, oral history and folklore with cultural resource 
developm ent, intercultural alliance-building and feminist activism. Not surprisingly, to 
theorize meaningfully about such multifaceted work requires a multifaceted theory as well. 
W hatever the explanatory or prescriptive power to be found in the theory articulated here, 
then, I attribute to the touchstone form ed by years o f collaboration with artists, scholars 
and culture-bearers from diverse communities. In this section I highlight what I see as the 
unique or m ost significant contributions of this study, first in its conception of 
reconciliation, then in its conception of the aesthetic dom ain, and finally in the theory and 
exam ples that link the two conceptual analyses.
The conception o f reconciliation proposed here makes significant contributions to 
the discourse surrounding conflict resolution theory and practice by virtue o f  the 
educational and moral philosophy on which it is based. In particular, this conception is 
unique in its articulation o f the theoretical overlap between reconciliation and education-in  
that each o f the two concepts require that transformative processes simultaneously enhance 
participants' capacities for integrity. Even when political leaders and activists may deem a 
conflict to be intractable, educators might see possibilities for ch an g e -a t least in the 
restoration or enhancem ent o f the interpretive, reflective and critical capacities o f persons 
on all sides o f a political divide.
The theory proposed here explicates the educational challenges to reconciliation 
inherent in the ethical and epistemic interrelatedness o f persons, both w ithin their own 
com m unities and with their enemies. Interventions in conflict situations m ust be designed, 
therefore, to help participants become aware, at a m etacognitive level, o f the webs o f
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shared meaning and ethical interdependence that can constrain as well as promote 
understanding and constructive action. These webs o f shared meaning are em bodied in 
gestures, languages, beliefs, anthem s, flags, foods, narratives and rituals. Processes 
designed to help people make choices about how they wish to relate to these webs of 
shared beliefs m ust help people overcome em otional resistances to change, and, therefore, 
must engage them bodily, emotionally, intellectually, and spiritually.
This study also makes an important contribution to the understanding of the 
educational challenges inherent in reconciliation by building upon the conceptual work of 
Elaine Scarry (1985). Her book, The Body in Pain; The M aking and Unmaking o f  the 
World, explores the political consequences o f the complete or virtual inexpressibility of 
some kinds o f  hum an pain. Scarry's work sets the stage for three very im portant lines of 
this study's argum ent. First, she dem onstrates that violence itself can im pair expressive 
capacities; I argue that aesthetic forms and processes offer resources that allow us either to 
circumvent dam aged capacities or restore capacities that have been lost. Scarry upholds the 
importance o f  human im agination-our creations must first be m ade up before they can be 
made real. A esthetic forms and processes, because o f specific ways they integrate the 
sensuous w ith the rational in pre-conceptual schemata, can cultivate creativity and 
innovation. These are very important capacities in the work o f reconciliation, because 
adversaries m ust imagine and create new social configurations and a new moral fram ework 
for their relationship. Finally, Scarry convincingly dem onstrates that in the case o f war, 
the wounded body functions as a sign, allowing human com m unities to believe in the 
realness o f our large-scale human creations, such as nation states, before they can be 
substantiated (or realized) through the creation o f buildings, maps, political institutions, 
econom ic relationships, etc. Those involved in the work o f  reconciliation also need to 
substantiate their large-scale creations—but m ust find ways to do so that are both 
convincing and non-violent. I argue that rituals and other collective expressive form s can
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structure viscerally-felt processes through which hum an communities can substantiate the 
constructs we imagine, until we have the opportunities to make them  real.
The conception of the aesthetic dom ain developed in the chapters that follow is also 
an original one. Its most significant contribution is its attempt to embrace the expressive 
form s and patterns of response o f  all the world's cultures, ranging from preliterate tribal 
groups to modern and postm odern elites.
The conception o f 'th e  aesthetic' articulated here is probably also unique in its 
simultaneously sympathetic and critical reading o f W estern philosophical aesthetic theory. 
Unlike many critics of W estern aesthetic theory, I believe there is educational and ethical 
value in the nonutilitarian response it celebrates, especially because such responses cultivate 
sensibilities needed to em pathize w ith and respect others and to gain reflective aw areness of 
the self. Unlike most who w ork within the fram eworks of W estern philosophical aesthetic 
theories, however, I believe that to use 'disinterestedness o f  response' as a criterion o f the 
aesthetic is unacceptable, because it devalues the expressive forms and related patterns of 
response o f most o f  the world's people and overlooks im portant similarities am ong 
seem ingly divergent expressive forms. I propose here that we take as the defining feature 
o f aesthetic experience a kind o f  pleasure that can be felt in perception itself, when there 
exists a reciprocity between the elements of a form to be perceived and the perceptual 
sensibilities o f the perceiver(s). W ith this understanding, passionate, em bodied and 
com m itted participation, which is the hallm ark of the expressive forms o f nonliterate 
collectivities, also falls within the dom ain of 'the aesthetic.' Furtherm ore, there is ethical 
and educative value in these aesthetic transactions as well, especially in light o f our need 
for viscerally real but non-violent w ays to substantiate large-scale hum an creations, noted 
ju st above.
The conception of 'the aesthetic' proposed here attempts to jo in  the conceptual 
clarity o f  philosophical analysis with an anthropological respect for the diversity o f  distinct 
cultural patterns. Reconciling the im peratives and the conventions o f  these two intellectual
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and discursive traditions has been a challenge worthy of conflict resolution experts with 
many m ore years o f experience than I, I would be gratified if  any aspect o f this analysis 
proves useful to those working in the fields of A nthropology, Folklore, Perform ance 
Studies, or Aesthetics.
The overarching theory articulated in this dissertation—i.e., the linking o f  the 
qualities o f  reciprocity o f subject and object associated w ith aesthetic pleasure, on the one 
hand, with the educational tasks and challenges inherent in the work o f reconciliation, on 
the o th er-m ay  prove to be o f greater significance than either o f the conceptual analyses out 
o f  which it is constructed. The theory is itself built on m etaphoric thinking: that is, in the 
noticing o f  similarities between the work o f reconciliation and the educative potential of 
aesthetic form s and processes, dom ains that would otherw ise be seen as different.
Am ong the similarities between 'reconciliation' and 'the aesthetic' is the importance 
o f  receptivity. In the creation and appreciation o f art, like in the understanding o f others 
w ith w hom  we disagree, engaged listening is key. T ransform ation, in both dom ains, 
depends upon the qualities o f  presence with which we seek to understand.
In both reconciliation and in aesthetic apprehension, how we inquire is at least as 
im portant, perhaps more important, than what we know. The qualities of presence we 
bring to our inquiry influence both what w e and our enem ies can understand and also how 
w e and our enem ies can act. We can say, then, that in each sphere, transform ative 
possibilities are created in the nexus o f the epistemic and the ethical.
W e recall that Gaston Bachelard uses the word 'transsubjectivity ' to refer to the 
shim m ering o f attention between poetic image and self that characterizes understanding a 
poem . A significant contribution o f the theory developed here is the insight that the same 
kind o f  shim m ering of attention takes place when w e try to understand an enem y. In each 
case, our understanding o f ourselves and the object o f our perception are reciprocally 
inform ed. The m ore w e truly understand, or the more clearly we perceive, the other 
(w hether our enem y or a poetic image), the more we com e to understand and the more
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clearly w e perceive ourselves. Conversely, the deeper our awareness o f  our own thoughts 
and feelings, the more clearly will we understand the other.
In Section Three o f this study, I propose that the reciprocity between subject and 
object that characterizes aesthetic engagement is inherently other-regarding. W e might even 
say, I argue, that aesthetic transactions are characterized by respect. Any kind of non­
violent conflict resolution has at its core a decision on the part o f form er adversaries to 
respect each other, at least in the minimal sense o f  respecting each other's right to exist. In 
reconciliation, the com m itm ent to respect the other is quite profound: we respect our 
form er enem y not only in her right to exist, but in her need to grieve, her capacity to learn 
and her desire to becom e more trustworthy. W hen form er enem ies' learning about each 
other's history and culture is m ediated through aesthetic form s, the process o f their 
engagem ent em bodies the respect they are striving to achieve. In other words, the ends are 
em bedded in the means.
Aesthetic forms and processes are characterized not only by an other-regarding 
reciprocity. They also integrate the sensuous and the rational. Because of this, learning 
that is m ediated through aesthetic forms and processes can also cultivate other sensibilities 
form er enem ies need in order to reconcile with each other. For instance, aesthetic 
engagem ent can lead to awareness (including awareness o f  suffering) that is feelingful. It 
can also staicture processes that invite us to becom e m etacognitively aware o f our own 
m eaning-m aking and interpreting o f  symbols.
The general point here is that aesthetic forms and p rocesses-bo th  by virtue o f their 
intrinsic characteristics and by virtue o f how they can be c ra fted -are  uniquely well-suited 
to accom plish the educational tasks, and meet the educational challenges, inherent in the 
w ork o f  reconciliation. Both reconciliation and aesthetic transactions are inherently 
educational, in that they simultaneously engage people in transform ative experiences while 
respecting the integrity o f  all parties. Also, the sensibilities required for the w ork of 
reconciiiation-receptiv ity , respect, empathy, creativity, vitality, and metacognitive
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alertness-are  precisely those cultivated by engagement with the aesthetic. In fact, we 
might even say that reconciliation is a way of living in relationship that is itself informed by 
aesthetic sensibilities. It has aesthetic qualities because it seeks to create, in the moral 
fram ework of relationships, a structure that can hold tensions and their resolutions, a form 
in which disparate elem ents are brought into relation, a unity that em braces conflict. In 
these ways, reconciliation itself is like a work of art.
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CH A PTER 2
RECONCILIATION: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
Reconciliation: Overview of Section 1
The purpose of this dissertation is to construct a poetics o f  reconciliation, a theory 
that explains why and how aesthetic forms and processes can be crafted to further the ends 
o f  reconciliation. In this section, which consists of chapters two through six, I define 
reconciliation in terms o f  criteria, o r standards, that conflict resolution processes m ust meet 
to be considered reconciliation. I then assess the interrelated ethical and epistemological 
im plications o f those criteria. Finally, I analyze the effects o f violence on the various 
capacities required to engage in the work o f reconciliation. Taken together, these chapters 
argue o f a notion of reconciliation in which education plays a central role. They also reveal 
the daunting educational challenges inherent in the work.
This chapter begins with a description o f  those circumstances that call for 
reconciliation, making distinctions among the related phenom ena of conflict, violence, 
injustice, and coercion. I argue that it is not conflict itself, but rather alienation—understood 
as moral estrangem ent from other human beings and from one's own v a lu es-th a t is the 
problem  that reconciliation seeks to address.
Next, I undertake a conceptual analysis of 'reconciliation' that clarifies several 
concepts central to the term. 'Trust' em erges as a key distinction between 'reconciliation' 
and a related concept, 'tolerance.' The proposed conception o f reconciliation also 
incorporates, as an important elem ent in both the means and ends of conciliatory processes, 
a notion o f  'justice' consistent w ith 'trust.' It is unlikely that this conception o f 
reconciliation, therefore, could be used, as some fear, to support a kind o f peace that reifies 
unfair political or institutional structures. This chapter concludes with a definition o f
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reconciliation as a process in which adversaries create a moral fram ework for their 
relationship.
The next chapter, Chapter 3, opens with five criteria that, according to the 
proposed definition, conflict resolution processes must meet in order to qualify as 
reconciliation. Then, I stand back from the proposed conception of reconciliation to 
consider the kind of concept that it is--namely, a concept that is both educational and 
ethical. In assessing the usefulness o f moral philosophy as a fram ew ork for understanding 
reconciliation, questions o f  cultural bias are addressed.
In Chapters 5 and 6 , 1 consider two sets o f epistem ological and ethical relationships 
w ith particular salience for the educational work o f reconciliation. Chapter 5 proposes 
'intersubjectivity1 as a framework for understanding the interem beddedness o f both the 
understanding and the capacities for agency of individuals and the groups with which they 
identify. C hapter 6 presents 'transsubjectivity' as a corresponding relationship, in this case 
betw een entities that relate to each other as adversaries or enemies. Taken together, 
'intersubjectivity ' and 'transsubjectivity' explain why violent conflicts between adversaries 
of different cultures often seem intractable, and why the educational work o f reconciliation 
often depends upon mediation by third parties.
The final chapter o f this section considers the likely effects o f vio lence-including 
the structural violence of oppression as well as assaults on  persons and p ro perty -on  the 
very capacities required by the work of reconciliation. By analyzing the negative effects of 
violence on people's capacities to think, listen, feel, imagine, create and trust, we can begin 
to appreciate the magnitude and the subtleties of educational challenges inherent in the work 
of reconciliation.
The Problem  Reconciliation Seeks to Address
On som e days it seems that our planet is circum scribed w ith a river o f tears. I step 
into the river in the foothills o f New  Hampshire, where the battered wom en's shelters and 
prisons are full, and where the rate of teenage suicide has been on the rise (Kachur, 1995).
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The river cascades through the neighborhoods o f  Boston, where an eight-year-old 's future 
has just exploded in the cross-fire o f a war between children not much older. It churns its 
way across the ocean, to the neighborhoods o f Belfast, subway stations in Paris, and the 
markets o f Sarajevo. The river surges south to the refugee cam ps near Rwanda and 
branches north through Chechnya and the Armenian enclaves in Ajerbaijan. You can taste 
its salt near a m osque in Hebron, and hear it roar in Sri Lanka and Tibet and Cam bodia and 
beyond. It is alm ost im possible to hold in one's heart an awareness o f the hum an faces that 
hide behind the headlines o f a single daily newspaper. To imagine those faces, to envision 
what has been lost in the conflicts that have ruptured those lives, can fill one's being with a 
yearning for reconciliation.
W ith the newspaper as a guide, it seem s that conflict, in itself, is bad-inex tricab ly  
linked with violence and coercion. Very seldom  do we read about disputes that have been 
resolved constructively. Even our families, our courts, and our legislative cham bers 
frequently devolve into com bative exchange. Yet democracies are dependent upon the 
refinement of conflicting ideas through dialogue; and learning itself requires us to engage 
with opposing points of view. A growing body of literature and dispute resolution practice 
recognizes conflict as inevitable, useful, and "potentially creative" (for exam ple, see W ehr, 
1979, p. 8; D iam ond, 1994, p. 2; Burton, 1995, p. 88).
Furthermore, the absence of overt conflict can indicate injustice in the extrem e: the 
disenfranchised group has been so thoroughly beaten down, so suppressed, that its 
m em bers have lost even the consciousness of their own oppression. In situations w here 
people can not nam e their ow n experience, where they have internalized aspects of a 
dom inant ideology into their own self-image, conflicts can not be identified, m uch less 
engaged. W hen we rem em ber, for exam ple, the struggles waged in this country to end 
child labor, and to win suffrage for wom en and for A frican-Am ericans, w e can see that 
while the confrontations to end these problem s may have been painful, even greater 
suffering w ould have resulted had the structural inequities remained unchallenged.
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So if some conflicts are constructive, and if the absence of conflict is sometimes 
merely an indication o f oppression, w hat is it, specifically, about the conflicts described in 
our newspapers that might call forth a yearning for reconciliation? Com peting nationalist 
claim s w ouldn't be so frightening if  they could be resolved without the injuring o f  bodies, 
the dislocation o f lives, and the breaking of spirits. W hat hurts most about Sarajevo isn't 
that there are seemingly incom patible opinions (i.e., conflicts) about who should control 
what land, and with what systems o f  sym bols its inhabitants should create meaning, but the 
violent coercion and the disregard for life through which the contenders have sought to 
determ ine the outcome. W hat hurts about Tibet isn't a conflict over borders or belief 
systems, it is the coercion, humiliation and exploitation of the Tibetan people caused by 
Chinese imperialism. W hat hurt about the stalemate between the United States and the 
form er Soviet Union wasn't the conflict between two systems o f political economy. Had 
that conflict been engaged m eaningfully, perhaps the w orld would now enjoy an innovative 
social order with a more beneficent mix of individual freedom and distributive justice than 
either U .S.-style capitalism  or Soviet-style com m unism  provided for its citizens. W hat 
was damaging about the Cold W ar was the long-standing threat of mutual annihilation 
accom panied by the reciprocal dem onization of two groups of people.
W hen I began this inquiry, I thought that conflict was the problem  that gave rise to 
the need for reconciliation. In my m ind, the idea of 'conflict' was conflated with violence 
(as in the w ar in the form er Yugoslavia), coercion, repression, and injustice (as in the 
colonial relations between China and Tibet), and estrangem ent (as in the divisions betw een 
U.S. and Soviet people during the C old W ar.)2 I've com e to believe that the problem  is 
not conflict, per se, but rather how conflicts are conducted, how adversaries frequently 
relate to each other when they perceive that potential solutions can accom m odate the needs, 
values and interests o f only one party.
In such circum stances, we often work tow ards our own goals in ways that ignore 
or dim inish our opponents' capacities for agency. W e come to see our adversaries as less
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than hum an, or even as demons, so that injunctions against killing and lying no longer 
apply. W e becom e alienated from each other, in the sense that we no longer relate to each 
other as though we were part of the same human community. This alienation both 
contributes to and results from the violence, coercion and estrangem ent that characterize 
many conflicts. I have come to understand this reciprocal dehum anization and 
dem onization, or what I refer to as moral alienation, in all its m anifestations, as the problem 
that gives rise to the need for reconciliation.
Defining Reconciliation 
'Reconciliation' is a term that has uses in every day language and in several 
academ ic disciplines. I begin this analysis by considering certain features o f the concept 
based on its everyday uses; Then, I refine this understanding, draw ing on conceptions o f 
reconciliation developed by ethologists, theologians, social philosophers, sociologists, 
anthropologists and practitioners of dispute resolution.
The Integration of Apparent O pposition-G ains and Losses, M eans and Ends
By considering how we use the word in everyday language, w e can see that 
'reconciliation' refers both to a process (or action) and a state that is the outcom e of the 
process. 3 For instance, when we talk about bringing our checkbooks into balance with a 
bank statem ent, the 'reconciliation' is both the process through which this alignm ent is 
created  and the record o f the account in which the two sets o f  figures have been aligned. 
Sim ilarly, in the domain of conflict resolution, a statement o f forgiveness or the release of 
prisoners, for instance, m ight be understood as a gesture of reconciliation, a step in a 
process o f peacem aking; the entire process is designed to achieve a state o f reconciliation 
betw een conflicting parties.
Reconciliation processes and outcomes seem to be em bedded within each other, an 
em beddedness reflected in A. J. M uste's adm onition "there is no way to peace; peace is the 
way." W ritings on the subject often suggest that steps taken toward a state of reconciliation 
m ust, them selves, reflect the qualities of relating (such as mutual respect and honesty) we
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26
associate with the outcome; and furthermore, because conflicts are an inevitable dimension 
o f interpersonal and inter group relations, a state o f reconciliation necessarily will involve 
ongoing conflict resolution processes.
In the English language, 'reconciliation' is used to refer to two different kinds o f 
acceptance or "coming to terms." W hen the word is followed by the preposition to it 
generally indicates that its object is seen in a negative light. For instance, a person might 
becom e "reconciled to" the untimely death of a loved one, or to a perceived unfavorable 
change in the supervisory structure at work. A quality o f subm ission or resignation is 
implicit w ithin the acceptance that is part o f becoming reconciled to the unfavorable event.
On the other hand, when 'reconciliation' is followed by the preposition with  it 
refers to happier or more just circum stances. For instance, following a period of 
estrangem ent, we m ight say that two family members achieve a state o f reconciliation with 
each other. Christian theology is based on the possibility o f hum ans, in spite o f being 
tainted with sin, achieving reconciliation with God by em bracing Christ. Reconciliation  
with implies an acceptance imbued with qualities o f affirmation and em brace (Hardim on, 
1994, p. 87).
In either understanding, 'reconciliation' evokes instances of acceptance that include 
both gains and losses. W hen I becom e reconciled to an unfortunate, painful or unjust 
circum stance I gain a m odicum  o f equanim ity, but only through the loss o f cherished 
hopes, the unfortunate com prom ise o f im portant values, or the lessening o f a standard. 1 
shrug my shoulders, turn m y palm s upward, and acknow ledge that, under the 
circum stances, this was the best I could accom plish, the m ost I could hope for. I'm  not 
happy about the state o f affairs, but I won't fret over it either. W hen I becom e reconciled 
with  an old friend, gaining a relationship of renewed vitality and possibility, chances are 
I've also incurred losses along the way: I've let go of unreasonable expectations, rigidly 
held interpretations o f past events, o r the illusion that the friendship could evolve in the 
absence o f pain. The difference is that w hat's been lost was not fully reasonable or
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justified  in the first place; I've come to see the rightness o f  letting it go. W hen I think of 
m om ents when I've becom e reconciled w ith old friends, I feel a  sim ultaneous smile and 
w elling up o f tears, happy for the return of w arm th, saddened by awareness of the pain 
we've caused each other, and humbled by the vulnerability that inevitably accompanies 
trust.
In summary, then, considering its significance in general use, we see that 
reconciliation is a concept that integrates or em braces apparent oppositions-o f both ends 
and means, and o f gains and losses. The philosopher M ichael Hardimon describes the 
acceptance that accompanies reconciliation as a wholeheartedness that acknowledges 
imperfections, "a positive attitude that contains w ithin it a  m om ent of negativity" (1994, 
p. 91). The concept itself seems to integrate opposites, acknow ledge com plexity and 
em brace paradox.
Reconciliation versus Tolerance: Engagem ent as a Prerequisite for Trust
Ethologists, scientists who study anim al behavior, have studied aggressive and 
conciliatory behaviors among primates, in part to understand the evolutionary and 
biological aspects o f these tendencies in hum ans. One Dutch scientist, Frans de Waal 
(1989), focuses on how the animals who are our "closest relatives" form "stable social 
relationships." Animals in cooperative groups m ust contend with both rivalry and 
dependency, and with the reality that "som etim es they cannot fight without losing a friend" 
(p .l) . They respond to this circum stance either by "reducing competition," a strategy de 
W aal calls "tolerance," or by "repairing the dam age afterwards," a strategy to which de 
W aal applies the term "reconciliation." Interestingly, de W aal's research suggested that 
those prim ates who fight and make up have stronger bonds than those who, through 
strategies o f  tolerance, avoid conflict.
De W aal finds considerable evidence o f primate instincts towards peacem aking.4 I 
refer to  de W aal's work, however, not to assess the strength o f  his conclusion that "making 
peace is as natural as making war," (p. 7) but rather to build upon his understanding of the
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word 'reconciliation.' The distinction he draws between tolerance and reconciliation is an 
im portant one for our purposes. Like 'reconciliation,' 'tolerance' is a condition 
characterized by acceptance. Also like reconciliation, tolerance can have positive and 
negative connotations. In a positive light, we use the word to refer to respecting the 
opinions and practices o f others, to accept those who are different in a spirit o f  good will. 
Tolerance also refers to "putting up with" negative circum stances (as in, "I learned to 
tolerate the pain"). Tolerance implies acceptance without struggle; we tolerate something 
w hether w e like it or not.5
'Tolerance' might describe that attitude of the hom eowners in an all-white 
neighborhood who cause no problem for the African-American or Viet N am ese newcomer 
who m oves in on their block. They m ight enact their tolerance through polite greeting, or 
sim ply even by avoiding contact. To become reconciled with one another, however, there 
w ould need to have been a conflict, acknowledged and jointly resolved by both sides. As 
this exam ple illustrates, reconciliation is a  form of desirable coexistence that em braces the 
inevitability, the usefulness, and the vitality o f conflict itself, a "conflict-em bracing higher 
unity" (H ardim on, 1994, p. 94).
In contrasting 'tolerance' with 'reconciliation,' we can see that because it em braces 
engagem ent, conflict and resolution, 'reconciliation' lays the groundw ork for the 
establishm ent of trust. According to the philosopher A nnette B aier (1994), trust "is 
accepted vulnerability to another's pow er to harm  one, a pow er inseparable from  the power 
to look after som e aspect o f one's good." (Baier, 19914, p. 133) In o ther words, 'trust' 
involves placing ourselves or som ething we value at risk o f being hurt or dam aged, 
believing both that the other party could inflict harm but will choose not to. It stands to 
reason that trust more likely develops in relationships that are able to w eather 
disagreem ents, w here disputants "fight and make up," than in relationships where 
aggression is avoided by maintaining distance. A defining feature o f  reconciliation is that
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parties previously in a state o f  m istrust have resolved (or are resolving) their differences in 
ways that enhance their trust o f each other.
If it is true that 'trust' is a central elem ent of the concept o f reconciliation, we must 
seek to understand, precisely, the processes that move people in conflict closer to  trusting 
each other. W hat are the kinds o f things that can be done or said by parties to conflicts to 
resolve them in such a way that the resulting relationships will be characterized by 
reciprocal, and w arranted,6 trust? In o ther words, how do we create the conditions in 
which people who have been untrusting adversaries become willing to take risks w ith each 
other, and becom e justified in believing that although a form er adversary could inflict harm, 
he or she will not choose to do so? In the next four sub-sections I describe how different 
conceptions of reconciliation provide for the re-establishment o f trust: (1) through the 
discursive practice o f  apology and forgiveness, (2) through rituals of o ther kinds,
(3) through the acknow ledgm ent o f  injustice and (4) through the understanding of 
suffering.
Re-establishing T m st through A pology and Forgiveness
Part of the answ er to the question o f  how to re-establish trust may be found by 
considering the role of apology and forgiveness in achieving reconciliation. Several 
scholars from different fields m ake apology (or penitence) and forgiveness central to, in 
fact nearly equivalent with, reconciliation. I'll consider here the work o f two: the Christian 
theologian V incent B rum m er (1992), and the sociologist N icholas T avuchis (1991).
Both Brum m er and Tavuchis assum e that 'reconciliation' refers to the reintegration 
o f  a moral com m unity that results when the party that has violated a moral im perative or 
caused harm  (1) acknow ledges the w rongdoing and the suffering it caused,
(2) apologizes or repents, including an expression o f sorrow, and (3) is forgiven. ('M oral 
com m unity' refers to a com m unity in which moral values are shared, and w here 
participants acknowledging each other as deserving of moral consideration, m anifested 
through respect, care and just treatment.)
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B rum m er understands reconciliation as applying primarily to relationships of 
"fellowship," a state o f  reciprocal love, in which two beings "identify w ith each other by 
treating the other's interest as his [or her] own" (p.440). From  his perspective as a 
Christian theologian, he takes as a paradigm o f reconciliation the restoration o f relationship 
betw een a person and God that occurs when a sinner repents and is forgiven. Brummer 
also uses the term 'reconciliation,' however, to apply to relationships am ong people, to 
refer to a return to  the norms o f fellowship after relating in manipulative or contractual 
m odes.
Tavuchis' work, M ea Culpa: A Sociology o f  A pology and  Reconciliation  (1991), 
on the other hand, is a study o f apology in all kinds o f relationships, w hether or not they 
can be construed as m eeting the moral standards associated w ith 'fellow ship.' For 
exam ple, Tavuchis analyzes instances when presidents refuse to  apologize for misdeeds, 
custom ers ask merchants to apologize for defective goods, crim inals apologize to victims, 
and m inority groups seek from  private and public institutions apologies for injustice and 
humiliation. Considering conflicts among individual m embers o f the sam e moral 
com m unity (a friendship, family, a school, for instance), in offering an apology (as 
opposed to an excuse, defense, or justification) the w rong-doer acknowledges the violation 
of the norm , the suffering caused and the sorrow felt. Because an effective apology entails 
an accurate assessm ent o f  one's actions, an understanding of the relevant moral norms, and 
a heartfelt expression of sorrow, in a  very succinct way it com m unicates to the offended 
party important information about the wrong-doer's capacities for responsible participation 
in the moral community.
In choosing to forgive the offender, the offended party in essence agrees with the 
offender's assessm ent of the nature of the breach and the dam age that was done. This can 
be seen m ost clearly by contrasting forgiveness w ith condonation. W hen w e condone 
som eone's action, we deny that any harm  w as done or that any norms w ere breached.
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Forgiveness acknowledges the breach, and in effect invites the offender to return to 
com m unity.
Although Tavuchis' and Brum m er's works differ substantially, they concur in 
asserting a moral fram ew ork for the concept o f  reconciliation. They understand the breach 
that gives rise to a need for reconciliation as a violation of ethical standards or norms. 
Furthermore, both apology and forgiveness can be offered only by moral agents acting 
freely and responsibly. A meaningful apology cannot be coerced, and we can request 
forgiveness but we cannot force a victim to forgive. As parents and teachers, we can cajole 
or dem and a child to say "I'm sorry," but a more educative sort o f engagem ent is required 
to help children understand their violation and feel sorrow at the harm they have caused. 
Interestingly, the appropriate words delivered w ithout feeling will do little to heal the 
breach. In order to w arrant the trust of som eone we've hurt, we m ust understand, in a 
feelingful way, the harm  that we have caused. It is through feeling the other's suffering 
(and, therefore, suffering to some degree ourselves) that we becom e determ ined not to 
repeat our hurtful actions. It is our heartfelt understanding that allows for the sincere and 
convincing expression o f sorrow and remorse and o f our com m itm ent not to repeat such 
hurtful behaviors.
Paradoxically, it is the freely chosen expression of the fact (and our understanding 
o f the im plications) of our own w rong-doing that is a step tow ards rejoining the moral 
com m unity from w hich those same transgressions have alienated us. By apologizing, we 
are acting in accordance with what is expected of a member. In offering forgiveness (as 
opposed to condoning the behavior), the offended party agrees w ith the violator about the 
hurt that was caused and the norms that were transgressed, discursively recreating a sense 
o f alignment.
In focusing on the m oral and em otional dim ensions o f the discursive sequence of 
apology and forgiveness, Brum m er and Tavuchis add several im portant ideas to our 
growing understanding of reconciliation. Up until now we've com e to see that
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reconciliation is a  concept that incorporates within it the integration of factors that are often 
understood as separate or opposite: means and ends, gains and losses. It is a kind of 
peacemaking that can occur only after a conflict has been expressed or enacted; in which, 
rather than keep a safe distance, parties "fight and make-up." In contrast with 'tolerance,' 
we see that the engaged quality of reconciliation lays the groundwork for the establishm ent 
(or re-establishment) of trust. Tavuchis and Brum m er help us understand that what 
reconciliation seeks to accomplish is the establishm ent or re-establishment o f a moral order. 
It accomplishes its work through processes that both acknowledge the suffering that was 
inflicted, and affirm or reaffirm  the norms o f  that community-in-the-making. Tavuchis and 
Brum m er also make it clear that the work o f reconciliation can be undertaken only by 
individuals or entities that have the capacity for moral agency-i.e ., the ability to act and 
speak freely and responsibly. And, as we dem onstrated, apologizing also requires the 
capacity to experience and express feelings.
Reestablishing Trust through Rituals O ther than Apology and Forgiveness
Brum m er and Tavuchis analyze in detail one strategy through which trust might be 
reestablished after a breach: through the mutual affirmation o f moral principles im plicit in 
apology and forgiveness. Both Brum m er and Tavuchis write as if  this particular discursive 
strategy were inevitably and inextricably linked with reconciliation. Does reconciliation, in 
other accounts, necessarily involve apology and forgiveness?
Several conceptions o f reconciliation suggest that it need not. Here I consider the 
work o f  two scholars: the anthropologist P. H. Gulliver, in particular his volum e entitled 
D isputes and Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (1979); and the Germ an educator 
B jorn K rondorfer (1995), w ho engages young non-Jew ish Germ ans and A m erican-born 
Jew s in understanding each other's relationship to the legacy o f the Holocaust. Both 
scholars make reference to role o f ritual in the work o f reconciliation, but in neither's work 
is apology and forgiveness a central factor. To the contrary, K rondorfer makes the case
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that apology and forgiveness are at least inappropriate, and perhaps impossible, in the kind 
o f reconciliations he facilitates.
G ulliver's study entails a conceptual analysis of 'negotiation' as well as a cross- 
cultural inquiry into negotiation strategies.-? Gulliver uses the words 'conciliation' and 
'reconciliation' to refer to those aspects and stages o f dispute resolution processes, 
including both negotiations and arbitrations, that establish or reaffirm  the norms upon 
which the disputants will base their future relationship. In his conception, this aspect of 
dispute resolution is distinct from ascertaining blam e, responsibility and com pensation for 
past actions.
Among the Arusha o f Tanzania, for example, ritual reconciliation occurs when 
form er disputants drink beer from the same gourd and feed each other m eat from a goat 
sacrificed for the occasion. These actions are witnessed by relatives and neighbors and are 
understood to invoke supernatural powers. These ritual reconciliations often occur at the 
conclusion of negotiated settlements. Although such rituals m ight include symbolic 
reference to  blam e and forgiveness (through the determ ination, for instance, of who would 
supply the goat and the beer), they certainly don't follow the discursive pattern o f an 
apology. But they do seem  to serve a similar purpose: they reaffirm  a set o f shared beliefs 
and values on the part of two members of a moral com m unity who have becom e alienated 
from  each other due to a violation o f norms (Gulliver, 1979, pp. 234-251).
W hat about reconciliation among disputants who do not, to their knowledge 
anyw ay, share a set o f beliefs and values that they can reaffirm ? Is reconciliation a 
possibility for people who have not previously perceived themselves to be a part of the 
sam e m oral com m unity? The theologian and educator Bjorn Krondorfer develops such a 
conception of reconciliation in his educational w ork w ith young non-Jewish G erm ans and 
A m erican Jews. In their initial encounters, his students find them selves suspicious o f each 
other, m istrustful, and constrained by a discourse that reduces them  to one-dimensional 
categories o f "victimizer" and "victimized." Their initial attempts at com m unication often
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fail, as the imperative towards remembrance felt by the Jewish participants clashes with the 
denial, silence, and desire for forgiveness that inscribe the young G erm ans' presentations 
o f  self. The very w ords used by each group seem  to place them  outside o f  the other's 
moral community.
K rondorfer facilitates m onth-long encounters between non-Jew ish Germ an and
Jewish American young people in which they simultaneously transform  their relationships
with each other and their understandings of their own identities; a central aspect o f his
pedagogy is to engage them  in the collaborative creation of rituals, interactions Krondorfer
defines as "deliberate, em bodied, performed, condensed, patterned and som ew hat
sym bolic or stylized" (1995, p. 15). After distinguishing his students' rituals from the
highly regulated religious and political ceremonies that represent and perpetuate pre-critical
understandings o f history, K rondorfer explains that:
reconciliation is a ritual practice or experience that strives toward 
transform ation. It liberates Jew ish and German young people from  the 
stalemate o f  current discursive practices and encourages them  to seek new 
ways o f relating to each other without neglecting the history and mem ory o f 
the Shoah. It requires a w illingness to take risks. R econciliation is not a 
m onum ent but a process, not a museum, but a "growing inventory o f an 
active m emory", (M aier, 1988:121) not a theory but an experim ental 
practice....G enuine reconciliation.... is a creative transform ation that does not 
sim plify the issues at stake (p. 16).
K rondorfer takes as a sign o f  successful reconciliatory w ork the capacity o f 
G erm an and Jew ish young people to comfort each other during a three-day visit to 
Auschwitz. T heir ability to give each other comfort depends upon both their security in 
their understanding o f their own feelings and history, and their aw areness o f  the other's 
pain. T he com m unity is able to hold the perspectives o f both groups.
In K rondorfer's sense, reconciliation describes the processes through which 
m em bers of two groups who previously had been alienated from  each other by a painful 
historical legacy, by lack o f  contact, and by rigidly held discursive categories, com e to 
understand each other's feelings and history. Because o f that understanding, they becom e 
able to relate to each other honestly, compassionately, and with an increasing sense o f
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trust. This reconciliation is both created and acknowledged through ritual. Since these two 
groups are not m embers o f  the same national, religious or cultural com m unity, they cannot 
rely on existing rituals. Rather, they construct their own. M eaningful rituals, in which 
members of both groups can participate with integrity, emerge only after the students have 
confronted each other, struggled over differences, and created "communitas." The 
presence of both groups allows for a kind o f transform ation that neither group could 
accom plish alone.
It is important to note that the rituals created by the Germ an and Jewish young 
people do not include statements o f apology and forgiveness. Forgiveness in this context 
is seen as inappropriate—in part because the young people themselves were neither the 
perpetrators nor immediate victims o f the crime, but even more important, because the 
Holocaust was an evil that defies both the language and the com prehension that are required 
for apology and forgiveness to be m eaningful. Reconciliation, in this case, requires an 
understanding o f the impossibility o f  forgiveness.
The im possibility o f forgiveness, however, does not render reconciliation 
unreachable or inappropriate. Krondorfer describes how the com m unitas his students 
created allowed them  to struggle over their differences, but to remain present to each other, 
in spite o f intense feelings of sham e and despair, rage and horror. Their participation in a 
moral com m unity offered students sufficient safety to take the risks associated with this 
kind of transform ative learning. Their rituals created and em bodied a moral community 
where none had previously existed. (K rondorfer, 1995, pp. 209-220) It becom es clear that 
trust based on shared norms and heartfelt understanding, not necessarily apology and 
forgiveness, is the central element o f  reconciliation.
The Problem s o f Inequity and Injustice
To establish trust based on shared norm s and heartfelt understanding is difficult to 
accom plish following any conflict, particularly w hen the dispute has been prolonged, 
violent, and/or when the disputants have had little contact with each other. The difficulties
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are even more pronounced in conflicts between groups of unequal power, in w hich one 
group has been in a  position to im pose its will on the other. In analyzing a conflict to 
assess w hat approaches to resolution are feasible and appropriate, it is im portant to ask 
w hether the conflict exists between the interests and/or constructs of two or more groups 
each equally capable o f  asserting its will, or whether it is a confrontation between parties of 
unequal strength.
Strong arguments have been m ade against the appropriateness of reconciliation in
conflicts characterized by gross inequities. The fear is that any peace achieved in such a
context will be the
peace o f  the master slave relationship. In situations where there is an 
asym m etry of pow er between the parties and gross inequity in terms o f 
hum anistic values, conciliation or integration does not solve the conflict, but 
only reinforces the unjust situation. Such basic conflict can only be solved by 
structural change. For this, polarization is necessary, confrontation inevitable 
(Schm id, sum m arized in Y arrow , 1978, p. 286).
M indful o f criticism s of this sort, people involved in extensive Quaker conciliation 
projects decided, in the 1960's, to limit their efforts to conflicts in which the opposing 
forces w ere relatively symmetrical in terms of power. A key leader in Quaker peace 
efforts, A. J. M uste, asserted that justice m ust be achieved before peace: "In a world built 
on violence, one m ust be a revolutionary before one can be a pacifist" (in Yarrow, 1978, 
p. 289).
T he problem  o f inequity and injustice can be described in terms o f two different 
kinds of violence: behavioral and structural. Behavioral violence refers to actions that 
cause "apparent injury to persons and things" (W ehr, 1979, p. 14). Included in this 
category are war, o f course, and also child abuse, riots, m urder, suicide, and vandalism . 
Structural violence refers to unjust, repressive and oppressive social and political structures 
that dim inish life chances for groups of people. Starvation and high infant mortality are 
am ong the consequences o f  structural violence.
Peace researchers debate among themselves about the relationship between these 
two form s of violence, and between strategies for ending both. "Behavioralists" claim  that
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the acute problems of war and civil violence must be resolved o r else we will not survive to
deal with the chronic inequities that characterize structural violence. The Quaker re-
evaluation o f its own work, referred to above, reflected a "structuralist" stance: with the
understanding that the roots of behavioral violence are in existing structures, the latter must
be changed before attempting to reduce the former.
Are there kinds of conflicts in which reconciliation is inappropriate? The answer,
o f course, depends upon one's conception o f  reconciliation. The Quaker's understood
their 'conciliation' work as efforts to "harm onize opposing perspectives" (Yarrow, 1978,
p. 290). That seems quite different from  the conception we are developing here, of
reconciliation as a "conflict-embracing unity" in which adversaries becom e increasingly
trusting and trustworthy. Several leaders of oppressed peoples seeking justice  through
nonviolent m eans use the word 'reconciliation' to describe the approach of their m ovem ents
or aspects o f  their work. By studying their understanding of reconciliation, we may be
able to ensure the conception w e are developing here will not contribute to the "peace o f the
m aster-slave relationship."
M artin Luther King, Jr. (1963), for instance, identified six steps for non-violent
social change: (1) inform ation-gathering; (2) education (inform ing others, including one's
opposition, about one's position); (3) personal com m itm ent (including preparing oneself to
accept suffering if necessary); (4) negotiations (including using grace, hum or and
intelligence to confront the other, w hile looking for ways to call forth the positive in one's
adversary, and looking for ways in which the opponent can win); (5) direction action
(actions taken to morally force the opponent to w ork with you in resolving injustices); and
(6) reconciliation, defined in this way:
Non-violent social change seeks friendship and understanding with the 
opponent. It is directed against evil systems, forces, policies, and acts, not 
persons. Reconciliation includes the opponent saving face. Through 
reasoned com prom ise, both sides resolve injustice w ith a plan o f action. Each 
act o f reconciliation is a  step closer to  the beloved community. Both the 
individual and the com m unity are em pow ered, leading to new struggles for 
justice and a new beginning. (M artin Luther King, 1963; sum m arized by 
Fellow ship for R econciliation, 1991, p. 17).
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King's notion of reconciliation clearly avoids the relativism  that seems likely if the 
notion o f "harm onizing opposing perspectives" were to be applied indiscrim inately in 
contexts o f oppression. It makes a distinction between the oppressive actions and policies 
of the opponent, on the one hand, and the person who is the opponent, on the other.
King's reconciliation reaches for the positive, the just, within each person; it 
sim ultaneously keeps in view both moral clarity and compassion.
This sam e clarity and com passion can be found in the w riting o f M aha G hosananda
(1992), the Cam bodian Buddhist peace-maker:
I do not question that loving one's oppressors—Cam bodians loving 
the Khm er R ouge-m ay  be the most difficult attitude to achieve. But it is a 
law of the universe that retaliation, hatred, and revenge only continue the 
cycle and never stop it. Reconciliation does not mean that we surrender rights 
and conditions, but rather than we use love in all o f our negotiations. It 
means that we see ourselves in the opponen t-fo r what is the opponent but a 
being in ignorance, and we ourselves are also ignorant of m any things.
Therefore, only loving kindness and right m indfulness can free us (p. 69).
The only way to interrupt the cycle of revenge is to bring into one's negotiations,
even w ith one's own oppressor, the moral principles and the qualities o f heart and mind
envisioned for the new social order. For Ghosananda, reconciliation entails a m ixture o f
moral clarity and humility, a willingness to take a stand at the sam e time as acknowledging
the lim itations o f  one's own know ledge.
Recognizing limitations on any particular human understanding of truth is also at
the core o f satyagm ha, the philosophy underlying Gandhi's m ovem ent to end British
im perialism  in India. Conflict is conceived as a "truth-seeking process in w hich the
objective is not to w in, but to achieve a  fresh level o f social truth and a  healthier
relationship betw een antagonists...The escalating com m itm ent is...to the discovery o f the
truth o f  social justice, a com m itm ent that admitted the possibility o f the opponent's truth."
(W ehr, 1979, p. 64). Satyagraha creates a dialectical process that seeks synthesis, not
com prom ise.
The distinction between com prom ise and synthesis is crucial for our conceptual 
analysis o f reconciliation. Like satyagraha, reconciliation seeks a kind of agreem ent, but
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not an agreem ent based on concession. "There is no 'lowering' of dem ands, but an aim ing 
at a 'higher' level o f  adjustm ent w hich creates a new, mutually satisfactory, resolution" 
(Bondurant, 1965, p. 197). In situations characterized by inequity and a history o f  
injustice, reconciliation requires m ore than a solution that rests on "the m iddle ground." In 
order for the process to deserve the trust o f the parties with less power, disputants must 
w ork together not towards com prom ise, but towards a more just moral order.
W ith this conception, it seem s appropriate to engage in the work o f reconciliation 
even in relation to conflicts characterized by inequities and injustice. The steps disputants 
must take to achieve reconciliation in the context o f  inequities may be different than 
processes between disputants o f  equal power, regardless o f the degree o f  violence. For 
instance, disputants m ust com e to understand each other's perceptions o f the dynam ics of 
power, and must seek a com m on assessm ent o f the nature o f the inequities.
However, disputants who engage in reconciliation in contexts of inequity realize 
that there is suffering even for the party benefiting from  greater power and privilege. This 
realization makes it possible for those w ith greater power to consider the possibility of 
trusting both the process and their adversaries. The understanding o f suffering is central to 
the Buddhist conception o f reconciliation, which we consider in the next section.
The Buddhist Conception o f  Reconciliation as Awareness and Understanding of Suffering
The understanding and awareness of self and other that are required in satyagraha 
are also at the core of the Buddhist conception of reconciliation, encapsulated by Thich 
N hat Hanh's b rief definition: "R econciliation is to understand both sides, to go to one side 
and describe the suffering being endured by the other side, and then to go  to the o ther side 
and describe the suffering being endured by the first side" (1987, p. 70). For B uddhists, 
reconciliation is based on aw areness~of the complex social, political and psychological 
forces m anifested in different conflicts, and o f  the interconnectedness o f all beings and 
things. In his explication o f  understanding, Thich Nhat Hanh em phasizes the sam e kind o f
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engaged and bodily awareness that Krondorfer's students enacted in their rituals. 
"U nderstanding," writes Thich N hat Hanh, involves
the ability to recognize the physical, material and psychological suffering of 
others, to put ourselves 'inside the skin' o f the other. W e 'go inside' their 
body, feelings, and mental formations, and w itness for ourselves their 
suffering. Shallow observation as an outsider is not enough to see their 
suffering. W e must become one with the object o f  our observation. W hen 
we are in contact with another's suffering, a feeling of com passion is born in 
us (1992, p. 82).
It is relatively easy to acknowledge the suffering o f som eone who is ill or 
oppressed. But as Thich Nhat Hanh rem inds us, even those w ith m ore than enough 
material comforts suffer. And with disciplined m editation, we can com e to see and 
understand the suffering even o f those who caused us harm. W hen we understand the 
reasons for the hurtful action, perhaps inadequate parenting, "we will no longer blam e him 
for m aking us suffer, because we know that he is also a victim . To look deeply is to 
understand. O nce we understand, we will long for him  to suffer less" (Hanh, 1992, 
p. 83).
T hich  N hat H anh's com passion extends to those who have abused positions of
power, including the whites in South Africa, Am erican veterans of the Viet N am  war-, even
to the pirates who rape young girls fleeing from Viet Nam:
W hen you first learn o f something like that, you get angry at the pirate. You 
naturally take the side of the girl. As you look more deeply you will see it 
differently....In my meditation I saw that if I had been born in the village of 
the pirate and raised in the sam e conditions as he was, I am  now the pirate. I 
cannot condem n m yself so easily. ...M any babies are born along the G ulf o f 
Siam , hundreds every day, and if we educators, social w orkers, politicians, 
and others do not do som ething about the situation, in 25 years a  num ber of 
them  will become sea pirates. That is certain. If you o r I w ere born today in 
those fishing villages, we m ight become sea pirates in 25 years. If you take a 
gun and shoot the pirate, you shoot all o f  us, because all o f  us are to some 
extent responsible for this state of affairs (1992, p. 62).
Like satyagraha, the Buddhist notion of reconciliation, however, does not equate all 
suffering to the point that it obliterates distinctions between the poor and the privileged,
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oppressor and oppressed. In fact, cognizance o f  such differences are a prerequisite for true 
understanding. Thich Nhat Hanh makes it clear that the mental anguish experienced by 
many westerners because their lives feel m eaningless is real suffering; but we still enjoy the 
material benefits o f a world econom ic order that each day allows 40,000 children to die 
from  hunger. W e can remain in touch with the world if we allow ourselves to feel both our 
suffering and the suffering o f  the hungry child (Hanh, 1987 p. 4). A wareness allow s us to 
m ake choices to live, act and speak in ways that lessen the suffering, and to refrain from 
acting and speaking in ways that perpetuate the inequities that create the suffering. It is our 
resistance to the feelingful awareness of suffering that keeps us out o f touch, alienated.
In the previous four sections, we have considered aspects of conflict resolution that 
prom ote warranted trust between former adversaries: the practice of apology and 
forgiveness, rituals of other kinds, the recognition o f  inequities and the understanding o f 
suffering. Before attem pting to synthesize these into a definition of reconciliation for the 
purposes o f  this inquiry, we will consider two additional ideas that are central to some 
concepts o f reconciliation: the overcom ing of alienation, and conflict resolution as 
transform ation.
Overcom ing Alienation and Transformation
O n several occasions, our analysis has drawn on a study o f reconciliation by the 
philosopher M ichael O. Hardimon, Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project o f  
Reconciliation  (1994). According to H ardim on, Hegel's entire social philosophy can be 
understood as a project of reconciliation in which the concept o f alienation is central, (p.84) 
H egel argued in favor o f  the reconciliation of the individual with m odern, capitalist, 
industrial society. In his philosophy, reconciliation referred to the process of overcom ing 
the "felt experience of alienation" that occurs when people feel "split" from institutions, 
"regarding them as foreign, bifurcating, and hostile or indifferent to their needs. M any 
people also feel split within themselves, divided by the conflicting aims o f  realizing their 
individuality and being m em bers o f the com m unity" (H ardim on, 1994, p. 1),
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Like Hardimon and Hegel, I also understand reconciliation to be a concept that
finds its opposite in a conception o f alienation. But m y use o f the terms 'reconciliation'
and 'alienation' are distinct from Hegel's in two im portant ways. First, I am  concerned
about reconciliation not between the individual and society, but as a reciprocal process
betw een individuals and/or members of groups, each o f which is capable o f understanding
the other, and each o f which undergoes a transform ation. Second, the alienation to which I
refer is not the division within a person because o f the conflicting im peratives of
individuality and community membership, nor the experience o f being split from the social,
institutional world. M y interest is in the estrangem ent from other hum an beings and from
one's ow n moral principles that accom panies prolonged periods o f enm ity, partisanship,
oppression and/or violence. In this context, 'alienation' refers to the kind o f estrangem ent
we feel from another person when we perceive them  to be outside o f a com m unity of
shared moral values and norms. It describes the state o f m utual disregard that almost
always accompanies war, when enemies "dehumanize" each other to the point that moral
injunctions against taking life and inflicting harm  no longer seem  applicable. This kind of
separation from another as a thinking, feeling being w orthy of fairness and respect seems
both to allow and to result from on-going violence o f many kinds, including direct injury to
property and person, as well the structural violence o f  econom ic exploitation, colonialism ,
and sustained oppression.
An interesting and important feature of this kind o f  alienation from the other is that
it appears to be accom panied by corresponding splitting within oneself, a separation from
one's ow n moral sensibilities. The effects o f rigidly held, hostile attitudes towards others
is noted by bell hooks (1993), who fears for the corrosive effects o f  bitterness towards
whites on African-Americans themselves:
Healing inner wounds m akes reconciliation possible. Reconciliation... 
evoke[s] our capacity to restore to harm ony that w hich has been broken, 
severed, and disrupted....To be at peace, b lack w om en, especially those 
among us who have been deeply w ounded and hurt, m ust release the 
bitterness we hold within us. B itterness is like a poison. W hen it's inside us, 
it spreads even to the parts o f  the self that allow us to feel joy  and a spirit of
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celebration....O ur capacity to forgive always allows us to be in touch w ith our 
own agency (that is the pow er to act on our own behalf to change a situation). 
Enslaved black people clearly understood the need to remain in touch with all 
those aspects o f the self that enabled them to experience agency. W ithout 
agency, we collapse into passivity, inertia, depression and despair (pp. 163- 
167).
Reconciliation is a concept that recognizes two sites of alienation and seeks to 
overcom e them both. This feature o f  alienation-i.e ., that it is characterized by 
estrangem ent from  both an other and from one's own moral sensibilities—contributes to the 
imperative tow ards self-transform ation that is a part of reconciliation. For K rondorfer 
(1995), the G erm an theologian w ho works w ith Jew ish and Germ an young people, 
reconciliation is strongly associated with the notion of transformation. As w ith bell hook’s 
conception, the transform ation he seeks is based on an increased understanding o f the other 
that sim ultaneously deepens one's relationship to and awareness o f oneself. In 
Krondorfer's view, reconciliation implies overcoming mistrust and anim osity; it represents 
an end to a lien a tio n -fro m  the other and, therefore, from  aspects of one's self. 8
The fundam ental nature of the changes required by reconciliation also is highlighted 
by peace activist and m ediator Louise Diamond (1994), who refers to her w ork as 'conflict 
transform ation.' For D iam ond, the transform ation occurs not only in people's 
relationships with each other and their understandings o f them selves, but also in their 
understanding of the conflict itself. Once the conflict has been analyzed, disputants often 
discover that their actual needs are not mutually exclusive, as they first appeared to  be. 
D isputants must seek solutions that address the underlying needs of all parties. These may 
be quite different, of course, than the "positions" that are first brought to the table. 
D iam ond's description o f conflict transformation suggests a system ic change that engages 
people intellectually, em otionally, physically and spiritually:
D iscovering peace requires the transformation o f the conflict- 
habituated system. Transform ing conflict is different from  m anaging or 
resolving conflict. To transform  conflict is to work system ically to change 
the very assum ptions, beliefs and perceptions o f the parties in conflict, as well 
as to open the doors to creative solutions and new behaviors. To transform  
conflict is to deal w ith the root issues and needs being expressed in the 
conflict situation, not ju st to bridge different positions. To transform  conflict
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is to release the energy bound in the intellectual, emotional, physical, and 
spiritual patterns o f  thought and action that have built up over time, and to 
reshape that energy into new and more positive patterns of relationship. To 
transform  conflict is to discover peace (p. 2 ).9
A Conception o f  Reconciliation for this Study
To sum m arize then, w e understand reconciliation to refer to both the means and
ends o f creating a relationship based on shared moral principles following a period o f
alienation. Central to the concept are notions o f respect, trust, justice, awareness of
suffering, and transform ation. The following definition seeks to incorporate the key
elements o f the concept:
Reconciliation refers to the re-creation and/or creation of the moral fram ework 
of a relationship through w hich individuals and groups overcome alienation by 
engaging in transform ative processes that in them selves embody the norms o f 
respect and fairness intended for their new relationship.
As they engage in on-going processes o f reconciliation, i.e., as they 
understand each other's suffering, acknow ledge injustices, and strive to 
address both unresolved and emerging conflicts in ways that meet their 
underlying needs, the parties to conflict becom e increasingly trusting and 
trustw orthy.
The definition refers to two distinct situations: (1) the re-creation o f a moral 
fram ew ork among people or groups who have previously considered them selves to be part 
o f such a com m unity; and (2) to the creation o f a moral fram ework among people who do 
not perceive them selves to be part o f a moral com m unity. A lthough these two kinds of 
reconciliation have m uch in com m on, the quality o f the change inherent in each is 
som ew hat different.
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In the case of conflicts that have alienated from each other m embers o f  a previously 
existing m oral community, (i.e., the re-creation of a moral com m unity) reconciliation might 
represent a return—to a familiar order, to the expected, norm ative roles. The reintegration 
will enjoy a quality o f transcendence; we may be returning to previously held values, but 
we now understand that our relationship is strong enough to w ithstand conflict. W e 
understand each other better, and know more about each other's needs, fears, capacities 
and limits. The fact that we've w itnessed each other choose reconciliation over our own 
particular cause may also create conditions for greater trust. ^  W e will have learned about 
ourselves and each other, but reconciliations of this sort do not require us to re-exam ine 
fundam ental beliefs.
T he rem ainder of this inquiry will focus on reconciliations o f the latter sort: the 
creation o f moral fram eworks for relationships among groups o f  people—such as Israelis 
and Palestinians; or Jewish-Am ericans and Palestinian-Am ericans; or Bosnians, Croats and 
Serbs; or Catholics and Protestants in Ireland; or A frican-Am erican and white communities 
in B o sto n -w h o  differ substantially in culture, religion and/or language. In tenns of 
learning, such reconciliations represent challenges of a much higher order. They require 
disputants to im agine the possibility of an agreed upon moral fram ew ork for their 
relationship, where one has never before existed, or at least where they believe one has 
never before existed. They also require parties to conflict to call into question their own 
beliefs and understandings, to critically assess the constructs through which they perceive 
w hat is real, w hat is m eaningful, and what they believe to be true.
'R econciliation ' refers to processes that are on-going. It is not an end, to be achieved, but 
a w ay o f  relating, to be lived. As Adrienne Rich (1979) w rites about "truth," similarly 
reconciliation "is not one thing, or even a system. It is an increasing com plexity" (p. 187). 
Reconciliation integrates m eans and ends, justice and mercy, tradition and transform ation. It is an 
ideal that can seem  unreachable, but that paradoxically creates itself in moments o f  its becoming.
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CHAPTER 3
TH E ED U CA TIO N A L AND ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
O F TH E CO N CEPT OF RECONCILIATION
In this chapter, I propose a set o f criteria that conflict resolution processes must 
meet to be considered 'reconciliation.' Embedded within these criteria are references to 
enhancing understanding and the restoration of capacities, making the education of 
disputants central to this conception o f reconciliation. The criteria also refer to concepts 
w ith eth ical im port, such as 'trust,' 'fairness,' 'integrity,' 'agency,' and 'justice.' T hey 
establish reconciliation clearly as a concept with both educational and ethical significance.
In the second section o f this chapter, I assess the relationship between 
'reconciliation' and 'education' on a conceptual level. A com m itm ent to participants' and 
students' integrity creates an im portant theoretical link betw een the two concepts.
In the third section, I consider the implications o f  using the methods and concepts 
o f moral philosophy to guide this inquiry into reconciliation. Specifically, I consider 
w hether using a  discourse o f 'm orality' limits the usefulness o f  the proposed conception of 
reconciliation in the context o f cultures other than W estern.
The Criteria Implicit in Reconciliation
There are infinitely many possibilities for structuring the processes of 
reconciliation; every conflict situation will require and help shape its own response. The 
term  'reconciliation' does not refer to certain strategies for resolving conflicts, or certain 
outcom es. Rather, it invokes a set o f criteria that constrain both processes and outcom es; 
in other words, in order to qualify as 'reconciliation,' efforts to resolve conflicts m ust fall 
w ithin certain parameters. This section proposes five criteria that conflict resolution 
processes m ust m eet in order to qualify as reconciliation.
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Understanding that reconciliation refers to the transformation o f conflicts between 
individuals, members o f  groups, or collectivities that have been alienated from each other, 
in the sense that they perceive each other as outside of the group to which normal moral 
considerations apply, to be considered 'reconciliation,' conflict resolution processes must:
• em body norms o f mutual respect and fairness intended to characterize the 
adversaries' future relationship;
• enhance disputants' capacity to trust and be trustworthy, how ever gradual that 
process might be;
• expand disputants' understanding o f  their ow n and each other's suffering, as 
experienced and interpreted by those who suffer;
• engage adversaries in acknowledging and when possible and appropriate, 
redressing, past injustices; and
• recognize participants' integrity as moral agents and when necessary, restoring 
the moral capacities required for the work o f  reconciliation.
In the rest of this section, I will consider how the learning im plicit in these five criteria 
contributes to the creation o f a moral framework for a new relationship among former 
enem ies.
Em bodying N orm s of Mutual Respect and Fairness Intended to Characterize the 
A dversaries' Future Relationship
The significance of this criterion can be grasped by com paring reconciliation to 
m ethods for settling conflicts that fall on the opposite end o f  the spectrum, such as the 
w inning o f a war or the coercive imposition o f a settlem ent either by a contender or by an 
outsider. These activities can be seen as transform ative--if not o f  people's consciousness, 
then certainly of realities on the ground. B ut they are far from reflecting the kind o f 
fairness and reciprocity of respect that would characterize a relationship following a 
reconciliation.
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Violence and oppression often leave the participants unequally prepared for the 
work o f reconciliation. The two com m unities may, for instance, have had unequal access 
to educational opportunities, and, therefore, their skills in debate, their know ledge o f 
history, their access to technology, etc., may be extrem ely disparate. Participants may 
enjoy different degrees o f  freedom  and have unequal access to  resources needed to travel, 
com m unicate w ith constituencies, build alliances, etc. The processes o f  reconciliation must 
account for these differences, in part by incorporating ideas from participants themselves 
about measures that w ould "level the playing field." *  ^ W ithin the boundaries o f conflict 
resolution w orkshops, rituals, or other activities, it may be possible to realize an 
approxim ation o f  fairness that w ould not yet be possible in the societies at large.
A lthough participants themselves will decide how to define and enact respect and 
fairness, two particular ideas about respect from the W estern philosophical tradition may be 
useful for our purposes. 'Respect' entails relating to others not only as means to  our own 
ends, but as people w ho have purposes, intentions and projects o f  their own. T o  respect 
som eone is also to recognize that they have potentials that may not yet be developed; we 
respect others when we treat them  as capable o f learning and growing.
Em bodying norms o f mutual respect and fairness can represent a particular 
challenge in efforts at reconciliation across cultural differences. Participants' m ight hold 
quite disparate understandings of fairness and respect and how com m itm ents to them can 
be enacted. The moral philosopher Dwight Boyd (1989) has addressed a related issue by 
calling for m eta-level conversations among members of various cultural com m unities in 
pluralistic societies to resolve the intellectual and ethical paradoxes inherent in constructing 
an overarching m oral order while still respecting the integrity of each sub-group. He 
argues that preparing present and future citizens for participation in such conversations is a 
responsibility o f  educators. Sim ilarly, mediators m ust often engage the various parties in 
learning about each others' values and sensitivities, in order to  be able to create processes
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that they mutually agree to be fair. This often can be the stage o f the reconciliation process 
most difficult to accomplish.
In establishing norms o f fairness and respect to govern the processes o f conflict 
resolution, and in deciding on the substance of those norms, previously alienated 
adversaries begin the process o f  creating a new moral framework for their relationship. A 
process agreed to be fair and respectful can also contribute to the establishm ent o f trust, the 
topic to which we turn next.
Enhancing D isputants' Capacity to T rust and Be Trustworthy
As we noted previously, according to Annette Baier (1994), to trust som eone is to 
place ourselves or som ething w e care about in a position to be injured, know ing that the 
other party could inflict harm, but believing they will choose not to do s o .  12 it  is difficult 
to engender trust in a situation w here people are filled with mistrust and, in fact, have 
behaved in w ays that warrant distrust. In situations in which people have becom e alienated 
from each other, it is often the case that they mistrust each other not only because of hurtful 
behaviors, but because they have com e to perceive each other as the kind of person (or the 
kind of people) who cannot be trusted. Challenging these perceptions is difficult because 
in violent or repressive conflicts, each group is likely to fulfill the other's m ost negative 
stereotypes. They fulfill these stereotypes in part because of hostile actions, and in part 
because even non-hostile actions and words are perceived through the filter o f  the other as 
"evil," "demon," "enemy," etc. M ediators can minimize the distorting effects o f 
stereotypes to interrupt cycles o f m istrust by clarifying adversaries' m eanings and 
interpreting, to each other, their intentions.
The conceptions o f reconciliation held by Gandhi (1961), M artin Luther King 
(1963), G hosananda (1992) and Thich N hat Hanh (1987) pay particular attention to 
interrupting cycles o f mistrust. By separating out the evil policies from  the persons, and by 
insisting on relating (even) to the oppressor with love and respect, they create a possibility 
for the establishm ent o f trust, even across differences in power. In the single act of
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insisting on the potential trustworthiness o f  their oppressor, these leaders' of 
disenfranchised peoples simultaneously present both themselves and their adversaries as 
the "kind o f persons" who could be trusted.
However, trusting itself is not a sign o f reconciliation; it is possible to trust naively 
and open oneself to further injury or abuse. The trusting m ust be warranted, or, in other 
words, the person being trusted m ust becom e increasingly trustworthy. How do people 
previously in conflict increase their capacity to be trustworthy? It seems that the first step is 
to risk seeking a resolution to the conflict in ways that are respectful and fair, or, at least, 
that do not violate the integrity of the other party. It is difficult to enact such a commitment 
when one is unsure whether the other party will reciprocate. For this reason, conflict 
resolution processes often include "confidence-building measures." Each party takes 
risks, perhaps sm all at first, but grow ing in intensity as agreem ents are kept and trust is 
built. Hostility and violence can spiral in rapid intensity, but trust usually m ust be rebuilt in 
slow, increm ental steps.
However, even after our intentions not to harm  the other are firm, further steps are 
required to warrant a former adversaries' trust. To avoid offending or violating the other 
unintentionally, we m ust learn about the other's system s of m eaning (i.e., the myths, the 
narratives and symbol systems that inform  and reveal the perspective of the other.). ^  To 
becom e worthy of the trust o f  som eone who has been an enem y requires com ing to know 
them  and to understand the world through their eyes. In contexts of violent conflict, in 
w hich people suffer injuries and losses o f all kinds, becom ing trustworthy means being 
w illing to understand our adversary, including her suffering. And developing the capacity 
to  be present to  another's suffering often m eans learning first how to be present to our 
ow n.
Expanding Disputants' U nderstanding o f T heir Ow n and Each O ther's Suffering
Suffering is a com plicated phenom enon, w ith physical, em otional, cognitive and 
cultural dim ensions. To understand our own suffering—including ways in which we
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ourselves m ight exacerbate it—is no simple task. Often parties to violence and oppression
have rigid perceptions of their own suffering: they becom e stuck in either denial and
repression, on the one hand, or in attachm ent to the status o f victim , on the other. The
processes o f reconciliation must help people gain the kind o f understanding o f their own
suffering that allows for the possibility o f change.
U nderstanding the suffering of one's own g ro u p -an d  m ourning its lo sses-can  be
critical in creating the possibility of change in a conflict-habituated system. The
psychological work o f  grieving is often required before victims can look to the future rather
than try to recoup past losses (M ontville, 1989, p.305).
To attend only to the losses of one's own group, how ever im portant, is insufficient
for reconciliation. In her book A Strategy fo r  Peace, the philosopher Sissela Bok (1989)
describes the dangers o f partisanship, when people in conflict to attend exclusively to the
suffering on their own side. She quotes Stephen Spender describing his grow ing
awareness o f the implications o f his own partisanship, during the Spanish Civil W ar:
W hen I saw photographs o f  children, m urdered by fascists, I felt furious pity. 
W hen the supporters o f  Franco talked of Red atrocities, I merely felt indignant 
that people should tell such lies. In the first case I saw corpses, in the second 
only words. [Gradually it became] clear to me that unless I cared about every 
murdered child impartially, I did not care about children being m urdered at all 
(Spender, 1949, pp. 253-254, cited in Bok, 1989, p. 9).
The Pakistani anthropologist and scholar of Islam A kbar A hm ed (1992) similarly
acknow ledges that the moral risks and
dilem m as... are as terrible for the persecutor as the persecuted, the aggressor 
as the victim ... W hen we see reports from  Israel on television showing a 
m other w ith tears stream ing down her face, crying in grief for her dead child, 
do w e really pause to enquire w hose side ii was on, Arab or Jew? A m other's 
grief is universal and we pray that the killing ceases; if we cannot, som ething 
is already dead in us" (pp. 73-74).
To acknowledge that my form er enemies' suffering m atters is to expand the circle 
o f those about w hose welfare I care. And understanding their suffering, in a feelingful or 
em pathic way, helps to create a moral fram ew ork for our relationship, because it reaffirms 
my capacity as a moral being (i.e., I am capable of feeling another's suffering) as well as
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my form er enem ies' status as a sentient being (i.e., therefore w orthy of moral 
consideration).
The idea that understanding suffering should play a major role in the resolution of 
conflicts is not w ithout its opponents, a topic to which we will return later in this chapter. 
For now it is sufficient to imagine the various kinds o f learning involved in the 
understanding o f  suffering, and to acknowledge that this criterion exists in tension with the 
next, which focuses our attention o f  the matter o f justice.
Engaging A dversaries in Acknowledging, and W hen Possible and Appropriate,
Redressing, Past Injustices
Like the understanding of suffering, mutual recognition of past injustices similarly 
contributes to creating a new moral framework for the relationship among form er 
adversaries. All agree that offending behaviors, however perceived at the time, are 
unacceptable now. A  com m on assessm ent o f past events can lay the groundw ork for 
agreements about the future.
Agreeing about the justice o f past actions, or about a sense o f justice to inform  
future institutional arrangem ents, however, can be difficult and com plicated. Noam  
Chom sky explains, for instance, "that when conflicting parties speak o f  peace, the 
definition o f  w hat they m ean is usually similar. W hen they speak o f justice, however, 
matters are not so sim ple as justice is m uch harder to define. The just dem ands of 
conflicting nations often seem  incompatible" (cited in Kazak, 1994, p. 227).
'Justice' is a concept w ith m any dimensions. The word can refer to a sense o f 
fairness in m any different arenas, including in relation to econom ic equity (distributive 
justice), punishm ent (retributive justice), access to pow er (political and social justice), and 
legal processes (procedural justice). Adversaries may bring to  the processes o f conflict 
resolution opposing sensibilities about which arena o f injustice requires more attention; and 
they may represent cultures that differ in beliefs about justice, for instance about w hether 
reason or revelation is understood to be the source o f judicial authority (Khadduri, 1984).
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In practical terms, historians o f non-violent justice struggles note that in contexts o f 
extreme inequities
often the dom inant group is guilty of acts that, by any reasonable standard, 
are crim inal and deserving o f  punishment. Still, it is much easier to resolve 
conflicts if  a settlement is offered that all parties can live with. If  the goal is 
vengeance or punishm ent, rather than a relatively sim ple end to injustice, the 
dom inant group is more likely to harden its resistance. This tendency 
suggests that there may be a  trade-off between demands for punishm ent and 
the speed with which one m oves towards a more ju st society (Burgess and 
Burgess, 1994, p. 275).
H owever, the question o f w hat role 'justice' plays in the work o f reconciliation 
requires considerations beyond those o f expediency. To eschew  concern about justice  is to 
risk imposing the "peace o f the master-slave relationship." It could lead to a settlem ent that 
reifies inequitable structures or legitim ates past aggression; to do so would underm ine the 
possibility o f  trust.
But too stringent a notion o f  justice will make our conception of reconciliation 
irrelevant to m any conflicts-conflicts, for exam ple, in which, adversaries cannot agree on a 
conception o f  justice, or when the violence has been so extensive and prolonged that a truly 
'just' solution is no longer tenable. Justice understood as retribution, for instance, 
especially if untem pered by care or com passion (Baier, 1994, p. 18), can be totally 
antithetical to the integrative intentions o f reconciliation (Cordelia, 1991). A sense of justice 
that focuses attention solely on assigning blame can deny the com plexity of the forces that 
contributed to the injustice, and preclude much o f the learning necessary for reconciliation 
(Hanh, 1987; Houston, 1992).
A way out of this dilem m a can be found in conceptions of justice invoked by those 
com m itted to  reconciliation. As w e noted above, Martin Luther King Jr. advocated 
resolving "injustices with a plan o f action." Gandhi conceived of social justice as the 
unattainable "truth" towards w hich we continually reach. For both of these leaders, then, 
reconciliation recognized and resolved injustices not through punishm ent, but through 
action designed to change the conditions that gave rise to the injustice and to ameliorate, if
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not elim inate, its effects. Sim ilarly, South Africa's experim ent with the 'Truth and
Reconciliation' commission places a higher value on truth than on punishment.
Fem inist activists working sim ultaneously on prison reform and the reduction o f
sexual violence make use o f a notion o f 'restorative justice' that has African origins:
[W]e need a new system o f restorative justice based on social and economic 
justice and on concern and respect for all victim s and victimizers, a new 
system based on remedies and restoration rather than on prison punishm ent 
and victim neglect, a new system  rooted in the concept o f a caring 
com m unity....The victim izer m ust take responsibility for his sexual crimes.
But the community also m ust examine its responsibility for the behaviors— 
must uncover the societal roots o f sexual violence, understand them, and find 
ways to reduce the potential for such violence to occur (Knopp, 1991, p. L 84,
192) .
Acknowledging injustice is im portant in reconciliation because it can interrupt 
cycles of revenge. 'Restorative ju stice ' does not elim inate the possibility o f punishm ent, 
but it challenges all parties to agree on the norms o f justice that will guide their relationship 
in the future. 'Restorative justice ' is a  conception o f justice that is consistent with other 
criteria of reconciliation, namely respect for all parties, enhancing adversaries' capacities to 
trust and be trustw orthy, and an understanding of the suffering on all sides. It prom otes a 
broad sense o f responsibility for injustices, reflecting and engendering an interdependence 
am ong members o f  a com m unity. As parties to a conflict determine a response to past 
violations, restorative justices em phasizes inclusion rather than exclusion, reinterpretation 
rather than adjudication, com pensation rather than retribution, and learning on all sides 
(C ordelia, 1991, p. 3 0 ).14
Recognizing Participants' Integrity as M oral Agents and W hen Necessary, Restoring the 
M oral Capacities Required for the W ork o f Reconciliation
After twenty-tw o years in South African prisons, Nelson M andela was offered 
"freedom " if he w ould renounce the use o f violence. N ot wanting to shift world attention 
away from  the violence inherent in the apartheid system, he refused the offer, and rem ained 
im prisoned for five additional years. His reasons for refusing the offer were read by his 
daughter in a speech delivered to a cheering crowd:
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W hat freedom am I being offered while the organization o f the people remains 
banned? W hat freedom  am I being offered when I may be arrested on a pass 
offense? W hat freedom am  I being offered to live my life as a family with my 
dear wife who remains in banishm ent in Brandfort? W hat freedom am I being 
offered w hen I m ust ask for perm ission to live in an urban area? .... W hat 
freedom  am I being offered when m y very South African citizenship is not 
respected?
Only free men [sic] can negotiate. Prisoners cannot enter into 
contracts....I cannot and will not give any undertaking at a tim e when I and 
you, the people, are not free (M andela, 1995, p. 523).
Reconciliation requires that those who engage in its processes be moral agents. 
According to traditional W estern conceptions o f agency this means that they be 
autonom ous, rational individuals capable o f  making choices, and speaking and acting freely 
and responsibly. In addition to those associated w ith standard notions of agency, 
reconciliation requires other moral capacities, such as the ability to experience and express 
em otions, and to imagine circumstances more ju st and m ore peaceful than those present. 
W e saw earlier how even the simple acts o f apology and forgiveness, to be effective, 
require freedom  of choice: the appropriate words, spoken without heartfelt understanding, 
w ill not suffice. Barriers to the capacities required for reconciliation can be institutional, in 
the case of M andela, or subjective, as suggested by bell hooks in the passage about the 
insidious effects of unresolved bitterness cited above.
Violence is som etim es defined as the intentional underm ining o f another's capacity 
for agency. It is not surprising, therefore, that people w ho have been involved in long­
standing violent conflicts must recover capacities that have been eclipsed. As we shall see, 
the restoring of dam aged capacities contributes to  the educational challenges inherent in the 
w ork o f  reconciliation. (This idea is developed m ore fully in Chapter 7.)
This criterion calls for the recognition o f  participants' integrity as moral agents. At 
first glance, the notion o f  'in tegrity '-o ften  understood to imply an unw avering 
com m itm ent to a particular set of va lues-m ay  appear in conflict with the quality of 
transform ation inherent in reconciliation. This apparent dilem m a can be resolved w ith help 
from  the fem inist philosophers V ictoria Davion (1991) and M aria Lugones (1990). They 
argue it is possible to maintain a sense of integrity even while changing radically. To do
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so, we m ust m onitor our own processes of change, and ensure that various dim ensions of 
our selves (or our various selves) do not undermine each other.
The term 'reconciliation' refers to a process that takes place over time. Every step 
of that process may not meet all these criteria; for instance, a gathering o f  disputants may 
begin with trust-building activities that do not, in themselves, increase people's 
understanding o f past injustices. But over time, an entire process o f reconciliation must 
meet all five criteria. Its sub-processes must embody norms o f fairness and respect; 
enhance disputants capacity to trust and be trustworthy; increase adversaries understanding 
of their ow n and each others' suffering; acknowledge, and if appropriate com pensate for 
past injustices; and recognize the integrity o f the moral agency of all parties, and, when 
necessary, restore moral capacities that have been impaired by violence. Participants 
them selves, w ith help if they choose, must agree to the sequence and balance of activities. 
D raw ing from the resources o f their own cultures, they m ust decide through their actions 
how to give substance to each o f these criteria.
By insisting participants' integrity be respected, we disallow  from consideration as 
reconciliation techniques o f indoctrination or manipulation. W e also increase the likelihood 
that the processes of reconciliation themselves will w arrant participants' trust. The 
com m itm ent to the integrity o f participants creates a strong conceptual link with education, 
a subject we consider in the next section.
The Relationship between Reconciliation and Conceptions of Education
In the previous section, we saw that reconciliation is a concept that refers not to a 
particular set of processes, but rather to the criteria such processes m ust meet. In this 
regard, the concept o f reconciliation is like the concept of education, as it is understood by 
R. S. Peters (1966), a philosopher whose conception of education has been particularly 
influential in the English-speaking world. (Houston, 1977, p .l)  Education, Peters argues, 
does not refer to specific activities, such as lecturing, or even m ore general concepts, like 
training, or even teaching. Rather, 'education' refers to certain criteria to which such
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activities and processes m ust conform  (Peters, 1966, p. 22). In brief, according to Peters, 
'education' refers to the intentional transm ission o f what is worthw hile: being initiated into 
the practice o f  torture w ould not qualify as education no m atter how broad and deep one's 
understanding. 'Education requires' that learners gain a cognitive perspective on their 
know ledge and understanding; in other words, they must not only com e to  believe certain 
facts, but they m ust com e to understand the nature of the evidence that leads to their beliefs, 
and the procedures through which those beliefs can be criticized and revised. Also, to 
qualify as 'education,' students m ust participate wittingly and voluntarily in their learning; 
the processes through they become initiated must be morally unobjectionable.
In addition to being a similar- kind of concept, reconciliation has other affinities with 
the concept o f  education. In distinguishing 'education' from  'training,' for instance, Peters 
refers to the cognitive breadth and the ability to take a critical stance towards one's own 
beliefs. It is clear that the capacity and willingness to take such a critical stance and to 
understand deeply is a centerpiece o f  the work of reconciliation—not ju st about the beliefs 
one holds by virtue o f one's academ ic orientation (i.e., as a scientist, or philosopher, or 
literary critic) but also about the beliefs one holds by virtue of being a m em ber of a 
particular com m unity, or religious faith, or nationality. We m ust becom e com m itted to seek 
that w hich is truly worthwhile, not accept without question those values and character traits 
deem ed w orthw hile by those who socialized us. (H ouston, 1977, p.43 ) The processes of 
reconciliation m ust meet the criteria of education in these w ays, then: they m ust initiate 
disputants in the practice o f reflecting critically on their beliefs, and seeking depth and 
breadth o f  understanding (at least o f  the historical, cultural and political circum stances that 
are relevant to the conflict.)
There are other ways in which our conception o f reconciliation requires processes 
o f learning and teaching that m eet Peters' standards o f education. F or instance, our 
requirem ents that reconciliation processes recognize participants' integrity and enhance 
disputants' m oral capacities and embody the norm s of fairness and respect m ean that, of
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necessity, Peters' requirem ents for voluntariness and wittingness will also be met. Also, 
our requirement that the reconciliation enhances people's capacities to trust and be 
trustworthy echoes Peters' concern that learning not be 'inert': in order to becom e 
trustworthy, one m ust not hold one's learning detached from how one lives daily life.
Trust requires that our new found perceptions inform  our actions.
Feminist educational philosophers including Jane Roland M artin (1981) and Nel 
N oddings (1992) have critiqued Peters' conception o f the 'educated man' (or 'educated 
person') on the grounds that it em phasizes the cognitive to the exclusion o f em otional and 
intuitive faculties, and that it em phasizes caring about knowledge more than caring about 
persons. They argue that Peters' (and related) conceptions o f education disregard the 
capacities required for the reproductive activities that, broadly understood, have, in m ost 
cultures, been understood as 'w om en's work.' The criteria im plicit in our conception of 
reconciliation do not suffer from this shortcoming. Reconciliation requires a feelingful 
understanding o f  suffering; it requires that we use our knowledge and understanding in 
service of our caring—for others and ourselves. (The link among thinking, caring and 
peacem aking is the centerpiece o f  Sara Ruddick's work, M aternal Thinking, which argues 
that the sensibilities required for peace-m aking evolve from the thinking required by the 
w ork o f  mothering [Ruddick, 1989, p .242]). Reconciliation as an educative concept 
em braces both rationality and em otions, both critical thinking and empathic awareness.
Regarding its engagem ent o f the "whole person," reconciliation is consistent with 
yet a third conception o f education: that of the philosopher M artin Buber (in Cohen, 1983). 
Buber argues that adult education, in particular, should focus not so m uch on the 
acquisition of new inform ation or skills, but rather on the adaptation o f  knowledge in 
"intellectually independent and purposive" ways so that students are "able to form personal 
opinions that are soundly based on the reality o f  both their own lives and the life of the 
group" (Cohen, 1983, p. 230). H is entire philosophy is based on the possibility o f  an 
authentic encounter of one being w ith another, of a relationship o f  mutuality in which one
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enters into straightforward relationships, when an other becom es an actual presence.
B uber rejects as an educational goal the tolerance o f ideologies other than our own, arguing 
that it is not neutrality that is dem anded o f us, but rather "to enter into union, into a life of 
shared responsibility for one another and reciprocal influence" (Cohen, 1983, p. 241).
Such authentic encounters are central to both reconciliation and education.
Buber's emphasis on the educational implications o f authentic, trusting encounters 
helps us see that just as in most cases reconciliation has em bedded within it processes we 
w ould call educative, in many circum stances, the relationships upon which education 
depends must entail processes o f  reconciliation. Consider contexts in which teachers, on 
the one hand, and students and their families, on the other, identify with different 
com m unities, each in conflict with the other, or one in a position of dominance over the 
other. In such cases, it will take w ork for students, parents and teachers to com e to trust 
each other, to be genuinely open to the virtues o f each other's system s o f sym bols and 
values. Similarly, reconciliation may be a  prerequisite to achieving a true community o f 
inquiry am ong students who are alienated from each other because o f identities based on 
gender, sexual orientation, class or race. W hen efforts at school reform  require the 
integration o f alienated factions (of teachers, adm inistrators and parents, for instance, or 
supporters o f opposing educational philosophies and practices) their success will likely 
depend on some processes that resem ble reconciliation. Resolving differences will include 
the building o f trust, an understanding o f  inequities and suffering, and the engagem ent (or 
in som e cases repair) of each party's agency. These processes w ould likely meet the 
standards we have come to associate here with reconciliation.
Reconciliation engages participants cognitively, emotionally, creatively and 
spiritually in the understanding of both self and other. It requires trust and im agination, yet 
often takes place in circum stances that have underm ined people's capacities to trust and 
imagine. The educational tasks associated with reconciliation are daunting.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
Reconciliation is an educational concept, in that it refers to a set of criteria that 
p rotect and nourish learners' integrity throughout processes that are designed to be 
transform ative. In our conception, incorporating as it does notions o f fairness, respect, 
trust, integrity and agency, reconciliation is also an ethical concept. Explicating this 
assertion is the task o f the final section of this chapter.
A ssessing M oral Philosophy as the Fram ework for U nderstanding Reconciliation 
Although I have drawn on insights from anthropology, political psychology, 
theology and other disciplines, by defining reconciliation as "overcom ing moral alienation" 
and the "creation o f a moral fram ework for a relationship" and by using the tools of 
philosophical analysis, I have placed this inquiry squarely within the field o f moral 
philosophy.
Some conflict resolution practitioners warn against using the language o f 
’m orality.' It evokes fears about the im position of values and of m oral judgm ents that 
w ould be unhelpful and unnecessary to the processes o f reconciliation. "'M orality' is such 
a value-laden term," wrote one practitioner in response to  an earlier draft o f  these chapters. 
She noted, for instance, that when facilitating conflict resolution processes between 
opponents on the abortion issue, m any mediators have concluded that engaging people's 
beliefs about the morality of abortion is counterproductive. A nother concern is that for 
people in developing countries, a discourse infused with the language of m orality might be 
resisted as yet another W estern imposition. ^
Several helpful precautions are embedded within this critique. There are kinds of 
judgm ents, evoked for m any people by the notion o f  'm oralizing,1 that are 
counterproductive to the intentions o f reconciliation; as educators, m ediators and 
participants in the processes of reconciliation we m ust take care to avoid them. For 
instance, judgm ents we make about our adversaries prior to attem pting to understand 
salient aspects of their experience-including, for instance, the various pressures that 
influenced and constrained their choices, the emotional and interpretive fram ew orks in
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w hich they operated, their intentions—such judgm ents are likely to engender defensive 
reactions and cut short the com m unication required for reconciliation. However, 
reconciliation does not require us to altogether eschew m aking judgm ents about the actions 
o f  our adversaries or our own group; in fact, rituals of apology and forgiveness, often 
central to reconciliation, depend upon such judgm ents. It does require us to tem per our 
judgm ents with understanding, and to  balance our recognition o f injustices and inequities 
w ith an awareness o f the suffering on all sides.
Another important critique is that moral judgm ents (particularly o f a dominant 
group) can be used in efforts to control others (particularly members o f  the subordinate 
group). "Ethics itself," writes Sarah Hoagland, "has been a tool of control" (1989, p. 246) 
Colonial systems, for instance, w hich have been supported through notions o f  moral 
superiority and the imposition o f norms designed to protect the status quo and subvert 
rebellion. Paul Salem (1993), the political scientist working on issues of conflict at the 
A m erican University in Beirut, argues that the prevailing paradigm o f  conflict resolution, in 
em phasizing peace over justice, unconsciously reinforces both a  Christian worldview  and 
the W est's dom inant position in the global economy. "All successful 'em pires' develop an 
inherent interest in peace" (p.365), he writes, whereas from the outsider's perspective what 
m atters is the success o f  the struggle. In Arab contexts, the W estern em phasis on peace 
itself is perceived by some as a m oralizing imposition.
It appears that the fram ew ork of moral philosophy, and, in particular, using the 
term s 'moral' and 'm orality ' could be significant liabilities in accom plishing the w ork o f 
reconciliation. To decide w hether it makes sense to revise the language and/or the 
fram ew ork o f our analysis we consider three questions:
(1) Is reconciliation necessarily a m atter of morality?
(2) Even if  reconciliation is understood to entail moral questions, m ust the 
w ords 'm oral' and 'm orality ' be used in defining, analyzing and presenting concepts?
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(3) By grounding this analysis in the fram ework o f moral philosophy, are we 
not risking that a) it will be perceived as culturally biased, and b) its usefulness will, in 
fact, be constrained by culturally biased assumptions?
Reconciliation as a Concept with Ethical Significance
In the preceding chapters, w e have developed a definition o f reconciliation that 
refers to "overcoming moral alienation" and "establishing a moral fram ework for 
relationships." 'M oral alienation' refers to the conditions o f dehum anization, dem onization 
or estrangement, in which the constraints that generally govern interactions among p eo p le -  
i.e., injunctions against killing and lying, for instance—do not apply. W hile not all 
conceptions o f reconciliation refer to "overcoming moral alienation" and "creating a moral 
framework for relationships," all m ake som e reference to the establishm ent o f  conditions 
that do, in fact, have ethical significance. They refer, for instance, to the establishm ent of 
trust, willingness to take risks, the reclaim ing of individual and collective identity, the 
mutual acknowledgem ent of past injuries, the importance o f respect. As we noted in 
Chapter 3, it is its insistence on the establishm ent of trust that distinguishes 'reconciliation' 
from  'tolerance.' And what allows form er adversaries to begin to trust is that, in the 
process of resolving their conflicts, adversaries are, either overtly or in effect, jointly 
deciding the moral principles upon w hich their future relationships will be based, and 
revealing their w illingness to abide by those principles. Often in incremental steps, form er 
adversaries agree to take the risks associated with being in relationship.
W hatever the language used to describe the circumstances reconciliation seeks to 
redress and the condition it seeks to  create, 'reconciliation' inevitably refers to the moral 
fram ew ork o f the relationship, i.e., the values that inform  how people will relate w ith each 
other. This is true even in the case o f  efforts at reconciliation between adversaries who 
might (as in the case of abortion debates) choose to refrain from  discussing their moral 
judgm ents about the issue per se, bu t agree to respect each other as persons, for instance by
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listening, by seeking to understand each other's intentions, and by refraining from  referring 
to each other w ith demonizing epithets.
Because reconciliation inevitably entails trust, and because it establishes a 
relationships based on the values that allow for trust to be w arranted, then, regardless o f 
the language used to describe it, 'reconciliation' is in fact a concept w ith ethical 
significance, and refers to processes that have moral im plications. However, because the 
d iscourse of m orality evokes concerns about unnecessary judgm ents and the im position of 
values, it is im portant to clarify more precisely what is m eant by this assertion.
T he w ord 'm oral' has two broad uses. In the categoreal or classificatory sense, the 
w ord refers to issues or questions that are matters o f a particular kind of judgm ent, 
distinguishing such judgm ents from  those of science, law, etiquette, etc. Its opposite is 
m oral, or non-m oral. On the other hand, if we advocate for a particular position by 
claim ing that it is the m oral thing to do, we are using the notion o f 'morality' in the sense o f 
appraisal, to refer to a judgm ent about what is right or good. T he opposite o f  'm orality' in 
this sense is im m oral, or m orally w rong (Houston. 1977, pp. 16-17)
W hen referring to 'reconciliation' as a  moral notion, we are asserting that how 
people choose to resolve conflicts is, in the categoreal sense, a moral choice (i.e., a choice 
w ith ethical significance.) W e leave open the question of whether, in any given conflict, 
one ought to engage in reconciliation. (Our purpose is to describe reconciliation, and then 
explain how and why, given its educational challenges, once reconciliation has been chosen 
as an approach to resolving conflicts, aesthetic forms and processes can be useful.)
The conception of reconciliation we have constructed does propose ethically 
significant criteria (in the appraisal sense) that conflict resolution processes m ust meet in 
order to qualify as reconciliation. T he processes m ust (1) em body norm s of m utual respect 
and fairness; (2) enhance form er adversaries' capacities to trust and be trustworthy;
(3) expand disputants' understanding of their own and each other's suffering; (4) engage 
adversaries in  acknowledging past injustices; and (5) recognize participants' integrity as
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
64
moral agents and, when necessaiy, restore moral capacities. H ow ever, the substantive 
normative moral questions about whether to engage in reconciliation, and if so, how the 
concepts of trust, fairness, understanding and injustice are to be interpreted m ust be 
decided by the parties to the conflict, with help from mediators if  all agree. The central 
intention of reconciliation is precisely to allow, support and facilitate these negotiations 
about substantive moral issues.
Advantages and D isadvantages of Referring Directly to 'M orality'
A ccording to the moral philosopher Mary M idgley (1993), the term "moral 
judgm ent" is often used in a "lopsided, highly selective way" to refer to judgm ents about 
others, rather than oneself; to disapproval and blam ing assessm ents rather than favourable 
judgm ents; to uncharitable judgm ents rather than assessments that allow for mitigating 
circumstances; to past rather than future actions; and to judgm ents m ade by detached 
outsiders (perhaps even superiors o r subordinates) rather than by sym pathizers or insiders 
(p. 30). It is for these reasons, in part, that the notion o f 'm orality ' evokes fears of 
control, im position, arbitrariness and harshness.
As w e have dem onstrated, reconciliation calls for m any kinds o f judgm ents, 
including those that, according to M idgely, are less frequently invoked by the terms 'moral 
judgm ent.' These include judgm ents o f oneself, judgm ents that are charitable, judgm ents 
that are favourable, and judgm ents about actions yet to be taken. Reconciliation asks us to 
focus on understanding the complexity more than on assessing blam e—yet acknow ledging 
responsibility is often integral to the processes o f reconciliation, as we see in South 
A frica's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
As m uch as moral judgm ents o f  various kinds are inevitable and useful in the work 
o f reconciliation, it is not necessary in every circum stance to use the word "morality." It 
may be preferable to refer to dehum anization and dem onization of the enem y, rather than 
moral alienation; or to  trust and mutual respect rather than the creation o f a moral 
fram ework; to values, perhaps, rather than moral judgm ents. In relation to this and m any
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other issues, the vocabulary used to describe the theory of reconciliation, and to  engage 
form er adversaries in its processes, m ust be chosen with sensitivity to the understandings 
and resonances of the people and groups involved.
For the purposes of this theoretical inquiry, however, I believe there is value in 
forthright and overt reference to categories such as 'moral alienation' and 'moral 
com m unity.' The fram ew ork o f moral philosophy suggests several generative and 
important questions, in particular about individual and collective moral agency and 
capacities, about integrity, and about the relationships am ong reconciliation, education, and 
aesthetic and moral sensibilities. In particular, situating this analysis within the fram ework 
o f  moral philosophy leads to interesting questions about relationships between ways of 
know ing, or qualities o f  apprehension, on the one hand, and ethical intentions and 
capacities for agency on the other. These insights m ight not have em erged within a 
different overarching fram ework.
Although the language o f  'm orality' m ight be seen by som e as an im position of 
W estern moralizing, conflict resolution paradigms that minimize judgm ent also have been 
criticized as im posing western am orality, psychologizing and secularism (Salem, 1993, 
p. 366). It is in part because reconciliation requires that adversaries from distinct moral 
communities create an (implicit or explicit) overarching framework, at least to govern their 
relations with each other, that its educational challenges are so daunting. W e m ight argue, 
along with Akbar Ahm ed (1992), that it is not moral philosophy, but conversely its absence 
that creates the greater danger. "The problem  with [Western] civilization is the hole where 
the heart should be, the vacuum  inside; there is no moral philosophy or set o f principles 
that drives it. W hat gives it its dynam ic energy is individualism, the desire to dom inate, the 
sheer drive to acquire m aterial item s, to hoard..." (p. 109).
N o analysis, no discourse, is culturally neutral. O ur intention, how ever, is to 
create a conception of reconciliation that is useful both in a variety o f  cultural contexts and 
to facilitate reconciliations am ong peoples whose cultures differ from each other. W e next
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turn to a brief consideration o f  the usefulness and limitations o f our conception o f 
reconciliation as an endeavor with both ethical and educational significance.
Concerns about Cultural Bias
In a recent book, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transform ation Across Cultures 
(1995), Paul Lederach offers a critique of the prevalent paradigm  o f conflict resolution 
training, which, he asserts, addresses cultural differences merely through small 
adjustm ents to pre-packaged conflict resolution models. He proposes that trainers instead 
use an "elicitive model," based partly on Freirian techniques that "build from cultural 
resources w ithin a given setting" (p. 5). His concern is to find conflict resolution strategies 
and processes that are sustainable in diverse cultural and multicultural settings, and that 
em pow er people by fostering "awareness-of-self-in-context" and validating "discovery, 
nam ing and creation through reflection and action."
Lederach's w ork is part o f a recent trend within the field o f conflict resolution, in 
which practitioners and theorists are questioning both the adequacy o f their m ethods in 
addressing conflicts between adversaries o f  different cultures and the risks o f im posing of 
W estern approaches on com m unities in developing countries. The question for this inquiry 
is whether the conceptual account of reconciliation outlined in these chapters is culturally 
biased and, if adopted, w ould represent an im position o f W estern values.
There is no doubt that ideas central to W estern philosophical traditions inform  this 
conceptual analysis of reconciliation. It includes the notion o f individual moral agency, and 
values the capacity for individuals to reflect not only on the beliefs and values o f their 
cultures but also on their own psychological processes. This analysis also reflects a 
(W estem -style) optim ism  about the possibility for change and even transform ation, and a 
belief that human suffering, to a degree, can be ameliorated. It values em otional openness 
and vulnerability-values held more strongly in A m erican and W estern cultures than in 
m any traditional societies. These, and perhaps o ther values o f  which I am  less aware, may
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limit the contexts in which this conception is useful; attempts at applying it in diverse 
situations w ill likely lead to revisions.
However, while this analysis inevitably reflects aspects of the W estern 
philosophical tradition, as well as proclivities that grow out of my particular social and 
political identities, I do not believe that the fram ew ork of moral philosophy, in itself, 
dim inishes its application in various cultural contexts. W e do not propose that adversaries 
to conflicts themselves engage in moral argumentation, a style o f discourse that would be 
inaccessible to many. To the contrary, as will becom e clear, our conception of 
reconciliation emphasizes much more the quality of presence with which former enemies 
engage each other, rather than concerns about justification or the strength of logical 
argum ents. W e intend to show that an array of expressive modes, including a variety of 
non-linear, aesthetic forms (with diverse cultural roots) be used to engage former 
adversaries—em otionally as well as cognitively.
By proposing a set of criteria that conflict resolution processes m ust m eet in order 
to qualify as reconciliation, rather than proposing a sequence o f  steps or activities, in effect, 
we invite participants and mediators to interpret these criteria according to the particularities 
of their contexts, including the values and norms of the cultures represented. Participants 
them selves will m ake decisions about the modes o f expression, the sequence of activities, 
the extent to which differences are addressed explicitly or through symbolic forms. 
Participants and facilitators will choose how to go about establishing trust, mourning 
losses, and how to balance the focus on historic injustices w ith attention to the suffering o f 
all parties. The sense of 'justice' that will inform  their interaction is up to the participants to 
choose or to create. The success o f the effort will depend to a large extent on participants' 
abilities to interpret to the criteria o f  reconciliation in terms of the symbolic, conceptual and 
practical resources o f their own cultures.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have proposed five criteria reconciliation processes must m eet to 
qualify as reconciliation according to our conception. These criteria reveal reconciliation to 
be a concept w ith both ethical and educational significance. The extent to which these two 
dim ensions of reconciliation are intertwined will become increasingly apparent.
Creating an overarching moral framework to guide relationships among adversaries 
o f different societies, through means that respect the integrity o f all parties, is an endeavor 
inscribed with challenges both ethical and educational. In the next two chapters, I consider 
these challenges in terms of two sets o f ethical and epistem ological relationships:
(1) betw een individuals and the groups with which they identify and (2) between two or 
more adversaries, each com prised o f both individuals and collectivities. Once these 
relationships are clear, w e will be in a better position to understand the strong 
interrelationships am ong the ethical and educational aspects o f  reconciliation. This 
understanding w ill contribute to assessments of the qualities o f  the com m unicative and 
expressive form s and processes necessary to engage adversaries in the w ork of 
reconciliation.
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CHAPTER 4
INTERSUBJECTIVITY: TH E ETHICAL AND EPISTEM OLOGICAL 
INTEREM BEDDEDNESS OF INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES
W ithin the traditions o f W estern moral philosophy, moral agency is a status that has 
generally been reserved for individuals. The conception o f  reconciliation proposed here, 
however, sim ultaneously refers to participants as moral agents and as collectivities (as well 
as individuals). W e m ust examine, therefore, whether, and how, m eaningful reference can 
be m ade to collectivities engaging in the work o f reconciliation. In this chapter I consider 
the capacities o f  persons and various kinds of groups, including both inform ally structured 
groups such as ethnic com m unities, and formally structured entities such as nation-states. I 
describe the ethical relationship between persons and the groups w ith w hich they identify, 
as well as the capacities and responsibilities of each.
Can nation-states and religious or ethnic groups rightly be said to engage in the 
work o f  reconciliation? Can collectivities, either formal or informal, be understood as 
moral agents? Can they understand suffering in a feelingful way? Answers to these 
questions will help us understand at a deeper level the educational and ethical challenges 
inherent in the w ork of reconciliation.
Moral Capacity in the W ork o f Reconciliation
As we noted in the previous chapter, the conception o f  agency that has 
predom inated w ithin W estern philosophy is "the capacity of rational, autonom ous 
individuals to m ake decisions and act." As we have seen, this understanding o f  agency is 
useful for reconciliation, in that reconciliation requires m em bers o f  groups to transcend the 
beliefs into which they were socialized, in order to m ake decisions and act in ways that are 
at odds with the com m only accepted beliefs of their com m unities. Even the basic
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discursive strategy o f apology and forgiveness assumes that individuals can rationally 
assess behaviors against a set o f moral standards or norms, and, w ithout coercion, 
acknow ledge wrong-doing.
W hen we think of the counter-examples, o f soldiers so addicted to violence that 
they seem  unable to choose to stop it, o f young girls so confused and so fearful o f 
retribution that they are unable to confront boys sexually harassing them , o f Nelson 
M andela unwilling to engage in negotiations while imprisoned, we see the im portance of 
rationality, freedom  and independent action for the work o f reconciliation.
W ithout entering into debates about definitions of agency, our conception of 
reconciliation makes it clear, however, that the moral capacities assum ed by traditional 
understandings o f  the phrase "moral agency" are insufficient fo r these sorts o f peace­
making efforts. Reconciliation requires us not only to rationally analyze behaviors in moral 
terms, but also to experience and articulate our own feelings, and to understand, in a 
feelingful way, the suffering o f others. In this regard, reconciliation requires capacities that 
are consistent w ith the conceptions o f morality and epistem ology articulated by feminist 
philosophers, w ho em phasize the im portance o f "caring," (G illigan, 1982; N oddings,
1984), and the conceptual reintegration of the emotional with the rational (Baier, 1994; 
H oagland, 1989; N oddings, 1984, 1992; N ussbaum , 1986). A t the very least, we m ust 
acknow ledge that reconciliation requires disputants to be sufficiently capable of 
experiencing, acknowledging and articulating feelings that their capacity for transformation 
(for changes in consciousness) is not impaired by em otional rigidity.
Because reconciliation of the kind we are examining refers to the creation of new 
moral fram ew orks where none existed previously, it requires disputants to engage their 
im aginative, as well as rational and emotional, faculties. The im portance o f im agination for 
moral reflection and action, noted by many philosophers, is sum m arized by Sissela Bok 
(1989):
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In order to re s is t ... failures of perspective and the abuses to which 
they can lead, im agination is indispensable, along with the attention it 
demands and the compassion it can generate. W ithout the ability to imagine 
oneself in the place o f others, the Golden Rule loses all m eaning and efforts to 
extend the scope of one's perspective falter. By "im agining foreign states o f 
mind," as W illiam  Jam es recom m ended, one can experience threats not only 
to oneself and those with w hom  one is personally linked but to all others as 
well, w hether com patriots or adversaries. Im agination can likewise enable us 
to extend our perceived horizon not only in sp ace -fro m  ourselves toward the 
entire hum an species and all that is endangered along w ith it—but also in time.
W e can then try to envisage how present conflicts may affect beings not yet 
even born, and consider our responsibility tow ard the past as w ell--w hat 
many have called our stewardship o f resources that are not ours to use up or 
destroy at w ill (pp. 27-28).
Reconciliation requires im agination to generate visions o f a new, more 
com passionate and just relationship, and also to generate innovative solutions to many 
intransigent, practical problems. The capacities required by reconciliation, then, extend 
beyond the rationality invoked by traditional conceptions of moral agency, to involve the 
whole person, including rational, em otional and imaginative faculties. In addition, because 
such conflicts are likely to be about shared  beliefs and values, and the institutions that 
em body them, it is insufficient to think o f reconciliation only in term s of autonom ous 
individuals. In the next several sections o f this chapter, we will consider whether, and in 
what ways, groups can be understood to have the capacities to engage in the w ork of 
reconciliation.
Intersubjectivity in the Relationships among Individuals and Groups
To explore the capacities, responsibilities and lim itations of persons and 
collectivities in the w ork of reconciliation, we m ust first develop a clear picture of the 
relationships that exist betw een individuals and the groups w ith w hich they identify. At 
first glance, it seem s that the parties to reconciliation can be either individuals or 
collectivities. On closer inspection, though, w e see a more com plicated picture.
C onsider the alienation experienced by the young non-Jew ish G erm ans and 
A m erican Jew s w ho w orked with B jorn Krondorfer, described in the previous chapter. In 
that case, the transform ations that occurred took place within individuals, but the
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individuals participated as m embers of larger religious and national groups. In a sense, by 
virtue o f  their socialization into their respective communities' discourses and cultures, 
initially each student carried within him self or herself the patterns o f  meaning, thought and 
feeling that were m icrocosm s o f  the collective cultural and national constructs.
Cultural patterns are m anifested within the language, the consciousness and even 
the bodies o f their members. The depth and duration o f the impacts of the collectivity on 
the person are noted by the literary scholar Elaine Scarry (1985):
The extent to which in ordinary peacetime activity the nation-state 
resides unnoticed in the intricate recesses of personhood, penetrates the 
deepest layers o f consciousness, and manifests itself in the body itself is hard 
to assess; for it seems at any given m om ent "hardly" there, yet seem s at m any 
m oments, how ever hardly, there in the metabolic mysteries of the body's 
hunger for culturally stipulated form s of food and drink, the external objects 
one is willing to habitually put into oneself; hardly there but there in the 
learned postures, gestures, gait, the ease or reluctance with which it breaks 
into a smile; there in the regional accent, the disposition of the tongue, m outh 
and throat, the elaborate and intricate play of small muscles that may also be 
echoed and m agnified throughout the whole body, as when a man m oves 
across the room, there radiates across his shoulder, head, hips, legs and arm s 
the history o f his early boyhood years of life in G eorgia and his young 
adolescence in M anhattan....
The political identity of the body is usually learned unconsciously, 
effortlessly, and very early--it is said that within a few months o f  life British 
infants have learned to hold their eyebrows in a raised position. So, too, it 
may be the last form  o f  patriotism  to be lost; studies of third and fourth 
generation immigrants in the United States show that long after all other 
cultural habits (language, narratives, celebrations o f  festival days) have been 
lost or disowned, culturally stipulated expressions of physical pain rem ain 
and differentiate Irish-A m erican, Jewish-American, or Italian-American.
W hat is "rem em bered" in the body is well rem em bered... (pp. 108-
109).
The psychological m echanism s by w hich the individual comes to identify w ith 
ethnic groups and nations are studied by political psychologists. A leader in that field, 
Vam ik Volkan (1990), argues that children com e to identify with ethnic sym bols at a very 
early age, as part o f psychological, developmental processes o f differentiation and 
integration. In order to create integrated images of oneself and others, i.e., im ages that 
integrate both the pleasurable and unpleasurable, he theorizes, children learn to externalize 
w holly good feelings onto "reservoirs" or "targets," the sym bols o f one's own ethnic, 
cultural and/or national groups. (W holly bad feelings are externalized to the sym bols of the
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groups that are adversaries or enemies.) Since within any ethnic group, parents "are likely
to offer the same targets of extem alization to their children...these become the building
blocks for the children's subsequent structuring of ethnic, cultural and national identity"
(V olkan, 1990, p. 33).
Clinical professor o f psychiatry and scholar of international relations Rita Rogers
(1990) argues that parents often make irresponsible choices about how to transmit to
children notions of identity:
Parents don't seem to question their right to transm it prejudice, hostility, and 
anger from  one generation to the next. Schools, the military, and other 
institutions base their raison d'etre on inoculating the new generation with 
group hostility. W hile parents know that their feelings o f  animosity toward a 
group will be transferred to their children, they feel entitled to the process and 
don't question their right to do so...Adults the w orld  over use and abuse 
children for the expression, activation, and vindication o f causes. W e adults 
don't know, or circum vent finding out, how youngsters really feel about the 
issues w hich remain unresolved fo r us (p.91).
W hen adolescents and post-adolescents seek a degree of social independence from 
their parents, the symbolic structures of their group (and the social relationships and 
institutions associated with them) offer security and continuity. One's sense o f  self 
becom es bound up with the identity o f the group--to the extent that attacks on the symbols 
o f  the group and incursions into territorial boundaries can be experienced and/or interpreted 
as assaults on personal integrity and security. Such phenom ena are considered by political 
psychologists to be manifestations o f  "psychogeography."
In em phasizing the ways that the groups w ith w hich we identify are manifested 
inside of what in som e cultures are understood to be the boundaries o f the person, I do not 
m ean to imply that the attitudes or actions of individuals are wholly or unchangingly 
determ ined by their group. Nor do I w ish to relieve the individual o f responsibility for her 
action. I do, however, wish to acknowledge the com plicated relationships between 
persons and groups, in order to create an understanding useful for our d iscussion o f moral 
capacities required by reconciliation. This com plication can be seen from  the opposite 
perspective as well: groups function, in large part, by virtue of the actions o f individuals.
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For instance, when we speak o f peace between "Israel and her Arab neighbors", we 
are referring to changes in governmental policies and territorial boundaries: changes that 
can only be enacted only through the structures o f the nation. The language o f diplom acy 
som etim es obscures the fact that governments are human creations, and changes in 
relationships among them result from the initiative o f persons, acting as citizens and/or as 
governm ent officials. In history of the contemporary peace process in the M iddle East 
makes it clear that, however limited and flawed they m ight be, the policies now being 
enacted by governmental entities reflect transformations that first occurred within the 
consciousness o f  individuals, who exerted influence from  positions both inside and outside 
of g o v e rn m e n t.^
The relationship between an individual and her group resem bles a hologram , or a
fractal: the pattern o f  the whole (the culture, in this case) can be discerned within each part
(the individual members). The inter-embeddedness o f individuals and the collectivities to
w hich they belong is described by Jurgen H aberm as (1993) in term s o f  'intersubjectivity’
and the use of language:
Linguistically and behaviorally competent subjects are constituted as 
individuals by growing into an intersubjectively shared lifeworld, and the 
lifeworld of a language community is reproduced in turn through the 
com m unicative actions of its members. This explains why the identity o f the 
individual and that of the collective are interdependent; they form  and maintain 
them selves together. Built into the consensus-oriented language use of social 
interaction is an inconspicuous necessity for participants to becom e m ore and 
more individuated. Conversely, everyday language is a lso  the m edium  by 
which the intersubjectivity of a shared world is m aintained (p. 199).
Another image that captures the complexity o f the relationship between the
collectivity and its individual members is presented by Patsy Schw eickert (1995) in an
essay on fem inist understandings o f moral agency and the nature o f  the moral subject:
...im agine that all of us are in a room, w orking together on an enorm ously 
com plicated "novel"-the  "story" o f feminism. Together we are trying to 
write ourselves into history. But at the sam e time, each o f us is also engaged 
in her own personal project of realizing herself as subject—of w riting her own
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personal story. The entire process of production is complicated because: 1) 
each personal story has to be inserted into the collective text, and the collective 
text has to be inserted into each personal text; 2) the collective and the 
personal texts are being written concurrently, and since the collective text is 
the interactive totality o f  personal texts it is constantly undergoing revision 
and this in turn necessitates the revision o f individual projects; and 3) the 
collective text and the personal texts are reflexive-they include the story o f 
their writing. In other w ords, the collective and the personal novels are
conditioned by intertextuality  [However] writing does not encom pass all
the activities that constitute either collective or the personal projects; it is only 
a model we have adopted for the sake of its heuristic possibilities.
Intertextuality, in other words, really indicates intersubjectivity-social 
interaction and political negotiation (p. 245).
An example will help ground, in the real world of conflict and reconciliation, these 
understandings o f intersubjectivity and individual and collective capacity for agency and 
transformation. It is taken from  a study o f the Norwegian nonviolent resistance to Nazi 
occupation during W orld W ar II, and the subsequent reconciliation between those 
Norwegians who resisted and those who collaborated. The study was conducted by the 
sociologist and peace researcher Paul W ehr (1979), based on historical docum ents and 
interviews with leaders o f the resistance.
W ehr found that the resistance based its efforts on the strongly shared dem ocratic 
values o f the Norwegian peo p le-reaso n , justice, autonom y and nonviolence—and also 
upon an existing, highly articulated netw ork o f occupational and avocational voluntary 
associations. W hen the occupying adm inistration tried to coopt the structure of the 
voluntary associations for the purposes o f  the N azi state, several leaders, prom inent in their 
own voluntary associations, met to coordinate a clandestine structure for com m unication 
and resistance. The purpose w as to create a "nationwide netw ork o f reliable contacts...to 
distribute directives and organize local resistance to nazification" (W ehr, 1979, p.76).
The leaders o f the resistance created an ingenious infrastructure consisting o f four 
channels of com m unication. In  addition to using underground newspapers, couriers, and, 
when possible, broadcasts o f m essages sm uggled out to the BBC, they developed a system  
of regional contact persons and local face-to-face contacts. The network allowed them  to 
send directives to the N orw egian population about how to respond in a coordinated w ay to
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76
Nazi rules and regulations. These paroles, or directives, were typically written in invisible 
ink, som etim es between the lines of correspondence that appeared to be a personal letter, 
som etim es between the lines of Nazi propaganda itself. The effectiveness of the 
com m unications was dem onstrated when, in 1942, the occupation's M inistry o f Church 
and Education required teachers to becom e members o f a national union, implying 
w illingness to teach Nazi ideology in their classrooms. The resistance leadership issued a 
parole  to the 14,000 teachers urging them "to protest the requirement by mailing in a 
standard letter of resignation on a certain day. Twelve thousand letters arrived at the 
m inistry, m ost of them  on the sam e day" (W ehr, 1979, p.86). A fter declaring a m onth­
long school holiday based on a "fuel shortage" the Ministry capitulated, agreeing that the 
teachers' union would remain apolitical. According to W ehr, "other [vocational] groups 
were subsequently attacked but the example o f  moral resolve set by the teachers was 
replicated m any times" (p. 88).
Throughout the war, the leaders o f  the resistance mobilized support in part through 
the polarization o f attitudes. The underground press, for instance, sharpened moral 
distinctions between those who participated in the resistance and those who collaborated 
w ith the Nazis. This polarization w as understood to foster imm unity to "nazification," and 
to offer a  vision o f  moral clarity amidst the ambiguity created by the military occupation and 
the upheaval o f norm al social relations and structures. As the w ar drew to a close, the 
resistance leadership w orked to "depolarize" public sentiment. "People had to be 
resensitized...for reconciliation w ith the enem y am ong them. This resensitization involved 
a conscious effort in resistance literature to reorient readers away from the 
oversim plifications upon which holdningskamp  [the battle o f the wills] had necessarily 
been based" (p. 93).
This brief history dem onstrates how the capacity for moral action is anim ated in the 
interplay between the individual and the collective and, correspondingly, within a creative 
tension between innovation and tradition. The Germ an occupation o f N orw ay, relatively
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benign as it at first appeared, actually represented an assault on cherished values and
norm s. T he traditional value placed on collectivity inform ed the response of Dr. H. J.
U stvedt, who issued the first invitation to several association leaders (W ehr, 1979, p. 76).
W orking in a small group, they analyzed the situation and made crucial strategic decisions
that w ould impact the course of Norwegian resistance. For instance, they chose NOT to
m ount a violent underground campaign in order to win back tu rf or even disrupt the Nazi
adm inistration. Building on cultural values o f nonviolence and reason, they imagined a
nonviolent resistance effort that was based primarily on coordinated com m unication, which
individuals could jo in  simply by participating in the network.
The existence o f the communications network and the recom m endations (and later
directives) from the resistance, made available to individual Norwegian citizens choices
very different than had no such network existed. Not only did the paroles  serve to remind
them  of traditional values and the convergence of individual, associational and national
interests, the directives allowed them to make choices know ing they w ould not be acting
alone. T he risks to any individual teacher submitting a letter o f resignation would have
been m agnified many times had thousands of teachers not sim ultaneously made the same
choice. T he coordination o f  the association not only rem inded them  o f their own values,
but also m inim ized the risk of acting in accordance with them. A ccording to W ehr (1979),
the logic o f  the paroles
rested on a moral undergirding carefully fashioned from  a deeply rooted 
socio-political ethos. Playing on such values as patriotism , self- 
determ ination, nonviolence, and professional responsibility was a powerful 
technique. The fact that the initial paroles were successful with those 
occupational groupings considered to be the guardians o f  national morals 
(i.e., teachers, clergy, judges) greatly influenced the parole 's  later success an 
appeal to national conscience and professional integrity.
Observers who recall that period say that there w ere no sharp 
distinction of class, personality type, or sense o f  national loyalty 
differentiating Norwegians w ho fell victim  to nazification from  those who did 
not. O ften it seem s to have been largely chance. H ad the KK, with its 
com m unications network and paroles not existed to sharply define the 
right/w rong and good N orw egian/traitor dichotom ies ... nazification m ight 
well have succeeded (pp. 85- 86).
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The leaders o f the Norwegian resistance would acknowledge, I think, that during 
the war, their com m unications not infrequently crossed the line from education into 
indoctrination and propaganda. Their deliberate decision near the conclusion o f the w ar to 
"resensitize" their readers to the complexities that confronted the N orwegians who did 
collaborate indicates an awareness of the dangers o f propaganda, even for an obviously just 
cause. Resistance required clarity, discipline, and a steadfastness m ade necessary by the 
upheaval o f the war itself; reconciliation required sensitivity, complexity, and flexibility. 
Each could be seen as appropriate in its own time. Both resistance and reconciliation were 
accom plished by an interplay of individuals and collectivities. Drawing on the values of the 
group, leaders m ade conscious choices to create structures to prevent individual 
N orwegians from  succum bing to the isolation and disorientation that otherw ise would 
have constrained their choices in favor of the Nazi occupation. As individuals chose to 
follow the paroles, they legitim ated the resistance, including its values, its structures, its 
strategies and its leadership. So at every level, the individual and collective processes were 
deeply em bedded within each other.
In this section, I have explicated the relationship between individuals and 
collectivities in terms o f intersubjectivity, using as lenses both linguistic and 
psychodynam ic theories. W e have seen that, in terms o f  capacity for m oral action, 
individuals and collectivities are interdependent. In this analysis, however, w e have not 
m ade distinctions am ong different kinds o f groups. Groups vary along m any dim ensions: 
they differ for instance, in size, in the formality of their structure, in the nature o f the 
com m onality that binds m em bers to one another, in their purpose. Im portantly, given the 
kinds o f transform ation implicit in reconciliation, groups differ in the structures and 
procedures through which they change. In the next section, w e w ill consider the capacities 
and limitation o f  tw o kinds o f collectivities particularly salient in the w ork of reconciliation: 
inform al social groups such as ethnic groups, and a  particular formal organization, the 
nation-state. W e will also reflect on the capacities o f individuals. After com pleting this
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analysis, we will consider what combination of individual and collective capacities will 
allow for the balance o f innovation and tradition required by the transformative processes 
of reconciliation.
Capacities o f  Individuals and Groups Relevant to the Criteria o f  Reconciliation
N ation-states; Can nation-states be understood to take part in the work o f 
reconciliation? There are argum ents on both sides o f this question. Perhaps the most 
compelling argument in favor o f nation-states having the capacity to engage in the work of 
reconciliation is how necessary their involvement appears. It seem s obvious that peace can 
only be created through the participation of the entities that have, in fact, been in conflict.
In the case o f  Israel and Palestine, for instance, m any small groups of individuals have 
engaged in dialogue groups and encounter sessions o f  various kinds. These conciliatory 
processes have been important in challenging governmental leaders to pursue peaceful 
strategies towards resolving differences, and in generating possible solutions for seem ingly 
intractable problems. A ju st and lasting peace, however, will require rapprochem ent on the 
part of the two peoples and the governm ental entities that represent them. This 
reconciliation would be created by and reflected in, for instance, mutual respect for political 
sovereignty, and agreed upon policies about water rights, boundaries, access to sacred 
places, official statem ents of apology, joint econom ic initiatives, education about the 
history and cultures o f  both peoples in both school systems, etc. These policies m ust be 
enacted through the structures of institutions, by people in relationship with each other, 
supported by an array of non-hum an resources as well.
M eaningful reconciliation seem s to require the policy-making and -enacting 
capacities, i.e., the effectiveness, o f  nation-states. There are exam ples of nation-states 
engaging in at least reconciliatory gestures, when, for instance, the United States 
governm ent decided to give m onetary com pensation to Japanese citizens w ho had been 
interned in cam ps during W orld W ar II, and when the Japanese prim e m inister issued a 
statem ent o f  apology to the Korean people for the suffering caused during Japan's
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conquest. However, embedded within the criteria for reconciliation laid out in Chapter 4 
are requirem ents for moral agency, and for rational, em otional and imaginative abilities, 
capacities we m ost readily associate with individuals. Furtherm ore, reconciliation assumes 
transform ation on the part o f the disputants. Are nation-states the kind of entity that can 
engage in reconciliation, as we've defined it?
Several scholars, working in different disciplines, m ight lead us to a negative 
conclusion. For instance, the philosopher Larry M ay (1987, 1992), in considering the 
moral responsibilities and liabilities o f  individuals and groups, declines to grant 
collectivities such as corporations the status o f full moral agency. He argues that there is a 
sense that both formally and informally staictured groups can be understood to choose and 
to act, but, as organizations, they do not have the equivalent of a conscience, and cannot 
feel rem orse. (M ay, 1987, p. 104) Similarly, the sociologist N icholas Tavuchis (1991) 
notes the lim itations of corporate structures to feel. C orporations can issue apologies, he 
suggests, and m ight even use the language of "feeling rem orse," but the m eaning o f their 
apology lies more in setting the record straight than in the expression of feelings (Tavuchis, 
1991, p. 97). V incent Brum m er (1992), the Christian theologian, argues that reconciliation 
(am ong individuals) is a possibility only for relationships that can be described as enjoying 
the status o f fellowship. In his conception, it is when relationships devolve into 
m anipulation or contractual reciprocity-m odes of relating typical of nation-states—they 
involve an objectification o f the other, a using of the other, that is itself antithetical to 
reconciliation (Brum m er, 1992,437).
These theories about the limitations o f bureaucratic, corporate organizations suggest 
that w hile nation-states might necessarily be involved in the w ork o f conflict resolution, 
nation-states understood as political organizations, as the m echanism s o f governm ent, do 
not have the capacities to feel and to enter into the w orlds o f  the other that we now associate 
w ith reconciliation. M artin Buber describes this lim itation in terms o f  the quality o f 
com m unication between nation-states. He believed that it is the loss o f trust, a precondition
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of d ialogue, that leaves man so "imperiled by hot and cold wars" (Cohen, 1983, p. 87). 
Buber writes:
The disputations o f the representatives o f  states which reach us through the 
m edium  o f broadcasts are in no aspect sim ilar to hum an colloquy: they do  not 
speak with one another but to a faceless crowd. Even the assem blies and 
conferences which are convened in the name of concord am ong nations lack 
the one elem ent which alone can raise bargaining to the level o f dialogue: the 
directness o f call and response between men [sic] which is free from  any alien 
motive or design (quoted in Adir Cohen, 1983, p. 87).
N ation-states are unlikely candidates for the work of reconciliation, therefore,
because of their inability to feel empathy and shame, and because their mode of relating is
contractual and impersonal, lacking in the give-and-take that can, under propitious
conditions, characterize dialogue between individuals. Furtherm ore, according to Joan
Bondurant, a political philosopher w ho has written extensively on Gandhi's satyagrahci,
for their m ost difficult conflicts, nation-states, including even liberal dem ocracies (the form
o f political organization best suited to handle change) resort to means o f resolution that are
inconsistent w ith reconciliation. Compromise, the prevalent way o f resolving conflicts in
dem ocracies, tends to devolve into a kind o f bartering that is devoid o f principle; it can
engender resentm ent and the desire for political revenge. Unlike the syntheses sought
through processes o f  satyagrahci, which aim to persuade all parties of the rightness or truth
o f a particular path, com prom ise too often involves coercion and m anipulation, an
avoidance o f the underlying conflict rather than a constructive grappling with it.
Even more im portant, violence is w oven into the fabric o f  the nation-state system.
In circum stances o f  challenge from w ithout or risk of subversion from  within, nations still
resort to force. In the
system s of norm s and sanctions which found and inform  every state, violence 
is the operative force and coercion constitutes the ultim ate process. It is the 
legal sanction o f violent force applied by agents o f the com m unity against 
delinquent m em bers that supports the political order, in both liberal 
dem ocracies and other forms o f  polity. In international intercourse the ultimate 
sanction is war, a  method legitimized in international law (Bondurant, 1965, 
p. 219).
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At least since W orld W ar II, relationships among nation-states have been 
understood and conducted primarily within a paradigm  of pow er politics, a fram ework 
often attributed to Hans M orgenthau, an international lawyer. Based on the idea o f  the 
inherent aggressiveness of hum an nature, states have been taken to be inevitably 
aggressive, and, therefore, requiring military power for their defense. Achieving superior 
power, o r at least the capacity for mutual deterrence, has been understood as a prim e goal 
of states (Burton, 1995, p. 84)
In relation to the capacity o f nation-states to engage in the work o f reconciliation, 
we have identified an im portant dilemma. On the one hand, reconciliation seems to require 
the effectiveness that nation-states alone enjoy: the capacities to make policies, to 
coordinate resources, to educate citizenry, to agree to shifts in boundaries, etc. On the 
other hand, nation-states seem  incapable of engaging in relationship in ways that are 
consistent w ith the standards w e have established for reconciliation. Their purpose seems 
more aligned with stability than with transformation, and, in making changes, they rely on 
means that are inconsistent with the ends of reconciliation. As political structures, they are 
capable o f inflicting great harm , but not capable o f feelingful awareness o f the suffering 
they have caused. It is the threat o f violent coercion, and defense against such threats, not 
trust, that forms the basis for their security; the threat o f violence as the ultimate sanction 
taints the less extreme, less overtly violent steps that precede if.
I believe that a  way out of this dilem m a can be found in the notion of 
intersubjectivity, through recognizing that nation-states are human creations, com prised not 
only of governm ental structures but also of persons and associations of all kinds. If we 
wish to create a w orld in w hich conflicts are more often resolved through reconciliation 
than through war, we may need to transform  principles that inform both the structures and 
the practices of our large-scale political entities. W e may need to construct nation-states 
with greater moral capacity, w ith the ability to make decisions as if they were feelingfully 
aware o f  the pain caused by their policies. This idea is consistent with em erging trends in
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political psychology. Harold Saunders (1990), form er undersecretary of State of M idEast 
affairs, for instance, advocates a new paradigm that em phasizes the relationships among 
states, rather than the old paradigm  based on force. In his view, "national interests" should 
be redefined to recognize the coincidence o f interests and needs--both practical and 
psycho log ica l-tha t bring people or nations together. "Learning people's real interests," he 
w rites, "requires probing the deep-rooted human fears, hopes, w ounds, perceptions and 
cultural values that form human beings' sense o f what is threatening and what is vital in 
protecting their identity" (Saunders, 1990, p. 15)
In addition to reconceptualizing the frameworks through which international affairs 
are conducted, we may need to clarify and expand our understanding o f the moral 
responsibilities of individuals in relation to the nations o f  which they are citizens (and from 
w hich citizenship they benefit.) The responsibility for individual action can be understood 
by the gap that exists between the effectiveness of nation-states (especially to inflict harm) 
and their lim ited capacity for transformation, for em pathic awareness of suffering, and for 
trust. Perhaps it is understanding the limitations on the capacities o f nation-states that 
m otivates recent efforts at citizen-to-citizen diplomacy.
W ith this second possibility in mind, w e will now consider the capacities and 
lim itations of persons in relation to the work o f reconciliation.
Persons: Understanding, within the fram ew ork of intersubjectivity, that individuals 
have incorporated within them aspects of the nation-states and other groups with which 
they identify, it is still meaningful to think about the particular capacities and lim itations of 
persons for the work o f reconciliation. As m uch as individuals m ust use the linguistic and 
conceptual tools o f  their com m unities, and as m uch as we are shaped by the cultures o f 
w hich we are part, we still enjoy substantial potential for innovating on cultural patterns, 
for critical assessm ent o f the actions o f our governm ents, and fo r im agining that w hich has 
not been before. W hen we consider the range of capacities required by the work o f  
reconcilia tion-the ability to trust, to maintain em otional presence in the face o f  suffering, to
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rationally assess actions in light of moral standards, to imagine justice  in its absence, to 
maintain a sense of integrity am idst transformations in consciousness-it is inspiring to 
rem em ber that hum an beings have demonstrated their ability not only to engage in this 
work, bu t to lead whole groups through reconciliation efforts.
Psychologically-based theories about the sources o f  violence often attribute it, at 
least in part, to the innate "aggressive tendencies" of human beings and to com pulsions to 
construct our w orlds dichotom ously, w ith in-groups and out-groups, friends and enemies, 
those w orthy and unworthy (M ontville, 1989, 1990, 1995; M oses, 1990; Volkan, 1990; 
etc.) H ow ever, the psychologists, neuroscientists, geneticists, anthropologists, and 
political scientists who met in Seville, Spain, in 1986 to exam ine the roots o f war, 
concluded that:
there was no scientific basis for considering hum an beings innately aggressive 
animals, inevitably com m itted to war on the basis o f biological nature.
Rather, they said, war is a result of socialization and conditioning, a 
phenom enon o f hum an organization, planning and inform ational processing 
that plays on emotional and motivational potentialities. In short, the Seville 
Statem ent implies that we have real choices and that a new kind of 
responsibility in the conduct of hum an group life is possible (M ack, 1990, 
p. 58).
For our purposes, it is sufficient to recognize that to w hatever extent biological and
psychodynam ic factors contribute to  violence and to dem onization o f the other, it is an
interplay of cultural norm s and individual consciousness that influences how and whether
such im pulses are encouraged, expressed, directed, shaped, and/or suppressed. The
political psychologist Robert M oses (1990) em phasizes the im portance o f the cultural and
social context, and therefore the responsibility of those whose silence or inaction might be
taken as condonation of dehumanizing actions:
W e m ust dare to examine publicly what it is that m akes certain hum an beings 
or groups com m it dehum anizing acts. W e should be aw are that such acts are 
not due to the evil of any one individual. If w e stress the fact that 
dehum anization can only o c c u r-o r be hushed up—w ith our support or 
connivance, then the next person to be tem pted will reflect m ore than once 
before he [or she] acts. If, however, he can get away w ith both the act and the 
illusion that is was done fo r the sake of his country, w hether in "self-defense" 
or revenge, or to obtain victory, then we will have to accept the
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responsibility...The fact that only a few commit such acts does not, I maintain, 
reduce by one iota the burden o f our responsibility. W ere it not that we, their 
society and their fellow citizens seem to condone it, they could not act on their 
latent readiness to becom e dehum anizers (M oses, 1990 p. 117).
Like the psychologist Robert M oses (1990), Gandhi (1961), Buber (1970, 1992),
and Thich Nhat Hanh (1987, 1992) all place trem endous importance on the
interdependence o f people and on the importance o f community for nurturing moral
sensibilities. However, each of these three emphasizes the moral sovereignty o f the
individual as o f param ount im portance for the work of reconciliation. For each, the kind of
integrity required for reconciliation is linked with a power that derives from the life o f the
spirit.
Gandhi's scityagraha was based upon the pow er of individual reason, w hich he 
believed could operate in any social milieu. He believed that when the state fails to 
establish conditions under which individuals can realize their fullest potential the individual 
has a responsibility to challenge its authority o f the state. In Gandhi's ethic, the key to 
individual integrity is reason, supported by the willingness o f people to choose self­
suffering rather than either succum b to illegitimate authority or to inflict harm  on one's 
opponent.
Thich Nhat H anh's B uddhist philosophy, as strongly as it em phasizes 
interdependence am ong all o f life, still recognizes the importance of individual agency. 
Individual integrity and effectiveness is associated with inner peace, with the ability to 
"sm ile for oneself," and the capacity to focus one's energy, to perceive w ith calm ness and 
clarity. "If even one person aboard" a refugee boat caught in rough seas, w rites Thich 
N hat Hanh, "can rem ain calm , lucid, knowing what to do and what not to do, he or she can 
help the boat survive. His or her expression—face, voice-com m unicate clarity  and 
calm ness, and people have trust in that person....W e need people who can sit still and be 
able to smile, who can w alk peacefully....M ahayan Buddhism  says that you are that 
person, that each o f you is that person" (H ahn, 1987, p. 12).
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Sim ilarly, although Martin Buber's (1992) philosophy is based on the idea that we
can becom e full human beings only in authentic relation with another, he writes that
....all knowledge [including knowledge about social justice] is an ascetic  act.
At the m oment of knowledge the knower m ust bring something paradoxical to 
pass; certainly he m ust enter into the knowledge with his whole being, he 
m ust also bring unabridged into his knowing the experiences his social ties 
have presented him with. But he m ust free him self from the influence of these 
ties through the concentration o f spiritual power. No one becom es a 
sociological thinker if his dream  and his passion have never mingled with the 
dream  and passion of a human community; but in the m om ent o f  thinking 
itself, as far as it stands in his power, he m ust exist only as person, the 
person open to the subject o f  thought. If this relation is maintained, he need 
not unduly trouble him self with the question o f  how far his knowledge was 
determ ined against his will by his m em bership in a group. In the relationship 
o f a man to the truth that he has discovered, freedom  and obligation, vision 
and blindness, are always merged. O ur concern is only this -  to will w ith all 
the pow er of our spirit to achieve free vision (p. 220).
If, as we asserted above, w hat nation-states can uniquely contribute to the work of 
reconciliation is the capacity to enact policies with far-reaching impact, individuals have the 
potential to contribute our capacities for the critical thinking, the feelingful awareness and 
the creative imagination that must inform  governmental policies. Persons can enter into 
relationships with others, including their enemies, and com e to understand w holly different 
perspectives on the same historical phenomena. As V ictoria Davion argues, persons can, 
w ithout violating their integrity as persons, engage in and m onitor their own 
transform ations (Davion, 1991, pp. 190-191). T he extent to w hich these capacities are 
present in any one person depends on many factors, including both the impacts o f violence 
and the nature o f his or her education.
Social groups: Social groups are distinct from collectivities such as nation-states or 
corporations in that they are less formally structured, have more fluid boundaries, and often 
foster relationships more often through face-to-face com m unication than through official 
statem ents and policies. They can contribute to the work o f reconciliation some of the 
effectiveness of the coordinated action o f nation-states, but still enjoy some o f the flexibility 
o f the individual. Social g roups-fam ilies, com m unities, organizations and associations,
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local ethnic groups, e tc .-them selves human creations, also constitute a stage on which 
hum an creativity comes to life.
Social groups are o f so many different kinds, and serve so many different 
purposes, it is difficult to generalize about their potential contributions to the work of 
reconciliation. Yet they are important players in their own right, with capacities that exceed 
the aggregate of their individual members, a circum stance with im portant moral 
consequences. Individuals are enabled by groups to be effective (for both good and for 
harm ) in w ays and to degrees they could not, or w ould not, on their own. The increment 
in effectiveness can be accounted for in part by the advantages o f  coordination, group 
m orale, shared learning, strategic deploym ent of resources, synthesis of various kinds of 
expertise, the motivational impact o f shared symbols, and collective recognition from the 
system s with which the group must interact. This increm ent in effectiveness can be readily 
understood by comparing the well-intentioned but unorganized efforts o f  individuals to 
m ake a neighborhood safer, or challenge a governm ent's foreign policy, or fight world 
hunger, on the one hand, w ith the coordinated efforts o f neighborhood chapters o f a 
national safety organization, a social protest m ovem ent, or an international relief effort on 
the other.
Individuals, like Gandhi, who wish to influence the policies of governm ents, create 
social m ovem ents and organizations. These associations nurture the developm ent of 
alternative fram ew orks and supported their members to take risks and rem ain steadfast in 
their com m itm ents. Similarly, as w ith the Buddhist sangha, or com m unity, social groups 
can support individual members to make moral choices.
B ecause hum an consciousness is so vulnerable to the discourses and structures in 
w hich w e participate, social groups are important in providing opportunities for engaging 
in liberatory or reconciliatory dialogues and conversations, as w e saw  in the case of the 
N orw egian resistance. W ithout minimizing the im portance of personal moral insight and 
courage, the social group can be important in supporting individuals to resist hegemonic
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discourse and to continue collaboratively to develop their alternative viewpoints. This is 
especially im portant in the modem  context, where dom inant ideologies are perpetuated 
through extensive systems o f mass communication.
Social groups can lend support to violent, coercive actions and beliefs as well as to 
benevolence. The moral philosopher Larry May (1987, 1992) points out that participation 
in groups often blunts individuals' m oral sensibilities. Individuals who participate in only 
one step o f a harm ful action—researching how to construct a weapon, or buying one of 
several supplies, or providing transportation to the one who will set o ff the device, or 
writing the propaganda that recruited members and expressed racist values, for instance— 
may be sheltered by the very collective nature of the action from feeling responsibility or 
rem orse for the suffering caused. Participation in groups can at times lead individuals to be 
negligent, to refrain from taking action to stop harm s that some other m em ber could 
interrupt w ith equal ease.
Identity groups are a kind o f social group that have particular salience for the work 
of reconciliation, because, according to conflict resolution expert John Burton (1995), they 
have "real pow er, power that has the capacity to resist authority and to effect change"
(p. 87). B urton argues that groups that meet "human societal needs" cannot be controlled 
by national authorities, because "identity, security o f the identity group, recognition, 
political and distributive justice... are values that are not negotiable, not repressible, for 
which persons and com m unities w ill make endless sacrifices" (p. 87). The contem porary 
proliferation o f  regional and ethnic conflicts supports Burton's claim  that ethnic groups are 
powerful political forces w ith particular salience fo r peace-m aking efforts.
In w hat sense can we say that social groups (including both am orphous group such 
as identity groups, as well as non-governmental organizations) have the capacity to engage 
in the w ork o f reconciliation? According to Larry M ay, social groups can be said to  decide 
and to act, two capacities m ost frequently associated w ith moral agency. W hether we 
accept his argum ent or not, i f  we think of social groups, as w e did above in relation to
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nation-states, as consisting not only of the structures and shared beliefs and values that 
define the group but also the individuals who comprise the group, then it seems possible to 
say that social groups can, in some sense, be understood as having m oral agency. This 
understanding places responsibility on the individual members o f groups to share with their 
groups the insights that result from their critical thinking, creative im aginings and feelingful 
awareness o f suffering. This sharing of insights presents a particular challenge in the many 
contexts, such as ethnic com m unities, or groups based on region or gender, w here there 
are no formal decision-m aking structures.
Social groups have important roles to play in reconciliation—in part because they 
can be in conflict with each other, in part because conflicts between nation-states and 
individuals are often in fact conflicts over the shared beliefs that define social groups, and 
also in part because social groups are the locus for generative, creative, collaborative 
hum an activity. M arshaling the resources o f social groups towards the ends of 
reconciliation, and, in fact, creating groups and small institutions for the explicit purpose o f 
engaging in the w ork o f  reconciliation, are becoming increasingly com m on in the world of 
conflict resolution.
Sum m ary of the Contributions o f N ation-States, Social Groups and Individuals to the 
W ork o f  Reconciliation
Although our conception of reconciliation includes capacities that we normally 
associate w ith individuals-the capacity for rational autonomous action traditionally 
associated w ith moral agency, along with capacities for feelingful awareness and creative 
imagination—we can reasonably think o f individuals, social groups and nation-states as able 
to engage in reconciliation. This m akes sense because of the intersubjective nature o f 
individuals and groups: the groups are com prised not only of the form al and informal 
structures that define them, but also the individuals that create, revise and m odify those 
structures; and individuals, whose capacities for critical consciousness and innovation are
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im pressive, still can be understood to  have the constructs o f their groups em bedded within 
their psyches and their bodies.
W ith this understanding, we can see that each o f at each of these levels, unique 
contributions to the work of reconciliation can be made. Persons contribute their capacities 
for moral integrity (i.e., the ability to m onitor themselves through processes o f change, 
seeking alignm ent among their beliefs, values, and actions), for empathic understanding of 
the suffering o f others, for assessing critically assessing behaviors against norms o f 
justice, and the ability to im agine peaceful, just, dynamic social orders where violence and 
mistrust have been prevalent. W ith education, persons have the ability to reflect to a 
considerable extent on the sym bolic systems and psychodynam ic processes that were 
established during their early socialization. Social groups contribute their capacity to 
nourish, support and coordinate the m oral creativity o f their members. They offer the 
effectiveness o f jo in t action, coordination, and organization. Nation-states contribute to 
the work of reconciliation their capacities for policy-making: the actions o f nation-states can 
have far-reaching, "reality-creating" impacts on the lives and institutional relations of 
m illions o f individuals. Nation-states, resting as they do on the threat o f violent coercion, 
and existing as they do to preserve stability and order, are less than ideal participants in the 
w ork of reconciliation. The moral lim itations of nation-states, coupled with their 
irreplaceable contributions to the work o f  reconciliation, place additionnl responsibilities on 
both the individuals and social organizations that enjoy the benefits o f m em bership within 
them.
The intersubjective nature o f  the relationship between individuals and the groups 
w ith which they identify establishes the scope of the educational effort o f reconciliation as 
both deep (within individuals and hum an relationships) and broad (engaging whole 
com m unities and nations.) The notion o f intersubjectivity begins to describe the 
relationship between epistem ological con cem s-i.e ., the constructs through which persons 
and groups m ake sense of their w o rld -an d  ethical concerns-specifically , capacities for
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moral action. O ur inquiry into the relationship between ways o f understanding and moral 
capacities is complicated further in the next chapter, when we consider the epistemological 
and ethical relationships among enemies.
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CHAPTER 5
TRANSSUBJECTIVITY: THE ETHICAL 
AND EPISTEM OLOGICAL INTERRELATEDNESS OF ENEM IES
Violent conflicts are conducted as though people have become invisible to each
other as moral beings. They relate to each other as if basic moral p recepts-such  as
injunctions against killing, injuring and ly in g -d o  not apply. Reconciliation requires that
form er enem ies become morally "visible" to each other, i.e., understood as beings who
deserve justice and respect. In this chapter we consider what it m eans to com e to know an
other, particularly an other who is or has been an enem y, and even more particularly, an
enem y who is suffering and in w hose suffering we are implicated. W ith the reciprocal
understanding o f suffering as a paradigm atic example, w e discover a rich epistem ological
and ethical interrelatedness am ong enem ies, w ith substantial implications for the
educational work o f reconciliation.
To perceive another's suffering is, according to Elaine Scarry (1985),
sim ultaneously to w ish it away. Inherent in pain 's aversiveness, she claim s, is the desire
to be rid o f  it, both in ourselves and in anyone else whose pain w e perceive:
If one imagines one hum an being seeing another human being in pain, one 
human being perceiving in another discomfort and in the sam e moment 
wishing the other to be relieved o f the discomfort, som ething in that fraction of 
a second is occurring inside the First person's brain involving the com plex 
action of many neurons that is, im portantly, not ju st a perception o f an 
actuality (the second person's pain) but an alteration of that actuality (for 
em bedded in the perception is the sorrow that it is so, the wish that it were 
otherwise). Though this interior event m ust be expressed as a conjunctive 
duality, "seeing the pain and wishing it gone," it is a single percipient event in 
which the reality of pain and the unreality o f imagining are already conflated. 
N either can occur w ithout the other: if  the person does not perceive the 
distress, neither will he w ish it gone; conversely, if  he does not w ish it gone, 
he cannot have perceived the pain itself (he may at the m om ent be experiencing 
som ething else, such as his own physical advantage, or his own resistance to 
having to attend to another person, but he cannot be perceiving
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the pain, for pain is in its essential nature "aversiveness," and thus even within 
technical medical definitions it is recognized as something which cannot be felt 
w ithout being wished unfelt (p. 290).
Is the w ishing-away-of-pain the response to each other's suffering that educators 
and m ediators seek to evoke in former adversaries who enter into processes o f 
reconciliation? Does the sentence 7  know you  are in pain  and I  wish you weren't' describe 
the quality o f com passionate understanding necessary for the work o f reconciliation? If 
not, how might we describe the epistemological and ethical relationships among 
adversaries, both when they are enemies and when they seek to reconcile? W e begin our 
response to these questions by considering briefly, in general terms, the challenges o f 
com ing to know another person.
Coming to Know An Other 
U nder the best of circum stances, com ing to know o th e rs-in  the sense of im agining 
the w orld as they interpret it-represen ts a difficult challenge. M any philosophers have 
m ade the distinction between perceiving others insofar as they m eet our own needs or fit 
into our own constructs, on the one hand, and perceiving others as the centers o f their own 
universes o f  m eaning, on the other. Buber (1970), for instance, makes the distinction 
betw een "experiencing the It" and "being in relation" with a "Thou." The French 
philosopher Em m anuel Levinas makes a similar distinction:
I can see another as someone I need in order to realize certain wants o f 
mine. She or he is then a useful or enjoyable part of my world, w ith a specific 
role and function. W e all belong to different com m unities in which we 
function m ore or less well on the basis o f  reciprocal needs. I can  also observe 
another from  an aesthetic perspective, for exam ple, by looking at the colors o f 
her eyes, the proportions o f  his face and so on. But none o f these w ays of 
perception allow the otherness o f the other to reveal itself. All aspects 
m anifested by a phenom enological description that starts from  these 
perspectives are immediately integrated by m y self-centered, interested and 
dom inating consciousness. These w ays o f locking at them  transform  those 
phenom ena into m oments o f  m y material or spiritual property. The sort of 
phenom enology based on these and sim ilar observations is a form  o f egology.
A nother com es to the fore as other if and only if  his or her 
"appearance" breaks, pierces, destroys the horizon of my egocentric m onism , 
i.e., w hen the other's invasion o f my w orld destroys the em pire in w hich all 
phenom ena are, from the outset, a prio ri, condem ned to function as m oments 
o f m y universe. The other's face (i.e., any other's facing me) o r the other's
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speech (any other's speaking to me) interrupts and disturbs the order o f my, 
ego's world; it makes a hole in it by disarraying my arrangem ents without ever 
perm itting me to  restore the previous order. For even if I kill the other or chase 
the other away in order to be safe from  the intrusion, nothing will ever be the 
sam e as before (Levinas, sum m arized in Perperzak, 1991, p. 440).
In Levinas' philosophy, then, encountering an other im plies an obligation to
imagine their w orld-even  to the point that we allow their constructs to penetrate o r
interrupt our own. In Nel N oddings' (1984) term s, we have an obligation to meet the other
as "one caring." These encounters might take place between m em bers o f a fam ily, or
between a  teacher and student, but they nevertheless require effort, and, in Levinas' view,
inevitably infringe on the ego's unfettered rights to  pursue its own interests and desires.
In the context o f reconciliation, the work o f  coming to know the other is m ade
several degrees more difficult than in an ordinary encounter with an individual who is not
one's former enem y. The others with whom we seek reconciliation are generally o f
different cultures, likely to be different from us in ways that challenge our ability to
com m unicate. W e may speak different languages or dialects, w e may have disparate styles
o f com m unicating, we may follow different custom s even for greeting guests. T he norms
governing each encounter, such as the ways in which we reveal or hide our em otional
responses, may cause us to m isunderstand each other. The frameworks and references we
use to make sense of ethical dilem m as are likely to  be different, and possibly, in som e
w ays, antithetical.
W hen we com e to know former enem ies, we must understand the plausibility and 
internal coherence of a cultural construct, a narrative, that they intersubjectively share with 
m em ber of their own group. The constructs o f the other alm ost always com e into conflict 
with aspects of our own beliefs, the understandings o f the w orld w e intersubjectively share 
w ith m em bers of our own communities. The extent o f  the intrusions o f an "other" into the 
"ego's" w orld, described by Levinas, can perhaps be understood by im agining the 
reciprocal interruptions that occur betw een Israelis and Palestinians when they encounter 
each other's discourses on 'Jerusalem ,' or 'Z ionism ,' or 'H olocaust,' o r ' 1 9 4 8 . ' ^
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To com e to perceive enem ies as deserving o f  moral consideration involves many 
things. It can mean com ing to  know  them as people w ith values and norm s, and as capable 
of and willing to assess past and fu ture  actions in light o f  those values and norms. It can 
mean becom ing aware of the h istory  and culture of the other g ro u p -to  understand the 
accom plishm ents and the aspirations through which their moral sensibilities are represented 
and engendered. In the context o f  reconciliation, w here people strive to see each other as 
moral beings after a period o f reciprocal dehum anization, moral visibility alw ays entails 
understanding each other's pain an d  suffering, In o rder to com prehend w hat is involved in 
enem ies com ing to understand each  other, then, we m ust inquire, at least briefly, into the 
nature o f  pain and suffering.
The Paradoxes o f  Pain
Pain is present at birth bu t it can warn o f death. It can indicate changes in a system 
that are both growthful and destructive. Pain is aversive, but unchosen num bness to pain 
can be "life-threatening for an organism  and m orally hazardous for a society" (M orris, 
1991). The psychologist and philosopher D avid Bakan (1968) writes that "pain is entirely 
intertwined with the question o f hum an existence. Its very salience precipitates questions 
about the m eaning o f  life" (p. 57).
Pain is a phenomenon that finds its m eaning at the intersection of m ind, body and 
culture. Historically, attempts to classify the phenom enon of pain have resulted in a range 
o f conceptions from those that take  it to be a sense (A ristotle) or em otion (Spinoza), to 
stim ulus or response (physiological psychologists) (Bakan, 1968, p. 63). Until recently, 
with the advent of "pain clinics" in  response to an apparent epidem ic o f chronic pain, the 
medical establishment generally treated pain as though it were entirely physiological. It is 
clear, however, that pain is also contingent upon a dim ension o f consciousness, and 
therefore the engagem ent of the m ind: the body o f a  person in a com a or under general 
anaesthesia may be penetrated o r  cut, but because he  or she is not conscious, w e w ould 
refrain from  using the word 'pa in ' to describe her condition or experience. W hen
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experienced with prolonged intensity, physical pain can cause mental anguish; conversely, 
in m any people, prolonged and intense mental anguish finds expression in physical 
sym ptom s.
A central feature o f  pain is its aversiveness, or unpleasantness (Scarry, 1985, 
p.31; Zborow ski, 1969, pp. 2 8 -2 9 ). 18 it is the very aversiveness of pain, how ever, that 
seems to have made it biologically adaptive. One of its primary functions appears to be to 
warn, bringing to consciousness an injury or disease that represents a threat to the 
organism 's integrity. For instance, in an injured body part the pain threshold usually is 
lowered, resulting in a decrease in m ovement, and, therefore, often, the prom otion o f 
healing.
Although pain is universally experienced with a degree of aversiveness, its meaning 
is evaluated by hum an beings according to its function as defined by human culture 
(Zborowski, 1969, p. 27). In fact, m any contem porary thinkers, even w ithin the medical 
establishm ent, understand pain not as sensation, but rather as perception, a form  of 
experience in which consciousness, em otion, meaning and social context all play a part. In 
its extrem e forms, pain can obliterate the capacity for language, a topic to which we return 
in the next chapter. But, in general, whether individuals tend to seek expression for their 
pain or keep it silent and hidden may have more to do with cultural or situational norms 
than w ith the severity of the injury. jn certain cultures and eras, pain has been 
associated with beneficent qualities. M ystics and visionaries have believed that the pain o f 
the body "inspires a pain of the soul that expands rather than contracts the soul's pow er of 
vision" (M orris, 1991, p. 192). In some cultural settings, pain has been associated with 
redem ption, beauty, passion and truth.
The extent and limits o f the interpretive dimension of pain becom e apparent in an 
extrem e case: the conflation o f  pain and pleasure that characterized the vision o f M arquis de 
Sade. D avid M orris (1991) writes that this conflation "depends on a paradoxically 
deadening o f the em otions in order that cruelty might be enjoyed to the utm ost....The
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libertine is paradoxically both hypersensitive and num b....Sade shows us w hat can happen 
in any culture when pain -  redefined as a m ere shuttle o f  electrical im pulses-has lost all 
m em ory o f  the tragic" (p. 210).
For purposes o f this inquiry into reconciliation, it is sufficient to be aware that pain 
is a phenom enon with interacting physiological, cognitive and cultural dimensions. To 
understand a form er enemy's expressions of pain will require knowledge of cultural 
conventions that govern its expression, alertness to the interplay of its em otional, physical 
and cultural manifestations, and openness to the evolving meanings our form er adversaries 
make of their pain.
The M eanings of Suffering
'Suffering' is a concept that has an even stronger interpretive dim ension than does 
'pain.' It refers to "thoughts about pain," or "a kind of dam age that afflicts mind, soul or 
spirit as well as the body" (M orris, 1991, p. 246). Behaviorists or clinicians who refer to 
pain as a purely physiological phenom enon define suffering as "our em otional response to 
pain" (M orris, 1991, p. 143). The B uddhist teacher Charlotte Joko Beck (1993) illustrates 
the distinction between pain and suffering w ith a story about a friend who had had an 
operation. She found that in the days im m ediately following surgery, her pain was "clear, 
clean and sharp; it was no problem ." But, as she becam e stronger, and her mind began to 
w ork, all her thoughts and fears about her circum stances began to appear. It was then that 
her suffering began (Beck, 1993, p. 105).
It is a delicate m atter to suggest that individuals, especially those who are victims o f 
violence or oppression, contribute to their own suffering. Such a perspective can be 
abused to blame victim s rather than the perpetrators o f crimes, as, not infrequently, has 
been done in instances of racial and gender-based oppression. It also can be used to deny 
the extent of a victim 's disem powerm ent, or the m ultifaceted nature of the assaults on 
integrity that occur in contexts o f violence and oppression. To recognize that suffering is in 
part a  m atter o f interpretation can divert people's attention away from  the necessary,
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difficult work involved in making econom ic and political structures m ore just. The 
educational work o f  reconciliation m ust not fall into these traps.
N evertheless, to ignore the ways in which suffering is frequently, in part, a matter 
o f  interpretation, is to forego the degree o f power that people in pain can assum e in relation 
to their condition. Psychological attachment to the status of victim hood is a circumstance 
that can have devastating consequences for both the victim and for efforts at reconciliation. 
The im portance o f m aking a conscious choice about how we approach our own pain and 
suffering is the centerpiece o f the philosophy o f  Viktor Frankl (1984), a survivor o f 
A uschw itz and a writer and psychoanalyst. It is the quest for meaning, he claims, the 
creates the possibility o f survival, even in the face o f  an "intolerable abyss of suffering."
According to the political scientist Paul Salem (1993) the assumption that pain and 
suffering are bad (and, conversely, that pleasure or comfort are good) is an attitude that 
derives from  the philosophical tradition o f Utilitarianism, and underlies many W estern 
approaches to conflict resolution. In other cultures, he writes, "the justice or m orality o f 
the cause" may "strike a more resonant philosophical chord" (p. 363). Except in the middle 
and upper econom ic strata o f post-w ar W estern societies, discom fort and suffering are 
"fam iliar com panions o f life. ...The suffering or discom fort associated with conflict 
...blends in with a fabric of discom fort and suffering that em braces m ost aspects o f  
life...W here discom fort is widespread, people give...m ore im portance to the justice  or 
outcom e o f  the dispute" (p. 364). Salem argues that in the Arab world, physical pain is not 
necessarily  worse than nonphysical losses like "loss o f honor, loss o f  patrim ony, loss of 
face, etc." (p. 365).
The Buddhist tradition offers a particular conception of suffering. According to this 
view, we all inevitably suffer because life is constantly changing. W e know that we can't 
hold on to pleasant things, and w e know that even if unpleasantness disappears, it can 
com e again (Beck, 1989, p. 106). H um an suffering is im plicit in life; to resist awareness 
o f it is to condem n oneself to ignorance and deception. Furtherm ore, by recognizing
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suffering's universality, w e can relieve a certain amount o f anxiety associated w ith it; 
recognition of the fact o f suffering, therefore, is paradoxically "the first step tow ards its 
m itigation" (Sivaraksa, 1992, p. 64.)
Som e human suffering, however, such as that caused by economic exploitation and 
war, is susceptible to relief. A ccording to Thich Nhat Hanh (1992), it is the disciplined use 
of the contem plative pow er o f  the m ind that holds the key to reducing not only our own 
suffering, but others' as well. Our w illingness to be present to the depths o f suffering, "to 
becom e one with the object o f  our observation," (p.82) he writes, can lead to a quality of 
understanding and com passionate action that might alleviate another's suffering.
For the educational processes o f  reconciliation, it is important to rem em ber that 
suffering is an experience that has physical, psychological, cultural, spiritual and emotional 
dim ensions. It is a phenom enon w hich allows for, and often seem s to call for, the 
ascription o f  meaning. W hether and how w e are present to our own and each other's 
suffering is, in part, a m atter o f choice. And w hat our ow n or another's suffering m ight 
"mean," as well as the course it m ight take, are not independent of whether the pain can be 
expressed and how the suffering is perceived, and responded to, by others.
Suffering for the Suffering o f Som eone Else
Reconciliation requires disputants to make choices about whether, and how, to be 
present to suffering. It offers form er enem ies the possibility to influence the course and the 
m eaning o f their own and each other's pain.
Emmanuel Levinas (1988) grappled with the meaning of suffering, a phenom enon 
that, initially, he found to be "useless." A lthough he considered suffering, in its "extrem e 
passivity, im potence, abandonm ent and solitude" to be "evil," he noted that suffering 
presents the
possibility that w herever a  moan, a cry, a groan or a sigh happen there is the 
original call for aid, for curative help, for help form the other ego w hose 
alterity, w hose exteriority prom ises salvation. It is the original opening 
toward w hat is helpful, where the prim ordial, irreducible, and ethical, 
anthropological category o f the medical comes to impose itse lf-across a 
dem and for analgesia, m ore pressing, more urgent in the groan than a dem and
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for consolation or postponem ent of death. For pure suffering, w hich is 
intrinsically meaningless and condem ned to itself w ithout exit, a beyond takes 
shape in the inter-hum an....
In this perspective a radical difference develops between suffering in 
the O ther which for me is unpardonable and solicits me and calls me, and 
suffering in me, my own adventure o f  suffering, w hose constitutional or 
congenital uselessness can take on a meaning, the only meaning to which 
suffering is susceptible, in becom ing a suffering for the su ffe rin g -b e  it 
inexorable--of someone else. It is this attention to the O ther which, across the 
cruelties o f our century-despite these cruelties, because of these cruelties -  
can be  affirm ed as the very bond of hum an subjectivity, even to the point of 
being raised to a supreme ethical p rinc ipal-the  only one which it is not 
possible to co n te s t-a  principle which can go so far as to com m and the hopes 
and practical discipline of vast hum an groups (p, 158).
In Levinas' view, a  purpose and m eaning for suffering can be found when we
suffer fo r  the suffering o f  another, when, in o ther words, we choose (w ithout any
assum ption o f  reciprocity) an attitude o f com passion toward, and responsibility for, the
other. It is in  this altruism  that the "ethical position o f  the self as self" is inscribed (p. 165).
W hat transforms us, writes David M orris (1 9 9 1), is our choice to open ourselves to
the ethical claim s o f the others' suffering: for our com passion, our aid, our response. In
contexts of reconciliation following violent conflicts, where suffering is likely to have been
experienced by all parties, we can choose to use the experience of our own suffering to
enhance our understanding of the suffering o f our form er enemy. It takes effort to do this,
especially because our enemies are implicated in our suffering (as we are in theirs).
Suffering, in itself, does not naturally lead to  com passion; but, com passion is an attitude
tow ard suffering that can be nourished. W ith intention and e ffo rt-th a t often includes
healing our ow n w ounds and m ourning our own losses—our ow n experiences o f suffering,
and our reflections upon them, may enhance our capacity to choose a skillful and
com passionate response to the suffering o f others.
Presence to Pain, Suffering and Loss
U nderstanding the cultural and interpretive dim ensions of pain and suffering helps
us to critique Scarry's assertion that to perceive pain is autom atically to w ish it away. In
spite of, and in som e cases because of pain's aversive nature, there are situations in which
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
it is tolerated, w elcom ed and even sought: to provoke the transform ations of consciousness 
that are part o f religious rituals, for instance, or as the signal of a  needed separation, as in 
the instance o f  childbirth. By the very intensity of its sentience, in some contexts pain 
brings the (at least momentary) reassurance of life. Since pain can be a sign o f growth as 
well as death, to automatically wish it away might mean rem oving an important impetus to 
developm ent.
Ironically, Scarry's insistence on the w ishing-away o f pain may interfere with the 
m ost benevolent and useful response we can have towards another's suffering: to be 
present to its depths w ith the paradoxically paired qualities o f  feelingful awareness, alert 
calm ness and engaged detachm ent. To understand another's suffering requires us to 
understand its physical, emotional, cultural, political and spiritual causes and 
m anifestations. This awareness is not based primarily on a desire to change som ething; it 
is based, first, in a w illingness to acknowledge and be present to w hat is. The capacity to 
be receptive, to listen, is at the heart o f feelingful awareness.
"To be present to what is" requires an engagem ent o f  m ore than rational faculties. 
O ur awareness will be incomplete if it ignores the em otional and bodily dim ensions of 
suffering, dim ensions that can be apprehended m ost readily when our own feelings are 
engaged. Furtherm ore, an unwillingness or inability to feel can have the effect of blocking 
or distorting perceptions. T o  be feelingfully aware means to be open to the apprehensions 
o f  our senses and our intuitions. It allow s us to bring to consciousness inform ation that 
often eludes language, rational acknowledgem ent and appraisal.
In terms o f  the w ork of reconciliation, when w e seek to understand an enem y's 
suffering, we are bound to encounter within the other's explanations ideas w ith which we 
disagree, interpretations that might be based, in fact, cn  historical inaccuracies and negative 
o r even hostile  im pressions of sym bols we, ourselves, cherish. B eing present to another's 
suffering requires us first to understand the suffering as it is configured—and as it evolves— 
w ithin the interpretive world o f the other. If we begin by trying to "set straight" the record,
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or correct inaccuracies, our interventions likely will be perceived as attempts to invalidate 
the other's pain.
However, receptiveness to the set o f meanings and interpretations constructed by 
the other does not m ean that we m ust relinquish our own point o f view. W e may need 
tem porarily to suspend our own point o f view, in order to understand a perspective that is 
different, and often, in conflict w ith our own. Reconciliation requires us to be feelingfully 
aware of our own evolving interpretations as well as those o f the o th e r-so  that, at the 
appropriate time, we can present our own perspective, engage in dialogue, and w ork with 
our form er enemies to construct a shared understanding of the relevant history, or, at least, 
a shared understanding o f our different points o f view.
Dori Laub (1992), a psychoanalyst and oral historian of H olocaust survivors, 
describes a quality o f  vitality and energy that listeners must bring to testimony o f great 
traum a in order to keep alive the w itnessing itself. In describing the quality of presence 
required for reconciliation as "alertness" I refer in part to this quality o f  vitality. I also wish 
to evoke a sense of active understanding, o f eagerness to hear, o f openness to the 
im plications o f the stories, o f  seeking to understand the interconnections am ong what may 
at first seem to be disparate experiences. Alertness allows us to attend to silences as well as 
to speech. Reconciliation requires us to be alert to the meanings our form er enem ies make 
o f  their experiences, to support their processes of m eaning-m aking (and m eaning-revising), 
and, sim ultaneously, to be engaged ourselves in an on-going process of interpretation and 
re-interpretation o f both our own and the others' stories.
Although it may at first seem  to be a contradiction, reconciliation is best served 
when the mental action o f  this alertness can take place within a fram ework of calm ness.
The calm ness is im portant because it allows for a responsiveness, an openness into which 
other's pain and suffering can be expressed, explored, reconsidered and transform ed. W e 
can cultivate the capacity for calm ness within ourselves by remaining aware that, as
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Sivaraksa (1992) writes, "crisis, tension, m isunderstanding and discom fort"- and, we 
w ould add, suffering itself--"are a part o f  life" (p. 88).
W hat is the quality o f presence to our own and each other's suffering required by 
the work of reconciliation? Since im plicit within our conception of reconciliation is the 
notion o f transformation, our presence to ourselves and our adversaries m ust be 
sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility o f change. At the very least, then, our 
presence towards our own and each other's suffering m ust not be rigid—either in avoidance 
of the suffering, nor in attachment to it. It is im perative that w e understand each other's 
suffering, but without becoming so overw helm ed that we are paralyzed by sham e or 
num bed by despair. In other words, we m ust find a balance o f engagem ent and 
detachment: a presence that makes room for our own and the other's feelings, experiences 
and interpretations, and allows for transform ation.
The state o f "feelingful awareness" includes the realms of both thought and 
em otions, cognition and sensation, contem plation and inquiry—directed both toward the 
self and the other. The paradoxical qualities of feelingful awareness, alert calm ness and 
engaged detachm ent characterize a way o f being present that can enhance our understanding 
of—and in som e cases transform -suffering , both our own and our enem ies'.
The idea that we can choose to use our own experiences of suffering to understand 
the suffering of our form er enemies illustrates one way in which adversaries' 
understanding o f themselves and each other are intertwined. T he understanding of 
suffering also illustrates that how w e know—both how deeply we com prehend, and the 
qualities of presence we bring to our inquiry—in itself has ethical implications. In this case, 
how  we understand another's suffering can alter its course: at least by relieving the 
aversiveness of isolation, perhaps by  creating the possibility for an expression o f  the 
suffering that is, itself, transform ative.20
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There is an interdependence between enem ies' understanding o f  themselves and 
each other, and also between these understandings and both parties' capacities for moral 
action. W e refer to this ethical and epistemological interdependence as 'transsubjectivity.'
Transsubjectivity
'Transsubjectivity,' we recall from Chapter 1, is a word used by Gaston Bachelard 
(1994) to refer to the ways in which poetic images "react on other minds and in other 
hearts, despite all barriers of com m on sense....A t the level of the poetic image, the duality 
o f subject and object is iridescent, shimmering, unceasingly active in its inversions" (p. 
xix).
To understand a poetic image, we must pay attention to how it reverberates within 
us. O ur attention "shimmers" back and forth betw een our own response and the image 
itself, constructing new meanings out of those reverberations. The image in the poem 
allows us to experience, perceive or understand som ething previously unknown about 
ourselves; and, conversely, it is by attending to w hat is evoked within us that w e are able to 
understand the poetic image. Being present to and understanding a poem can, in itself, 
alter a reader, who enters into a state o f receptivity to the poetic image, to its resonances 
and reverberations w ithin her, and to the "unceasingly active" inversions between them.
In a com parison that may at first seem peculiar, com ing to know an enemy is in 
som e ways like coming to know a poetic image. To understand how this m ight be a useful 
m etaphor, we first m ust consider recent theories about the nature o f enm ity. As we noted 
in the previous chapter, political psychologists theorize that children's sense o f ethnic or 
national identity is created in part through the "extem alization" o f pleasurable and wholly 
good im pulses onto symbols of the in-group. In a parallel process, unpleasurable 
phenom ena, or impulses labeled as 'bad' are attached to sym bols associated w ith the other, 
and, in particular, w ith the enemy. Volkan (1990) w rites that "since our enem ies serve as a 
reservoir o f our unconscious selves, they are unconsciously seen to some extent as being 
like us, although on a conscious level they should not seem  like us since they contain our
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unw anted aspect—those characteristics we vigorously reject" (p. 38). Im ages enem ies hold
of one another are often m irror images: "each side attributes the same virtues to itself and
vices to its enem y" (S tein, 1990, p. 73).
Because our im pressions o f our enemy are at least in part determ ined by our own
projections, to com e to know the enem y on its own terms threatens to confront us with
those aspects of ourselves we wish m ost passionately to hold at a distance. Furtherm ore,
our own group's self-definition is "often achieved in opposition to the enem y ... [and]
intragroup stability is often purchased through intergroup hostility" (Stein, 1990, p. 71).
To maintain an "enemy system" both adversaries are "locked into a perm anent
dance," in which their apprehension "of each other is governed largely by projections"
(Stein, 1990, p. 71). Especially in cases o f overt aggression, the stereotyped enem y is
devalued through dem onizing and dehum anizing attitudes and behaviors that allow us to
avoid feeling guilty about inflicting injury and destruction. To justify our violence, we
convince ourselves that the enemy is not only sub-human, but th rea ten ing -a  force from
which w e m ust defend ourselves. S ingle incidents are taken as evidence that the total fabric
of the enem y group is dem oniacal. These beliefs are supported by m embers of our fam ily,
our friends, the m edia, and, generally, political leaders (M oses, 1990, p. 53).
If, as psychoanalytic theorists o f  conflict assert, enem ies becom e receptacles for the
projection o f  negatively valued attributes o f ourselves, to perceive our enem y more
completely does entail com ing to know ourselves as well. The psychological
anthropologist H ow ard Stein w rites that
transcendence o f group-ism s can only be accom plished, and always 
incom pletely, as w e are able to relinquish and integrate the inner splits 
between "goodness" and "badness" that have led us throughout history to 
dichotom ize betw een idealized and disparaged groups.... Only by grieving 
over our ow n im perfectability and mortality, can we begin to perm it ourselves 
and others to be am bivalently, m ore fully, "human all too human," and not 
people the social and supernatural world w ith saints and dem ons. L iberation 
begins w ith an understanding o f  what w e need and use our indispensable 
enem ies for (p. 87).
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Stein's description o f how w e begin to transcend the seem ingly "perm anent dance" 
o f adversarial sym biosis captures the interplay of the understanding o f self and other that 
inform s the notion of 'transsubjectivity.'21 Like the shim m ering or iridescent quality of 
com ing to  know oneself through a poetic image (and a poetic image through its 
reverberations within us), com ing to know an enemy inevitably confronts us with new 
perceptions o f ourselves; those new perceptions, in turn, may allow for an even greater 
understanding of the other.
The interrelationship among former enemies' capacities both to understand and to 
act morally, are exem plified by the dynam ics that surround the phenomenon o f mourning, 
the grieving o f losses that is central to  the work o f reconciliation. The form er diplom at 
Joseph M ontville (1989) argues that "oppressors" can help "to heal the w ounds o f their 
victims and facilitate their ability to m ourn by the simple process of asking and receiving 
forgiveness" (M ontville, 1989, cited in Volkan, 1990, pp. 43-44). In "norm al m ourning," 
those who suffer losses m ove (albeit in a  non-linear, reiterative fashion) through stages of 
denial, bargaining, anger, sadness and acceptance. If  groups o r individuals fail to mourn, 
their self-esteem  is bound up w ith im ages of what has been lost; circum stances which they 
then try to recoup, often through violent aggression. Losses that haven't been m ourned 
may also be passed on to future generations. If the circum stances o f the losses generate 
intensive anger, rage can interfere w ith the ability to complete the cycle o f mourning, in 
turn leading to more violence. W hat can make a crucial difference in a group’s ability to 
mourn is recognition on the part of the world community and particularly from their 
o p p re sso r-o f the harm  inflicted. B y helping each other m oum  past losses, form er enem ies 
can relieve each other o f the need to  attem pt to "recoup ancient losses" (Volkan, 1990, 
pp. 43-44).
The interdependence inherent in transsubjectivity can also be seen in Buber's 
theory o f  I and Thou: the "I" that enters into relation with a being on its own terms is 
different from the "I" that objectifies the other. And what o f the "I" that dehum anizes and
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dem onizes the other? Several theorists o f  conflict resolution (Julius, 1990, p. 101; Moses,
1990, p. 53) suggest that it is not possible to dehum anize an other w ithout becoming
dehum anized ourselves, at least to some degree. A s Julius writes,
in the process o f walling off strong feelings and com partm entalizing ourselves, 
o f denying the humanity of others and generally losing touch with our powers 
o f empathy, we become m ore like that cold, calculating, and emotionless 
enem y than the so-called enemy himself! As w e deny dignity and respect to 
the other, we begin to lose our own hum anity and self respect (p. 101).
The interrelatedness of adversaries' images of each other and their respective
abilities to act ethically is the central theme o f Akbar S. Ahmed's (1992) book
Postm odernism  and Islam: Predicament and Promise, whose study o f the impact o f mass
m edia on the relations between W estern and Islamic societies is itself a gesture of
reconciliation. Although clear in his acknow ledgem ent of injustice and excesses, he brings
a breadth of historical and cultural know ledge to his generous understanding o f  the
suffering on all sides. He challenges both M uslim s and W esterners to look to their own
traditions to discover resources for the work o f  reconciliation. A hm ed notes the effects of
the one-dimensional picture o f  Saddam , and by extension, o f all Arabs, created 
during the G ulf crisis. It therefore dehum anized Arab civilization, reducing it 
to a nonsense. Arabs where shown either as playboys squandering money in 
European casinos, o r bully-boys terrorizing sm aller neighbours. For the 
American G I on the Arabian peninsula there was little difference between the 
Arabs he was defending and those he was to attack. Both were 'desert 
niggers'; and he had contributed a racist neologism . W hen the G I on 
television said 'I'm  here to kick ass', it was difficult to predict which 
posterior--friend or foe—was destined to receive the imprint o f  his undoubtedly 
large boot (p. 229).
Islam is essentially the religion o f equilibrium  and tolerance; suggesting and 
encouraging breadth of vision, global positions and the fulfillm ent of human 
destiny in the universe. Yet the non-M uslim  m edia, by their consistently 
ham m er-headed onslaught, have succeeded in portraying a negative image of 
it. They may even succeed in changing m uslim  character. M uslim s, because 
o f their gut response to the attack—both vehem ent and v itrio lic-are  failing to 
m aintain the essential features o f Islam  (p. 48).
O n the threshold of the twenty-first century the confrontation between Islam 
and the W est poses terrible internal dilem m as for both. The test for M uslim s is 
how to preserve the essence o f the Quranic message, o f adl and ahsan  [balance 
and com passion], ilm  and sabr  [knowledge and patience], w ithout it being 
reduced to an ancient and empty chant in our times; how to participate in the 
global civilization without their identity being obliterated...The challenge for 
those in the W est is how to expand the W estern idealistic notions of justice,
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equality, freedom and liberty beyond their borders to include all humanity and 
without appearing like nineteenth century imperialists; to reach out to those not 
of their civilization in friendship and sincerity. In both cases a  mutual 
understanding and w orking relationship are essential (pp. 264-265).
A Comparison o f Intersubjectivity and Transsubjectivity as Epistemological
and Ethical Concepts 
'Intersubjectivity ' and 'transsubjectivity' are terms that refer to two sets of 
epistem ological and ethical relationships that have important implications for reconciliation. 
'Intersubjectivity ' refers to the relationship between persons and the groups with which 
they identify; 'transsubjectivity' to the relationship between two or more entities (each 
com prised of persons and/or collectivities) that are different from, yet in relation to, each 
other. B oth o f these sets of relationships are epistem ological, because they refer to how the 
perceptions, understandings and constructed meanings o f  one entity in a relationship affect 
the perceptions, understandings and constructed m eanings o f  the other. T he relationships 
are also ethical, because they describe how each party's capacities for moral action of each 
party to the relationship are, at least to a degree, dependent upon the actions of the other 
party. Furtherm ore, the ethical and the epistemological dim ensions o f  these relationships 
are not distinct: there are ethical implications to the qualities of presence adversaries bring 
to their efforts to understand each other, and, conversely, the moral dim ensions of 
adversaries' actions affect each other's capacity to understand.
As concepts, both 'intersubjectivity' and 'transsubjectivity ' are epistem ologically 
and ethically neutral, in the sense that they can refer to morally abhorrent as well as morally 
virtuous actions, and to perceptions that are simplistic or misleading as well as 
understandings that are clear and insightful. Considered together, these two concepts help 
to explain why conflicts between identity groups (including both ethnic groups and nation­
states) can seem  so intractable.
'Intersubjectivity ' refers to the interem beddedness o f  individuals and the groups 
with w hich they identify, in terms o f both the conceptual fram ew orks used to interpret the
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world and capacities for agency. Although there is a sense in which reconciliation depends 
upon the possibility o f persons taking independent moral action and adopting critical 
stances towards the beliefs o f their own groups, intersubjectivity focuses our attention on 
the w ays that individuals carry within our m inds and bodies the discourses (which include 
both conceptual frameworks and the moral sensibilities) o f the groups with which we 
identify. Particularly powerful are those fram eworks into which we were socialized at very 
young ages. In relation to moral capacities, the extent o f group solidarity and support for 
an action, w hether it be benevolent or harmful, will influence the action's feasibility, its 
effectiveness, and the risk to the individual in undertaking it.
Conversely, 'intersubjectivity' also focuses our attention on the ways in which the 
policies and framing assumptions o f collectivities are in part constructions o f individuals. 
Collectivities enjoy authority in large measure through the tacit or explicit, willing or 
reluctant, acceptance of individual members. Change in groups occurs when individuals 
educate other m em bers o f  the group, influence policies o f  organizations, or present an 
im aginative and captivating re-interpretation of a traditional symbol. H ologram -like, the 
person is com prised in part by patterns of m eaning incorporated from  the group, and the 
group is com prised in part o f individuals, each m anifesting the cultural patterns within his 
or her consciousness and even w ithin processes of grow th and change.
These bundles o f intersubjectivity-collectivities and their m em bers-do  not exist in 
isolation. To the contrary, they exist and are defined in part in relation to other bundles of 
intersubjectivity. In concrete terms, for instance, one's sense o f being white, or Christian, 
or m ale is partly constructed through one's sense o f being different from  the qualities 
associated w ith being Black or H ispanic, or Jewish or M uslim , or female.
In cases of enm ity and oppressive relationships, collectivities define themselves 
partly in opposition to each other. As we noted above, it is not unusual for enem ies to 
perceive each other as exact mirror images, each attributing the sam e set o f favorable values 
to their own group, and the same set o f negative values to the other. T o  more com pletely
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understand our enem y, therefore, requires us to be willing to accept our own less desirable 
traits, and to grieve over our own imperfections.
The interdependence o f adversaries' understandings of them selves and each other— 
both in the case o f  the distorted perceptions o f  enmity and the m ore complete 
understandings associated with reconciliation-is one aspect o f transsubjectivity. Although 
at first glance, enem ies may seem  other, different or separate, on closer inspection we see 
that enem ies' capacities to understand both themselves and each other, and their capacities 
for moral action (towards themselves and each other) reside partly inside o f each other.
For instance, to understand the "meaning" or the moral significance of the actions or 
policies of one's own nation, it is not sufficient to assess those actions o r policies only in 
terms o f  the am bitions o f that nation. W e can only understand the moral significance of 
actions and policies in light o f their impacts on all those affected, including those whose 
voices may have been silenced or dim inished by the action in question. For exam ple, the 
significance o f the western expansion o f the United States, presented to schoolchildren 
under the rubric o f 'm an ifest destiny,' can be more fully understood if the analysis gives 
weight to  the harms done to Native American peoples and cultures. To assess the morality 
of Israel's 'law o f  return' it is insufficient to consider only the increm ent o f security it may 
provide to Jew s throughout the world; it is necessary to acknowledge its im plications for 
Palestinians exiled from  their homes.
The interdependence o f enem ies' capacities for moral action is clearly illustrated in 
the effects that oppressors can have on their victims by the relatively sim ple process of 
asking for forgiveness, as we noted above. Oppressors' apologies offer victim s a degree 
of recognition and safety that can facilitate their ability to mourn losses, rather than seek to 
recoup them  by violent m eans. Apology and forgiveness is one way for enem ies to 
interrupt escalating cycles of violence and revenge.
W e see, therefore, that enem ies' capacities to understand them selves and each 
other, and their ability to act morally, are influenced by each other's understandings and
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actions. Furthermore, we see that the ethical and the epistemological are not easy to 
separate: part o f what we seek to understand is the moral significance of our own and each 
others' actions, and our choice to  deepen our understanding has, in itself, ethical 
consequences. Because recognition o f one's identity group appears to be such a powerful 
social need (a need for which individuals appear willing to m ake enorm ous sacrifice), the 
w illingness and ability o f adversaries to understand each other and to validate each other 
through their understanding, is an epistemological phenomenon with trem endous ethical 
implications. And because knowing enem ies involves understanding how they have 
suffered (within their own interpretive framework), the qualities of presence w e bring to 
our inqu iry -p resen t or aloof, open or defensive, com passionate or re luc tan t-affec t what 
our form er adversaries can rev ea l-an d  transform —by expressing their pain. A lthough there 
are m any aspects o f enmity systems over which individuals have little or no control, in 
m any circum stances, persons can choose an attitude o f com passion towards, and a m easure 
o f responsibility for, each other's suffering. They can use their own experiences o f 
suffering to help them  choose a skillful and compassionate response to the suffering o f 
their form er enemy.
T o understand the educational implications inherent in these last two ideas—the 
im portance o f mutual recognition and the possibility o f choosing a com passionate presence 
tow ards an enem y's su ffe rin g -w e m ust return to the notion of intersubjectivity. Each of 
the parties to this epistem ological and ethical encounter, as both knowers (or seekers) and 
as persons to be know n, are to som e degree em bodim ents o f  the discourses, the patterns o f 
meanings and values, that inscribe their groups. Their perceptions o f  each other to some 
degree are shaped by the constructs of their groups. W e qualify these assertions as being 
"to som e degree" because, although the constructs of identity groups m ay reside 
perm anently w ithin the recesses of personhood, people can increase their ability to  choose 
w hich o f those constructs to em brace and which to minimize, which to preserve and which
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to transform. The educational work o f reconciliation is directed towards the possibility of 
expanding people's abilities to  m ake such choices.
Conclusion
To com e to know our en em ies-in  the sense of knowing others that Levinas (1988) 
and Buber (1970) describe—requires us to take a critical stance towards the construction of 
reality that intersubjectively binds us to m em bers o f  our own group. It requires us to 
confront our fears about ourselves, powerful fears we have invested considerable energy in 
avoiding. As our image of the dehum anized other begins to soften, as we start to feel 
em pathy tow ards the adversary w hose suffering we ourselves have sought, we m ust 
confront feelings o f remorse and guilt.
This chapter refers to two choices that parties to reconciliation m ust be supported to 
make: (1) the degree to which they wish to apply the constructs o f their own group to their 
efforts to understand their adversary, and (2) whether, and how, to use their own 
experiences (o f suffering, in this case) to understand their form er adversaries' experience. 
Part o f  the educational task o f  reconciliation is to enhance participants' capacities to 
understand these as matters o f choice.
In this chapter, we have analyzed the understanding of the suffering o f  one's 
enem y, one of the five criteria o f reconciliation. By exam ining in some depth the nature of 
suffering, and the qualities o f  presence required to apprehend and transform  it, we 
discovered the extent to which enem ies' ethical capacities are intertwined with each other. 
W e adapted Gaston Bachelard's (1994) term  'transsubjectivity' to refer to the iridescent 
qualities o f  enem ies' perceptions of them selves and each other, as well as to their ethical 
interdependence. The com plicated intersections between intersubjectivity and 
transsubjectivity-betw een the ethical and epistemological interem beddedness o f an 
individual w ith his or her ow n group, on the one hand, and the ethical and epistem ological 
interdependence o f former enem ies, on the o ther-shape the educational challenges inherent 
in the work o f reconciliation.
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To com e to understand a former enemy, to come to perceive a form er enemy as a 
being deserving o f moral consideration, requires many cognitive skills and em otional 
sensibilities, and, importantly, meta-level aw arenesses of these skills and sensibilities. To 
engage in reconciliation also requires moral imagination and a willingness to trust. Many 
of these capacities, however, are impaired by the very violence and oppression that 
reconciliation seeks to address. In the next chapter, the final one in this section on 
reconciliation, we consider the effects o f violence on the moral capacities required for this 
difficult work.
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CHAPTER 6
TH E EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE ON TH E M O RA L CAPACITIES 
REQUIRED FOR THE W ORK O F RECONCILIATION
Violence, as noted in Chapter 2, is sometimes defined as the intentional 
underm ining o f another's capacity for agency. It is not surprising, therefore, that people 
who have been involved in long-standing violent conflicts must recover capacities that have 
been dam aged or eclipsed. In this chapter, I consider how violence can im pair the 
capacities of both victims and perpetrators. This inquiry explains why, so often, the 
educational agenda of reconciliation must include not ju st the recognition, but the repair, of 
m oral capacities. It also dem onstrates why linguistic m odes o f expression often prove 
insufficient to the expressive and communicative challenges inherent in the work o f 
reconciliation.
In the first section o f  this chapter, I discuss how violence can becom e addictive, 
erasing the thoughts and feelings that might lead perpetrators to refrain from inflicting more 
harm . Then, in the next three sections, I assess the likely effects of violent conflicts on 
victim s, including their capacities for linguistic expression, physical and em otional 
integrity, im agination and creativity. These three sections draw  heavily on Elaine Scarry's 
(1985) analysis o f torture and war, as explicated in her work The Body in Pain: The 
M aking and Unmaking o f  the World. The final section of this chapter returns to a theme 
central to our conception o f reconciliation: the capacity to trust. In som e cases, violence 
can im pair victim s' capacities to trust, and even to assess w hen situations warrant trust.
This chapter concludes with a brief summary o f  the educational challenges inherent 
in reconciliation, as we have com e to understand the concept in Chapters 2 through 6.
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The Addictive Nature o f  Violence
W hen we think o f violence diminishing people 's capacities, our attention may
naturally be drawn to effects on victims. But engaging in violence can also im pair the
moral capacities of those who perpetrate it or who bear its legacy. Feelings of guilt and
shame, or rigidly held defensive postures can interfere with flexible thinking and
com passionate response. This was at first the case, for instance, am ong the Germ an
students who w orked with Bjorn K rondorfer (1995) in the reconciliation efforts we
described in Chapter 2.22
In this chapter we consider how one particular quality of violence can interfere with
perpetrators' moral capacities: violence can become addictive, perpetuating itself through
the very misery it causes. Sissela Bok (1989) makes the following com m entary on Simone
W eil's understanding of the intoxicating quality of violence. Violence can:
numb both feelings and reason, so that those in its sway no longer m ake room 
for what she called "that halt, that interval o f hesitation, wherein lies all our 
consideration for our brothers in humanity." It is this interval o f  hesitation, of 
reflection, that perm its us to think o f  the moral dim ensions of w hat we as 
human beings do to and for each other; of what we ow e to ourselves, to 
m embers o f our own groups and com m unities, and to others, even our 
adversaries....V iolence calls out for still greater violence, not only in 
retaliation against those who have killed one's com rades but also in self­
protection, for it helps block out the thoughts that would otherw ise 'tear at the 
soul' (pp. 10-11).
W eil (1956) writes o f the Greeks and Trojans, so worn down by years o f fighting, that
they still believed that liberation could be possible only through further carnage:
Any other solution, more m oderate, more reasonable in character, w ould 
expose the m ind to suffering so naked, so violent, that it could not be borne, 
even as m em ory. Terror, grief, exhaustion, slaughter, the annihilation of 
com rades-is  it credible that these things should not continually tear at the 
soul, if the intoxication o f force had not intervened to drown them ? (Weil, 
quoted in Bok, 1989, p. 11).
W eil and B ok describe violence as a kind o f self-perpetuating addiction, that 
com pels those who participate in it to continue. The only way to avoid experiencing the 
suffering, the devastation, that one's violence has wrought is to continue the violence itself. 
Being numbed to the suffering caused by violence is, in a sense, the opposite o f being
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"feelingfully aware." It is this numbing, a  choice not to know, (or not to know 
feelingfully) that allows one to continue to perpetrate violence.
Becoming addicted to the numbing effects o f  violence illustrates one way in which 
the moral capacities of perpetrators can be impaired. The rest o f the chapter focuses on 
how violence can im pair the capacities of victims.
The Effects o f Violence on Capacities for Linguistic Expression and for Listening 
"Outside o f the continuing conversation of community," writes the philosopher 
Charles Taylor (1985) "human agency would be not just impossible, but inconceivable" 
(p.8). Language (understood as shared system s o f symbolic expression) is the m edium  
through which human beings create meaning, think thoughts, interpret feelings and 
com m unicate with each other. Since human interpretations o f se lf are drawn from the 
interchange the community carries on, language is inherent to the notion o f  intersubjectivity 
and indispensable to  moral agency.
The work o f  reconciliation depends on communication. Disputants m ust com e to 
understand the constructs that give m eaning to  each others' words. They m ust understand 
not only each other's injuries, but also the m eanings they ascribe to their losses. They 
m ust learn about each others' history, and their similar and different interpretations of the 
history they share.
However, the physical pain and em otional suffering caused by violence can destroy 
or infringe on victims' capacities to use language to describe their experiences. In this 
section, I focus on three forms o f  vio lence-bod ily  injury, psychological traum a, and the 
long-standing structural violence o f oppression-and  how each can im pair disputants' 
capacities for linguistic expression.
The Relative Inexpressibility of Physical Pain
The expression of the physical pain that accompanies bodily injury can be critical to 
the related processes o f  healing and com m unication, both necessary for reconciliation. For 
the sufferer, the expression of physical pain may be the only, o r the m ost im portant,
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avenue she or he has for reducing her own suffering. While w e may not be able to control 
the pain itself, we reclaim  a portion o f our selfhood by shaping the form o f our expression. 
The act of expression itself reasserts a m odest degree o f pow er in relation to one's 
experience. Expressions of suffering also m inim ize one o f pain's m ost aversive features: 
the extent to which it isolates us from others, from hum an beings who could respond with 
com passionate presence. Adequate expression o f pa in-adequate  enough to assist medical 
personnel in treating it correctly,23 or to convince the jury in a personal injury trial to 
award com pensation, or to stir the consciousness o f the world's citizens to protest the 
torture o f a prisoner—can contribute to pain's am elioration or even e l i m i n a t i o n . 24
However, because pain exists in the interior o f our bodies and has no object in the 
material world, we have little direct language for physical pain. It "passes m uch of its time 
in u tter inhum an silence," writes the literary scholar David M orris (1991, p. 3).
Furthermore, in its extreme forms, pain can actually obliterate the capacity for 
language, as speech devolves into m oans and cries. Scarry writes (1985):
[One] dimension o f  physical pain is its ability to destroy language, the 
pow er o f verbal objectification, a m ajor source o f our self-extension, a vehicle 
through which the pain could be lifted out into the world and eliminated.
Before destroying language, it first m onopolizes language, becom es its only 
subject: complaint, in many ways the nonpolitical equivalent o f confession, 
becom es the exclusive mode o f speech. Eventually the pain so deepens that 
the coherence of com plaint is displaced by the sounds anterior to learned 
language....
[Another] element o f physical pain, one that overlaps but is not quite 
coterminous with the previous elem ent, is its obliteration o f the contents of 
consciousness. Pain annihilates not only the objects o f  com plex thought and 
em otion but also the objects o f the m ost elem ental acts o f perception.... Pain 
begins by being "not o n e se lf  and ends by having elim inated all that is "not 
itself." A t first occurring only as an appalling but limited internal fact, it 
eventually occupies the entire body and spills out into the realm  beyond the 
body, takes over all that is inside and outside, make the two obscenely 
indistinguishable, and system atically destroys anything like language or world 
extension that is alien to itself and threatening to its claim s. Terrifying for its 
narrowness, it nevertheless exhausts and displaces all else until it seem s to 
becom e the single broad and om nipresent fact o f  existence (pp. 54-55).
It is unlikely that people w ho are in physical pain so intense that they have lost all
capacity for language will at that m om ent be participating in reconciliation efforts.
However, such intense physical pain is "rem em bered" in the body, and it will likely still
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defy linguistic expression later, when words are readily available to describe other domains
of experience. To help disputants' both regain the capacity for self-definition associated
w ith language, and also to  understand each other's suffering, efforts at reconciliation will
have to help restore, or else circumvent, these im paired capacities for linguistic expression.
Psychological T raum a and Silence: Insights from  Laub's w ork with H olocaust Survivors
The simultaneous near-impossibility and critical importance of the expression of
extrem e physical pain is also true for some victims o f  psychological traumas (that may, or
may not, include bodily injury). Like extrem e physical pain, life-shattering traumas can
also defy language, in this case because the events, though real, take place outside o f the
normal categories that allow them to be linked with other experiences, com prehended, and
recounted. This phenomenon is explored in detail by Dori Laub (1992), a psychoanalyst
and docum entor who works with survivors o f the Holocaust. The ambivalence that
survivors feel about bearing witness to their experience is explained by Laub in this way:
[The traum a survivor] profoundly fears such know ledge, shrinks away from 
it and is apt to close o ff at any m oment, w hen facing it...Such know ledge 
dissolves all barriers, breaks all boundaries o f time and place, o f  self and 
subjectivity. ..Speakers about traum a on som e level prefer silence so as to 
protect them selves from the fear of being listened to -a n d  o f listening to 
them selves...W hile silence is defeat, it serves them both as a sanctuary and as 
a place o f bondage. Silence is for them  a  fated exile, yet also a home, a 
destination, and a binding oath. To not return from this silence is the rule 
rather than the exception (p. 58).
As is the case with those who experience physical pain, to refrain from  speaking of 
psychological traum a has serious consequences. Laub (1992) presents cases o f survivors 
who, unable to speak of their experiences, construct and interpret their on-going 
relationships in ways that recreate the emotional isolation of the original trauma. The 
experiences they cannot speak in words instead leave their mark in the patterns o f their 
dom estic, social and vocational lives. Often, survivors' reticence or inability to speak of 
their experiences creates a "black hole" of silence between them and their children, a silence 
that insinuates itself into future generations.25
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David Morris (1991) considers the cultural significance of "the suffering o f  a 
com m unity or the brutalization of an entire race" (p. 51). The traumas o f  this century, he 
argues, continue inevitably to "affect how we think, how we interact, how w e feel. Pain 
on such an immeasurable order of magnitude will very likely defeat or cancel thought. The 
m ind simply blocks what it cannot com prehend, casting us back as a  culture on doomed 
escapes into amnesia, repression and denial. Quite literally, we can make nothing of it" 
(M orris, 1991, p. 51).
It is likely that many candidates for the work o f reconciliation will have witnessed 
the death of loved ones, sometimes by brutal means. T hey may have been assaulted 
sexually and/or wounded physically. They may have lost their homes and been torn from 
their com m unities. This sort o f violence destroys not just individual human lives, or 
relationships, or the material artifacts that people create together. It can also severely 
dam age the ability to trust and to create trusting hum an relationships (M ack, 1990, p. 121). 
Furtherm ore, the uprooting of com m unities, an occurrence not uncom m on in the violent 
conflicts of this century, can also destroy the systems o f sym bols that previously gave 
meaning and direction to lives, that otherw ise might have provided frameworks for the 
telling o f  stories, the w itnessing of the violence itself.
It is not surprising, then, that victims of such traum as may at first be unwilling or 
unable to speak o f  their experiences, to break through the silence Laub describes as both 
"sanctuary" and "bondage." W hen we design educational strategies for the work of 
reconciliation we m ust keep in m ind not only the ways in w hich physical pain can limit 
linguistic expression; we must address the silences that often accom pany psychological 
traum a as well.
T he Infringem ents on Linguistic Agency in Context o f Oppression
Lim its on the expressibility of suffering that both characterize and extend the 
injuriousness of intense physical pain and extrem e psychological traum a also feature 
centrally in contexts o f oppression, the structural violence that inscribes the personal and
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institutional relationships between dominant and dominated groups. W hether such
oppressive relationships are based on race, ethnicity, gender, class, sexual orientation or
other category of difference, part o f what defines oppression, and w hat allow s oppressive
structures to operate with minimal overt violence, is that the suppressed group takes on the
ideology o f the dom inant group. Through this ideological im position the worker com es to
believe that she or he is less creative, less deserving of the benefit o f labor than the
entrepreneur, and the wom an com es to believe that her opinions are less worthy than those
o f her husband or male colleague.
This "m ystification" (Bartky, 1995) takes place in part because the oppressed group
com es to perceive the world, including their images of them selves, through the language of
the oppressor. Sarah Hoagland (1989), in her book Lesbian Ethics, writes that "language
is the tool o f oppression," because
w e rem ain trapped in oppression when we perceive only w hat the oppressors 
perceive, when we are restricted to their values and categories. Language 
interests m e because of its insidiousness as a means of m aintaining a political 
perspective, and because of its susceptibility to change. However, language 
use has a contradictory dynamic for those under oppression—it is a matter 
both o f agreem ent and o f coercion: in using language w e participate in a 
consensus, often unwittingly; but our participation is also coerced (p. 14).
H oagland (1989) considers the linguistic hegem ony of the dom inant group to be an
im portant aspect o f the "de-moralization" that occurs w hen we, as m em bers o f oppressed
groups "go on" and "make choices under oppression." In the process, w e internalize the
values o f dom inance and subordination. In such circum stances, because we make
choices, we can still be considered moral agents, Hoagland writes, but our "ability  as moral
agents is being underm ined" (p. 213).
In som e instances o f oppression, the im position of a dom inant ideology through
language is overt, as when colonizing pow ers forbid indigenous people to speak their own
languages. For instance, Native A m erican children were punished when they spoke native
languages at the mandatory boarding schools run by the U nited States Bureau of Indian
Affairs. Sim ilarly, during the period of slavery, African people who spoke the sam e
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languages were often separated from each other. They were forbidden to use drum s to 
com m unicate from one plantation to another.
Other oppressive linguistic impositions take place through com m only accepted 
usages and m eanings that subtly but insidiously influence perception. For instance, until 
recently, the ubiquitously accepted convention of distinguishing between "M rs." and 
"M iss" in addressing women, in contrast with the single title "Mr." for both married and 
unm arried men, reflected and reproduced patriarchal ideology and relations. A similarly 
insidious exam ple is the association o f blackness w ith the negative qualities of evil and 
sadness, an association that pervades W estern literature.
"To exist, hum anly," writes Paulo Freire (1970), "is to name the w orld, to change 
it." In contexts of oppression, in which a dom inated group has internalized the constructs 
o f  the more powerful group, the w ork of reconciliation often begins with consciousness- 
raising, a processes Freire describes as 'conscientization.' The educational processes o f 
reconciliation m ust reflect a critical awareness o f both the transformative and the oppressive 
potential o f  language. In some cases it will be appropriate to elicit and amplify the 
indigenous oppositional discourses.
The Im portance of Listening
However, the understanding o f suffering and the acknow ledgm ent of injustice does 
not depend only the expression o f experience, w hether in linguistic o r other forms. It also 
requires disputants, including those who may them selves have suffered substantially, to 
listen to each other as they give voice to their experiences. Sensitive, patient and engaged 
listening can som etim es help those who are reluctant or terrified to speak and help others to 
create or re-create language that is adequate to their experience. However, this listening can 
be difficult for several reasons. Based on his experiences gathering testim ony from 
H olocaust survivors, Laub (1992) writes that the person who listens to the testim ony o f 
survivors o f trauma:
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
122
m ust listen to and  hear the silence, speaking mutely both in silence and in 
speech, both from  behind and from within the speech. He or she m ust 
recognize, acknow ledge and address that silence, even if this sim ply means 
resp ec t-an d  know ing how to wait. The listener to trauma needs to know  all 
this, so as to be  a guide and an explorer, a companion in a journey onto an 
uncharted land, a journey  the survivor cannot traverse or return from  alone...
T here is so m uch destruction recounted, so much death, so m uch loss, 
so m uch hopelessness, that there has to be an abundance o f  holding and of 
em otional investm ent in the encounter, to keep alive the witnessing narration; 
otherwise the whole experience of the testimony can end up in silence, in 
com plete w ithholding. Paradoxically enough, the interviewer has to be, thus, 
both unobtrusive, nondirective, and yet imminently present, active, in the lead 
(pp. 58-59, 71).
A ccording to Laub, the dem ands of such listening, even for a trained 
psychotherapist, are likely to give rise to a num ber o f  defenses within the listener, who 
seeks to protect him - or herself from  the images o f traum a and from  the onslaught o f 
existential questions inevitably raised by such narratives. These defenses range from 
paralysis and num bness, to  anger at the narrator, to a kind of hyperem otionality which 
m ight at first look like com passion but can simply "drown" the survivor in "the listener's 
defensive affectivity" (Laub, 1992, p. 73). How much more difficult it m ust be to achieve 
em pathetic aw areness of the other in contexts o f violence, when one's ow n people are 
suffering, when to  acknow ledge another's suffering may be interpreted as legitim ating their 
political claim s, w hen propaganda may have led us to regard their statem ents as untrue, and 
when, in fact, the opposing side m ay have exaggerated claims of its suffering for political 
ends.
As educators and m ediators working in contexts o f  conflict, a recognition of the 
im portance and difficulty of the listening, as well as of the telling, m ust be kept in m ind as 
we design the processes o f  reconciliation. Disputants may need help to expand the 
repertoire and pow er of their listening skills. In many cases, the m is-m atch betw een the 
needs o f  the teller and the capacities o f their former adversaries as potential listeners 
contributes to the need for m ediation and/or facilitation. M embers of the Am erican 
Psychiatric A ssociation 's T ask  Force and Com m ittee on Psychiatry and Foreign Affairs, 
who have facilitated w orkshops w ith Israeli, Egyptian, Palestinian and other M iddle
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
123
Eastern antagonists for several years, have discovered that groups that have suffered
repeated victimization become seemingly incapable of empathizing with the suffering of
another group. Analogous to the narcissism  o f individuals who can attend only to their
own needs, m embers of victimized groups seem to "have little capacity to grieve for the
hurts of other peoples, or to take responsibilities for the new victim s created by their
warlike actions'^ Mack, 1990, p. 125). To break the cycle:
a fundamental attitude o f healing or transcending conflict must be present in the 
third party conveners, who m ust constantly have their own ethno-nationalist 
pain and identifications well in hand. Second, all sides must do a great deal of 
listening to the telling o f  history, especially o f each group's hurts and its 
version o f  where responsibility has lain. Little by little, acknowledgm ent of 
the victim  experience o f another group can occur, first by the third party 
conveners, and finally, by the adversaries themselves in relation to each other.
In this way bonds can be forged between groups, so that they can begin to 
substitute mutual empathy for the egoism  of victimization (p. 126).
To sum m arize then, the expression o f  pain and suffering is important for the work 
of reconciliation. It is im portant for the teller, the one who is suffering, and the listener, 
the one who may have participated in causing the pain. The expression of suffering is 
important to the teller because it may help alleviate the pain and enhance capacity for self­
definition; and it is important to the listener, who m ust gain feelingful awareness o f the 
other's experience and relate com passionately to the form er adversary. There is a 
dialectical relationship between this comm unication about suffering and people's visibility 
to each other as trustworthy moral beings: the more we see each other as moral beings, the 
more we understand each other as vulnerable to sentience and capable o f  com passion; 
conversely, the m ore we understand each other's vulnerability and feel the w arm th o f  each 
other's com passion, the more likely it is that we will endow each other w ith the status of 
moral personhood.
Expression is im portant not only in term s of the understanding of suffering. 
Disputants' m ust be able to tell their stories, to represent their cultures and, especially, their 
understandings o f  the history relevant to the dispute. They m ust becom e visible to each
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other as moral be in g s-n o t only in their ability to feel pain and offer com passion, but also 
as persons capable of creating m eaning and acting in the world.
For these reasons, if  the capacities necessary for these com m unicative exchanges 
have been im paired through the conflict, or are absent for another reason, the processes of 
reconciliation must, in their initial stages, begin to restore them. This might mean that at 
first, facilitators work separately w ith each group. Alternatively, the educational processes 
of reconciliation can account for some reduced capacities by circumventing them, by, for 
instance, engaging disputants in non-linguistic forms o f expression and/or m aking use of 
m ediating persons and structures to facilitate communication.
The violence o f  w ar and oppression infringe on people's moral capacities by 
dim inishing disputants' abilities to express their experiences in language and to listen to 
each other's experiences o f  suffering. In the case of physical pain, this infringem ent o f 
voice is directly linked to the violation o f  people's physical integrity. The reduction o f 
capacities for verbal expression is only one way, however, in w hich physical injury has 
im portant ram ifications for the w ork of reconciliation. In the following section, we will 
consider other implications of the em bodied nature o f violent conflicts.
The Injured Body As Sign 
As we saw in the discussion of intersubjectivity, the constructs that define cultures 
find their way into the recesses of a  person's physical being--for instance, in our accents, 
our culinary preferences, and in the subtle ways in which we construct facial expressions 
and hold tensions in our bodies. It is not surprising, then, that in conflicts over com peting 
cultural constructs the body is altered, used, and invested with m eanings beyond its 
physical substance and processes. Bodies are important in conflicts and in the w ork of 
reconciliation not only in their physical existence, but because of their functions as signs.
The relative inexpressibility of physical pain, a  notion w e considered in the 
previous section, is the centerpiece o f E laine Scarry's (1985) theory about the uses o f the 
body in torture and war. The difficulty we have in finding language to express extrem e
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physical pain, coupled with the simultaneous certain realness o f pain for the sufferer and 
lack o f  certainty for the observer, have profound political consequences. It is possible, she 
claim s, for the "felt-attributes of pain"--i.e., its "compelling vibrancy or its incontestable 
reality or sim ply its certainty ... to be lifted into the visible world" but attached not to the 
actual person in pain, but rather to beliefs or constructs that lack "substantiation," or some 
m aterial basis o f authentication (Scarry, 1985, p. 13).
This linking of the body's certainty and realness to otherw ise unsubstantiated 
hum an constructs was perhaps first practiced in rituals o f hum an sacrifice, in which the 
opened body was brought into proximity with beliefs (in gods, for instance) that could not 
be verified in the visible world. In the history o f cultural developm ent, in m ost cases 
hum an sacrifice has been replaced by animal sacrifice, and then later with other forms o f 
substantiation (in edifices, rituals and texts, for instance). In som e religious rituals, such 
as the piercing of the body in Native American rites, beliefs are given credibility through 
the w ounding o f the body. An obvious and morally im portant difference between these 
rituals and the practice o f hum an sacrifice is, o f course, whose body is used in the 
substantiating, and under w hose direction.
Torture, a practice currently used in some one hundred countries,26 represents a 
gruesom e and contem porary case o f physical pain being m isappropriated away from its 
original site in the body, to lend an aura o f realness to an otherwise unsubstantiated 
construct. Illegitimate regimes, i.e., regimes lacking recognized legitimacy, seek to 
appropriate to themselves the certainty o f the pain of the tortured body. The regim e 
controls the "reference" for the pain, i.e., the construct to w hich the pain will lend 
substantiation, because its agents inflict pain so as to obliterate, intentionally, the victim's 
capacity for language. The victim  is m ade inescapably aware o f  his or her body; and the 
torturer appropriates to him self the pow er of the voice, the capacity to name. By engaging 
in the act of torture, the regime com m unicates its realness to  itself. The injured body o f  the 
prisoner is "read" as a sign of certainty, vibrancy and power. A ccording to Scarry (1985):
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
126
the failure to express pain—whether the failure to objectify its attribute or 
instead the failure...to refer them to their original site in the human b o d y -w ili 
always work to allow its appropriation and conflation w ith debased forms o f 
power; conversely the successful expression of pain will always w ork to 
expose and m ake impossible that appropriation and conflation (p. 14).
W ar is another circum stance in which w ounded hum an bodies are sought as signs
in order to legitim ate cultural constructs. In this case, advocates o f  two (or more)
com peting fictions seek to legitimate themselves and de-legitimate each other. Like torture,
w ar seeks to appropriate the "realness" and "certainty" o f the open, wounded body to a
political fiction, in this case to the as-yet-uncertain status of a construct, for instance, of
nationhood. W hat m akes the outcom e of war "abiding," according to Scarry, is not, as is
com m only believed, that one side loses its actual capacity to continue to fight. The
outcom e o f  war "is believed to and hence allowed to carry the power o f  its own
enforcem ent" (Scarry, 1985, p. 108) because o f  the nature o f "injuries-as-signs": they
m em orialize an activity that has occurred in the past, and, confer reality to a future-in-the-
m aking.
The dispute that leads to w ar involves a process by which each side 
calls into question the legitimacy and thereby erodes the reality of the other 
country 's issues, beliefs, ideas, self-conception....The injuring not only 
provides a m eans of choosing [a winner] but also provides, by its m assive 
opening of hum an bodies, a way of reconnecting the derealized and 
disem bodied beliefs w ith the force and pow er o f the m aterial world....
I f  the Ireland 'for w hich one dies' existed, an Ireland independent o f 
British rule, one w ould not be dying; if  the Israel 'for which one kills' 
existed, an Israel secure within boundaries acceptable to her population and 
population o f  her neighbors, one w ould not be killing.... [T]he United States 
that in 1861 one 'dies for,' a geographically and m orally unified nation, does 
not exist; the Northern boy kills because it does not exist; he brings it into 
being by his acts which are productive of the thing; ju s t as the country for 
which the Southern boy dies, one securely separate and autonom ous from  the 
North, does not exist and he brings it into being by his death. In this and 
every war, the injuring contest is a contest to see w hich one o f  the two not-yet 
existing countries w ill be produced in the outcom e....
[I]njuries produce the radical m aterial base for the w inning issues, 
investing them  with the bodily attribute of reality until there is time for both 
populations to consent to them , enact them , m ake them  real (Scarry, 1985, 
pp. 128-132).
Injuries can fulfill this function because of the "com pelling and vivid reality" of the 
hum an body, and, because that realness can be referred away from  the body, lending
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credibility to a fiction that, in the case o f torture, is often fraudulent, or, in the case o f  war, 
has not yet been m ade real.
In their attitudes tow ard violence, trust, suffering and injustice, war and 
reconciliation could not be  more different. But in one regard, they are similar. W ar and 
reconciliation both seek legitimacy for large-scale human fictions, or creations. Unlike in 
war, however, w here these fram eworks are determ ined in a contest of w inners and losers, 
reconciliation seeks to engage all parties in processes designed to meet the underlying needs 
of each.
It is interesting, in light of Scarry's theory about the role o f the injured body in 
substantiating fictional constructs, to note how efforts at reconciliation and non-violent 
resistance also take into account the role of the body lending authority to  as-yet-unrealized 
constructs. For instance, m any contem porary theorists and practitioners of reconciliation, 
including B jorn K rondorfer (1995) whose work with German and Jew ish young people 
was described in an earlier chapter, emphasize the importance o f ritual. One of the defining 
characteristics o f  rituals is that action is embodied: participants stand, sit, walk, eat, touch, 
dance, chant and move.
Gandhi's experim ents with satyagraha  also relied on the altered human body for 
substan tia tion-bu t it w as G andhi's own body that he made vulnerable, in the form o f 
extensive fasts (G andhi, 1961, pp. 310-324). In V iet Nam, several B uddhist m onks 
burned their own bodies to dem onstrate the urgency of peace. The w illingness to suffer 
among m any practitioners of non-violent resistance can perhaps be understood as the 
w illingness to use one's ow n body to lend legitim acy to one's beliefs.27
Educators involved in the work of reconciliation m ust take into account the 
im portance o f the body in several ways. W e must recognize that the fram ing constructs 
under revision are likely to be held not only in the language and consciousness o f those 
w ho have been in conflict, but in their bodies as well. Therefore, the "transform ative 
processes" that com prise the work of reconciliation will be m ost effective w hen they reach
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out to people in the recesses of their personhood, toward the gestures, postures, rhythm s 
and accents that embody their earliest learning.
Also, the revisions o f large-scale fictions that are accomplished through 
reconciliation (such as the constructs that define nations) will require substantiation. If this 
authentication or legitimization is not to take place through war, then we will need 
alternatives that can move people as primally, as viscerally, as the sight and feel o f a 
w ounded body.
Finally, educational efforts a t reconciliation must take into account the effects of 
traum a on the b o d y -b o th  how difficult it is for survivors o f intense physical and 
psychological pain to find language to express their suffering, and how traum as can be held 
in bodily and psychological rigidities that become impediments to both thinking and 
feeling.
W ar and Torture as Deconstructions o f Hum an Creating
In its "massive fact o f itself," according to Scarry (1985), war is "a huge structure 
for the derealization o f cultural constructs and, simultaneously, for their eventual 
reconstitution" (p. 137). This "eventual reconstitution," the re-ordering o f  large-scale 
fram ing assum ptions, is one way o f understanding war's purpose, an understanding that 
has m ade it d ifficult to achieve consensus on the immorality o f  war. In Scarry's sum m ary, 
political philosophers and military scholars have argued that "the world that has perm anent 
peace" w ould be '"less just' than one in which peace can be interrupted by war" (1985, 
p. 141). The fear is that a w orld w ithout war would freeze boundaries, trade 
arrangem ents, markets and ideological patterns into formations that would inevitably favor 
certain groups of people over others. This argum ent is supported by the fact that it is often 
the m ore pow erful adversary in the conflict who, ignoring the structural violence that is 
implicit in the institutional arrangem ents of systemic oppression and colonialization, 
clam ors for "peace."
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The morality of war, I believe, should not be assessed in com parison to 
unchallenged and unchanging structural inequities, but rather in com parison to other 
processes, m any perhaps yet unim agined, that groups could use to revise the large-scale 
fram ing assumptions, the "master narratives" that define and legitimate relationships among 
nations, land, beliefs ethnic groups and persons. In its modern forms, in which civilians 
often have becom e primary targets, in moral terms war may have more affinity with torture 
than with justice. One o f those com m onalities with particular salience for the w ork of 
reconciliation, is that both torture and war deconstruct the creative work o f civilization.
The purpose of the interrogations that accom pany torture, according to Scarry 
(1985), is not to gather inform ation, but rather to deconstruct the prisoner's voice.
Torturers typically first distort language, for instance by using the vocabulary o f com fort 
and dom esticity to refer to its barbarisms: the torture room is called the "guest house" in 
G reece and the "safe house" in the Philippines, for instance. Items that were created to 
sustain life and relieve suffering are used instead to inflict pain, torturers thereby subverting 
the m eaning of the objects o f consciousness. They invert the purpose of civ ilization’s 
artifacts: a room is used not for shelter, but for isolation and secrecy; verbal and material 
rem inders o f the institutions o f law, for instance, are used not for justice, but rather to 
contrive "evidence" in support o f injustice; the language, tools and even persons associated 
with the institution o f m edicine are used not to heal, but to injure. Torturers inflict pain so 
aversive that it obliterates all other aspects of consciousness. It is when their victim s have 
lost contact w ith their universe o f  m eanings that interrogators subvert the prisoner's own 
voice, forcing her or him  to "confess," and often, to betray com rades and loved ones. 
Finally, the pain of torture obliterates prisoners' capacities for language altogether (Scarry, 
1985, pp. 27-59).
Torture deconstructs civilization, as civilization is held in the consciousness o f its 
victims. It not only subverts the m eaning o f artifacts and language, it destroys that capacity 
for creating the meaning of those objects o f consciousness, the hum an capacity to nam e and
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to im agine. It is in this sense that the body in pain represents the "unm aking of the world,"
half of the subtitle o f Scarry's work.
In war, the contested cultural constructs are attacked not only in their em bodied
form, i.e., in the bodies and consciousness o f hum an beings, both soldiers and civilians,
but also in the artifacts of civilization: the buildings, homes, farms and cities that are the
physical manifestations that represent and recreate culture itself. Scarry (1985) writes that:
the declaration of war is the declaration that "reality" is now officially "up for 
grabs," is now officially not only to be suspended but system atically 
deconstructed, a deconstruction that will be carried far enough on both sides 
so that either one, if  designated the loser, will have less difficulty reim agining 
itself as "without" its disputed aspect of self-definition than it would 
im m ediately prior to the war. The lies, fictions, falsification, within war, 
though authored by particular kinds o f  speakers in any given instance 
(governm ent officials, journalists, generals, soldiers, factory workers) 
them selves together objectify and extend the formal fact of what war is, the 
suspension o f the reality of constructs, the systematic retraction of all benign 
form s o f substance from  the artifacts of civilization... (p. 137).
Like torture, war also reveals the structure of "unmaking"; its structure is the m irror
im age o f the structure of creating, which is, according to Scarry, a defining feature o f
civilization. It is the work of civilization to relieve the body o f the aversive aspects o f
sentience: first to imagine, and then to create, objects and non-material constructs that
allow the individual to attend less to  the exigencies o f  the body, and more to a larger, more
expansive world. Human beings first "make up" and then "make real" clothing, for
instance, to stabilize the body's temperature; houses, to create a zone o f  safety; furniture, to
relieve the body o f the problem  of weight. C ivilization involves not ju s t these processes of
m aking up and m aking real, but the on-going re-m aking o f the very processes o f  making,
so that maker, once relieved o f the immediate vulnerabilities o f  the body, can create for the
pleasure of creating, to fashion objects of beauty, and to celebrate and substantiate other
creations.
In torture and war, the objects o f  civilization are used not to relieve pain, but to 
inflict it; the intention is not to expand the torture victim 's or enem y's world, but to 
constrict it, so consciousness is once again consum ed w ith the exigencies o f  survival and
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the re lief of pain. Civilization's creations and its form s of creating are deconstructed, 
som etim es at the site o f the "making up" and sometimes at the site o f  the "made real."
In furthering its purpose, rearranging o f the fram ing assum ptions that define 
international relations, war assaults the physical, cultural, and political integrity o f people 
and groups on all sides. It should not be surprising, therefore, that often people's capacity 
for integrity will need to be restored in the early stages of reconciliation processes. Just as 
violence deconstructs hum an creating, destroying not only our creations but our capacity to 
create, reconciliation must reconstruct creating, by helping survivors not only to create new 
frameworks, but to restore and recreate creativity itself. Educators and mediators who seek 
to engage people in reconciliatory processes following violent conflicts must take into 
account the extent to which the massive destruction of the artifacts o f civilization are likely 
to have destroyed or eclipsed the various capacities necessary for reconciliation. As people 
witness the destruction of the objects of their cu ltu res-the  dem olition of Palestinian homes, 
the bom bing o f the library in Sarajevo, the defiling o f B uddhist temples and shrines in 
T ib e t-th ey  are experiencing an assault on the symbols that have imbued their personal and 
com m unal lives with meaning. These symbol systems com prise the constructs through 
which they perceive their worlds. T he confusion that results from  the shattering of such 
form ative constructs can im pair people's ability to think and feel w ith coherence and 
openness. Efforts at reconciliation may need to create opportunities for people to revive 
and revise traditional symbols, or invent new symbolic constructs through which to 
perceive and give meaning to their unfam iliar, and perhaps frightening, new circumstances.
Victimization and Infringements on the Capacity to Trust
"[T jorture has an indelible character," wrote Jean A m ery (1980), a Belgian Jew 
w ho had been captured by the N azis during his years in the Belgian resistance. "W hoever 
was tortured, stays tortured. Torture is ineradicably burned into him , even w hen no 
clinically objective traces can be detected" (p. 34). "[W jith the very first blow that 
descends on him  he loses som ething we will call 'trust in the world'" (pp. 28-29).
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The ability to trust, to establish trusting human relationships and to believe in the
possibility of a safe and meaningful life, are moral capacities so basic that they are often
overlooked. Y et w ithout the ability to trust--or at least to believe that trust is possible--the
work of reconciliation w ould be virtually impossible. This chapter ends w ith a brief
inquiry into the effects o f violence on victims' abilities to trust, drawing on insights of
political psychologists who have studied the roots o f terrorist violence. W e will see that,
like m any who have experienced torture, those who become perpetrators o f terrorism  have
them selves been violated in ways that have undermined their capacity to trust.
According to Joseph M ontville (1990) "ethnic victimization is a state o f  individual
and collective ethnic mind that occurs when the traditional structures that provide an
individual sense o f security and self-worth [are] shattered by aggressive, violent political
outsiders. V ictim hood can be characterized by either an extreme or persistent low-level
sense of m ortal vulnerability" (p. 169).
Individuals identify w ith ethnic victim hood when they suffer personally from  an
episode o f  physical violence. A sense of victimization ensues when the violence directed
against them  o r their group is clearly unjustifiable, when the assault represents a continuous
threat, and w hen it generates a basic fear of annihilation. Just as torture can leave a
psychological scar that is "indelible," so the experience of victimization can lead to
seem ingly perm anent effects, including a  "readiness to commit violence w ithout remorse."
(Olsson, 1990, p. 189). A ccording to the clinical psychologist Jeanne K nutson (1981),
who interviewed hundreds of victim s of political violence, in the United States, Ireland,
Iran, Cyprus and the M iddle East:
[o]ne never erases the identity o f a victim. The first blows m ake the victim  
perm anently on guard for the next attack by the victim izes Even if the la tte r-  
a tribe, another ethnic group or na tion-loses power or the ability to m ount a 
credible threat, the victim 's fear continues even if dim inished. A  life- 
preserving, prim itive belief in personal safety has been breached. Once 
having been terrorized, a victim  thus simultaneously grieves over the past and 
fears the future. A t base, this intense anxiety over future loss is driven by the 
sem i-conscious inner know ledge that passivity ensures victim ization. The
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genesis of political violence ... is the belief that...only continued activity in 
defense of one's self (one's group) adequately serves to reduce the threat o f  
further aggression against the self (Knutson, 1981, cited in M ontville, 1990, 
p. 170).
The political psychologist Rona Fields (1986) studied the cognitive, affective and 
moral developm ent of children in Northern Ireland, the M iddle East and Africa. She found 
that children growing up in conditions of ongoing violence have a very strong sense of 
right and wrong, but "seem to becom e truncated at the second level o f  moral 
developm ent....at which right and wrong [are viewed exclusively] in terms of their identity 
group" (Fields, 1986, p. 5). Such children grow up w ith a prevailing sense o f  
helplessness, "not ameliorated through observations o f parental efficacy," and become 
fixated in im potent rage (Fields, 1986, cited in O lsson, 1990, p. 190). For children who 
grow up in contexts of protracted ethnic violence and the apparent powerless o f  the adults 
o f  their own group, the world does not w arrant their trust. It cannot m eet their most 
fundam ental needs for safety and for a sense o f justice. The psychological scars o f  such 
violence lead some of those children to assert their personhood, their identity, through acts 
o f terror. And so begin intra-psychic and inter-ethnic cycles of fear, rage and agg ression - 
cycles that are difficult to interrupt, even when "objective" circum stances change.
Joseph M ontville (1990) believes there are some long-term strategies for healing 
such tragedies:
To deal with the violence of peoples who have been victimized solely because 
o f their ethnic identity requires processes o f analysis, recognition of historic 
injustices, contrition by the authors o f the injustices or their successors, and 
the com pletion of mourning o f  historic losses. These tasks are truly 
awesom e, but the ever-em erging knowledge o f human psychology points the 
way to strategies of healing that hold out previously unimagined hope for 
m ankind's future. To ignore this know ledge in the nuclear age also holds out 
the possibility o f unim aginable disaster for m ankind (p. 179).
Conclusion
As we have noted throughout these chapters on reconciliation, at its core, 
reconciliation is about the moral restructuring of relationships between form er adversaries.
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It requires and is constituted by processes through which people becom e visible to each 
other as moral beings.
V iolence is a form of resolving conflicts in which adversaries seek to "win" by 
dam aging and/or destroying each others' capacities for agency. In the context o f  violence, 
including both overt, physical destruction and the on-going structural violence of 
oppression, individuals and groups assault each others' worlds: their bodies and their 
constructions and the systems of symbols that give m eaning to personhood in the context 
o f com m unity. These reciprocal attacks on physical, cultural and political integrity often 
leave both persons and groups im paired -in  their capacities to speak, listen, think, feel, act, 
im agine and create. In conflicts characterized by  the asym m etrical distribution of power, 
the nature o f these infringements on moral capacity may differ in quality and degree for 
those w ith more and less, and different kinds o f  power. However, it is a likely possibility 
that all parties to conflicts may come into the process in need o f restoration of some of the 
capacities required by reconciliation.
Reconciliation is also a form o f  resolving conflicts. B ut in reconciliation, 
adversaries seek not to "win," but rather to create a new moral fram ew ork for their 
relationship, in which conflicts are addressed in ways that recognize and, in fact, enhance 
each others' integrity.
In this chapter, w e have considered why, so often, reconciliatory processes must be 
designed not sim ply to acknowledge disputants' moral capacities, but to restore them. We 
have exam ined how physical suffering, psychological traum a and long-standing oppression 
can im pair abilities for linguistic oppression, and also how violent conflicts in fact 
deconstruct the creative processes of civilization, intruding on the very sym bol systems that 
disputants may need make sense of, and articulate, their experiences. W e also have hinted 
at w hat kinds o f processes, and w hat m odes o f  expression, m ight serve to restore 
disputants' capacities for agency. The educational processes o f reconciliation will find 
special uses for modes o f  representation and expression that do not rely exclusively on
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discursive language, and that in themselves animate the whole person, revitalize em otions, 
and engage the imagination.
In these chapters on reconciliation, we have em phasized how people become 
m orally visible to each other in part through the recognition o f each others' suffering and 
com passion. To consider each other as worthy o f respect also requires adversaries to 
appreciate each other as creators o f meaning, as tellers of stories, and as inventors o f  
material and cultural artifacts that imbue life with significance. This is an important reason 
w hy the processes o f reconciliation must help adversaries appreciate each others' 
representations o f  history and culture. Sometimes the traditional rituals and artifacts are 
incorporated directly into the educational processes o f  reconciliation. In cases o f cultural 
dislocation, in w hich the salience or flexibility o f  traditional system s o f sym bols has been 
dim inished, educational efforts may need to help victims o f  such dislocations to revitalize, 
reinterpret and/or invent useful symbolic constructs through which to m ake meaning of 
their experiences.
Just w hen the shattering o f one's world calls forth despair, reconciliation requires 
an attitude o f hope for the future. To engage in reconciliation following prolonged violent 
conflict requires believing in the possibility of trust. M any people whose childhood 
identities are infused with experiences o f victimhood will need to engage in the painstaking 
work o f  rebuilding their capacity to trust.
A fter participating in the deconstruction of civilization, the deconstruction not only 
o f the m ade world, but the very processes o f creating, people w ho engage in reconciliation 
will likely need rem inders of the benevolent potential of hum an creativity. It has been the 
history o f civilization that human creations (most especially language and tools) re-create 
the processes o f imagining, substantiating and constructing. R econciliation offers the 
possibility that we can recreate the processes o f revising our largest fictions, the framing 
assum ptions that define nations, cultures, boundaries and beliefs. Its ends are furthered
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when its processes help people rem em ber the potential vitality, generativity, and 
benevolence o f  the human capacity to imagine.
A fter w itnessing the deconstruction of civilization through war, those w ho engage 
in reconciliation may need practice in both imagining and creating, in "making up" and 
"making real." Reconciliation, after all, asks those who engage in it to im agine and give 
form to the fiction we call "peace."
Summary o f the Educational and Ethical Challenges Inherent in Reconciliation 
Reconciliation is an educational and ethical concept. W e have conceptualized it as a 
set o f criteria that conflict resolution processes can aspire to meet. These criteria reflect one 
o f  the primary distinctions between reconciliation and m any other ways o f  resolving 
conflicts: the ends (of a relationship characterized by mutual respect, reciprocal 
understanding and com m itm ent to work towards a shared sense o f justice) are em bedded 
within the m eans, the processes o f reconciliation themselves.
As an educational concept, reconciliation reflects a com m itm ent to the restoration of 
impaired capacities and to a kind of understanding that em braces both rational and 
em otional sensibilities. As an ethical concept, it emphasizes the establishm ent of 
relationships based on warranted trust. Form er adversaries agree to recognize and support 
each other's integrity as moral agents and to create, collaboratively, a moral fram ew ork for 
their relationship. That framework, then, creates a context for the constructive, on-going 
resolution of conflicts as they em erge.
Reconciliation requires a  kind of understanding that in itself has ethical 
consequences. I have proposed conceptual fram eworks o f 'intersubjectivity ' and 
'transsubjectivity' to describe the complexity o f the epistemological and ethical 
relationships between individuals and the groups with which they identify, on the one 
hand, and among adversaries, on the other. W hether we choose to understand, how  
deeply w e understand, and the quality o f presence we bring to our quest for understanding:
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in them selves these choices can influence the course and meaning o f our own and our 
enem ies' suffering, our ability to act in ways that lessen the likelihood of further violence, 
and, therefore, even the outcome o f a conflict.
M ediators and mediating forms and processes are often required to help adversaries 
perceive each other outside o f the constructs of their ow n com m unities' discourses and the 
mutual suspicions of enmity. M ediating forms and processes can also play a role in 
restoring the capacities that may have been dam aged by violence, and in engendering the 
qualities of feelingful awareness, alert calmness and engaged detachm ent that, I have 
argued, allow for the transformations im plicit in our conception of reconciliation. One 
educational and ethical challenge o f reconciliation is to support adversaries to participate in 
such transform ative processes in ways that also protect and nourish their in teg rity -as 
individuals, as members o f their own com m unities, and as citizens of the larger, inclusive 
hum an "community" of which we are all a part. A second challenge w ith both educational 
and ethical implications is to recognize injustices and past hurts in ways that acknowledge 
responsibility, w ithout heightening defensiveness. W e proposed the notion of 'restorative 
justice ' to refer to the kinds o f  acknowledgem ent that support the collaborative invention of 
a new moral framework to guide relations in the future. An understanding of 
transsubjectivity, or how both parties to  a conflict contribute to each other's capacities to act 
ethically, supports the notion of 'restorative justice.'
Reconciliation engages every facet o f  the human beings who participate. It 
recognizes and requires the interanimation o f cognitive, em otional, physical, spiritual, and 
im aginative faculties. It asks those who participate to think, feel, act and im agine informed 
by a tension betw een their status as unique, autonom ous m oral agents and as beings who 
share the symbolic structures and patterns o f m eaning o f  the groups with which they 
identify. Reconciliation is furthered when people becom e aware o f and make conscious 
choices about how to relate to the intersubjectivity that characterizes individual and 
collective capacities for understanding and for ac tion-choosing , for instance, w hich of the
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groups' traditional sym bols to em phasize, when to innovate on cultural patterns, when to 
jo in  in and when to stand apart from  popularly held beliefs. Reconciliation asks those who 
participate to recognize their epistemic and ethical interdependence and to make choices 
based on the recognition that the ability o f  each group to meet its m ost basic, underlying 
n eed s-fo r recognition and security, for instance—is greater when form er enem ies' 
underlying needs are also addressed.
Reconciliation engages people in processes where the paradoxical (paradoxically) 
can becom e expected. Those who participate in and/or facilitate reconciliation processes 
m ust contend with seemingly contradictory imperatives towards mean and ends, justice  and 
mercy, attention to individual and systemic change, em powerm ent and interdependence. 
Competing and even contradictory narratives lay claim  to legitimacy, often with equally 
compelling vibrancy. The ability to maneuver within the realm  of paradox and ambiguity is 
central to the educational work of reconciliation.
W e have seen that, for several different reasons, the m edium  o f discursive language 
is likely to be inadequate to the educational work of reconciliation. As w e have seen in 
previous chapters, the discourses o f  adversarial com m unities often have em bedded within 
them stereotypes and other constructs that em erge out of and perpetuate the conflict. 
Furtherm ore, disputants' capacities for linguistic expression may have been impaired as a 
consequence of the conflict. A s w e argued in Chapter 7, it is unlikely that discourse alone 
will allow people to reach beneath defenses, or move them at the visceral level that we 
hum ans apparently need w hen we seek to substantiate new fram ing constructs.
The processes of reconciliation m ust reach deeply into the "recesses of personhood" 
and broadly, out to com m unities and nations. They m ust acknow ledge the potential 
lim itations o f  discourse and help participants make sense o f  paradox and am biguity. They 
m ust recognize, augm ent and/or restore capacities to think, feel, trust, im agine and act, 
both independently and collaboratively. Reconciliation requires the re-presentation of 
historical narratives and cultural sym bols within a tension between innovation and tradition,
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and in ways that engender feelingful awareness, alert calmness and engaged detachm ent. 
Understanding these educational challenges lays the groundwork for our inquiry into the 
usefulness of engaging aesthetic form s and processes in the work of reconciliation, to 
which we turn in the next section.
Perhaps the greatest educational challenge o f the work of reconciliation occurs prior 
to any negotiations or w orkshops in non-violent conflict resolution. As educators, our 
greatest challenge may be to help the "children of violence" (Lessing, 1969) develop not 
only the skills but the w illingness to engage in reconciliation. W e and our children need the 
capacity even to imagine reconciliation as a possible approach to resolving conflicts and to 
consider its benefits. O ur inquiry into the nature o f aesthetic forms and processes may 
suggest strategies to m eet this challenge as well.
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C H A PTER 7
W ESTERN  PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON T H E A ESTHETIC DOM AIN
The Aesthetic Domain: Overview o f Section II
A nyone who dares to contrive a theory o f the aesthetic is challenged not just 
to accommodate plurality, as any theory m ust, or to tolerate diversity, as 
liberal social theories profess to do, but to em brace that very ground of 
confusion-indeed  to increase and intensify it....Aesthetic theory is inherently 
grounded in paradox and has been so recognized by all major aesthetic 
theorists from Plato to the present (H ein, 1993, p. 4).
As the feminist philosopher Hilde Hein suggests, theories o f the aesthetic are
"contrived" from a ground of confusion and paradox, and the conception proposed in this
dissertation is no exception. Philosophical debates within aesthetic theory are abundant,
and they generally remain unresolved paradoxes. To these philosophical paradoxes, there
recently has been added a layer of contentious political struggle, some differences debated
explicitly, some merely implied by the appropriation o f language by groups whose
expressive forms have been m arginalized by the categories of W estern philosophy and the
practices of the elite art world. As different disciplines and constituencies debate meanings
of the word 'aesthetic,1 the precision and clarity that are the hallm arks o f  conceptual
analysis seem  elusive and unreachable.
I have entered into this conceptual terrain reluctantly, unsure w hether conceptual
clarity is possible, and indeed, whether precision at this level o f  abstraction is necessary to
provide a theoretical rationale for the contributions to reconciliation of specific aesthetic
form s—narrative, or folk arts, or poetry, for exam ple. However, given the purpose o f the
dissertation—to understand the unique contributions o f  aesthetic forms and processes to the
educational w ork inherent in reconciliation—a conceptual analysis of the aesthetic domain
has been unavoidable. If I am to claim  that aesthetic form s and processes are uniquely well
suited to the educational challenges inherent in the work o f  reconciliation, then there must
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be some way o f  deciding w hether or not a particular expressive form or pattern of response 
reasonably can be described as 'aesthetic.1 So with Hilde Hein's warnings o f confusion 
and paradox close at hand, we proceed.
The word 'aesthetic' derives from the G reek word aisthesis  or 'sensory 
perception.' It has been used to refer to a quality o f  human perception or a particular 
attitude o f  response, and in some cases, to the objects, events or scenes that apparently 
evoke such perceptions and responses. In relation to hum an capacities, the word 
'aesthetic' is used adjectivally to specify qualities o f  a range of phenom ena, including 
perception, pleasure, attitude, response, judgm ent, taste, expression, ideas, and 
experience.
'A esthetics,' as a branch of W estern philosophy, in the past has been understood as 
the study o f beauty and taste; in recent decades, it has referred more narrowly to the study 
o f  art. A t least one American philosopher, Nelson G oodm an (1968), claimed that since the 
arts enhance understanding, aesthetics (which, he claim s, should explain how they do so) 
is a branch of epistem ology. In either case, as a field o f philosophical inquiry, aesthetics 
devotes considerable attention to defining the appropriate object for its own study—in some 
instances focusing on acts o f  artistic creation, in some cases on the created object, and in 
yet other instances on aspects o f  the experience o f receiving, or beholding, works of art 
and/or other phenom ena (most com m only scenes o f  natural beauty).
In recent years, post-m odern and feminist philosophers have challenged the logical 
and ethical foundations of the entire philosophical inquiry into 'aesthetics.' In his 
introduction to a collection o f essays entitled The Anti-Aesthetic: Essavs in Post-modern 
Culture. Hal Foster argues "that the very notion o f  the aesthetic, its netw ork of ideas, is in
question here  'A nti-aesthetic' signals a practice, cross-disciplinary in nature, that is
sensitive to cultural forms engaged in a politic (e.g. feminist art) or rooted in a vernacular 
—that is, to  form s that deny the idea of a privileged aesthetic realm" (Foster, 1983, p. xv). 
A rthur Danto argues that w hat distinguishes 'art' from  non-art objects resides in
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designations by the institutions o f an elite 'artworld' (1964). Fem inists, w ith related
concerns about issues of pow er, contend that the positive value placed on 'disinterested
perception,' a concept central to m ost W estern philosophical notions o f the aesthetic, is
necessarily dom inative, in part because it directs attention away from the perceiver's social
and political position (Donovan, 1993, p. 53). A dvocates for the world's tribal cultures,
as well as some contem porary anthropologists and non-W estem  scholars argue that
western societies have used their own culturally constrained aesthetic values to denigrate
the expressive forms o f non-W estem  peoples throughout they world. D avid Sobrevilla, a
Peruvian aesthetic scholar, for instance, notes that Hegel exam ined Asian art
from the perspective o f  being an art form  in its infancy....Until well into the 
nineteenth century, the prejudice that all art is European is m aintained. Along 
this line, Ruskin thought that "there is no art in all of Africa, Asia and 
America." (c /R ub in  1977:77) Later, Martin H eidegger based his philosophy 
of art on the consideration o f  the "great art" o f the Greeks and Euorpeans 
which lasted until the nineteenth century (1962:39) "Great art" for H eidegger 
was that which fulfilled the decisive task of revealing, by way o f the w ork o f 
art, w hat the totality o f being is (1985:98). And the totality o f being revealed 
itself only in the W est (Sobrevilla, 1991, p. 218).
Some fem inist theorists argue for an explicitly 'fem inist aesthetic '-one  that
emphasizes process, elevates collective and participatory expressive forms, and integrates
ethical and political concerns. Scholars of African history and culture have proposed a
distinctly A frican conception of 'aesthetics,' the defining tenets of which contrast sharply
with defining aspects of W estern philosophical notions.
To com plicate matters further, Philosophy is not the only academ ic discourse that
offers definitions o f 'the aesthetic,' nor is the W est the only civilization to have produced
an aesthetic theory. The disciplines of Folklore and Anthropology describe the aesthetic
sensibilities of various collectivities. Perform ance Theory also refers to  aesthetically-
m arked perform ances that are linked with cultural identity.
W ith several com peting conceptions vying for consideration, to determ ine the 
boundaries o f the aesthetic dom ain is no simple matter. This circum stance creates a 
challenge for the present inquiry. H ow  are we to choose one conception over another?
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How are we to avoid choosing or constructing a definition of the aesthetic that is so aligned 
with reconciliation that it begs the very question we are considering?
Our challenge is to construct a definition that (1) can be understood within the 
traditions o f the disciplines that make use o f  the term; that (2) includes the range of 
experiences, forms and processes that cohere around this category; but that (3) avoids 
being so broad as to be unhelpful in distinguishing between aesthetic phenom ena and those 
that do not fall w ithin the domain. Furthermore, we m ust assess w hether exclusivity and 
dom ination are necessary elem ents of the aesthetic, or whether it is possible to construct a 
useful definition of 'the aesthetic' that both is consistent with the disciplinary traditions that 
have contributed to its meanings and also avoids these qualities. If aesthetic forms and 
processes are by definition dom inative and exclusionary, they are unlikely to be effective 
forms for mediating the learning required by reconciliation.
I proceed as follows. The balance o f the present chapter focuses on 'the aesthetic 
dom ain' as the concept has been used by several W estern philosophers to dem arcate a 
dom ain of individual human experience related to the apprehension of beauty and the 
creation of art. Since some philosophers of the aesthetic limit their inquiry to m atters 
related to art, and others include experiences of nature and of non-art hum an fabrications 
such as artifacts, the first task is to clarify, for the purposes o f this inquiry, a way o f 
conceptualizing the relationship betw een 'the aesthetic' and 'art.' W ith this accom plished, I 
then offer an explication o f philosophical notions of the aesthetic in some detail, draw ing 
on a sam pling o f analytic, pragm atic and phenom enological philosophical texts. The 
analysis focuses on three clusters o f  concepts, which can be sum m arized briefly as (1) the 
integration o f the sensuous w ith the rational; (2) form  and the apprehension of form al 
qualities; and (3) qualities of non-utilitarian response, including the notion o f 
'd isin terestedness.'
In the chapter that follows, Chapter 8 ,1 present challenges to the W estern 
philosophical view o f  the aesthetic dom ain from several sources. The D arw inist Ellen
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Dessanayake (1988, 1992) claim s that the individualized nature of artistic expression in the 
contem porary art world and related notions o f  'the aesthetic' are anomalies brought about 
by transform ations in the organization o f  human sense perception associated w ith 
w idespread literacy. H er analysis leads me to consider two theories of the 'aesthetic' that 
are based on the expressive forms and patterns of response typical o f non- and pre-literate 
cultures: a 'm atriarchal' or 'gynecentric' aesthetic, based on the collective expression o f 
relatively egalitarian cultures; and a theory about expressive forms indigenous to Africa, 
referred to by the K isw ahili phrase kugusa mtima, meaning 'to touch the heart.' By using 
the term 'aesthetic' to refer to the utilitarian expressive forms o f collectivities, fem inist and 
Africanist scholars present a significant challenge to the conception o f 'the aesthetic 
domain' that emerges from W estern philosophical traditions, which refer nearly exclusively 
to the experiences of individuals or ensem bles of individuals.
Chapter 9 analyzes the Darwinist, feminist and Africanist theories o f the aesthetic 
discussed in Chapter 8 according to the sam e three clusters of ideas that em erge from  
W estern aesthetic theory. I conclude that the patterns of expression and response of non­
literate cultures are sufficiently sim ilar to those described in W estern philosophical literature 
to be understood as part o f  the sam e domain. They are different enough, though, to 
highlight several im portant lim itations in the W estern approach.
In Chapter 1 0 ,1 briefly consider another trajectory from  which to assess the 
adequacy of the W estern philosophical conception of the aesthetic dom ain-nam ely , the 
aesthetic theories that em erge from  non-W estem  but scholarly traditions. Specifically, I 
present b rief overviews o f Japanese and Indian aesthetics. These two Eastern theories 
focus attention on the inevitably intersubjective nature of aesthetic experience, and, present 
categoreal challenges to W estern views. Chapter 10 closes with the articulation o f  an 
integrative theory of the aesthetic dom ain, that generalizes from  the individual, collective 
and intersubjective views considered to that point.
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The entire section on the aesthetic domain concludes with Chapter 11, in which I 
present an assessment o f  the inter-related ethical and epistemological possibilities and risks 
associated with the very complex and multi-faceted domain called 'the aesthetic.'
W e turn first to a conception o f 'the aesthetic domain' that em erges from W estern 
philosophical analytic, pragm atist and phenomenological literature.
The Relationship o f 'Art' and 'The A esthetic Domain'
W estern philosophers disagree about w hether 'aesthetics' as a discipline refers to a 
theory of ait, or whether it inquires more broadly into other experiences o f beauty and 
form. A first step for this inquiry, then, is to clarify w hether 'the aesthetic' refers only to 
experiences o f art, or whether it refers also to experiences o f other phenom ena—most 
particularly of nature, but also perhaps o f other hum an endeavors, such as athletics, and 
perhaps even to some instances o f (artfully conducted) rational discourse.
The debate in the field polarizes in relation to, on the one hand, Kant's assertion 
that the purest aesthetic experiences can be enjoyed in relation to natural scenes (because, 
he asserts, they can be appreciated w ithout interference from constructs im posed by the 
rational m ind) and, on the other hand, the theories of M arxists, who contend that it is only 
through our interaction with hum an-m ade art objects that we leam to have aesthetic 
responses, which we can then apply to natural and social domains. This latter position is 
articulated, for instance, by Ellen D essanayake (1992), who asserts that a defining feature 
o f aesthetic pleasure is the mental appreciation of the role o f a human creator in fashioning 
and em bellishing elements to achieve intended results in an object of art. (Dessanayake, 
1992, p. 29) She holds that "aesthetic experience is an imposition o f culture on nature" 
(D essanayake, 1992, p. 131).
It is not necessary, for our purposes, to resolve the question o f  w hether the capacity 
for aesthetic appreciation ought to be associated paradigmatically with the perception o f 
nature or o f art. Rather, it is sufficient to understand that it is possible to engage 
aesthetically with both nature and objects of art (as well as w ith other human
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constructions). The feminist aesthetic theorist Hilde Hein (1993) contends, in fact, that
anything can be experienced aesthetically (or not), and that, "aesthetic experience is
quintessentially qualify ing, or adverbial. The m anner of experiencing--not the object--is
m odified." (H ein, 1993, p. 8) This understanding is consistent w ith that o f John Dewey
(1934), w ho argues that the very act o f  com posing o r defining 'an experience' out o f  the
ongoing stream o f experience-i.e ., giving structure and closure to an interaction or series
of e v e n ts -in  itself confers an aesthetic quality onto events. (Dewey, 1934, p. 38)
Further, there are both com m on and distinguishing features of our aesthetic
responses to art and to nature. In asserting this, I draw on the analysis o f Paul C row ther, a
contem porary British philosopher o f  the arts, who argues for a  conception o f  the aesthetic
that em braces a diversity  of aesthetic responses (Crowther, 1993a). Both scenes of natural
beauty and artistic renderings of them  can evoke in viewers responses that are receptive and
heightened, for instance, but only in relation to the artwork will we marvel at the human
capacity to create illusions through the arrangement o f elements into forms. The aesthetic
appreciation of nature, on the other hand, challenges us to  integrate a seem ingly irrelevant
elem ents (such as sounds). As the philosopher R. W . Hepburn (1984) observes, w e are
som etim es enveloped in the natural scenes we observe: surrounded by trees, ringed by
hills, or held within the expanse o f a plain.
W e have not only a mutual involvem ent of spectator and object, but also a 
reflexive effect by. which the spectator experiences him self in an unusual and 
vivid way.... The effect is not unknown to art, especially architecture. B ut it 
is both more intensely realized and pervasive in nature-experience — for we 
are in nature and a part o f  nature; we do not stand over against it as over 
against a painting on a wall (p. 13).
To clarify the relationship o f 'the aesthetic' to ’art,1 then, w e can conceptualize them  
as overlapping dom ains. In some instances, it is art that evokes an aesthetic response, but 
we can have aesthetic responses to non-art objects as well. Similarly, som e of our 
responses to art are aesthetic, but we can also have other, non-aesthetic responses to art. 
(These would include pragm atic responses as, for instance, when we estim ate the m onetary 
value o f a sculpture or measure the size of a portrait to determ ine whether it can fit the
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em pty wall above the fireplace.) It seem s likely that the distinct aspects o f our aesthetic 
responses to art and nature, might, in som e cases, influence our perceptions o f the other.
This understanding of the relationship between the aesthetic and art precludes us 
from  accepting one common definition o f the aesthetic: namely, to refer to those kinds of 
responses that are evoked by art. This does not represent a significant loss, because such 
analyses tend to be circular: What is art? Objects that evoke aesthetic responses. What is 
an aesthetic response? Those kinds o f  responses evoked by art.
In order to distinguish conceptually between aesthetic and non-aesthetic responses, 
then, we will consider three clusters o f concepts that are central to most philosophical 
theories o f  the aesthetic. Nearly all W estern philosophical definitions o f 'aesthetic' refer to 
perception via the senses, using words such as 'feeling,' 'sensuous,' 'em bodied,' or 
'em otion.' (W hether or not such perception m ust also be contem plative, or, alternately, 
m ust exclude cognition, is a matter o f  debate that we will consider directly.) Nearly all 
definitions o f 'aesthetic' also address the notion o f  'form,' referring to the com position of 
distinct elements into a bounded whole that exhibits a unity of relation, or intentionality of 
relation, am ong the parts. Finally, nearly all definitions o f the aesthetic discuss non­
utilitarian response, a transformation in the attention or attitude that we bring to, or is 
evoked in us by, our responses to the formal qualities that present them selves to our 
senses. The transform ed m ental state is som etim es referred to as 'distinterested,' 
'detached,' or 'receptive,' or, alternatively, is characterized by 'heightened attention.'
These three clusters of concepts—pertaining to (1) the integration of the sensuous 
and the rational, (2) form and attention to formal qualities, and (3) transform ations in the 
qualities of attention related to non-utilitarian response—are related in complex ways. For 
the sake of clarity, we will consider each cluster separately. M y intention is to understand 
how the aesthetic domain has been described and dem arcated w ithin the W estern 
philosophical tradition with sufficient clarity to allow us an evaluation o f the educative 
potential of aesthetic forms and processes for the transform ative work o f reconciliation.
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The Sensory and the Rational 
In this section, I consider how aesthetic form s and processes-includ ing  both 
perception and expression, as well as the art symbol itself—integrate sensory and rational 
m odes o f apprehension and understanding. First, I resolve a conceptual puzzle created by 
the tension between Kant's (1966 [1790]) assertion that aesthetic perception is free o f  all 
concepts, and Dessanayake's (1988) claim  that all aesthetic processes involve some form of 
m ental mediation, (p. 165) Are there non-conceptual or pre-conceptual mental formations 
that serve to m ediate our sensory impressions? Kant's own theories about pre-conceptual 
im age schem ata are supported by insights from both C. S. Peirce (1960) and M ark 
Johnson  (1987, 1993), a contem porary moral philosopher. N ext, draw ing on the w ork of 
Jerrold Levinson (1996), I consider a kind o f  integration between the sensuous and the 
rational that is associated with the pleasure of aesthetic response, when we focus our 
cognition on the impressions of our senses. Finally, w ith help from M erleau-Ponty (1995) 
and Nelson G oodm an (1968), I note the metacognitive integration of sensuous and rational 
faculties that can occur in creating works o f art and by virtue o f the "density" w ith which 
art sym bols convey meaning.
Pre-Conceptual Schemata
As we noted  above, the w ord 'aesthetic' derives from  the G reek word for 'sensory 
perception.' Its use by contem porary philosophers traces back to A lexander Baum garten, 
a rationalist in the tradition o f Descartes and Leibniz. In contrast to his m entors, however, 
B aum garten believed that sensations and perceptions w ere valuable form s of consciousness 
that should not be excluded from  conceptions o f 'know ledge' (Csikszentm ihalyi & 
R obinson, p. 6). In a 1735 study o f poetry, he argued that poem s com m unicate content 
"in sensory form" (B aum garten, 1974 [1735]).
'The heresy o f paraphrase' is a notion that captures the centrality o f sensory 
perception to the concept of the aesthetic. It is used to com m unicate the necessity o f 
im m ediate or direct sensation in apprehending the m eaning o f works o f art. N o summary
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o f the plot of a literary text, for instance, or description of the objects in a painting, can
replace a direct encounter between the work and the senses of the perceiver. W e can't
ju d g e  the success o f  a play by knowing what them es it develops or w hat story it portrays.
W e m ust witness it being perform ed, or at least read its dialogues, and experience how its
rhythm s—for instance, its tensions and resolutions, its variations in m ood and in ten sity -
w ork w ithin us. As John Dewey (1934) writes:
Only as these rhythms, even if  embodied in an outer object that is itself a 
product o f art, becom e a rhythm in experience itself, are they esthetic. And 
this rhythm  in what is experienced is som ething quite different from 
intellectual recognition that there is rhythm in the external thing; as different as 
is the perceptual enjoyment o f  glowing harm onious colors from the 
mathem atical equations that define them for a scientific inquirer (p. 162).
T he sensuous nature of aesthetic experience is em phasized by many theorists. For
exam ple, the literary theorist Louise Rosenblatt (1991) uses the term  'aesthetic' to refer to
the em otional, bodily experiences o f the reader while reading: "attention is focused on what
is being lived through, the ideas and feelings being evoked and organized during the
transaction." In her theory, 'aesthetic' engagem ent w ith the text is contrasted with
'efferent' readings, which em phasize analysis, criticism  and/or the acquisition of
inform ation or know ledge to be used in the w orld beyond the text (Rosenblatt, 1991, p.60)
W e can be clear, then, that the experiences, perceptions, judgm ents and pleasures
that w e describe as 'aesthetic' necessarily engage the senses. B ut what, if any, cognitive or
rational dim ension does the aesthetic entail? To qualify as 'aesthetic,' m ust a perception be
devoid o f  the "intellectual recognition" to which D ew ey refers? M ight aesthetic perception
also include a cognitive, or contemplative, or rational dim ension? M ust it include some
engagem ent o f the rational?
In his Critique o f  Judgment, Kant frequently asserts that 'pure aesthetic judgm ent is
one w ithout concepts.' It is an issue about w hich he is "em phatic" (Crow ther, 1993a, p.
69). K ant w rites that, "aesthetic judgm ent is quite unique, and affords no, absolutely no
(not even a confused) knowledge o f  the object, but only the final form  in the determ ination
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o f the powers o f  representation engaged upon it" (Kant, 1966 [1790], cited in Crow ther, 
1993a, p. 69).
The British aesthetic theorist Paul Crowther (1993a) argues that the "possibility of
de-conceptual perception" (p. 69) as articulated by Kant (as well as by Croce and others)
Finds little support among contemporary thinkers. One formulation o f  the apparently
inevitable constraints that concepts place on perception can be found in Languages o f  Art
by Nelson G oodm an. Incorporating insights from the art historian Ernst G om brich,
G oodm an (1968) writes:
... there is no innocent eye. The eye com es always ancient to its work, 
obsessed by its own past and by old and new insinuations o f the ear, nose, 
tongue, fingers, heart, and brain.... Not only how but w hat it sees is 
regulated by need and prejudice. It selects, rejects, organizes, discrim inates, 
associates, classifies, analyzes, constructs... reception and interpretation are 
not separable operations (pp. 8-9).
W e m ight argue that not all sensation involves interpretation: a baby being cuddled
by her parent, for instance, m ight sense and respond to the w arm th and fam iliarity of
sounds, sm ells, touch, and taste. But as Dessanayake (1992) convincingly argues, not all
sense experience is considered to be 'aesthetic':
It has been dem onstrated that cows and suburban shoppers are both 
measurably more relaxed when their bam s and malls are supplied w ith piped- 
in recorded music. Yet w e do not say these physical effects are "aesthetic." 
W hatever the good or bad quality of the music, the subjects are not 
consciously listening to or even necessarily aware o f the sounds they are 
"hearing." And, in an opposite kind o f exam ple, discotheque patrons, who 
are  overpoweringly aware o f hearing sounds, similarly cannot be said to be 
responding aesthetically to the pulses and insistent chords that bom bard their 
bodies and provoke uninhibited, alm ost reflexive, physical reaction. Sheer 
sense experience, w hether unconscious or conscious, w ithout mental 
m ediation, is aesthetically m eaningless. It is what the m ind m akes  o f the 
physical sensations that is interesting and relevant. H ence, to anyone who 
stops to  consider the subject of aesthetic response, the mind (or soul or spirit) 
seem s to be the relevant vehicle for the experience o f art (p. 28).
How are w e to reconcile Kant's apparent rejection o f any form  o f conceptual
know ledge w ithin "pure" aesthetic experience and Dessanayake's insistence that sensory
experience w ithout "mental mediation" is irrelevant to aesthetic response? Should we
accept theories of the aesthetic that suggest that art functions to link the rational and the
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sensuous, or, as H egel puts it, "art is a mode of understanding which is half-w ay between
the concrete particularity o f  material phenomena and the abstract generality o f  pure thought"
(cited in Crow ther, 1993a, p. 5)1
B aum garten (1979 [1735]) originally used the word 'aesthetic' to refer to 'sensory
perception.' W e have agreed that the aesthetic necessarily involves the senses. To answer
our questions about the nature of the 'mental mediation' that D essanayake claim s is integral
to the aesthetic, i.e., to discover w hether mentality necessarily presupposes the imposition
of conceptual constructs, we need to  look more closely at the second term in Baum garten's
form ulation, nam ely 'perception.'
According to Dewey (1934), perception involves "an act o f reconstructive doing,"
in w hich "consciousness becom es fresh and alive" (p. 53). To "take in" an experience, we
m ust do m ore than place it "on top o f consciousness over w hat was previously known. It
involves reconstruction w hich may be painful" (p. 41). Perception, in this view , is yielding
but active. It is com prised of "the going out of energy in order to receive" (p. 53).
Does this "going out o f energy" indicate that the object o f perception is fram ed in
terms o f a previously held concept? In distinguishing betw een 'perception' and
'recognition,' Dewey (1934) im plies that this is not the case;
Recognition is perception arrested before it has a chance to develop freely. In 
recognition there is beginning o f an act o f perception. But this beginning is 
not allowed to  serve the developm ent of a full perception o f the thing 
recognized....In recognition we fall back, as upon a stereotype, upon some 
previously form ed scheme.... Som etim es in contact w ith a hum an being we 
are struck w ith traits, perhaps o f  only physical characteristics, o f which we 
w ere not previously aware. W e realize that we never knew the person before; 
we had not seen him  [sic] in any pregnant sense. W e now begin to study and 
to "take in." Perception replaces bare recognition...Recognition is too easy to 
arouse vivid consciousness. There is not enough resistance betw een new and 
old to secure consciousness o f the experience that is had.... [A]n act of 
perception proceeds by waves that extend serially throughout the entire 
organism ....The perceived object or scene is em otionally pervaded throughout 
(pp. 52-53).
Perception, then, involves an active organization o f sensory inform ation. It 
requires some degree of "mental m ediation," sufficient patterning o f  inform ation, so that 
sensory inputs acquire the degree o f coherence required for consciousness. In contrast
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with 'recognition,' how ever, 'perception' appears to preclude at least the im m ediate 
im position o f  pre-existing concepts. This suggests the presence of som e sort of pre- 
conceptual organizing structures that mediate between sensation and conceptual 
understanding.
W e can find conceptions of ju st such mediating structures within several theories o f
cognition, including Kantian notions of im agination, C. S. Peirce's theory o f signs, and
recent developments in cognitive science.
Kant refers to the mediating function o f imagination in terms of structures that
mediate between im ages and concepts. In his theory, sense experiences are rendered into
specific images or mental pictures by  the reproductive dimension o f the imagination.
Concepts are abstract rules or sets o f  criteria, that specify which objects, events or
experiences qualify as, or fall under, that concept. "In our experience o f physical objects,
the material com ponent is given to our senses from  outside us, while the formal com ponent
is given by the structure o f our understanding and of our capacity for having sensation. The
form  is som ething we im pose on our experience" (Johnson, 1987, p. 148). In K ant's
view, the structure that m ediates betw een sensation and concept is a schema. A schem a is
neither sensation nor concept, but
some third thing, w hich is hom ogeneous on the one hand w ith the category, 
and on the other hand with the appearance, and which thus m akes the 
application of the form er to the latter possible. This mediating representation 
m ust be pure, that is, void o f  all em pirical content, and yet at the sam e time, 
while it m ust in one respect be intellectual, it must in another be sensible 
(K ant, 1966 [1790], cited in Johnson, 1987, p. 152).
A ccording to Kant, when w e make sense o f som ething we perceive, or
"understand" or "know" som ething, we use schematic structures to organize the
apprehension of our senses. In ordinary (i.e., non-aesthetic) perception, we use these
schem atic structures to link sensory apprehensions with concepts. In aesthetic experiences,
we create or apprehend new organizations o f  schemata, giving form to patterns o f
experience that have not yet been conceptualized or that may elude representation by way of
concepts. Kant defines an aesthetical idea as "that representation o f the imagination which
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occasions m uch thought, without how ever any definite thought, i.e., any concept being 
capable of being adequate to it; it consequently cannot be completely com passed and made 
intelligible by language" (Kant, 1966 [1790], cited in Johnson, 1987, p. 162).
C. S. Peirce's theory o f signification is another map to the sam e terrain, i.e., the 
pre-conceptual structuring of sensory data into patterns o f increasing com plexity and 
meaning. According to Peirce (1960), human intelligence results from the generation o f 
interpretants, or signs created by our m inds, that mediate all understanding.28
Peirce posits three levels o f signs, designated as firstness, secondness and 
thirdness. Firstness refers to the im pact o f  things in our environm ent-co lors, sounds, 
tem perature, e tc .- th a t affect us w ithout our awareness. W hen w e describe the experiences 
o f  firstness in language, we transform  the sign (i.e., the thing in the environm ent) into an 
interpretant, usually an emotion. "If a sign produces any further significate effect [beyond 
the emotional interpretant] it will do so through the mediation of the emotional interpretant" 
(Peirce, 1960, p. 5.475) In Peirce's theory, firstness is the basis of all know ledge, 
experience and thought, although only a small fraction o f  impressions at the level o f  
firstness evolve into other forms of meaning.
W hen we do become conscious of something external to ourselves, we enter the 
realm  o f secondness. In this realm, there is a consciousness o f polarity, but it is a pre- 
conceptual awareness, as of force and resistance. It is only at the level o f  thirdness, 
however, that there exists language and reflection, in which thought becom es sym bolic and 
subject to consciousness. Thirdness allows us to interpret experience in relation to more 
general meanings. Since, according to Peirce's theory, linguistic symbols are created 
through a process that involves signs at the levels o f  firstness and secondness, all 
conceptual thinking is inevitably im bued with emotion.
B oth Kant's understanding o f  the im agination and Peirce's theory o f signification 
are parts o f  distinct and com prehensive theories about the nature of hum an cognition. For 
the purposes o f  this inquiry, it is sufficient to note that both Kant and Peirce posit
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structures o f mentality that mediate between sensation, on the one hand, and interpretation 
through concepts, on the other. Both theories also account for the possibility of the 
m eaningful and creative, yet pre- or non-conceptual, patterning of such mediating 
structures. They refer to this non-conceptual mental activity in terms of the aesthetic.
A  third theoiy that negotiates this same terrain is that o f the contemporary moral 
philosopher M ark Johnson, who integrates elem ents o f Kant's notions o f  the imagination 
w ith recent developm ents in cognitive science. Like Kant, Johnson's theory is based on 
schem atic structures that mediate between sensory experience and conceptual 
understanding. Johnson's theory is unique in its claim  that these schem atic structures arise 
from  the em bodied interactions of a  person with his o r her environment.
Johnson proposes that hum an m eaning-m aking occurs by way o f metaphoric 
application o f  image schemata. These schem ata are structures in which patterns from a 
"source dom ain...typically some aspect of bodily experience" are mapped "onto a more 
abstract or less highly articulated target dom ain" (Johnson, 1996, p. 51). For instance, our 
bodily experiences o f balance, developed from  feeling the dynamic equilibrium o f our 
anatom ical systems as well as experiences o f  learning to sit and walk upright within a 
gravitational field, cohere into prototypical schem ata. Johnson's (1987) primary claim  is 
that
the metaphorical projections move from  the bodily sense (with its emergent 
schema) to the mental, epistem ic or logical domains. On this hypothesis, we 
should be able to see [for instance] how it is that our experience of bodily 
balance, and o f  the perception o f  balance, is connected to our understanding 
o f balanced personalities, balanced views, balanced systems, the balance of 
pow er, the balance of justice , and so on (p. 87).
As in Peirce's signs at the levels of firstness and secondness and Kant's m ediating 
schem a, Johnson's image schem ata are not conceptual or propositional. They operate as 
general constraints on, but not as precise determ inants of, the perceptions, m eanings and 
concepts that are built upon them. Johnson uses the language of metaphoric projection to 
refer to the intrapsychic activity that Peirce describes in terms o f  the generativity of the 
sem iotic process, in which each level o f  interpretant can itself become a  sign, subject to
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further interpretation. Johnson's theory of im age schem ata is quite similar to Kant's, with 
the im portant exception that for Johnson, all such schem atic structures develop out o f
bodily experiences.29
In Peirce's epistemology, the integrative aspect o f intrapsychic preconceptual 
activity is referred to as "abduction," o r the construction o f  explanatory hypotheses. 
A bduction is a creative process, generating new insights, or explanations that reduce 
"m anifold[s] to unity" (Peirce, 1960, 5.276, cited in Davis, 1972, p. 47). A bduction 
functions in "ordinary" perception, as when "the m ind struggles to get a grasp on a scene, 
and finally, as in a flash, the connection and harm ony becom e apparent....D uring the 
period o f confusion, all o f the data were present; all that was lacking was an hypothesis, an 
interpretation o f the data" (Davis, 1972, p. 47). W e can infer that, in Peirce's vocabulary, 
aesthetic engagem ent involves abductive, pattern-finding processes at the levels o f firstness 
and secondness—levels o f  apprehension that are close to sensation and em otion, and prior 
to conceptualization.
To return, then, to the dilem m a about how aesthetic engagem ent can require "mental 
m ediation" as Dessanayake (1992) claims, but w ithout concepts, as Kant stipulates (at least 
for "pure" aesthetic experience), w e are now in a position to understand that, according to 
several different conceptions o f hum an mentality, there are many layers of pre-conceptual, 
and perhaps non-conceptual, mental processing. One way to distinguish between 
engagem ent or perception that is aesthetic and that which is discursive or analytic or 
"regular" relates to the nature of the mental m ediation involved. W e can think o f  non- 
aesthetic apprehension as the im position of pre-existing structures, elaborated as concepts, 
onto  sensory data, or the reciprocal 'fitting' of concepts w ith patterns o f sensory 
im pressions. Efforts to categorize and to fit particular cases to  a general rule fall into this 
non-aesthetic, o r logical, mode. Aesthetic response, alternately, refers to an openness to 
new  configurations o f  coherence am ong the elem ents sensed, m aking use o f  schem ata that 
are 'non- or pre-conceptual. Kant w ould say that the m ind is engaged in "playing over"
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various percepts, im ages and concepts in search o f novel ways o f ordering them, thereby 
generating new meanings.
Does this mean that in order to qualify as aesthetic, a perception, experience or 
judgm ent m ust be entirely devoid o f concept? I think not. There may be some acts of 
perception and interpretation (i.e., from  one non-linguistic m edium  to another) that are 
virtually free o f conceptual patterning. It is likely, however, that many com plex acts of 
perception involve both the novel configuration of schema and the imposition of pre­
existing conceptual patterns. W e might say that such interpretive processes have an 
aesthetic d im ension-referring  to the aspect o f  the process in which new configurations of 
coherence and m eaning emerge. It is also possible that, as Croce (1964 [1902]) argued in 
his explication of intuition, concepts "lose their autonomy," and becom e elem ents o f an 
innovative structure o f  coherence. This w ould be one way to understand flashes o f 
scientific insight, when, for instance, paradigms shift to reconfigure the array of concepts 
that com prise a theory or discipline.
O ne way, then, in which to understand the aesthetic as integrating the rational and 
the sensuous is that it refers to sensory input being organized into coherent p a tte m s- 
schem a or in terpretan ts-that can be used to make meaning. A lthough these schematic 
configurations do not have all o f the characteristics of the conceptual constructs most often 
associated w ith rationality, they nevertheless can becom e elem ents o f  com plex symbolic 
expressions and representations that invite engagem ent and interpretation. W hat pow er 
such sym bols may lack in precision, they may offer originality, and in the depth o f feeling 
and the richness o f  resonance with w hich they communicate.
Conscious A lignm ent o f Sensory and Cognitive Energy
A nother understanding o f how the sensuous and the rational are integrated in the 
aesthetic dom ain derives from investigations into the nature o f 'aesthetic pleasure.' In 
Kant's aesthetic theory, the ascription o f 'beauty' to an object refers actually to the 
harm onious interaction of the subject's faculties o f  im agination and understanding; aesthetic
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judgm ent em erges from the free play of the cognitive faculties over the formal qualities of 
the object o f attention.30 Johann von Schiller adapted Kant's theory to assert that human 
beings reach their fullest potential when engaged in 'aesthetic play,' em ploying both "sense 
and reason in a recreative harm ony" (Schiller, 1967 [1795], letter 26; cited in Paton, 1996, 
p. 382).
In a contem porary analysis o f  aesthetic pleasure, Jerrold Levinson (1996) argues 
that "pleasure in an object is aesthetic" when it results from attending to its "forms, qualities 
and m eanings for their own sakes” (Levinson, 1996, pp. 331-332) and also attending to 
"the way in which all such things emerge from the particular set o f low-level perceptual 
features w hich define the object on a non-aesthetic plane" (p. 332). In relation to art, for 
instance, in a case where a work has a "prominent intellectual or moral or political content," 
aesthetic pleasure results from "appreciation o f the manner in w hich ... these are em bodied 
in and com m unicated by the work's specific elements and organization" (p. 332). Viewing 
a  scene in nature aesthetically is similarly "a multi-level affair" in which we attend to 
appearances p e r s e  "coupled with a vivid awareness" o f the interrelations of the scene's 
observable structure, its experienceable aspects, and even o f the concepts under which we 
identify the objects. For instance, to appreciate "the lum inosity of the sun's color at sunset 
is to enjoy such lum inosity as the upshot of a particular shade and brightness o f yellow , 
and as som ehow appropriate to the heavenly body which is the source o f  all life"
(Levinson, 1996, p. 333).
In other words, in Levinson's conception o f aesthetic pleasure, our attention and 
conceptual reasoning are focused on the same object as our senses, and on the processes o f 
sensation and interpretation themselves. This accounts for the qualities o f "focus" and 
"rapt attention" often associated w ith aesthetic experiences, w herein all o f one's sensory 
and cognitive energy is aligned and consciously directed. A w areness shim m ers between 
the object of our attention and our ow n processes of sensing and interpreting. W e become
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aw are of the world as well as of our own sensing, interpreting, perceiving, understanding, 
questioning and wondering, at levels both immediate and meta-cognitive.
The foregoing discussion about the relationship between the sensuous and the 
rational in the aesthetic dom ain focuses primarily on the experience o f the w itness, the 
beholder o f  the beautiful vista or the recipient who enjoys the work o f art. How are we to 
understand the relationship o f sensuous to rational in the realm  o f artistic expression and 
creation?
M etacognition and the Sensuous Immediacy of the Art Symbol
One answer to this question can be found in the theory o f art o f  the French 
phenom enologist, M aurice M erleau-Ponty (1995). His understanding of the genesis of 
artw orks develops from a theory of perception consistent with Johnson's theory of 
em bodied image schemata, outlined above, that stresses the bodily engagem ent with the 
w orld. In M erleau-Ponty’s fram ew ork, our engagem ent w ith the world results in 'carnal 
formulae' — "structures constituted from  the sensory and affective life of the 
subject...[T]he body articulates the world into m eanings by grasping it through the 
integrated operation of the senses, and relating what is thus grasped to  its past and future 
life" (M erleau-Ponty, sum m arized by Crow ther, 1993b, p.42). In "prim ary expression," 
new perceptual meanings are brought into existence, whereas m eanings derived from 
already fam iliar "carnal formulae" are attached to objects in "secondary expression." In 
m any cases, the new m eanings o f  "primary perception" are incorporated into our perceptual 
structure, and used to inform  future perceptions.
But in some cases, especially when the perceiver is fam iliar w ith the possibilities 
inherent in an artistic m edium, she will feel a need to articulate further the new impressions. 
Engaging with the m edium  allows the artist to attain a fuller grasp on the m eanings 
encountered in perception. W orking in a m edium enables the body to continue the creative 
stylizing process begun in the artist's perception itself, in order to concentrate the 
'scattered' m eanings found there, and make them exist in a unified concrete form. It brings
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his [sic] own perceptual style to a point of consummation" (M erleau-Ponty, sum m arized by
Crowther, 1993b, p. 45). And importantly, by rendering a bodily perception in an artistic
medium, the artist sim ultaneously imprints the m edium with som ething of her own style,
her own way o f being in the w orld, her own "relationship to being" (M erleau-Ponty, 1974,
p. 51; cited in C row ther, 1993b, p. 45). Artworks, then, use signs in a  richer way,
seeking to construct or reconstruct some aspect o f the world in its sensuous im m ediacy,
sim ilar to how it m ight be encountered in perception itself. In this way, works o f  art make
the workings of imaginative perception and reconstruction publicly accessible.
The work o f art expresses the artist's personal relation to a shared w orld.
According to Crow ther (1993b),
In M erleau-Ponty 's theory ... the artw ork is defined and given its rich 
m eaning by virtue of occupying a unique half-way position between 
perception and reflection. Unlike ordinary language and abstract thought, it 
has a sensuous im m ediacy that comes close to that o f our fundam ental 
perceptual contact w ith the world. Unlike perception itself, however, it 
preserves and articulates the m ost crucial 'invisible' scaffolding of the specific 
situation it is expressing (p. 51).
Although the term 'art' may exist only in certain cultures, there are artifacts in every 
culture whose purpose is to com plete the stylizing process begun in perception itself. 
According to M erleau-Ponty, it is by virtue of its roots in human em bodim ent that art can 
facilitate transcultural understanding. (Crowther, 1993b, p. 47)
In our attem pt to understand the nature o f various possible intersections between the 
sensuous and the rational within the aesthetic domain, M erleau-Ponty's theory focuses our 
attention on the creation and perception o f symbolic forms, i.e., to that sector o f  the 
aesthetic dom ain that refers to  hum an-m ade artifacts, and, w ith an even greater specificity, 
to those artifacts considered to be art. At least one theory of art, that o f  the philosopher 
Nelson G oodm an (1978), in fact dem arcates the aesthetic dom ain in term s of the w ays in 
w hich sym bols function. (This approach contrasts with definitions o f the aesthetic that take 
the quality of perception or the nature of artistic creation to be defining.) G oodm an 
proposes several "sym ptom s" o f sym bols, attributes th a t , when present, point tow ards (or
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"diagnose") the condition o f "the aesthetic.” His criteria include: syntactic and semantic
density (in which small differences in symbols may constitute a significant difference in
meaning); relative repleteness (referring to symbols in which many different aspects are
significant); exemplification (in which a symbol confers meaning by virtue o f  its own
characteristics--as when a sculpture's actual symmetry refers to abstract qualities o f
harmony or balance); and multiple and com plex reference. This last criterion refers to
works in which "symbols perform  several and interacting referential functions, some direct
and som e mediated through other symbols. Rather than having a sim ple unambiguous
m ean in g ,... the sym bol carries a  penum bra o f overlapping and difficult-to-separate
m eanings". According to G oodm an (1978), "these properties tend to focus attention on the
sym bol rather than, or at least along with, what it refers to" (pp. 71-89).
Because "aesthetic symbols" tend to draw attention to themselves as well as their
referents, they invite moments o f m etacognition, in which we becom e aware of ourselves
as interpreters and of the nature of our processes o f perceiving and interpreting. In an
explication o f M erleau-Ponty's theory o f painting, Crow ther offers an eloquent and
succinct contrast between "everyday" (i.e., non-aesthetic) and "aesthetic engagement"
precisely in relation to this notion o f  metacognition:
Our everyday engagem ent w ith the world usually immerses us in things 
w hich are, visually speaking, sim ply 'there.' W e have no tim e or 
inclination to attend to that rich visual texture o f light, colour, shape and 
so forth, which is inherent in things and the visual background. Yet it is 
precisely this texture which enables the visible to be seen. H ence, in so 
far as the painting is a self-contained portion o f  the world which invites 
us to contemplate its sensuous particularity, both it and the texture which 
enables it to be seen are given full manifestation. Indeed, one can say 
that here we see what it is to see. Vision becom es visible to itself 
(C row ther, 1993a, p. 113).
M eta-cognition, i.e., the m eta-level awareness o f our perceptive and interpretive capacities,
is one additional way in which we can understand the integration o f  the sensuous and the
rational within the aesthetic domain.
To summarize this section then, I have elaborated upon three different ways in
which the sensuous and the rational can be integrated within aesthetic form s and processes.
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The first occurs when we engage in mental mediation by way of non- or pre-conceptual 
intrapsychic structures (schemata, interpretants, or carnal formulae) that place constraints 
on our patterns of m eaning-m aking and apprehension, but which do not, in them selves, 
rise to the level of concept. The second takes place when we focus our conscious attention, 
our rational capacities, on the same objects as our senses. Here we discover a distinct kind 
o f pleasure in the harm onious interplay betw een our thinking and our sensing (or, as Kant 
w ould say, between our understanding and our imagination). The third way in which the 
sensing and thinking are integrated in aesthetic processes involves the m eta-cognitive level. 
In this instance, because of the com plexity, density and sensuous immediacy o f  the 
sym bols w e seek to understand, we becom e aware o f  an interplay among the sym bol, its 
various possible referents, and our ow n processes o f  thinking, sensing and feeling.
That these three modes o f  apprehension all integrate the sensuous with the 
cognitive, but do so in slightly different ways, may actually point to variations in the kinds 
o f  aesthetic experiences. In all three cases, however, w e are led to ask: W hat is it about 
the nature o f the objects perceived, and/or the quality o f our attention, that gives rise to 
these interplays between the sensuous and the rational? I will look for an answer to this 
question in an examination o f  two additional and related clusters of concepts that dem arcate 
the aesthetic domain: namely fo rm  and non-utilitarian response.
Form  and the A pprehension o f Formal Qualities
The w ord 'form ' itself derives from  the Greek w ord for 'shape.' It is a notion at 
the center of m any theories o f  the aesthetic and o f art, referred to in term s of 'structure,' 
'coherence,' 'dynam ic equilibrium ,’ 'patterns o f elem ents,' 'sensuous m anifold,' o r 'unity 
in diversity.' Aesthetic experience is often understood to be engendered by attention to the 
'form al qualities' o f an object or event. W hat is form? And what, precisely, is m eant by 
the phrase 'attention to form al qualities?1 This section addresses these questions.
'Form ' is a concept that has been called "inescapably am biguous and vague" 
(M oraw ski, 1974, p. 104). It has many different referents, som e significantly different
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from  others. For instance, Plato is perhaps best well known for his notion o f Form s, 
understood to be idealized patterns o f organization o f  "the good things o f  their kind" that 
are m ore real that the instances of those patterns that are accessible to our senses (Eldridge, 
1996, p. 159). Aristotle, in contrast, referred to an "indw elling form" exists like a kernel 
in every organism . He used 'form' to refer to the patterns that govern the developm ent and 
growth o f every organism , revealed to hum an com prehension through action (Schechner, 
1977, p. 5).
Formal Relationships of Elements in a W hole
One straightforward and general conception o f  'form' is that it refers to a  "patterned
relationship o f elements" (Am stine, 1970, p. 32) in which the parts are perceived in
relation to each other and to the whole. 'Elem ents' o f  form include lines, shapes, and
m asses; colors, shades and textures; tones and timbres. This idea that elements are
perceived in relation to a relevant whole is expressed in relation to works o f  art by the
philosopher R. W . H epburn (1996):
A work o f art is, characteristically, a com plem ent (of notes, instrument 
tim bres, brush-strokes, colour patches, w ords, im ages, speech rhythm s, and 
so on) whose elem ents do not impinge on us as isolated units, but are 
determined in their perceived qualities by the context o f  all the other elements 
and their relationships. The character o f the whole, as a function o f the 
individual components and their interrelationships, in turn modifies, controls 
these com ponents as w e perceive them  (p. 423).
In describing the formal qualities o f a w hole—a natural scene, or a w ork of art, or 
an event, for in stance-art critics and aesthetic theorists make use o f concepts such as 
'harm ony,' 'balance,' and 'rhythm ,' concepts that refer to the relationships o f parts to each 
o ther and to the whole. D. E. W. G otschalk (1953), a theorist of art, refers to 'harm ony' 
as the repetition of elements that are completely or partially similar. Harmony contributes 
to unity within a work o f art because items echo each other, either partly o r wholly, 
som etim es repeatedly, throughout a work. W hen elem ents appear in harmonic relationship 
w ith each other, we perceive unity in diversity. 'Balance' can be understood as the 
converse o f  harmony. Balance, w hether sym m etrical or asym m etrical, engenders unity by
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way o f contrast, by items opposing and equilibrizing each other. "Opposing items form a 
system o f  complementary and neutralizing tensions, resulting in a com plete and stable 
unity." W hen elem ents in a work o f  art are in a state o f balance, we perceive the diversity 
that is possible within a structural unity. Rhythm em erges from  the interplay, or, as 
G ottschalk puts it, the "collaboration" o f balance and harmony. A rhythm  is an 
organization o f materials so they possess or suggest patterned m ovement.
Som e contemporary theories of art emphasize the im portance of a different set of 
form al relationships, including, for instance, dissonance and random ness (Townsend.
1996, p. 182). O ppositions, disharm onious systems, and dynam ic structures are as 
"valuable and necessary" (M orawski, 1974, p. 100) as the "full agreem ent o f all elem ents" 
that constitutes harmony. The effectiveness o f such dissonant elem ents nevertheless rests 
upon the existence of a formal structure, set apart from  its environm ent, which frames the 
w ork, and allows the dissonance to appear to the senses. W hen Brecht, for instance, 
invokes the Verfremdunseffectkt, or estrangem ent effect, by having his actors distance 
them selves from their own roles, the jarring effect can only be realized within the context of 
the form al unity o f the play as a whole (M orawski, 1974, p. 102). The im portance o f the 
unifying effect of the form  itself is em phasized by Paul Crow ther (1993a) in this way:
"[N]o m atter how violent or tragic the style or subject-matter, ou r experience of the work 
will not be com plete unless we can appreciate the way such potentially disruptive non- 
aesthetic material is integrated in a unified formal structure" (p. 26).
In  part, then, 'form al qualities' are those qualities o f  a whole that em erge because of 
the boundedness o f an object or event, as well as because o f the relationship o f its parts to 
each other and to the whole.
O n som e accounts, 'form' can be understood in its contrast w ith content. For 
instance, M oraw ski (1974) outlines how this opposition w ould work in relation to a variety 
o f art forms:
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with respect to non-representational art, I understand by content the means of 
expression, while form in this context is the organization (the structure) o f the 
material; w ith poetry or song, content is what provides the pattern o f m eaning 
in the verbal media, while form  is both the sound (or graphic) patterns and the 
organization of material as a whole; with the presentational arts, content 
consists of the ideas, persons, objects events and their relationships given by 
the iconic surface or the patterns o f  images, and by form  we can understand 
the iconic surface, the patterns of images, plus the organization of the material 
a whole; and finally with the applied arts (including architecture) I would 
suggest that by form we understand the textures, the surfaces and their shape, 
while by content we understand the function....W ith regard to perform ing 
arts, I abandon the above terms and speak rather of "design" (e.g. score or 
script) and "execution," each o f which in turn possesses the aspects o f form 
and content (p. 104).
N ot everyone accepts so strict a dichotomy between form  and content, however. 
Paul C row ther softens the polarity by proposing two levels o f  structural relations: the 
infrastructural and the superstructural According to Crowther, we apprehend fo rm - 
w hether in nature or in a rt-b y  attending to how an object presents itself to  our senses, or, 
w here appropriate, to the im agination. "Formal aspects .... arise from  those qualities which 
pertain to the structure o f  appearance a lone-as opposed to those dispositional qualities 
w hich determ ine the essence, or whatness, of that which is appearing" (Crow ther, 1993a, 
p. 18). 'Infrastructural qualities' refer to qualities o f  the "basic units o f the phenom enal 
fabric" (1993a, p. 20): the relationships o f light, shape, texture and color that, for 
instance, constitute the visual appearance of a m ountain (and o f a painting of a mountain); 
o r the patterns of tone, timbre, melody and harmony that inform  our perception o f a 
m elody. In reading a text, when we pay attention not to  the content but to  how something 
is said, w e are attending to the infrastructural qualities. 'Superstructural qualities' emerge 
w hen we attend to the patterns o f these formal elem ents in relation to  the w ork as a whole, 
including its content. W e can appreciate the forms created not only by the textures and 
colors and shapes in a painting; we can also m arvel at how  clouds can be m ade so 
lum inous, or how  a tree appears to reach toward the sky.
Aspects o f  content can becom e formalized, then, when w e attend to them  in relation 
to patterns o f tensions and resolutions, or their resonances w ith other formal elem ents and
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qualities. C row ther (1993a) offers Ham let as an example. We are enlightened by what he
refers to as the "infrastructural felicities" o f the text, including prose, rhym e and metaphor,
and, we m ight add, its blank verse. But, he explains
we are equally, i f  not more, alive to the development and evolution of the 
narrative for its own sake. O ur interest in Claudius's guilt, for exam ple, is 
not purely moral but rests on how it echoes and increases in proportion to 
H am let's actions. W ithin the context o f the plot, in other words, C laudius's 
moral guilt is formalized, and takes on, thereby, aesthetic significance 
(1993a, p. 20).
To sum m arize this section so far, then, we can assert that a logically distinctive 
feature of the aesthetic dom ain is attention to the patterned relationships o f elem ents in 
which the parts of a  phenomenal fabric are perceived in relation to each other and to the 
whole. These patterns present them selves to our senses (and som etim es to  our 
imaginations) at both the infrastructural and superstructural levels. The objects of such 
attention can be hum an fabrications or natural scenes and events.
Form  and G enre
To this point, w e have considered the notion o f 'form' in relation to individual 
works of art or solitary acts o f perception. There is another, related understanding of 
'form ,' as the w ord is used in phrases such as "the sonata form," or "the form  of a 
sonnet." Here, the word refers to  a genre—a group of works that resem ble each other in 
terms of the arrangem ent o f their elements and generate more or less o f a sim ilar effect on 
those who perceive them.
Philosophers have em phasized the relationships between genre and generic form 
and different elem ents o f  the aesthetic experience. Plato, for instance, understood the form 
o f an artistic expression as the m ost stable, unified and integrated exem plar, or, as we 
noted above, "a good thing o f its kind." In his view, the unruly or transgressive gesture o f 
an individual artist w ould alw ays dim inish the quality o f the work. Aristotle, on the other 
hand, focused prim arily on the relationship between forms and their audiences. H is 
Poetics is devoted partly to an analysis o f the genre of tragedy, indicating w hat elem ents are 
necessary in order to induce the desired (cathartic) effect. Unlike Plato, Aristotle is
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som ew hat tolerant o f  individual transgressions in the form: "error [in the form] may be 
justified , if....the effect o f  this or any other part of the poem  is thus rendered m ore striking' 
(cited in E ldridge, 1996, p. 159). Collingw ood, among other m ore recent philosophers, 
has considered generic form in relation to the emotional needs o f the artists--w ho, he 
asserts, create works of art in part to clarify and discharge em otions that build up in 
response to recognition and to thought. Effective forms will serve this function for their 
makers, and as if  by coincidence, for their audiences as well—since contem poraneous 
audiences, at least, are likely to be  in need of discharge o f sim ilar psychic burdens.
In general, according to aesthetic theorist Richard Eldridge (1996), artists attend to 
the formal dem ands of their individual creations, but also consider the context o f the genres 
in which they choose to work. As Kant pointed out, excellence in art requires both 
originality—i.e.. expressions o f  the unique sensibilities o f  the particular artist, often in a 
w ay that is som ew hat transgressive o f the expectations that historically have been built up 
in relation to a particular g en re-an d  exem plariness—i.e.. "adm itting o f  useful, elucidatory 
com parisons w ith other works" o f  the same genre. Such works "suggest that our 
individuality and autonomy may be consistently and intelligibly housed in the sorts of 
things that we do along with others" (Eldridge, 1996, p. 161).
The formal qualities o f works of art seem  to respond to the hum an needs both "for 
self-recognition and for identity w ith fellow-beings" (Crowther, 1993a, p. 99). Creating 
and attending to formal qualities, then, appears to m ediate needs for innovation and 
conservation, to balance the im pulses to improvise and transgress w ith the im pulse to refine 
and sustain. The pleasure we take in noticing the formal qualities of th ings-especia lly  in 
instances o f organic forms, w hether these occur in nature or in works of a rt-a llo w  (or 
entice) us to notice w ith a quality of attention that has both epistem ological and ethical 
im plications. It seem s that part o f  what is valued so highly about an aesthetic experience is 
the quality of consciousness that such integrated forms m ake possible. F or instance, in
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
167
relation to perceptions of natural form s, Crow ther (1993a) describes how pleasure in a
perfect specimen of a  natural kind works to stimulate cognition:
Our pleasure in the perfect specim en of a natural kind...is founded on a felt 
harmony between our concept o f  the object and the sensible manifold 
which instantiates it. There is a sense of fit or cohesion between our 
capacity to attend to the thing's sensory particularity, and our capacity to 
comprehend it in more general conceptual terms. The fit between the 
concept and the manifold which instantiates it embodies qualitative 
com pleteness-a  totality of aiticulation--which cognition in general aspires 
towards. This exemplary function stimulates both sustained cognitive 
exploration o f  the object itself, and the general interaction o f  our capacities 
to attend and com prehend (p. 159).
Hepburn (1996) describes a similar extension of cognitive capacities in relation to 
perceptions o f the formal qualities o f works of art. "The intricacy of an artw ork's structure 
can challenge and stimulate our perceptive powers, making its appreciation both a 
strenuous and rewarding activity," he writes. Because o f the interconnections o f  the 
elem ents of objects o f aesthetic attention, we are able to synthesize "a far greater totality 
than in any other context. W hereas consciousness can often be attenuated, meagre, 
sluggish, here it is at it m ost active and zestful....Elements of experience norm ally disparate 
and distanced are brought into a vivid relation, and our experience is given new vitality"
(p. 423).
The epistemological significance of attention to the formal qualities o f integrated 
wholes, then, is that such attention appears to revitalize our cognitive pow ers, infusing 
consciousness H epburn suggests, w ith the energy of activity and zest. The ethical 
im plications of this kind o f attention will be addressed later, in Chapter 11.
Paradoxically, aesthetic response also has been associated paradigm atically with 
quieter forms o f cognition, such as contemplation, and more distant attitudes, som etim es 
referred to as 'detached,' or 'disinterested.' It is to an explication o f  these defining features 
o f the aesthetic that we turn next.
The Qualities o f Aesthetic Response 
In the previous tw o sections o f  this chapter, we have considered tw o clusters of 
ideas that have been used by W estern philosophers to describe defining features o f the
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aesthetic domain: the integration of the sensuous with the rational, and attention to formal 
qualities. We now consider the third cluster o f concepts central to many definitions o f the 
aesthetic: special attitudes and qualities o f response that we bring to, or are evoked in us 
by, certain objects and events. T hese special attitudes and qualities have been described as 
'd isin terested ,1 'contem plative,' 'heightened,' and 'receptive.'
It may be helpful to start by indicating the kinds of attitudes or responses that 
aesthetic theorists have agreed are outside of, and in some cases opposite from, those that 
fall w ithin the aesthetic domain. W ith considerable consistency, aesthetic responses are 
understood to be different from  responses that are exclusively utilitarian or analytic. If, for 
instance, in noticing a maple tree in my field, my attention is focused on when and where to 
tap it to collect the largest am ount o f  sap, or on where it should be placed in a taxonom y o f 
genus and species, it is unlikely my response w ould fall within the dom ain o f  the aesthetic.
As we noted earlier, however, the concept 'aesthetic' can be an adverbial one, 
m odifying other categories o f behavior. For instance, in analyzing the elem ents o f a tree in 
order to determ ine its taxonomic relationships, I m ight pay special attention to the forms 
created by the patterns of its branching and take pleasure in its sturdiness and sym m etry, or 
notice the efficiency o f the veining patterns reflected in the shape o f the leaf, and, in those 
m om ents, appreciate the beauty of the tree. As I becom e aware of the formal features o f the 
tree, as I focus my cognitive attention on sensory impressions, I would experience delight 
in the tree's beauty. This aw areness, then, w ould contribute an aesthetic dim ension to my 
otherwise analytic task of scientific categorization. Similarly, I might, while tapping a  tree 
to collect its sap, pause for a m om ent to reflect on the tree's plenitude, or becom e aware o f  
the rhythm  o f  my year as it is punctuated by the rituals of sap-gathering in the spring. W e 
could consider these awarenesses as contributing an aesthetic dim ension to an otherwise 
practical task.
A s these exam ples illustrate, in at least som e cases, we use the term  'aesthetic' to 
refer to those aspects o f  an experience in which w e appreciate som ething for its own sake,
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distinct (at least mom entarily) from our own purposes. When we bring such an attitude to 
an object of our attention, our will and our desire are in abeyance. Kant refers to this 
quality o f  apprehension as 'disinterested.'
Kant (1966 [1790]) writes that in pure aesthetic perception, the subject is "merely 
contemplative... indifferent as regards the existence of an object." W e take pleasure in 
forms as they appear, w hether the object is real or imagined. O ur enjoym ent is 
disinterested, as Crow ther (1993a) writes in his explication of Kant, because it is based in 
qualities that are
'ontologically neutral....From  the viewpoint of strictly formal appreciation a 
hallucinated or illusory appearance will do just as well as one that is real or 
veraciously cognized. [B]ecause of its non-practical and ontologically neutral 
grounds, the enjoym ent o f form al qualities as such is, in a logical sense, 
absolutely disinterested. It entails no reference to that natural attitude which 
enables us to cope with the practical vicissitudes of living; and it is, indeed 
probably just this feature which is responsible for that feeling of 
'tim elessness' o r 'transport to a higher plane which is so often reported in the 
context of formal appreciation" (p. 21).
In Crowther's view , however, apprehension does not have to m eet the standard of 
absolute disinterestedness to  qualify as aesthetic. To the contrary, we often require 
background knowledge o f an object to fully appreciate it. For instance, in the case of a 
w ork o f art, our appreciation o f it is enhanced when we know that it is a hum an creation, 
and even when are fam iliar with the genre from  which it emerges. It is this know ledge that 
allows us to appreciate its originality. Crowther ( 1993a) classifies these experiences as 
relatively disinterested, because they "presuppose not only a concept of their object but 
also an interest in the real existence o f the object" (p.23). This kind o f perception is still 
som ew hat disinterested, however, because the "background knowledge required or belief 
which mediates our appreciation....is not itself of a necessarily practical nature" (Crow ther, 
1993a, p. 23).
The idea o f 'd isin terestedness'-understood  as perceiving som ething separate from  
our ow n interests, needs and desires, or perceiving som ething for its ow n sake—is one of 
the m ost pervasive in the writing o f  W estern philosophies o f the aesthetic. It figures
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prom inently in most W estern theories o f the aesthetic since Kant (W hewell, 1996, p. 250). 
Schopenhauer wrote that in aesthetic perception, there is a "withdrawal from our usual 
practical, w illful engagem ent w ith things" (sum m arized in Cooper, 1995, p. 24). W e 
becom e contemplative, but in his view, our attention is directed not towards appearances, 
as Kant claimed, but "towards Platonic ideas or forms which lie behind 'appearances' 
them selves." Schopenhauer believed that a proper attitude towards works o f  art would 
reveal reality better than our everyday manner o f encountering the world. The notion of 
disinterestedness was re-interpreted in the early twentieth century in an influential essay by 
the psychologist Edward Bullough (1957), who referred instead to the related notion of 
'psychical distance.' As an exam ple o f an aesthetic apprehension, he described the 
circum stance o f being confined on a fogbound ship, and, rather than attending to  the 
practical dangers of navigating w ith low visibility, becoming interested in the eerie beauty 
o f  the shapes and forms that em erge from  the fog (Bullough, 1957, p. 93).
In this century, the notion o f disinterestedness has been inteipreted in an extrem e 
way by formalist theorists of art to justify their claim  that the proper viewing of art should 
not consider its content or meaning. Em ploying an understanding of 'disinterestedness' 
akin to w hat Crow ther terms 'absolute,' they hold that "concern for content and m eaning 
would contradict the required indifference to  matters of existence and conceptualization" 
(Cooper, 1996, p. 24). A estheticists argue that art exists for its own sake and should be 
perceived purely in terms of its form al qualities. In this view, "art" is som ething quite 
rem oved from life, and its value is precisely in its separation from the everyday.
The eschewal of all extrinsic value for aesthetic experience by formalists and 
aestheticists appears to extend Kant's understanding of disinterestedness far beyond the 
m eaning he him self intended. In fact, although the primary thm st of Kant's theory m akes 
strong distinctions between m oral reasoning and aesthetic judgm ents, he does acknow ledge 
that aesthetic experience is "purposive in reference to the moral feeling" since it prepares us 
to "love disinterestedly" (Kant, 1966 [1790], p. 108; cited in Cooper, 1996, p. 24). In
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other words, there is ethical significance in our ability to suspend our own individual
purposes as we apprehend objects in the world.
The philosopher Robert Hepburn (1984) suggests that there are two different
conceptions o f the aesthetic. "The study of aesthetic experience," he writes
tends to m ove between a narrow er and a broader conception of its subject- 
matter. For the narrower conception, the proper focus o f study is taken to be 
the rapt contem plation o f particular objects o f art o f  or nature, where the 
spectator is wholly absorbed in the immediately given perceptual qualities of 
the object, and his attention is quite confined to these—or as near as can 
be...[I] work with a very m uch w ider and more com plex conception of 
aesthetic activity. That activity cannot, in my own view, be reduced to an 
absorbed attention to the surface qualities of the object before one. R ather the 
object is also the centre of, and is the occasion of, many possible lines o f 
reflection or m ovem ents o f the mind, transformations o f perception, attitudes 
and feelings that may affect a person’ life and modify the quality of his 
experience long after he has ceased to contemplate the particular object itself.
No doubt, some trains o f reflection prom pted by works of art or contem plated 
natural objects can be aesthetically irrelevant, idiosyncratic, fortuitous. But 
others can be highly relevant, part o f w hat makes the object worth 
contem plating, part of what gives seriousness to the aesthetic dim ension of 
hum an life (pp. 1-2).
The w ord 'disinterestedness' by itself seems inadequate to describe the richness and 
variety o f aesthetic responses suggested by Hepburn. It may be  a defining feature o f  at 
least a certain type of aesthetic response, but what gives the aesthetic perception its 
character are the positive qualities o f  attention that fill the space once our utilitarian 
intentions are suspended. And, as we have seen above, the 'aesthetic attitude' does not 
refer to only one quality o f  attention: it includes both receptivity and inquisitiveness, 
contem plativeness and active mind. This make sense when w e remember that aesthetic 
experience integrates the sensuous and cognitively, and that at times our energy or 
conscious attention m ight be focused on one aspect or the other. W e are receptive in those 
m om ents when w e allow the object of our attention to register itself on our sensations (to 
create w hat M erleau-Ponty refers to  as 'carnal form ulae.') Then, as we scan these 
im pressions seeking patterns o f  coherence, our m ind might becom e more active, as images 
and configurations stir us to recall experiences or impressions from many different periods 
and dom ains o f our life.
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David Cooper (1996) suggests that the aesthetic appreciation is marked by the 
spectator's
readiness to employ imagination in attempting to  satisfy the interrogative 
interests w ith which he approaches the work... Im agination incorporates that 
peculiar blend o f  will and receptivity, that oscillation between an imposition of 
structure or m eaning and a readiness to be 'taken over', w hich is so 
characteristic...of our best m om ents in the presence o f art (pp. 26-27).
The "oscillation" to which Cooper refers, is related I believe to the qualities of
'resonance' and 'reverberation' w ith which G aston B achelard (1994) describes our
response to poetry. To understand the distinction between them, we must first note that
Bachelard distinguishes between the soul and the m ind (of both poet and reader.) "A
consciousness associated with the soul is more relaxed, less intentionalized than a
consciousness associated with the phenom ena o f the m ind" (p. xxi). In poetic reverie,
how ever,
the mind is able to relax, but... the soul keeps w atch, w ith no tension, calm ed 
and active....[In this way] forces are m anifested in the poem  that do not pass 
through the circuits o f know ledge...[T]he im age com es before thought" so that 
"poetry, rather than being a phenom enology o f the m ind, is a phenom enology 
o f the soul (p. xxi).31
To understand the workings o f a poem, Bachelard argues, we m ust follow two
perspectives—"towards the outpourings o f the m ind and tow ards the profundities of the
soul." W hen the images o f  a poem reverberate w ithin us, they bring about a
veritable awakening o f poetic creation, even in the soul of the read::-, through 
the reverberations of a single poetic im age....Through this reverberation, by 
going immediately beyond all psychology or psychoanalysis, w e feel a poetic 
pow er rising naively within us....The reverberations bring about a change of 
being. It is as though the poet's being w ere our being (pp. xxiii, xxii).
The multiplicity of resonances then issues from  the reverberations' 
unity of being...A fter the original reverberation, w e are able to experience 
resonances, sentim ental repercussions, rem inders o f our past. B ut the im age 
has touched the depths before it stirs the surface...The im age offered us by 
reading the poem now becom es really our own. It takes root in us. It has 
been given us by another, bu t we begin to have the impression that we could 
have created it, that we should have created it" (p. xxiii).
W ith  this introduction to the notions of 'reverberation ' and 'resonance,' w e can
understand more fully a concept o f Bachelard's that w e cited in Chapter 1, nam ely that "[a]t
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the level o f  the poetic image, the duality o f  subject and object is iridescent, shimmering,
unceasingly active in its inversions" (p. xix). Aesthetic perception involves, as Cooper
noted above, a willingness to be taken over, to be transform ed by the object o f our
perception, oscillating with the "imposition" (or creation or discovery) of structure and
meaning. H ow ever, we can only "enter into the poetic space," writes Bachelard (1994), by
abandoning ourselves to the image "without reservations" (p. xxviii). As a reader or
listener, we allow an image to enter into us and transform  us, and then we attend to its
repercussions w ithin us—how it reverberates in our being, and what resonances it sets in
m otion in our minds. Our attention "shimmers" between self and object, each awareness
m aking possible new aw arenesses o f the other.
Perhaps the aesthetic attitude best can be characterized by this very tacking back and
forth betw een the object of perception (the poem) and ourselves (our feelings, questions,
thoughts). The 'disinterestedness' and focus o f our attention enhances our capacity to
perceive the other in its integrity, (i.e., to enter into the poetic space w ithout reservation).
It also creates a  space for us to then w onder about ourselves in a new way. In the
im aginative interplay o f  the w orking of our minds and our souls (Bachelard, 1994), or our
cognitive and sensuous faculties (Kant, 1966 [1790]), em erge new possibilities o f
perceiving both ourselves and the other more clearly. This "com plex cast of mind," as
M artha N ussbam n (1995) argues, is key to the moral significance of literature. W hether
considering the tragic dram a which informed Aristotle's poetics, or contem porary novels, it
is not ju st the content that engenders moral sensibilities, but
the very form constructs com passion in readers, positioning them  as people 
w ho care intensely about the sufferings and bad luck of others, and who 
identify w ith them  in ways that show possibilities for themselves. Like tragic 
spectators, novel-readers have both empathy w ith the plight o f  the characters, 
experiencing what happens to them  as if from  their point of view, and also 
pity, which goes beyond empathy in that it involves a  spectatorial judgm ent 
that the characters' m isfortunes are indeed serious and have indeed arisen not 
through their fault. Such judgm ents are not always available w ithin the 
em pathetic viewpoint, so the novel-reader, like a tragic spectator, m ust 
alternate between identification and a more external sort of sympathy. W hat 
the ancient pity tradition claim s for epic and tragedy m ight now be claim ed for
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the novel: that this complex cast of mind is essential in order to take the full 
measure o f the adversity and suffering o f others, and that this appraisal is 
necessary for full social rationality (Nussbaum , 1995, p. 66).
In this section on non-utilitarian response we have seen how, in aesthetic perception
in general (K ant, 1966 [1790]; Hepburn, 1984), as well as m ore specifically in responses
to literature (N ussbaum , 1995), and poetry (Bachelard, 1994), there is som e kind o f
oscillation, or tacking back and forth, between the object o f our attention and our
experience o f ourselves, others and the world. W e have begun to consider the interrelated
epistem ic and ethical implications o f aesthetic attitudes, i.e., the range o f ways we
apprehend objects in the cognitive/emotional/psychological/spiritual space created by
stepping back from our own interests and purposes. W e will take up this investigation into
the ethical significance o f the aesthetic domain again in C hapter 11.
Sum m ary o f Philosophical Demarcations of the Aesthetic Domain 
W e are now in a position to summarize a  conception o f 'th e  aesthetic dom ain' that 
incorporates elem ents from several W estern philosophical traditions: the Kantian analytic 
tradition, the pragm atist tradition associated with Peirce (1960) and Dewey 
(1934), and the phenom enological tradition associated w ith M erleau-Ponty (1995) and 
B achelard (1994). In the conception o f  the aesthetic dom ain that we have constructed from 
these sources, a conceptual pattern emerges of a dialectical integration of opposites, or 
tendencies tow ard the mean, along three different dim ensions. The first is the integration 
(at a higher level of com plexity than either affords us singly) o f our rational and sensuous 
apprehensions o f  the world. W e create this integration in one or more of several ways: by 
suspending the constructs of pre-existing concepts to allow som ething to em erge as it 
appears to us (by using pre-conceptual schemata to organize sensory data); by focusing our 
conscious attention and our rational m inds on our sensory im pressions; by becom ing 
m etacognitively aware o f  the processes through which w e sym bolically interpret our 
sensations.
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The second dimension is that of formal organization. O ur senses and cognitive 
faculties are brought into focus on an object or event when the organization o f its elements 
falls som ew here betw een a chaotic o r random array, which we w ould experience as 
overw helm ing, and a rigid structure o f uniform  elements, w hich we w ould experience as 
boring. W e are able to perceive these relationships among elem ents—including harmony, 
balance, dissonance, e tc .- in  most cases because the object o f our attention is bounded or 
framed in some way. W e take pleasure in perceiving objects and events in which the 
organization appears to be organic, i.e., in which every element appears in relation to the 
whole. The resulting unity in diversity that is sometimes considered definitive of beauty.
The third dim ension along which the aesthetic appears to provide a kind o f 
integration o f  extrem es is that o f  focus o f  attention. W hen we suspend our own utilitarian 
purposes to apprehend the formal qualities o f an object of our attention, w hen we engaged 
both sensuously and rationally in this apprehension, we attend both to the object and to 
ourselves. O ur understanding o f  the object depends upon our noticing the resonances and 
reverberations that it sets in motion in our being; and our understanding and experience of 
ourselves shifts in the light of the impressions made as we allow the object o f our attention 
to enter our being.
The conception of the aesthetic domain that emerges from  the traditions o f Western 
philosophy is understood by many to have important ethical im plications. W e will return to 
these in C hapter 11. F irst, however, in the next three chapters (8, 9 and 10), I w ill present 
contrasting view s of the 'aesthetic.' The first refers to the experiences and sensibilities not 
o f individual creators and perceivers, but to the experiences and sensibilities of 
collectivities.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
176
CHAPTER 8
A ESTH ETIC EXPERIENCE IN N O N -LITERA TE CONTEXTS
In the previous chapter, I presented an analysis o f 'the aesthetic' dom ain that 
em erges from several strands of W estern philosophical literature. The analysis 
incorporates several different views, but as we saw, they cohere around three clusters o f 
ideas: the integration of the sensuous with the rational; the apprehension o f formal 
qualities; and non-utilitarian response sometimes referred to as disinterested, or as response 
in which attention oscillates between self and other.
W estern philosophical literature on 'the aesthetic' assum es that 'aesthetic 
experience' refers to the experience o f  individuals. In the present chapter, I consider three 
theories that challenge this im plicit consensus. First I sum m arize the theory of Ellen 
D essanayake (1988, 1992), w ho presents the sociobiological view that art-m aking is a 
universal species trait. She argues that, from the long perspective o f hum an evolution, the 
individualist art-m aking traditions that gave rise to the W estern philosophical notion of 'the 
aesthetic' are anom alous. Collective expressive forms and patterns o f response, typical of 
pre- and non-literate cultures, she claims, have been the norm, and are better suited to the 
needs o f  hum an beings.
D essanayake's use o f  the term  'aesthetic' is contradictory, som etim es reserved for 
the disinterested individual response typically valued in literate societies, som etim es used to 
refer to the patterns of collective expression and response typical o f non-literate cultures. 
Several other theorists, however, m ake unambiguous (if implicit) claims for using the term 
'the aesthetic' to refer to the expressions o f  collectivities. In this chapter, I presents sets of 
tw o such theories, one by  fem inist scholars, and the other by scholars of African history 
and cultures.
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The chapter following this one consists o f an analysis o f the collective expressive 
forms and the related patterns of response described by Dessanayake and the feminist and 
Africanist scholars, based on the three clusters o f ideas that em erge from W estern aesthetic 
theories ju s t explicated in Chapter 7. There I demonstrate th a t-a s  different as collective 
participatory forms may be from the individual works celebrated by the contem porary art 
world—conceptions o f the aesthetic that relate to the expressive forms and patterns o f 
response o f individuals, on the one hand, and o f collectivities, on the other, can deepen 
and enrich each other in important ways.
H om o Aestheticus: Dessanayake's View o f Art as a Universal H um an Capacity
According to the W alter Benjamin (1978), an aesthetic theorist associated with the 
Frankfurt School, "during long periods o f history, the mode o f  hum an perception changes 
with hum anity's entire m ode o f existence. The manner in which hum an sense perception is 
organized, the m edium  in which it is accomplished, is determ ined not only by nature but by 
historical circum stances as well" (Benjamin, 1978, p. 222). Benjam in wrote these remarks 
as part of a study on the effects o f photographic reproduction on hum an sense perception, 
but they serve equally well as an introduction to the transform ations in human sense 
perception that accompanied an earlier technological innovation: the developm ent o f 
w idespread alphabetic literacy. The transformations in the organization o f human sensory 
perception that accompanied the innovation of literacy are at the center of Ellen 
D essanayake's theory o f  art.
In her books W hat is A rt For?  and Homo Aestheticus, D essanayake argues that art 
is a universal hum an behavior that evolved because it offered a selective advantage to those 
groups that used it to draw focused attention to objects and events necessary for survival. 
She defines "the behavior o f art" as the making and appreciating o f  form ed objects and 
events for the purpose o f  "making special." According to D essanayake, because art fits the 
general pattern of evolved biological procliv ities-it is a human behavior that (1) is 
universal; (2) occasions intense involvement, in terms both o f  the am ount of time and the
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quality o f energy; and (3) generates pleasurable feelings-the  behavior of art probably 
evolved through natural selection. Therefore, "art can be plausibly considered a biological 
need that we are predisposed to w ant to satisfy, whose fulfillm ent gives satisfactions and 
pleasure, and whose denial may be considered a vital deprivation" (Dessanayake, 1992, 
p. 38).
Dessanayake clarifies that the behavior of art is similar to, but not identical with, 
either play or ritual. Like play, art is nonutilitarian and involves an elem ent of pretense;
'art' and 'play' share a "m etaphorical nature" in which som ething stands fo r som ething 
else. Like ritual, art is com pelling, non-ordinary and stylized; both art and ritual share the 
qualities o f being form alized, socially reinforcing, bracketed, sym bolic and universal. 
Furtherm ore, art and ritual were generally linked in practice. For D essanayake, what 
m akes art distinct from  play and ritual, is that its way o f "making special" is "aesthetic," 
defined as "the intention to appeal to (that is, to attract and, if  successful, to satisfy) 
another's appetite fo r apprehending and appreciating a specialness" (D essanayake, 1992, 
p. 55). Underneath the apparent circularity of her definition lies an idea central to many 
notions o f the aesthetic: elem ents are organized in space and time for the purpose o f 
engaging attention and/or evoking a particularly desired kind of response. Each o f the arts, 
she illustrates, can be understood as "cultural control (shaping and elaborating) of natural 
m aterial that in its raw state is unfinished and unseem ly" (D essanayake, 1992, p. 107).
For m ost o f hum an existence, those activities now associated in the W est w ith the category 
o f  'the arts,1 although experienced as sacred, w ere also a part o f every day life.
W hy is such "making special" behavior adaptive? Through engagem ent with 
aesthetic sensibilities and pleasures, as defined above, early hum an groups assured "willing 
participation in, and accurate perform ance of, the cerem onies that united" their m em bers 
(D essanayake, 1992, pp. 59-60). F or the thousands o f generations in w hich groups' 
collective w isdom  was passed down primarily through oral perform ances and participatory 
rituals, ensuring the attention o f group members was critical.
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D essanayake also argues that engaging in the behavior o f art nourished bonds 
am ong group members. She summarizes recent neurobiological research to propose a 
concept o f "aesthetic empathy," through which works o f art and rituals inscribe the bodies 
o f  participants with kinesthetic patterns that can be understood to create em bodied 
dim ensions of the very unity they celebrate. "In prem odem  societies, where arts and 
cerem ony are joined," she writes, "aesthetic empathic means are invariably used to express 
the group's perception o f the world" and, therefore, to create feelings of unity and 
belonging am ong group m em bers (D essanayake, 1992, pp. 140-193).
From  D essanayake's vantage point as a student o f  hum an evolution, the 
conceptions o f 'the aesthetic' that emerge from W estern philosophy and the art-m aking 
practices o f  the elite art world are extremely anomalous. "Until the Enlightenm ent," she 
w rites,
no other society had considered art to be an entity in itself, to be set apart from  
its context o f  use (usually in ceremony or entertainment) o r the content that it 
portrayed o r suggested....They found no reason to assum e that [form s such 
as paintings, sculptures, poem s, motets, an cantatas] belonged in a nam eable 
superordinate category, "art," that suggests a special m ode of w orking or 
noteworthy social identity (being an "artist" rather than sim ply som eone who 
paints) or a special result (a "work of art" rather than an altarpiece o f ancestor 
figure) (D essanayake, 1992, p. 197).
W hy is it that W estern-style modernity has produced art that is separate from 
everyday life, an art-world o f  elite institutions, and patterns o f  apprehending art that are 
individualized, cerebral, and perhaps m ost confusing o f  all, 'd isin terested '?  A ccording to 
Dessanayake, the prim ary factor that accounts for these difference is the developm ent o f 
broad-based alphabetic literacy, and the myriad changes that resulted from  that 
developm ent. In keeping w ith her evolutionary view, D essanayake em phasizes how recent 
a developm ent is literacy, especially mass literacy: of an estim ated 1600 generations o f 
hum an beings, only 20 generations have had even the opportunity to read and write. 
Literate cu ltu res-w h ere  m ost people know how to read and write, and social practices 
revolve around the expectation o f literacy—is only three or four hundred years old, for only 
a fraction o f the earth 's population (D essanayake, 1988, pp. 171-173; 1992, p. 196).
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To understand how the developm ent of literacy accounts for changes in the
conceptions of art, as well as in the practices that surround art's creation and reception, we
must first consider how literacy changes the organization of hum an sense perception and
patterns of thought. W hile acknowledging that her dichotomized analysis o f oral and
literate societies is som ewhat oversim plified, Dessanayake (1988) nevertheless
convincingly argues that "learning to read and write is an initiation to a state of mind from
which one cannot return" (p. 173).
W hen inform ation is written down, it is possible to analyze data, to notice
analogies, to think reflectively. W ritten texts, unlike oral narratives, for instance, are
available to be studied and reviewed; information can be classified, quantified with
exactness, and organized hierarchically. In oral cultures, by contrast, m eanings tend to be
implicit rather than explicit, received simultaneously rather than in linear fashion,
discontinuous rather than uniform  (D essanayake, 1988, p. 173). Verbal arts are public and
participative, and language m ust be vivid, inspirational, and, literally, m em orable; (p. 174)
w hereas literacy, by contrast, provides opportunities for detached, m ediated and isolated
experience. Furtherm ore, not only is the time we spend reading and w riting inherently
solitary. Literacy changes the patterns of our sense perception because we pay attention
differently when we know that we can return to a cookbook o r a map rather than rely on
memory. Non-literate persons have "no choice but to watch or listen and rem em ber,"
writes Dessanayake, so their participation in events, and their engagem ent w ith people, is
m uch more direct and focused.
Literate persons becom e easily accustomed to and thereby dependent upon 
external devices for am usem ent and distraction — mechanically produced 
sights, sounds, and events that are selected and provided by som eone other 
than them selves, usually a stranger. To the nonliterate, the notion o f  boredom  
has little meaning; existence itself demands neither justification nor 
cultivation. If nothing is distracting it, the m ind finds occupation in its inner 
life or directly in the surroundings. The immediate world is m ore likely to be 
noticed — colors, sm ells, sounds, appearances o f  things, as well as their 
relationships to each other and to the mental and imaginative life 
(D essanayake, 1988, p. 176).
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In contrast with the "vast and multiform , but often disconnected" bits o f knowledge
characteristic of literate people, nonliterate people are immersed in bodies o f integrated,
useful "knowledge," or "lore," beliefs m ediated by intimately known people and expressive
forms including proverbs, folktales and ritualized formulations. Dessanayake (1988)
argues that where there are fewer words and less reliance on language,
those aspects of life for which there is no precise description are not lost, 
ignored or dism issed but instead (coded in other, non-linguistic ways) tend to 
be integrated in socially shared symbols. In pre-literate culture, a pictorial or 
visible sym bol becomes a fact: it sim ultaneously stands for, defines, and 
m anifests its referent (Otter, 1971). In such cultures, ritual rather than books 
serves as the locus of know ledge and operates on many levels....[P]reliterate 
people have conceivably been sensitized to apprehend and respond to many 
kinds of information that are never verbalized but only expressed in ac tio n -in  
rituals, em otional gestures, and so forth....For post-traditional humans 
whose th ink ing-and  even fantasy and daydreams--is largely occupied with 
instrumental, pragmatic concerns, it is perhaps difficult to appreciate the more 
em bedded, enactive, and symbolic type o f  thinking that is characteristic of 
nonliterates (pp. 177-178)
Alphabetic lite racy -th e  decoding o f  symbols each of w hich stands for a sound, 
rather than an idea or object as in pictographic systems o f w riting—allows for inform ation 
to be absorbed with little awareness o f symbolic mediation. "One of the features of 
alphabetic literacy," Dessanayake writes, "is its transparency, the way it seems to give, 
w ithout laborious deciphering, instant and direct access to its subject" (1992, p. 204). 
A lthough reading poem s and other texts shaped into formal patterns can, o f  course, draw 
attention to the linguistic symbol itself, it is important to note that in much reading, the 
sym bol disappears from focus. In other words, we can take in inform ation and 
perspectives from written texts w ith minimal awareness o f the m eaning-m aking process 
itself.
On the other hand, writing m akes it possible to see words as things, as separate 
from  their referents—much different than in oral language, in which the unit of 
com prehension tends to be the utterance, rather than the word. In literate (and 
hyperliterate) cultures attention is focused on the meaning o f the word, rather than the 
m eaning o f an object, event, or experience (D essanayake, 1992, p. 208).
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Dessanayake argues that it is literacy, and its concomitants as she describes them,
that shape contemporary attitudes tow ards art. She writes that
the required response to art in m odem  tim es is not direct psychophysical 
reaction to rhythm, tension and release, or associated with powerful cultural 
or biological symbols (the "ecstasy o f com m unal participation") but a 
detached, cognitively mediated "appreciation" of its internal relationships, its 
place in a history and tradition, and its implications and ramifications outside 
itself ("the aesthetic experience") (1988, p. 183),
As the subject o f aesthetics developed...a startling and influential idea 
took hold. This idea held that there is a special frame o f  mind for appreciating 
works of art: a "distinterested" attitude that disregards any consideration of 
one's own personal interest in the object, its utility, or its social or religious 
ramifications. This unprecedented idea led to still another: the work o f art is 
a world-in-itself, made solely or prim arily as an occasion for this kind of 
detached aesthetic experience, which was considered to be one o f the highest 
form s of mental activity.
"Disinterest" implied that one could transcend the limitations o f  time, 
place, and temperament, and react to the artwork o f eras far removed from 
one's o w n-w hether or not one understood the m eaning they had had for their 
original m akers and users. In this sense, art was "universal." A nother key 
idea that gradually developed in the field o f  aesthetics was that works of art 
were vehicles for a special kind o f  know ledge—a knowledge that, with the 
waning o f  religious belief, often took on the spiritual aura and authority once 
restricted to the church. Still another corollary was the idea of art for art's 
sake (or life for art's sake), suggesting that art had no purpose but to "be" and 
to provide opportunities for enjoying an aesthetic experience that was its own 
reward, and that one could have no higher calling than to open oneself to 
these heightened moments (D essanayake, 1992, p. 197).
From  the long perspective o f  evolution, the solitariness of modern and postmodern 
cultures worries Dessanayake. The em phasis on "self-knowledge, self-developm ent, self- 
fulfillment," characteristic of contem porary life in general, as well as literacy and artistic 
engagem ent in particular, deny us the support o f "socially shared significances" which 
appear to have been central to the viability o f  our species. In this context, those members 
o f contem porary societies who are involved in the arts often seek to fill the needs that 
society cannot meet: connection w ith the natural world; direct, immediate and unself­
conscious experience; and the integration o f fragm ented lives:
W ith the lack o f coherence in our lives, w e are all called upon to be a rtis ts-to  
shape, find significant aspects of, im pose m eaning upon, discern or state 
what is special about our experience. Response to the m ystery o f  life 
becomes a personal aesthetic gesture rather than acting out of com m unity and 
confirm atory cerem ony (D essanayake, 1988, p. 190).
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Paradoxically, in contemporary society art becomes either totally segregated from 
the every day, transformed into inaccessible sacredness; or, am ong the avant garde, all of 
life is aestheticized, every juxtaposition a potential significance in an unending quest for 
coherence. In these modern formulations, Dessanayake (1988) sees "reactions to the 
changes brought about when literacy replaced art-ritual as the means o f em bodying and 
transm itting com m unal knowledge and values" (p. 192).
One need not be convinced o f all o f  the details o f  Dessanayake's evolutionary 
theory to recognize the value of her insight about the anomalous nature o f art-making and 
-appreciating in m odem  and postmodern literate cultures. The capacity to organize 
elements into spatial and temporal forms designed to give pleasure and attract attention 
appears to be universal; many ethnographic studies docum ent cultures in which all 
m embers are expected to participate in collective expressive forms. It is likely that a theory 
o f 'the aesthetic' that arose in anomalous circum stances w ould be inadequate to describe the 
m anifestations of these capacities in all linguistic and cultural contexts.
H ow ever, D essanayake's use of the term  'aesthetic' is frustratingly inconsistent. 
Som etim es she uses the term to refer to her notion of "m aking special," i.e., enactm ent of 
form s, usually collective, that evoke a response of specialness w ithin a participant. By the 
end o f  her theorizing, however, her use o f  the term is consistent with usage by the art 
w orld elite and form alist and aestheticist thinkers: she associates 'aesthetic' with 
d isinterestedness o f  response, art for art's sake, and the separation o f art from everyday 
life—and, therefore, disparages it.
O ther theorists, however, unam biguously use the category o f  'the aesthetic' to refer 
to the kinds o f  collective expressive forms Dessanayake attributes to non- and pre-literate 
cultures. They do not argue that the term is appropriate; rather, their use o f it is im plicit in 
the nam es they give their theories: 'fem inist aesthetics' and 'A frican aesthetics.' W e will 
consider these two bodies o f theory in the remaining tw o sections o f this chapter.
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Fem inist Challenges to W estern Philosophical Conceptions of T h e  A esthetic'
In an essay entitled "Re-enfranchising Art: Fem inist Interventions in the Theory of
Art," Estella Lauter (1993) proposes a feminist aesthetic, based on assertions that art is
gendered and that responses to it are embedded within cultures (as opposed to separate
from every day life, or somehow universal, as some W estern philosophical theories have
argued or assum ed). Lauter's claim  that art itself is gendered arises from the sexist biases
of the art world, including its distinction between art and craft, and, she claims, its unfair
and ungrounded devaluing o f the w ork of specific wom en artists. Lauter also writes in
sym pathy with A rthur Danto's w arning that in the post-m odern context, philosophy has
dis-enfranchised art by absorbing it into thought "so that virtually all there is at the end is
theory, art having finally become vaporized in a dazzle of pure thought about itself" (Danlo,
1986, p. 111). "Fem inist theory," writes Lauter, "re-enfrachises art by revisioning its
com plex relationships to cultures." It does this by acknow ledging the difference gender
m akes in "the creation, reception and evaluation of art" (p. 22).
Lauter defines her feminist theory in contrast to form alism  (a conception of the
'aesthetic' that em phasizes non-utilitarian and disinterested attention to the formal qualities
of works o f art) along several different dimensions. W hereas form alism  defines art in
terms o f "formal properties, qualities and principles and arranges those element in a
hierarchical order to privilege those least useful to daily life," fem inist theory
describes art as everexpanding and seeks to identify it through exem plars and 
m odels instead o f  trying to define it....[B]oundaries betw een art and culture 
or art and nature are identifiable but shifting. [Art's] status depends on its 
effectiveness in m aking life sensible to an audience for which it is produced or 
by w hich it is received. G ood art reaches beyond its society o f  origin to 
suggest alternative ways o f being. Its aesthetic value arises in relationship to 
m oral and cognitive values (Lauter, 1993, p .31).
U nlike the artist o f  the form alist paradigm, who strives to "disguise 
relationships betw een his art and his personal life to m ake his art seem  universal," fem inist 
artists strive toward authenticity fo r themselves and for their audiences." This idea is 
em bedded in a poem  'Transcendental Etude' by Adrienne Rich (1978):
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The longer I live the more I mistrust 
theatricality, the false glam our cast 
by perform ance, the more I know its poverty beside 
the truths we are salvaging from  
the splitting-open o f  our lives.
The wom an w ho sits w atching, listening,
eyes moving in the darkness
is rehearsing in her body, hearing-out in her blood
a score touched off in her perhaps
by some w ords, a few chords, from  the stage:
a tale only she can tell (p. 74).
In contrast with the disinterestedness that characterizes the attitude o f response
valued in the formalist paradigm , "in feminist reception theory," writes Lauter (1993),
[ojptimal response involves political, social, religious, econom ic, ancl 
aesthetic sensitivity, which may com e from formal education or from 
experience. [The art critic] evaluates art according to its potential to em pow er 
people to live more effective, moral and satisfying lives in a world 
increasingly characterized by  differences. The critic's likes and dislikes are 
foregrounded as stum bling blocks or starting points for the process o f 
increasing understanding... (p. 32).
M em bers o f  the art w orld have argued long enough about the 
interpretation o f works as if  they w ere autonom ous objects. Let us now study 
how art em bodies, enacts, and changes cultures (p. 33).
The em beddedness of art in culture is the hallmark of Lauter's feminist aesthetic.
However, it is important to understand that Lauter theorizes well within the general
categories of the W estern philosophical tradition: she imagines a world o f art-m aking and
art critics, apparently related to but nevertheless distinct from "daily life." She lists
'aesthetic sensitivity' as separate from  religious and political sensitivity. W e could say that
Lauter's aesthetic, in a norm ative sense o f the word, identifies the ethical and
transform ative w ith the beautiful. B ut in categoreal terms, she still maintains a distinction
between the aesthetic and ethical, political and religious domains. W hile she argues for an
appreciation of 'art' em bedded in diverse cultures, her own categories are derived from  the
discourses o f W estern philosophy and the elite art world.
The work of another fem inist theorist, Renee Lorraine (1993), challenges W estern
philosophical notion o f the aesthetic at the deeper, categoreal level. Lorraine grounds her
theory o f  a 'gynecentric aesthetic' not on a critique o f the m ale-defined art w orld (as did
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Lauter), but rather on the forms o f cultural expression that appear to characterize societies 
in which women enjoy relatively high status in relation to men. Starting from an entirely 
different point of inquiry than Lauter, Lorraine's study points to the im portance o f culture 
in defining characteristics o f various different aesthetics. Lorraine com pared the work o f 
Heidi G ottner-Abendroth (1986), a G erm an fem inist and scholar of interpretive theory, 
and Alan Lomax (1968), an A m erican folklorist who, am ong many other endeavors, 
studied the relationship between the structures of dance and music forms, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, patterns o f  social organization. Lorraine discovered that the w ork o f 
both scholars points towards com m on features in the form s of artistic expression in ancient 
and contem porary cultures in "com plem entary societies," i.e., cultures in which the status 
o f men and wom en is relatively equal.
Based on her studies of the structure o f  myth and ritual, G ottner-Abendroth 
articulates "Nine Principles of a M atriarchal Aesthetic" (Gottner-Abendroth, 1986, p. 8 1). 
T hese principles are in some ways consistent w ith, and in some ways contradictory to, the 
notion o f the aesthetic that emerges from  the W estern philosophical tradition. According to 
G ottner-A bendroth, one major difference betw een 'matriarchal' and 'patriarchal' art is that 
in the former, all participants are sim ultaneously authors and spectators. Because of this, 
analysis o f the relationships among the author, text and reader (or artist, object or 
perform ance, and audience), so prevalent in W estern understandings of the aesthetic, are 
irrelevant. The focus o f this theory is on the process o f the creating, (not on the object 
created). The proper attitude for those involved is one of "total commitment."
In matriarchal societies, Gottner-A bendroth claims, the primary expressive form 
was the dance, which, w ith its attendant rituals and m ulti-m odal sensory stimulation, 
functioned not as separate from  reality, or as a part of reality, but as transform ative of 
reality. In healing rituals, for instance, sham ans used sym bolic forms to augm ent the 
patient's hope for recovery, trust in the w itch doctor, and belief in the cure. This shift in 
belief contributed to a new "psychosocial reality," i.e., to the healing of the patient, and his
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or her reintegration into the community. Gottner-Abendroth distinguishes matriarchal 
aesthetic from the patriarchal by arguing that patriarchal ait has existed only since the 
aesthetic sphere was separated from the rest of life. M atriarchal art, by contrast, is "the 
ability to shape life and so change it; it is itself energy, life, a drive toward the 
aestheticization of society" (Lorraine, 1993, p. 37).
Gottner-Abendroth's matriarchal aesthetic is intended as both (1) a description of an 
aesthetic sensibility that historically has arisen in cultures in w hich wom en's status is 
relatively equal to that o f men, and that informs some contem porary artistic creations; and 
(2) a utopian vision of a "complex, socially subversive praxis"...that seeks to "dissolve the 
divisions w ithin the aesthetic and so aestheticize the whole o f society," and to define 'art' 
as "the universal ability to shape a worthwhile life, both personally and socially (Gottner- 
Abenroth, 1986, p. 94). The following paragraphs offer a critical view of these two 
dim ensions of her theory.
The notion o f  matriarchy has been criticized from several directions. As Renee 
Lorraine (1993) writes, "to speak o f'm atriarchy ' and o f nature, m agic, em otion, love, and 
the erotic in the sam e context may seem ...dangerously close to sexist essentialism" (p. 37). 
Positing a single 'matriarchal aesthetic' could obliterate im portant differences among the 
aesthetic sensibilities of women, based on geographical, cultural, econom ic and historical 
differences among them. Early research on prehistoric m atriarchy has been questioned; and 
anthropologists, including feminist anthropologists, are "nearly unanim ous in their 
dism issal o f  a universal matriarchy as 'pure conjecture,' and m any deny that there is 
evidence o f  any matriarchy at all" (Lorraine, 1993, pp. 38-39). Furtherm ore, 'm atriarchy' 
appears to suggest an inversion o f the dom inative relationships that define patriarchy, 
w hereas evidence suggests that even in cultures where fem ale figures were worshipped, or 
w here women contributed a large share of the food supply and participated in decision­
m aking structures, pow er was not concentrated in one gender as has been the case in 
patriarchal settings. (W e can assume that it is at least partly for this reason that Renee
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Lorraine chose to refer to a  'gynecentric' rather than G ottner-A bendroth 's 'm atriarchal' 
aesthetic.)
Leaving aside questions about whether at some prehistoric tim e wom en universally
enjoyed greater equality with men than w e do now, and leaving aside concerns about the
term 'm atriarchy,' folklore research suggests that there are distinct features o f the
expressive forms o f nonauthoritarian cultures where the status o f  w om en is high, features
that correlate closely w ith those that comprise G ottner-Abendorth's 'matriarchal aesthetic.’
The lack of clear distinction between the domains o f 'a rt' and 'life' appears to  be typical of
preindustrial societies in general, a claim  made by M arxist as well as fem inist theorists
(Lorraine, 1993, p. 44). A s D essanayake (1988, 1992) noted, the use o f  the term  'art' to
define an overarching category began as recently as The Enlightenment. In preindustrial
societies also characterized by relative gender complementarity, both ethnographic studies
(Begler, 1978; Krige & Krige, 1947; Lee, 1979; M arshall, 1959; Turnbull, 1961) and
cantom etric and choreom etric analyses o f the relationship between the form s music and
dance and the structure of social organization (Lomax, 1968; Lom ax & Berkowitz, 1972)
suggest that expressive forms are more inclusive o f all m embers of the com m unity, both
wom en and m en. In these societies, for instance, the vocal music is generally sung with
several parts o f equal importance, rather than having som e voices subordinate to others.
The dance style "is described as flowing, curved ... and erotic, with m ultipart trunk action
and accentuated hip, pelvis and breast m ovements." The presence o f  such characteristics is
correlated w ith the degree to w hich women contribute to the subsistence needs o f  the group
(Lom ax, 1968; Lorraine, 1993, p. 40). Lorraine (1993) sum m arizes the congruent
findings o f G ottner-A bendorth 's studies of myths and ritual, ethnographic studies of
relatively com plem entary societies, and Lomax's quantitative analysis, by noting that
all o f the cultures described stress integration and inclusion rather than 
fragm entation, a unity o f equal voices rather than hierarchism  and 
stratification. Em otion, magic and the dance serve to unite the individual, 
society and nature; there is an integration of religion, art, healing, and life; 
em otion, intellect and action combine to achieve an ecstatic state; process and 
continuous creation is stressed over objectification; there is a synthesis o f  the
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arts, and no divisions in the aesthetic sphere; the continuous cycle of life takes 
precedence over a focus on individual death; sexuality is (responsibly) free 
rather than exclusive; and everyone is included in aesthetic and other social 
activities. Significantly, however, this em phasis on synthesis, integration, and 
unity is not so total as to eliminate the self: the group consciousness and 
harm ony with nature do not limit or repress individual consciousness but seem 
rather to nurture and support it. (This is not paradoxical but analogous to the 
harm ony o f individual themes in a piece of music.) Relationships between 
individuals and with the natural world are subject to subject rather than subject 
to object (pp. 44-45).
Lorraine finds support for the idea that such an aesthetic is not only egalitarian but
gynecentric because of its tendency toward integration, a  tendency associated with
fem aleness in the psychological theories of Nancy Chodorow (1978), the moral theories of
Carol G illigan (1982), and the aesthetic theory of Julia Penelope Stanley and Susan J.
W olfe (1978), am ong others.
I do not w ish to contend that tendencies toward integration am ong wom en are 
biologically determined, for they are not peculiar to wom en, not all women 
exhibit them, and cultural factors may be responsible for them and can 
dim inish them. Yet it is significant that these tendencies are strong in the 
societies [in which wom en enjoy relatively high status.] For because the 
wom en in these societies are relatively autonomous o f men, their actions and 
expressions are likely to be authentic, to be based on female experience rather 
than to be imitations of men or acting out o f male conceptions of the feminine 
(Lorraine, 1993, p.45).
In addition to proposing an aesthetic as a description of sensibilities that emerged 
from egalitarian societies, G ottner-Abendroth and Lorraine present their 'm atriarchal' and 
'gynecentric' aesthetics as ethically prescriptive, both as a utopian vision o f the future and 
as a m eans for transform ing patriarchal society. "In the gynecentric culture envisioned 
here, everything made w ould be m ade with beauty, everything done w ould be done with 
beauty. A rt w ould not be separate from the rest o f  life, and the entire society w ould be 
aestheticized" (Lorraine, 1993, p. 48). In  G ottner-Abendroth's view , distinctions between 
the ethical and the artistic apparently would disappear. Aestheticising the whole o f  society, 
she writes, w ould constitute "creating a meaningful social life together. Seen from this 
perspective, art is no longer a specialised technique, an exclusive know -how  but the
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universal ability to shape a worthwhile life, both personally and socially" (Gottner- 
A bendroth, 1993, p. 94).
The question of whether or not there are distinct qualities o f the expressive forms 
associated with relatively egalitarian patterns o f social organization, or typical o f each 
gender, may be relevant to the practical work o f  structuring conflict resolution strategies. It 
is possible, for instance, that women o f  enemy societies will find in their folk arts 
com m onalities that facilitate reciprocal communication, understanding, and even respect 
for each other's hum anity. Practitioners m ight find in the forms o f  w om en's folk 
expression models o f  inclusiveness useful in structuring workshops, rituals and other 
activities. The theories o f Lomax, Gottner-A bendorth and Lorraine suggest that it is at least 
worth considering these possibilities. H ow ever, for the purposes of our conceptual 
understanding o f the aesthetic, it is not necessary to resolve questions about the gendered 
nature o f patterns o f artistic expression and response.
It is necessary, however, to note that G ottner-A bendroth 's and Lorraine's 
'm atriarchal' and 'gynecentric' notions of the 'aesthetic' differ categoreally from the 
W estern philosophical conception. In other words, they are proposing not just that the 
ethical implications o f a work of art ought to influence a beholder's sense o f an object's 
beauty, but that collectively constructed rituals created to shape communal life by evoking 
feelings of passionate commitment, not ju st individual works of art created to evoke 
disinterested responses w ithin individual viewers, ought to be  the subject o f aesthetic 
inquiry.
They are claim ing as 'aesthetic,' therefore, expressive forms that w ould be 
excluded from  the category as understood in the traditions o f W estern philosophy. For 
instance, participation in the rituals they claim  as definitive o f  their gynecentric or 
m atriarchal 'aesthetic' is clearly utilitarian. In this regard, G ottner-A bendroth 's and 
Lorraine's critique o f the W estern philosophical conception o f 'th e  aesthetic dom ain' is 
m ore radical than Lauter's.
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A similarly radical claim  is made by several scholars o f African cultures, whose 
theories we consider in the next section. We begin with a critical review of a  recent article 
in the N ew  York Review  o f  Books, w hich reveals how the tensions betw een the aesthetic 
conception o f  the W estern art world and those im plicit within the expressive forms of pre­
literate tribal cultures manifested themselves in the context of a Guggenheim exhibition of 
arts and crafts created in Africa.
Kugusu M tim a  (To Touch the Heart): An African Conception of 'Aesthetics'
The com plications of understanding and appreciating the expressive form s of a 
particular tribal culture through the linguistic categories o f  W estern aesthetic theory and the 
forms o f display o f the W estern art world are revealed in an April, 1997, NY Review of 
Books article about a recent display at the G uggenheim  m useum  entitled "Africa: The Art 
of a Continent." The reviewer, K. Anthony Appiah, grew  up the capital of an old Akan 
kingdom  now  in the center of the republic o f Ghana, surrounded by his mother's collection 
of figurative goldweights: small figures that had been used for weighing gold dust, their 
surfaces inscribed with symbols familiar from textile motifs. The artifacts "depict people 
and anim als, plants and tools, weapons and dom estic utensils, often in arrangem ents that 
will rem ind an A sante who looks a t them of a fam iliar proverb" (Appiah, 1997, p.46). A 
large selection o f  goldweights com prised a m ajor com ponent o f  the Guggenheim  
exhibition. Appiah, obviously educated in W estern philosophy and aesthetic theory, was 
in the rather unique position o f appreciating the objects in the exhibition both through their 
fam iliar cultural resonances, and through the sensibilities o f som eone educated in the ways 
of the W estern art world.
In his review, Appiah noted with som e irony that the displayed objects, while 
"am ong the splendors of African creativity," were produced by people who saw them 
neither as an expression o f  African culture nor as art, especially not in the sense of 'art' as 
it has been used in the W est since the early nineteenth century (i.e., to designate a special 
dom ain of creativity distinct from craft and technology) (W illiam s, 1983, pp. 41-42). Their
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m akers identified, not with constructs of nations or the continent, but w ith local groups. 
They made and assessed the gold weights for their functional significance as well as for 
their detail, hum or and artisanry. "Their decorative elegance w as something prized and 
aim ed for...but it was an ornament, an embellishment," writes Appiah, "on an object that 
served a utilitarian function" (p. 46).
T heir utility notwithstanding, the makers o f  many o f  the objects in the exhibit "had 
notions o f  form  that the object needed to meet if it was to be judged a well-made artifact." 
(p.48) Sim ilarly, as an ethnographer wrote in relation to m asks m ade to be used in 
m asquerades and rituals in Sierra L eone-also  displayed in the G uggenheim  ex h ib it-in  
order for a mask to be accepted by the society, the mask "must first and forem ost be 
beautiful, enchantingly beautiful in Sande eyes." The problem  here is that in the language 
o f S ierra Leone, the word nyande, roughly translated as 'beauty,' actually can be 
understood only through a cluster o f  English concepts, including "beautiful, good, kind, 
nice" (p. 48). Appiah notes that in Asante-Twi, the A frican language o f his father's 
people, the sam e word is used to describe "attractive people, ethical behavior and good 
m anners" (p. 48).
Apppiah writes that the curators o f the Guggenheim  exhibition invited museum- 
goers to "evaluate [the artifacts] in the m anner we call aesthetic. This means we were 
invited to look at their form, their craftsmanship, the ideas they evoke, to attend to them in 
the w ay we have learned to attend to art museums." (p.50) (Em phasis added. Appiah's 
"we" obviously refers to the W estern-educated visitors to the G uggenheim  and readers of 
The N ew  York Review.') Since the exhibit "decisively established that anyone w ith half an 
eye can honor the artistry o f Africa, a continent w hose creativity has been denigrated by 
som e and sentim entalized by others, but rarely taken seriously," Appiah suggests that the 
display should engender questions about the past of W estern culture, w hy it has had "such 
great difficulty learning to respect m any of the artworks in the....show because they were
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African." M embers of Appiah's extended family, including people w ith both African and
European cultural lineages, agreed that
the show was wonderful; and what made it wonderful was that the eye could 
linger w ith the pleasure on the forms, the shapes, and the surfaces, the 
patination and the pigment, and engage each object with whatever we 
happened to know o f  its m aterials, its history, its origin. In short, we found 
ourselves responding naturally to these African artifacts as  art; which when 
all is said and done, was all that...the curator...had invited us to do"
(em phasis added, p. 51).
Although w e might question whether a response evoked by the rarefied 
environm ent o f a G uggenheim  gallery can appropriately be considered "natural," we can 
agree with Appiah that the exhibit at the Guggenheim , and others like it, allow m em bers of 
non-African cultures to appreciate the skill and artisanry of peoples w hose expressions 
have been deprecated and overlooked. If, as Appiah suggests, they invite their audiences 
to wonder about the factors that lead W estern culture to dismiss the dignity of the creative 
expression of A fricans for generations, such exhibitions can surely be said to serve an 
educative purpose. But what are the implications o f taking an object from  a cultural context 
in which museum s are unknown, an object crafted to be appreciated for its usefulness more 
im portantly than its form, and setting it off in vitrines, illuminated by m useum lighting? 
(Even Appiah acknow ledged that the gold weights "cried out from the m useum 's vitrines to 
be touched" [p. 46]).
The critical ethnographer James Clifford would say that the gold w eights and masks 
on view at the Guggenheim  had been elevated within the "aesthetic-anthropological" 
(Clifford, 1988, p. 209) or "art-culture" system , in which objects of non-W estern peoples 
are appropriated, first to be contextualized as intriguing specimens o f dying (or dead) 
cultures, and then, as w orthy o f the detached (and elevated) eye of art connoisseurs. 
(Clifford, 1991, p .2 14) The problem  with the anthropological-aesthetic system  as a way o f 
understanding the creative expression of other cultures is that the system itself imposes 
upon those expressions the categories of the academic and art discourses current in the 
W est, including a W estern understanding of the aesthetic domain itself. W hat would it
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mean to look beyond those discourses, into the conceptual frameworks o f the various
cultures from which objects and tem poral formal expressions emerge?
In an essay entitled, 'The African Aesthetic and National Consciousness,' the
scholar o f African studies D ona M arim ba Richards (1993) suggests one such approach.
Like the feminist theorists cited in the previous section, she calls for a conception o f the
aesthetic that is transformational, that has both spiritual and political implications.
Eschewing the utamawazo  (culturally structured thought) o f the European tradition as
rationalistic, objectifying, and anti-spiritual, she calls for a reconceptualization o f 'the
aesthetic,' that is true to African uramaroho  (spirit-life). She seeks a conception that is
"uniquely suited to African sensibilities," that relates to "power of a spiritual-em otional
nature, w hich effects perception, thought and feeling" (p. 65).
Richards discovers such a conception in the Kiswahili te rn  Kugusa M tim a  (to
touch the heart). "Kugusa M tim a , " she writes,
is the African experience o f  being "touched," "moved," "affected" by a self­
consciously created form /phenom enon. These expressions are powerful 
energies which act on reality and which act on us. They have the ability to 
change reality as w e have. The concept o f  Kugusa M tima  takes "aesthetic" 
beyond "beauty" and "pleasure," expands it and places it into the context o f 
the profound A frican understanding/experience of the universe. Kugusa  
M tim a  deals w ith transcendence, transformation, hum an consciousness, and 
the pow er o f collective hum an will (Richards, 1993, pp. 65-66).
The transcendent qualities o f  this African conceptualization o f som ething akin to
'the aesthetic' occurs through the vehicle of ritual drama. "The m odality of ritual allows us
as African people to both create and experience spiritual reality," R ichards writes. It
carries people into an "eternal moment" in which time and space are joined in one sacred
totality.
The transform ative pow er o f  Kugusa Mtima is em bodied in the m ask, and in the
active and participatory process of masking:
The African m ask is in essence not a representation. It is not life-less matter.
It is not a "work o f art" to be adm ired on a wall. It is m ost certainly not a 
"disguise." It is a force. It has being, and as such can be/should be pow erful.
Its pow er lies in its ability to transform. M asks are used to transform  young 
boys into young men. The Sowo is used to transform young girls into M ende
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women. Masks are used to assure the presence o f  the ancestors at ceremonial 
occasions and judicial procedures. They are used to heal, to frighten, to make 
fertile, to initiate, to bind in oath, to appease and to atone. They are used to 
harmonize, to give praise and to lament, m ost importantly they are used to 
energize, for the transformation o f our consciousness and our being. W e are 
no longer our ordinary selves, but becom e our m ore profound cultural selves 
(R ichards, 1993, p. 67).
Dancing and drumming, "inseparable modalities," are the media through which 
African people
express and experience the m ost com plex, the deepest aspects of African 
philosophy. The drum translates to us the rhythm  o f the universe and the 
dance transports us to a phenom enal dim ension in which we becom e a part 
of the connecting thread that binds all being, thereby making the universe 
whole. ...The power of the A frican drum  is inescapable. In unison the 
drums becom e compelling, forceful. This is no academ ic, cerebral exercise; 
neither is it peripheral or detached. It is rather visceral and involved"
(R ichards, 1993, p. 68).
Sim ilarly, Richards asserts, the "African sym bol is spiritual truth, not its 
representation." Citing W ade Nobles (1986), she contrast European sym bolism  
(representational, sequential and analytic) with the African understanding and experience 
o f  sym bol (as transformational, synchronic and analogic). A frican sym bols can "assault, 
neutralize, protect and teach." They are "spiritual energy manifested in the form  or shape, 
pattern or design o f  sculpture, braided hairstyle, clothing, a m elody-sound, a word, song 
o r dance o r the rhythm o f the drum  itself. C lassical African writing is first of all symbolic 
and sacred" (Richards, 1993, p. 68).
W ithin African cultures, according to the Nigerian scholar Dele Jegede (1993), "art 
fo r art's sake" can barely be understood. "Art for life's sake" is the African imperative.
The description and explication o f Kugusu Mtima, a distinctly African construction, 
to refer to a body o f theory and practices that corresponds to what in the W est is called 
'aesthetic,' adds dim ension to Clifford's criticism s of the W est's im position o f  the 
aesthetic-ethnographic system  on the artifacts and expressive forms o f  other cultures. On 
the one hand, to move an artifact from  an anthropological m useum  to a display in an art 
m useum  appears to elevate it, to dignify it as w orthy o f aesthetic appreciation, even to claim
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for it universal appeal. This "elevation" occurs, however, all within a context designed to 
transform  the consciousness of the viewers, for sure, but in accordance with the values 
prized by the W est, and in accordance w ith W estern understandings of 'the aesthetic.' 
Specifically, by presenting artifacts devoid o f context, by the very structure o f  display, 
w hich separates apprehension from  use, m useums run the risk o f  appropriating the 
expression o f one culture in service o f the values (of individualism  and detached rationality, 
for instance) o f their own cultural context.
There are obvious parallels between the matriarchal and gynecentric aesthetics 
articulated by Lorraine and G ottner-Abendroth, on the one hand, and Kugusu M tima  , 
described and illustrated by Richards, and the "arts-for-life's-sake" aesthetic articulated 
Jegede and others, on the other. The theories of both fem inist and Africanist scholars 
propose a notion o f 'th e  aesthetic' that is distinct—in the categoreal sense—from the 
conception that has em erged from W estern philosophical traditions. The participatory and 
collective nature and transformative purposefulness o f artistic/aesthetic creation, and its 
close ties with cosm ology, stand out as distinct from  individual acts of creation and 
response associated with the aesthetic domain explicated within W estern philosophical 
literature and enacted in the W estern art world. Also, whereas m any W estern aesthetic 
theorists have labored to articulate the distinctions between the ethical, the religious and the 
aesthetic,32 African theories o f the aesthetic appear to based on the, intrinsic ^.separability 
o f these dim ensions o f experience. The rituals described by both African and feminist 
scholars as paradigm atic o f their 'aesthetics' stand in sharp contrast to W estern notions of 
the aesthetic by virtue of their utilitarian purposes and the com m itted—even ecsta tic - 
responses they are designed to evoke.
It could be  argued, and is in fact implied in the writing o f m any W estern scholars, 
that the participatory expressive forms o f collectivities, as intense and powerful as they 
might be, and as transform ative as they are, nevertheless fall outside of the aesthetic 
domain. An individual transfixed in an ecstatic and trance-like state can hardly be engaged
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in the non-utilitarian (disinterested, contemplative) oscillation o f  attention between self and 
other w e came to see, in the previous chapter, as definitive of aesthetic response. Perhaps 
the feminist and Africanist scholars, while engaged in a laudable attem pt to address 
inequities that have resulted from the domination of W estern cultural forms, have 
nonetheless m uddied the conceptual waters, expanding the concept of 'the aesthetic' so 
broadly that it ceases to have a distinct meaning.
W hy not reserve 'the aesthetic' for those moments of oscillating attention, the non­
utilitarian/disinterested response-and  the forms that evoke it—and find other language to 
describe the particular power and resonance of collectively constructed expressive forms 
and the feelings of belonging and passionate commitment they are intended to evoke? The 
next chapter is devoted to an answer to this question.
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CH A PTER 9
TH E AESTHETIC DOM AIN AND TH E EXPRESSIVE FORM S OF COLLECTIVITIES
In this chapter, I analyze several specific exam ples of the material and performative 
expressions o f co llectiv ities-and  the patterns of apprehension related to them —in order to 
understand the extent to which the "aesthetic experiences" o f collectivities are both similar 
to, and different from , aesthetic experiences o f individuals (as these were explicated in 
Chapter 7), This analysis will help to address the question posed at the end o f the 
preceding chapter, nam ely, why not reserve the terms 'the aesthetic' for those m om ents of 
oscillating attention and non-utilitarian/disinterested response paradigmatic o f the aesthetic 
domain as that concept has evolved within the traditions o f  W estern philosophy?
As outlined in Chapter 8, aspects of collective forms o f  exp ression -fo r instance 
their utility, the passionately com m itted responses they evoke, the absence o f distinction 
between artist and aud iences-locate  them clearly outside the category o f 'th e  aesthetic' as 
its m eaning has evolved in three hundred years o f W estern philosophical discourse. In 
fact, the abandoned, passionate com m itm ent evoked in collective ritual could be seen as the 
very antithesis o f the non-utilitarian detachment (and the resulting oscillation of attention 
among self, symbol and referent) definitive of the aesthetic experiences of individuals.
For these reasons, the theorists and activists who use the terms 'gynecentric 
aesthetic' and 'African aesthetic' appear to be taking an oppositional stance. T heir use of 
the term 'aesthetic' appropriates the power and political/econom ic value associated w ith the 
form s and sensibilities o f the w orld 's dom inant cultures to the forms and sensibilities of 
groups that have been m arginal to W estern society and its academic discourses.
The Africanist and feminist scholars cited in Chapter 8 described the sensibilities o f 
particular cultures; their critique o f W estern philosophical definition of the aesthetic is
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implicit. In this chapter, I explicitly demarcate the aesthetic domain in relation to the 
experiences of collectivities. I will show that, despite initial impressions, the collective 
expressive forms and the patterns o f response they evoke can be shown to bear a strong 
conceptual resemblance to the related forms and patterns of response demarcated as 
aesthetic in W estern philosophy. In order to embrace the expressive forms o f collectivities 
and the patterns of participation and response they evoke, the clusters o f ideas we identified 
in Chapter 7--the integration o f the sensuous and the rational, form and the apprehension of 
formal qualities, and the oscillation of attention associated with non-utilitarian and 
disinterested response-w ill need to be modified or enlarged, but not, I think, 
inappropriately. The result I believe is a richer conception of the aesthetic dom ain—a 
conception that, while still founded in the philosophical discourse through which the 
concept evolved, also incorporates meanings that have em erged from the fields of 
A nthropology, Folklore and Perform ance Studies. The richer conception offers a degree of 
redress for the culturally-based lim itations of philosophical discourse about aesthetics, 
which has focused on the expressive form s and patterns of response o f individuals only.
In the previous chapter, we encountered two different kinds o f expressive forms 
typical of non-literate tribal cultures: (1) material objects such as the Akan paperweights 
described by Appiah (1997), and (2) rituals that incorporate, am ong other forms, m usic, 
dance, and masks, understood by both Gottner-A bendroth (1986) and Richards (1993) to 
be the paradigmatic expressive forms o f the complementary and tribal cultures they studied. 
In keeping with Dessanayake's theory that literacy and the related transformations in the 
hum an perceptual apparatus account for the shift from collective to individual art-m aking, 
this chapter focuses on the m aterial and ritual expressions of non-literate cultures in 
particular.
I consider the following questions. Do the expressive forms typical of non-literate 
collectivities (1) integrate the sensuous with the rational; (2) engage people in apprehension 
o f  formal qualities; and (3) evoke non-utilitarian and disinterested qualities of response? If
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so, how do they do so: in ways that are sim ilar to and/or different from the w orks that 
express the sensibilities of individuals? How m ust the cluster o f ideas associated with 
W estern philosophical theories o f the aesthetic be expanded to incorporate the expressive 
and receptive patterns o f collectivities?
As discussed in Chapter 7, W estern aesthetic theory and the practices of the art 
w orld em phasize innovation. Even when works o f  art clearly represent a genre or a 
stylistic tradition, the qualities most appreciated are often novelty and originality. By 
contrast, collective expressive form s such as folk arts, crafts, and rituals, are often 
assum ed to be conservative, perpetuating tradition. The analysis in this chapter challenges 
this assum ption by considering both the conservative and innovative aspects o f collective 
expressive forms.
The logic of this chapter's analysis o f collective expression takes som ewhat o f  a 
different form  that the pattern o f  logical argum entation used in previous chapters. Although 
there has been a great deal written about the expressive forms o f  non-literate people, there 
has been little theorizing about the aesthetic (understood as an experience of collectivities) 
as a  category. As a result, I begin m y analysis from particular exam ples and work towards 
the abstraction o f  concepts. This is quite different than the form of the argum ent in Chapter 
7, w here I sought patterns among already articulated aesthetic theories.
T o understand how collective experiences integrate the sensuous w ith the rational, 
and the relationships am ong their form al qualities and the responses they evoke, requires us 
to consider not only relationships am ong the formal elem ents (textures, colors, designs, 
shapes, etc.) that com prise an object or event, or even the relationships and transactions 
am ong producer, object and beholder. W e m ust consider an array o f relationships among a 
culture's system s of beliefs and values, on the one hand, and the production and functions 
of the object as well as its formal elem ents and sym bolic resonances, on the other. This is 
an effort to be undertaken with considerable epistem ic hum ility, remem bering, as
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D essanayake warns, that it is virtually impossible for the literate, modern mind to imagine 
the m eaning-m aking experiences of pre-literate people.
In keeping w ith this caveat, and in order to attem pt to understand the relationships 
am ong cultural elem ents with sufficient depth, I present an analysis o f  the material 
expressions of one particular culture—the Yekuana, a non-literate tribal group living in 
V enezuela. Yekuana culture is the subject of a book-length ethnography by David Guss 
(1989), entitled To Weave and Sing: Art, Symbol and  Narrative in the South American  
Rain Forest. The expressive forms o f  the Yekuana, including the visually expressive 
bichrom atic baskets used in all aspects of daily life, are an appropriate focus for this 
inquiry, in part because Guss' detailed and nuanced ethnographic study gives us a degree 
o f  access to the consciousness o f the people who produced them. Also, in spite of 
confrontations with the same European ideologies that have insinuated themselves more 
extensively into the other pre-literate cultures (including the other Carib-speaking tribes of 
Venezuela), the Yekuana have been unusually successful in m aintaining the integrity and 
independence o f their culture (Guss, 1989, pp. 14-15).
The relatively lengthy analysis of the material expressions of this one culture are 
then supplem ented with a brief discussion of the conservative and innovative potentials of 
folk arts and crafts, w ith brief references to the collective expressive form s of several 
different cultures, both literate and non-literate.
Follow ing the section on folk arts and crafts, I turn to an analysis of rituals, 
draw ing exam ples from  several different cultures and related theories. The chapter ends 
w ith a com parison of the aesthetic domain as it has been demarcated within the traditions of 
W estern philosophical analysis and as it emerges from  this chapter's analysis of the 
expressive forms and related experiences o f collectivities.
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Folk Arts and Crafts
The Painted Baskets o f  the Yekuana
W hile w orking am ong the Kabyle people o f North Africa, Pierre Bourdieu (1977)
made the following observation:
In a social formation in which the absence of the symbolic-product- 
conserving techniques associated with literacy retards the objectification o f 
symbolic and particularly cultural capital, inhabited space--and above all the 
house—is the principal locus for the objectification o f the generative 
schemes; and through the intermediary of the divisions and hierarchies it 
sets up  betw een things, persons, and practices, this tangible classifying 
system  continuously inculcates and reinforces the taxonomic principles 
underlying all the arbitrary provisions of this culture (Bourdieu, 1977, p.
89; cited in Guss, 1989, p. 167).
Bourdieu m ight well have been writing about the Yekuana, who organize 
them selves in fiercely independent small villages, all members living under one very large 
roof. The circular form o f the "atta," or house, represents Yekuana cosm ology in striking 
detail.
The conical roof is said to be the Firmament o f Heaven and like its nam esake 
is divided into two concentric circles. The upper section...corresponds to 
Akuena, the Lake o f  Im m ortality, which sits at the very center o f Heaven, 
while the m ore ephemeral outer maahiyadi thatch may be said to represent the 
six houses o f Kahuna, w here the various spirit beings and anim al m asters 
live... (G uss, 1989, p. 22).
"Am ong the Y ekuana," writes G uss, "every object, anim ate or inanim ate, is said to possess
an invisible double or akato  that is both independent and eternal" (p. 31). A  long post
passes through the center o f  the roof of the atta , representing the center post o f  the
universe, connecting the two w o rld s-th e  visible and invisible. The w ord for the center
post, nenudu, is linguistically  related to Y ekuana words for 'tongue,' 'navel,' and 'eye.'
The hum an eye is understood to be where "the m ost im portant o f each person's six
'doubles' or akato  is located. Identical to the center post o f the village, it is the location o f
the celestial spirit dispatched by W anadi from  Kahuna to animate each individual" (Guss,
1989, p. 22).
On the floor o f  the house, surrounding the center post, are tw o concentric circles. 
The inner circle is reserved for sacred and ritual occasions; the outer circle is com prised of
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the living com partm ents for each extended family within the community. This pattern o f 
two concentric circles, with the profane and ephemeral enclosing the sacred and eternal, is 
reproduced not only in the invisible landscape o f heaven but also in the Yekuana image of 
the Earth.
The communal house, then, with its concentric circles, represents two interlocking 
realities: "an illusionary and material outer one encasing a more powerful and invisible 
inner one." But the house can be perceived either as comprised o f two concentric circles— 
an inner sacred circle surrounded by an outer mundane ring—or as itself the sacred center of 
a the dangerous universe beyond. This is typical o f  Y ekuana constructions, w hose forms 
continually unfold upon one another, proposing "a world of constant m ovem ent and 
transform ation, wherein no sooner is one's vision focused than it is forced to shift" (Guss, 
1989, p. 33). For instance, in the house, the ritually pure center is the domain of the men; 
but in the garden, which recreates the concentric circular form of the house, the central 
space is the wom en's domain. A nd during certain rituals, wom en som etim es occupy the 
central space o f the house, and men som etim es occupy the central space in the garden.
The "competing dualities" that are expressed in the stm ctures o f the house, the 
garden and their related rituals are recapitulated in adornments to Yekuana body. Bands of 
beads tightly applied to ankles and wrists, and knees and biceps, divide hum an bodies into 
tw o concentric rings; in the center resides the divine breath. The solar plexus, the center of 
the inner ring, serves as the "center post" o f each individual, "granting him  or her the same 
access to the invisible world provided to the group through the nunudu  o f  the house" 
(G uss, 1989, p. 42). And if  the torso and limbs recreate the floor plan o f the house, the 
head is conceived o f as both roof and firmament; adult Yekuana cut their hair into bow l­
shaped circles, referred to by the sam e word that identifies the perfectly round edges o f the 
roo f and the "relentless effort required by women to  keep the gardens free of the ever- 
encroaching jungle." In this way, "each individual in the form  o f  his or her own person 
recapitulates the sym bolic w orld o f  the tribe at large" (p.42),
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The staple food o f the Yekuana people is the yucca root, from which cassava bread
and manioc meal are derived. In its raw state, the yucca contains a deadly acid, and
Yekuana wom en, according to Guss, spend ninety percent of their working tim e involved
in som e aspect o f  yucca production (p. 29). The practical challenges o f extracting poison
from  the yucca root, as rigorous as they are, are quite limited, in com parison with
the far greater spiritual challenge underlying each encounter between the 
village and the world that lies beyond. In a universe where every o b je c t-  
animal, m ineral, and vegetab le-is  animated with an independent and 
potentially destructive life-force, the problem of appropriation becom es less a 
practical than a spiritual one. The conversion of a poisonous tuber into a life- 
sustaining food is not only the result of an ingenious technology of graters 
and presses, but o f  ritual skills that enable the Yekuana to detoxify these 
plants of even greater m alevolent forces. The challenge o f Yekuana 
subsistence is in...the ability to transform  the contaminated and im pure into 
the culturally-infused and hum an. To do so ... requires the mastery o f ritual 
skills, along with a knowledge o f the hidden world they are keyed to unlock 
(G uss, 1989, pp. 30-31).
W ith this partial introduction to the culture's cosm ology and expressive forms, we 
are prepared, to consider the m eanings incorporated into Yekuana "painted baskets." 
Yekuana baskets are bold in design, ingenious in their stylized representation, perfect in 
their symmetry and exact in the smoothness of the outer edge. They are circular, with a 
central area m arked off from an outer ring. Due to limitations o f  the technology—narrow 
strips o f  cane woven at right angles to each o th e r-th e  division between the inner and the 
outer areas take the form  o f a square or rectangle, rather than a circle. N evertheless, the 
baskets "share in the spatial sym bolism  found elsewhere in the culture" (Guss, 1989, p. 
1 2 1 ).
W oven into the inner circle are abstract designs that symbolize aspects o f Yekuana 
cosm ology. The m ost frequently used patterns represent snakes and jag u ars-an im als  
feared for their poisons, "tamed," so to speak, in their representation on the baskets.
Virtually all aspects o f  Y ekuana life-agriculture, cooking, hunting, ea ting -requ ire  
the use of baskets. W ith  the exception of one type, Yekuana baskets are m ade by men, 
who, in fact, m ust prove their skill in basket-m aking in order to be allow ed to m an y . Both 
men and wom en, how ever, tell stories and sing songs about the origins of the anim als
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sym bolized in basket designs. In this way, esoteric lore is passed on, an integral aspect of 
learning to weave more complex patterns.
The raw materials for the baskets m ust be gathered from the environm ent, and 
transform ed--cut, dried, colored, fired, cut more fin e ly -each  step accom panied by ritual 
singing, in some cases involving the local shaman who may use hallucinogens to visit "the 
o ther world" to gain permission to cut the cane. The basic dualities--chaos and order, 
visible and invisible, being and non-be ing -tha t inscribe Y ekuana cosm ology, then, are 
repeated in the rituals surrounding the production, fabrication and uses o f the basket, as 
well as in the designs represented in the weave of the baskets and the stories told as they 
are m ade and used.
In one additional way, im portant for our inquiry, the baskets o f these rain forest
peoples reproduce Yekuana cosmology. The images them selves are constructed to engage
the eye in a "kinetic play o f form s"—in which background and foreground images appear to
ju m p  in and out o f  focus. As Guss (1989) writes,
depending on the way in which one views the design, one or another o f the 
elements will always dominate. But to keep all of the elements in equal focus 
at the sam e time is nearly im possible....im age and counter-im age endlessly 
com peting for the viewer's attention. The problem  o f where and how to focus 
one's eyes is much more than ju st a game, however. It is a m etaphor for the 
sam e metaphysical challenge upon which every Yekuana's's life depends
(p. 121).
Yekuana cosm ology is recapitulated, then, not only in the form  and design o f the 
baskets them selves, and the rituals surrounding their production and use, but—to use 
W alter Benjam in's (1978) p h ra se -in  the organization o f the hum an "perceptual apparatus" 
that is evoked when one engages over time with the created forms. The constantly shifting 
dualities are not only represented in the material object and re-enacted in its use, but 
inscribed in the patterns of perception o f those who gaze upon and use the baskets 
throughout the course o f their lives.
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Analysis o f Yekuana Expressive Form s as an Exam ple o f Collective Aesthetics
W ith this brief synopsis of the cultural patterns o f one particular non-literate tribe 
we can now reflect on the extent to which their material expressive fo rm s-their baskets and 
people's relationships w ith th em -can  be understood in terms o f the three clusters o f ideas 
used to demarcate the aesthetic dom ain in W estern philosophical traditions. Is the concept 
o f the aesthetic domain that emerges from literate societies sufficient to describe the forms 
o f a preliterate group? (i.e., Do the material expressions o f collectivities (1) integrate the 
sensuous with the rational; (2) elicit attention to formal qualities; and (3) evoke non­
utilitarian, disinterested response? If so, how do they do so? If not, how m ust we expand 
these clusters o f ideas to account for the collective experiences of the Yekuana people?)
In Yekuana culture, it appears that there is no meaningful distinction between the 
sensuous and the rational. On the one hand, they are integrated in the expressive forms. 
The rational elements (the cosmology, the narrative, the beliefs) are made available for 
apprehension through people's engagem ent w ith constm cted space and time, and with the 
objects of material culture. On the other hand, the sensuous and the rational are integrated 
in the bodies and the perceptual apparatus o f  the Yekuana people themselves. The regions 
o f the body, demarcated for instance by bands worn on the arms and legs, recapitulate the 
culture's central cosm ological metaphors. The symbolic construction o f the body is 
supported by linguistic references, for instance to the pupil and the solar plexus as 
analogous to the centerpiece o f the house in their capacity to link the m undane and visible 
w ith the sacred and invisible. Furtherm ore, through life-long engagem ent w ith the material 
and temporal forms of the culture, the perceptual capacities and proclivities of the Yekuana 
people are them selves instantiations o f  the cosm ology, as when the shim m ering im agery of 
the baskets trains the eye to perceive shifting dualities.
Through the lens of anthropological analysis, we can say that the rational elem ents 
o f the culture—its narrative, its beliefs and values, its cosm ology—are inscribed on and in 
the bodies of the Yekuana people; they are ongoingly enacted and recreated through daily
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
207
routines as well as through rituals that mark seasonal and life cycle transitions; they are 
m ade accessible to people ubiquitously and through all of their senses. But if we attempt to 
im agine their world as it is experienced by the Yekuana them selves, we understand that 
'm eaning ' and 'doing' are sim ultaneous, co-extensive, and inextricably interwoven. 
Apprehending the meaning is no different than engaging bodily and sensually with the 
material and temporal forms.
Because the expressive forms of Y ekuana culture are so pervasive and because they 
are experienced through the bodies senses so thoroughly, the nature of the "apprehension" 
o f the forms is somewhat different than that described in the individualist aesthetics 
theorized by W estern philosophy. There, we recall, a dem arcating feature of the aesthetic 
dom ain is attention to formal qualities, i.e., to relationships among elem ents o f a whole or 
between elem ents and the whole. In the case o f highly integrated cultures like the Yekuana, 
where all or m ost o f the expressive foim s can be understood as sym bolic references to each 
other and to the whole cosmology, formal qualities are apprehended through em bodied 
participation, not through detached appreciation. Virtually all dim ensions o f life—gestures, 
m ovem ents, words, songs, preparation and consum ption o f  foods, shelter, clothing—stand 
in form al relationship to each other, as the ordering principles that define the whole are 
m anifested also in each of its parts. Cosmology is recreated through the processes of 
creating and dwelling within the forms.
Y ekuana baskets take on formal qualities, then, not only because of the 
relationships among the e lem en ts-th e  colors, textures, designs, shapes, e tc .-o f  which 
they are com posed. The baskets, and the processes involved in producing them, are 
elem ents of a larger whole, in this case, the patterns o f beliefs and values that comprise 
Y ekuana culture. Symbolically, the baskets are m etonym s for the culture as a whole.
In W estern aesthetic theory, one o f the defining elem ents is the non-utilitarian 
appreciation o f an expressive form , i.e., the ability to apprehend som ething for its own 
sake, for how it appears to the senses rather than for its value as a com m odity or for its
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functional use. In the space created by this non-utilitarian response, there can arise
perceptual patterns that have been valued for the pleasure they entail and for the kinds of
awareness they m ake possible. The oscillation o f attention am ong self, symbol and
referent, for instance, allows for layers of m eaning-m aking, in which there can arise new
understandings o f both self and other.
A great deal o f theorizing about "primitive art" draws attention to matters of
function rather than form  (Guss, 1989, p.90). C onsideration o f Y ekuana basketry,
however, points to the inadequacy of either a formalist or functionalist approach. The
basketry is not m ade by one individual to evoke any kind of response (w hether o f detached
contem plation o r engaged reaction) on the part o f  others. The baskets are expressions o f  a
collective sensibility. Every aspect of their production and their form  resonate w ith the
cultural symbol system. The baskets reflect the culture that produces them, and, at the
sam e tim e, reproduce the culture by structuring the activities and perceptions o f those who
m ake and use them.
In cases of collective expressive forms, at least in stable and highly integrated
cultures like the Yekuana, there is no real distinction between those who create and those
who behold. The purpose is not so much to engender desired qualities of response, but to
structure opportunities for partic ipation-for the expression and recreation o f  the cultural
system  as a  whole. Pierre Bourdieu (1977) theorizes about the nature of principles and
values internalized, as in Yekuana culture, by the body. "The principles em -bodied in this
way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness," he writes,
and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate transform ation, cannot 
even be m ade explicit; nothing seems more ineffable, m ore incommunicable, 
m ore inim itable, and therefore, more precious, than the values given body, 
m ade body by the transubstantiation achieved by the im plicit persuasion of a 
hidden pedagogy, capable o f instilling a whole cosm ology, an ethic, a 
m etaphysic, a political philosophy through injunctions as insignificant as 
"stand up straight" or "don't hold you knife in your left hand" (Bourdieu,
1977, p. 94; cited in G uss, 1989, p. 40).
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Expressive Form s of Collectivities and the Mediation o f Tensions between Innovation and 
Tradition
A s noted above, the material expressive forms of collectivities, w hose meanings
after all are inscribed onto the bodies and perceptual capacities o f those who make and use
them, are often assum ed to represent a conservative sensibility (G lassie, 1972, p .258),
especially in contrast with the high value placed on innovation by the institutions of the
W estern art world. The em phasis on tradition is described, for instance, by folklorist
Simon B ronner (1986), who writes that "the forms of folk objects are slow  to change"
(p.200). And through such objects
beliefs can be com m unicated. Haunted houses, are, in a  sense, the objective 
correlatives o f  the fear and w onder o f  the supernatural. For Pennsylvania 
G erm ans, the New Year's day meal o f pork and sauerkraut engenders good 
luck for the com ing year. A m ong Jews, some mothers decorate a prayer 
shaw l for their son's B ar M itzvah. The shawl remains a visible and tangible 
rem inder o f the youth's status in the adult ritual com m unity (Bronner, 1986, 
p .207).
In recent years, however, folklorists have begun to  recognize how folk art forms 
not only conserve traditional forms and values, but also structure responses to and even 
them selves engender innovations. For instance, the folklorist B arbara B abcock (1993) 
writes that w hen the Pueblo Indian potter Helen Cordero fashioned the first ceram ic 
"storyteller," the shape itself was an invention, but she drew on  traditional techniques for 
w orking with clay, and made visible perhaps the most im portant m ode o f  Pueblo cultural 
continuity: the intergenerational transm ission o f the oral tradition. However, by depicting 
what w as traditionally a male activity (the telling of sacred stories) in a m edium  that was 
traditionally a fem ale domain (pottery-making) Cordero's innovation served to consolidate 
an econom ic and cultural pow er base for women. It has also p layed a role in her 
com m unity 's transition from  a subsistence to a cash economy.
Interestingly, m any of the w om en who created their own versions o f Cordero's 
sculpture fashioned storytellers o f either female or am biguous gender. "At home, no  
wom ens are storytellers," said Helen Cordero. "But," wrote the folklorist B arbara A
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Babcock (1993), "women are potters and with the transform ative power o f their hands, 
they have contrived to tell stories about storytelling, to subvert masculine discursive 
control, and profoundly to disturb the distribution o f  power. The struggle betw een the 
powerless and the powerful has been displaced quite literally onto the surface o f  things"
(p. 90).
Under certain conditions, then, innovations on folk traditions can challenge social 
and political values as well as aesthetic conventions. In contexts of colonial relations, for 
instance, traditional forms can serve a counter-hegem onic function, and also serve as a 
vehicle for covert instructions and subversive com m entary. During the 1920's, for 
instance, when the British first installed a military presence in Palestine, wom en expressed 
their protest through adaptations o f traditional embroidery patterns, stitching inverted trees 
to depict the ecological disruptions they feared would ensue. During the period o f slavery, 
A frican-Am ericans encoded instructions fo rescape  routes to the north in folksongs like 
"Follow the Drinking Gourd." In another example, the Barbardian-Am erican author Paule 
M arshall (1983) describes how her m other's friends, the "poets o f the kitchen" w ho 
w orked as dom estics in w hite w om en's kitchen, healed themselves from the indignities of 
their days and reaffirmed their own cultural values by recounting their experiences with the 
ironic humor and rhythm ic cadence o f  Barbadian dialect. "'Soully-gal, talk yuh talk!' they 
were always exhorting each other. 'In this man world you got to take yuh mouth and m ake 
a gun!' They w ere in control, if only verbally and if only for the two hours or so that they 
rem ained in our house" (M arshall, 1983, p. 7).
T o summarize this section, w e considered a form o f folk art o f one particular non­
literate tribal culture and analyzed the cultural patterns surrounding it according the to three 
clusters o f  ideas that em erged from  W estern philosophical theories o f the aesthetic. W e 
found that Yekuana expressive form s do integrate the sensuous w ith the rational, and they 
do engage people in the apprehension of fo rm s-b u t in ways differently that those described 
in individualist aesthetic theories. They do not evoke responses of disinterestedness and
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
211
non-utilitarianism . Rather, they express collective sensibilities, and they structure 
opportunities for participation. Finally, we review ed recent literature from the field o f 
Folklore, finding evidence that collective forms and processes, like those of individuals, do 
mediate tensions between innovation and tradition.
The final examples of innovative folk arts cited above shift away from material 
objects to expressions in perform ative modes. These brief exam ples will serve as a 
transition to the next section o f this chapter, which focuses on ritual-collective expressions 
that involve multiple modalities, generally including music and dance. Rituals are 
ubiquitous throughout all the world's cultures, but seen by the Africanist and feminist 
scholars whose theories we reviewed in the preceding chapter as the paradigmatic 
expressive form o f preliterate peoples. Theoretical and ethnographic literature on ritual 
offers a deeper understanding o f the aesthetic domain as it refer to the experiences of 
collectivities.
Ritual
In this section, I analyze rituals—multimodal collective performative expressions-in  
terms o f the integration o f the sensuous and the rational, the relationships o f engagem ent 
w ith forms and the evocation of desired states o f  participation and response, and the 
m ediation o f tensions between innovation and tradition. First, I present recent theoretical 
and neuropsychological research on ritual as explicated by the Performance Theorist 
R ichard Schechner (1977, 1993). Then, using exam ples drawn from various preliterate 
cu ltu res-v isiting  rituals o f the Ilongot o f  the Philippines, exorcism  rituals o f  the Sinhalese 
people o f  Sri Lanka, the carnival o f  Trinidad, and storytelling rituals of the Bedouin o f the 
Sinai—I analyze rituals as aesthetic forms. (In other words, I consider rituals in term s of 
the now-fam iliar three clusters of ideas that em erged from  W estern philosophical discourse 
to assess both how they can be explained in terms o f the now-fam iliar three clusters o f 
ideas and also how the three notions m ust be expanded to include the experiences of 
rituals.) The section concludes w ith a discussion o f V ictor Turner's (1986) notion o f  the
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potential for "plural reflexivity" (p.25) associated with the lim inal states o f rituals and other 
social perform ances~a possibility I compare with the kind o f conceptual generativity we 
cam e to associate with individual aesthetic experience in Chapter 7.
The Integration o f  the Sensuous and the Rational Neuropsychologically and in the Forms 
of Ritual
In studying the ritualized behavior of animals, ethologists discovered that it consists 
of elem ents o f  ordinary behavior, "made into rhythms or pulses (often faster or slow er than 
usual) o r frozen into poses" (Schechner, 1993, p. 296). H um an rituals are similarly 
com prised o f elem ents (such as gestures, lights, colour, m ovem ent, voice, etc.) organized 
in patterns o f  "repetition, rhythmicity, exaggeration, condensation, sim plification and 
spectacle" (Schechner, 1993, p. 301). W hat distinguishes hum an ritual from  its animal 
counterpart is that the formal configurations and actions are "wrapped in a web o f 
sym bolism . Through ritual, beliefs about the universe com e to be acquired, reinforced and 
eventually  changed..." (Kertzer, 1988, p. 10).
This is one basic way, then, that rituals integrate the sensuous and the rational: the 
elem ents of rituals that engage our senses--the colors, lights, rhythm s, smells, m ovem ents, 
etc.—are im bued with symbolic meaning, including, for instance, beliefs about cosm ology 
and values about social relationships. Dessanayake (1988) refers to this integration o f  the 
sensuous and the rational when she asserts that in preliterate cultures, collective w isdom  is 
passed dow n through oral perform ances and participatory rituals (p. 177).
Rituals o f the kind described in the previous chapter by G ottner-Abendroth (1986) 
and Richards (1993) are characterized by the highly coordinated organization of elements 
both  form al and symbolic. B ecause o f their intensity, theorists suggest they can provide 
unique kinds of aesthetic experiences, in which sensory stim uli perceived in one mode 
generate or stim ulate sensations in another, such as w hen we hear sounds that cause us to 
v isualize colors. Schechner uses the word 'synaesthesia' to refer to this kind o f  cross-
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modal sensory stimulation. Rituals can lead to synaesthetic experiences, he argues, 
because they:
integrate music, dance and theater. The display of masks and costum es; the 
processions, circum am bulations, singing, dancing, storytelling, food- 
sharing, fire-burning, incensing, drumming and bell-ringing; the body-heat, 
press, and active participation of the crowd create an overwhelm ing 
synaesthetic environm ent and experience for the audience, tribe or 
congregation (Schechner, 1993, p. 302).
G ottner-A bendroth (1986), w e recall, writes that within rituals "emotion, intellect 
and action com bine to achieve an ecstatic state." Recent neuropsychological research 
supports her view , providing evidence that because rituals are so powerfully resonant in 
both sensory and cognitive domains, we derive pleasure from them  that results from 
rhythm ic synchrony o f right and left hemispheres o f  the brain (Schechner, 1993, p. 302). 
The pleasure o f ritual, the feelings o f  ecstasy, well-being and relief, result in part from the 
"driving techniques em ployed in rituals that are designed to sensitize or 'tune' the nervous 
system and thereby lessen inhibition of the right hem isphere and perm it tem porary right- 
hem isphere dom inance" (Lex, 1979, pp. 144-145; cited in Schechner, 1993, p. 309). The 
sim ultaneous stimulation o f  both left and right hemispheres results in states o f "trance and 
other suprem ely affective states of flow (Lex, 1979, p. 120, cited in Schechner, 1993, 
p. 309).
It is beyond the scope o f this inquiry to examine in detail the neuropsychological 
research associated with ritual. W e will continue a  bit further in this direction, however, 
because the theory surrounding ritual articulates a kind of integration of the sensuous and 
rational, aesthetic in nature, but distinct from the kinds of sensory-rational integration that 
em erged from  our analysis of W estern philosophical conceptions o f 'the aesthetic dom ain.'
T he rhythm s, colors, m ovem ents and patterned array o f people and objects that 
com prise rituals resonate w ithin a fram ew ork that is cognitive, including sets of values 
and/or narratives. It is in these ways that "rituals em body cognitive system s of values that 
instruct and m obilize participants. These embodied values are rhythmic and cognitive, 
spatial and conceptual, sensuous and ideological" (Schechner, 1993, p. 302).
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The narrative-cognitive stim ulus works from the cerebral cortex down, while 
the m ovem ent-sonic stim ulus works form the lower brain up. ...The 
performance of ritual is both narrative (cognitive) and affective; these 
working together com prise the experience o f ritualizing. ...The affective 
states aroused by ritual are necessarily nested within a narrative frame. But 
from within—as a person perform ing a ritual—the narrative frame dissolves as 
the ritual action continues (Schechner, 1993, p. 309).
Rituals can offer a richly textured integration of the sensuous with the rational, in 
which whole sets o f values are em bodied in a coordinated array o f forms that engage the 
senses. The rational e lem en t-th e  cultural narrative, the sets o f beliefs and v a lu es-a re  
m anifested not through spoken ideas of discourse and argumentation, but bodily, through 
dances and songs, foods and incense, the felt heat o f the fire or wetness o f  the water. In 
some cases, the narrative (rational) and sensory dimensions may resonate w ithin the mental 
apparatus o f individual participants causing an intense and pleasurable harmony o f cerebral 
stim ulation. However, the integration of the sensuous and rational does not necessarily 
take place within the consciousness o f each individual participant, for w hom  "the narrative 
fram e may," as Schechner noted above, "dissolve as the ritual action continues" (p.309). 
As we discovered in relation to the Yekuana baskets, the integration o f the sensuous and 
the rational takes place within the expressive forms themselves.
The Em bodim ent and Perpetuation o f Cultural Values
G ottner-A bendroth 's and Lom ax's descriptions o f dance and m usic form s that 
em body the values o f their cultures, cited in the previous chapter, are excellent exam ples of 
values being expressed in and through the forms themselves. In com plem entary societies, 
where a high value is placed on inclusivity, vocal music generally gives equal w eight to all 
parts. Song forms rarely highlight solo perform ers or em phasize only one voice.
Similarly, in cultures that are relatively sexually permissive and where fem ale erotic 
expression is valued, dance form s are m ore flowing and curved and involve m ore 
m ovem ents o f the hips and pelvis.
The ethnographer Renato Rosaldo (1993) offers another exam ple o f the integration 
o f  the sensuous and the rational w ithin ritual forms themselves. He describes how the
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Ilongot people o f the Philippines organize the pacing of their rituals so as to engender and
support a particular "culturally valued quality o f  human relationships" (Rosaldo, 1993,
p. 256). Visiting among near and distant friends and relatives is a frequent occurrence
am ong the Ilongot. The visits are unscheduled and open-ended, and generally begin with a
period o f silence, followed by a meal served by the host to the guest, followed by an
inquiry into the well-being of the guest's family, although the exact routine varies
according to the closeness of visitor and host and other contingencies. Rosaldo (1993)
proposes that the open-endedness o f visiting
...comprises a concrete exem plar o f forms o f social life marked by mutually 
adjusted action and an openness to uncertain futures. V isits are improvised, 
m ade up as people go along; and social grace, a culturally valued quality of 
human intelligence, consists o f  one's responsiveness to w him s, desires, and 
contingencies, whether these em anate from  one's own heart or from  those o f 
one's partners in action (p. 257).
Rosaldo suggests that am ong the Ilongot, w here, as in many other non-industrial, 
tribal and peasant contexts, "clock-time is not the param ount reality," it is an  "aesthetic 
sensibility" that "shapes the tem po o f everyday life." In other words, the rational 
dim ension—the cultural value placed on improvisation - i s  integrated into the indeterminacy 
structured into the ritual form  of visiting, available then to be sensuously apprehended by 
the Ilongot people. In fact, their very sensibilities about time and improvisation are both 
reflected and perpetuated through their participation in such visits.
So far, we have considered several exam ples that describe how expressive form s 
integrate the sensuous and the rational by sim ultaneously reflecting, em bodying, and 
perpetuating beliefs and values. The "rational" elem ents - i .e . ,  the values, beliefs, 
narratives, e tc .-a re  incorporated into the bodies and the beings o f  those who participate. 
The capacity o f ritual performance to construct (in addition to reflect, embody and 
perpetuate) is the focus o f the next example.
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Ritual Construction o f Social Reality and the Reintegration of Individuals into a Shared 
M oral Community
The construction of social reality through ritual is the centerpiece of an analysis of 
Sinhalese (Sri Lankan) exorcism  rituals by the anthropologist B race Kapferer (1986).33 
This exam ple is important for our inquiry because it dem onstrates that through active 
em bodied involvement in ritual forms, people can develop a  quality o f experiential 
understanding of those from whom they have become alienated. In this case, admittedly, 
those who are alienated were once members o f the same com m unity, so they have a 
com m on set o f  values and symbols to support their reconciliation. The alienation is 
expressed and understood as illness, not enmity. Nevertheless, in term s o f the larger 
question o f this d isserta tion-the usefulness o f the aesthetic domain in the educational work 
o f reconciliation--it is important to note the role o f ritual in the epistemic and ethical 
interdependence o f  members o f this community: the patient is reintegrated into the 
com m unity o f  shared values as others participate in shared ritual forms, and thus 
paradoxically are able to understand, in an experiential way, his isolation.
D uring the first phase o f Sinhalese ritual, spectators gather at the ritual site, but are 
aloof from  the activities o f the exorcist and the patient, as they renew  acquaintances, play 
cards, and eat a meal. During this phase, the "patient's behavior is rendered potentially 
quite strange....m em bers o f  the ritual gathering do not share in the im m ediacy of the 
patient's experience" (Kapferer, 1986, p. 197). D uring the m idnight w atch, however, the 
exorcist uses elaborate presentations of music and dance to direct the attention of the 
audience towards the patient. "Everyday contexts, hitherto part of the perform ance setting, 
can be suspended, and members of the ritual gathering recontextualized within 
fundam entally the sam e context as the patient" (Kapferer, 1986, p. 197). It is through their 
individuation and relocation, both patient and members of the audience paradoxically join in 
a shared experience o f  isolation.
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The structural hierarchy o f the Sinhalese cosm ology [the rational 
elem ent] is continually present in an exorcism. It is through the pow er of the 
Buddha and the [subordinated] deities that the dem ons are summoned to the 
rite, that their hold over the patient is progressively broken, and that their 
polluting and illness-causing essence is w ithdraw n from  the patient's body....
The reality o f experience constructed in m usic and dance reaches the 
senses directly through these m edia as aesthetic forms... [M ]embers o f  the 
gathering are uniformly individuated and restricted from adopting standpoints 
outside the immediate experiential realm  constituted in music and 
dance...[which] mold all subjective experience to their form.
...It is in the individuation o f m em bers o f the ritual gathering in 
relation to the central ritual events and through the m edia of music and dance 
that the experiential state of the patient, alone and terrified in the world, is 
m ost nearly approached (K apferer, 1986, pp. 198-199).
The transform ative pow er o f ritual, in K apferer's view, results from  how various
expressive forms structure active, committed, em bodied participation. The "directionality
o f  the perform ance and the media of the perform ance...constitute the meaning of the ritual,
...enable com m unication o f its meaning, and create the possibility for mutual involvement
o f  participants in the one experience....1' (K apferer, 1986, p. 193). K apferer
acknowledges that the ritual may awaken different images and feelings in each of the
spectators. Citing Defrenne (1973), however, he asserts that the spectator's different
perspectives "converge at the same point, like intentions which aim  at the same object. All
these views only display or exfoliate its possibilities..." (Dufrenne, 1973, pp. 59-60,
quoted  in K apferer, 1986, p. 193).
T he transform ative dim ension of the ritual, begun as the forms o f the m usic and
dance structure a shared experience for the "patient" and other members o f  the gathering, is
augm ented through possibilities inherent in yet another form, com edic drama.
Com edy and the discovery o f  the com ic Finds its specific m ovem ent and 
process in the juxtaposition o f  opposites, in the linking o f categories of 
experience and knowledge which in the eveiyday cultural world are 
understood to be located in different dom ains, and in the realization o f 
contradiction.... The comic process itself reveals [these] inconsistencies], but 
the recognition by an audience of the full potential o f  the comic is dependent 
on their being conscious and com m itted to their everyday world as it is 
culturally and socially typified. Patients are enjoined by the exorcists and by 
other participants to laugh, and their laughter in  the com pany of others is 
taken to be a sign that they have reentered the w orld as experienced by the 
norm al and the healthy.
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...The com edy of exorcism ....frees individuals from  the solitude of 
subjective experience, links them to others through the mediation o f  shared 
constructs and typifications, and demands that they take a variety o f 
standpoints on the world as experienced and as it achieves its diverse 
m eanings... (K apferer, 1986, p. 201).
This description o f an exorcism ritual reveals the social re-integration that is made 
possible through em bodied and committed participation in structured ritual forms. Through 
the media o f  music, dance and comedic drama, the exorcist structures the context to evoke 
desired qualities of response and participation. The healing itself is accom plished when, 
through their engagem ent with music and dance, participants com e to share an experience 
w ith the otherwise isolated, frightened and alienated patient. Then, through participation in 
the com edic drama, the patient is invited or cajoled to return to the shared beliefs and values 
o f the com m unity.
The reintegration of the patient into the com m unity is rem iniscent o f  the 
reintegration that takes place within a moral community, w hen, through rituals o f apology 
and forgiveness, the repentant person and the violated person reaffirm  their shared 
understanding o f  the moral order. By agreeing on their shared assessm ent o f  the violating 
behavior, they are able to achieve a reconciliation o f their relationship through a 
reaffirm ation o f the ethical principles they share. Shared laughter at contradictions and 
inappropriate juxtapositions affirm  shared membership in an ethical/religious/social 
fellow ship.
The Native American feminist and writer Paula Gunn Allen (1986) eloquently
sum m arizes the capacity of ritual to harmonize the relationship between individual and
com m unity by constructing social reality and shared cosmology. In relation to the rituals of
N ative A m erican com m unities, she writes that
tribes seek—through song, cerem ony, legend, sacred stories (m yths) and tales 
- t o  em body, articulate and share [the mythic reality that gives life its 
meaning], to bring the isolated, private self into harm ony and balance with 
this reality, to verbalize the sense o f  the majesty and reverent mystery o f all 
things, and to actualize, in language, those truths that give to hum anity its 
greatest significance and dignity (A llen, 1986, p. 55).
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Liminality, Innovation and the Sublimation o f Violence
So far, w e have considered examples where rituals integrate the sensuous w ith the 
rational as they reflect, embody, perpetuate and reaffirm shared beliefs and values, and 
construct social realities. In the next examples, ritual forms, like the instances o f  material 
culture noted in the previous section, also provide the context for innovation and cultural 
transformation.
Although many people associate the repetitive nature o f rituals w ith conservatism  
and reification o f  the status quo, V ictor Turner (1974, 1977, 1986), perhaps the forem ost 
anthropologist o f ritual, argues for the opposing view. W hile in m any circum stances, 
rituals do provide stability and reinforce existing social relations, because o f their formal 
qualities rituals also create contexts for freedom and innovation: structured within a 
framework o f  traditional symbols, participants enter moments w hen they are released from 
the norm ative dem ands o f  cultural scripts, where they enjoy the freedom  associated with 
play. As Clifford Geertz (1980) puts it, ritual allows the "dream ed o f ' and the "lived in" 
orders to fuse (cited in M eyerhoff, 1986, p.273). During rituals, w rites T urner (1974), 
participants are
betw ixt and between successive lodgments in jural political system s. In 
this gap betw een ordered w orlds almost anything may happen. In this 
interim  o f  "liminality," the possibility exists o f  standing aside not only 
from  one's ow n social position but from  all social positions and of 
form ulating a potentially unlimited series of alternative social 
arrangem ents... ( p. 13).
The freedom  to experim ent with "alternative social arrangements" is supported by  both the
boundedness and the liminality associated with ritual forms.
The history o f  the carnival on the island o f Trinidad offers an exam ple o f  these
dynamics. It is a history inscribed by the cultural, class and ethnic rivalries that evolved
from the enslavem ent of Africans and the indentured servitude of East Indians. During the
period o f  slavery, Blacks and mulattos were denied access to the fine "fetes" o f their
culturally European m asters—who expressed their ow n am bivalences by donning costumes
of "negro" w orkers and m ulatto "seductresses" (Stewart, 1986, p. 299). A t the end of
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
220
slavery, and into the early tw entie th  century, the carnival developed on two planes: "as a 
rowdy, superstitious always po ten tially  violent carnival of the m asses and as a carnival of 
glitter and stiff-backed decorum  am ong the upper classes" (Stewart, 1986, p. 302).
Carnival provided an opportunity  for the cu ltu ral middle class, excluded from full 
political and cultural enfranchisem ent by the w hite elite, to see their conflicting allegiances. 
Few achieved an invitation to  the upper class ball, but many were among the m ost vocal 
critics of the fighting, bloodletting and public eroticism  that characterized the street festivals 
o f  the African and East Indian com m unities (S tew art, 1986, p. 303). Prior to W orld W ar 
II, the ritual was sufficiently spontaneous, how ever, to afford the kind o f  liminal 
experience theorized by Turner (1974). A t the last "jump up" o r street dance, "fraternizing 
between the classes approached its m ost daring. U n d er the cover o f darkness and lost in 
the throng, people struck up acquaintances they seldom  would have in other circum stances" 
(Stewart, 1986, p. 304 ).
After the war, apparently influenced by the American miltary presence on the island 
and concomitant media celebration o f  violence, m en w ho had engaged in ritualized com bat 
at the time of the carnival exchanged  their relatively innocuous sticks for far more 
dangerous weapons: knives, cu tlasses, rocks and razors. Since independence, the Creole- 
dom inated government has w orked  to curb the violence, by transform ing the carnival into a 
series of government-supported com petitions, geared  less to the desires and sensibilities o f 
the "locals" than to the needs o f  Trinidadians return ing  from abroad and tourists. In its 
current form, hundreds of p rizes are aw arded—to bands, for costum es, and for skills in 
design. In exchange for participating , com petitors are required to obey and com ply with 
instructions of the Stage M anagers, and to forego presentations judged to be lewd, vulgar 
or obscene.
The carnival is the cen terp iece  o f  a grow ing and  successful tourism  industry. M any 
local Trinidadians, however, have  becom e alienated from  the routinized events. Partly in 
reaction to excessive control, fo r instance, the steel bands that used to be the centerpiece o f
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the post-pageant street dance, or "jump-up" have becom e alienated from the festival, which
now has lost the capacity that it enjoyed as a more liminal event to engender relationships
across the divisions of race and class.
The anthropologist John Stew art (1986) writes that:
[cjhanges in the carnival...m ay be recognized as occurring between the two 
poles o f  social ideal and social reality, with a tendency to reject insistence on 
either extreme. W here the underlying tensions that are a fundamental part o f 
everyday social relations appear too boldly, are too fully expressed, the 
carnival declines from ritual to mere disorder. By contrast, where there is 
overem phasis on the ideal o f harmonious integration, such as is the case with 
the current festival, one result is the loss of ritual vitality. In their 
interpretation o f  the festival, Trinidadians resist either being too fully subjects 
of their carnival or being too heavily subjected to it. The desire is for a 
voluntary experience o f the tensions between ideal and real, balance and 
excess, perm issiveness and control, and various other oppositions (p. 313).
According to Stewart, then, the generative, liminal space o f ritual is itself a space
"between": between the chaos and violence o f complete disorder, and the rigidity and
superficial harmony of im posed order. Rituals, then, may also m ediate against violence by
creating lim inal context in which inequities can be redressed and new social relations
explored.
Ritual Performance and Cultural Survival
The formal qualities o f rituals not only support reflection and innovation arising 
from  within a particular com m unity, rituals can help groups understand, respond to and in 
some cases even resist intrusions from  their environment. As Sm adar Lavie (1990) reports 
in her study o f the Bedouin o f the Sinai, the intrusions o f both Israeli and Egyptian armies 
and tourists made traditional cultural imperatives towards hospitality virtually im possible to 
enact. In choosing to articulate this and other related dilemmas in the context o f traditional 
storytelling rituals, however, the Bedouin were able to reaffirm their identity and recreate 
the patterns o f social interaction that w ere at the core o f their communal life. In the context 
o f  historical change too rapid to be  understood and accommodated, the shaping o f  stories 
about new and threatening circum stances in the forms o f  long-standing narrative traditions 
provided a context for m ediating betw een the new and the old (Lavie, 1990, p. 30).
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The form in which the Bedouin chose to articulate the threats to their traditions 
paradoxically preserved the very practices and values whose dem ise they feared (Lavie, 
1990, p. 31). The Bedouin narrative culture described by Lavie (1990) continued its 
dynam ic developm ent through sustaining the forms o f storytelling performance. W e can 
imagine attempts to preserve threatened cultures by recording "authentic" renditions of 
stories on audio tape, or by transcribing narratives verbatim  in printed text, or by exhibiting 
prototypical samples of traditional em broidery in a museum. Som ething o f the values of 
the culture will be preserved through such attem pts at documentation, but in the absence o f 
the interactions facilitated by the perform ance o f  traditional ritual forms, it is unlikely that 
the culture will survive. The strongest survival value of a collective expression can be 
discovered in perform ances, i.e., in the m om ents of its shaping, in the acts that give 
m eaningful form to values, not in reified instantiations o f  the form  itself.
Plural Reflexivity
Because of the freedoms associated w ith lim inality and boundedness, rituals can 
offer opportunities for collective innovation in response to new (and possibly threatening) 
circumstances. Rituals, then, can function both in service o f conservation and 
transformation; it appears that they often serve to m ediate tensions between the two, as 
reflected in the circumstances of the Bedouin reenactm ent of traditional storytelling rituals.
Like the aesthetic objects described in C hapter 7, rituals also "work" by virtue o f 
their form al qualities. The nature o f people’s engagem ent w ith the forms, however, is 
quite different: it is m uch more m ulti-sensory, a  more bodily participation than a detached 
apprehension. Nevertheless, in both cases, formal qualities are registered. In the case o f 
rituals, the intensity of engagem ent~via m ultiple modalities, som etim es over extended 
periods of time, often involving tem porary or perm anent alterations o f  the body—can result 
in the creation o r substantiation o f social constructs and related transform ations in 
individual and collective consciousness.
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
223
Theories o f the aesthetic that address both individuals and collectivities refer to the 
evocation of desired qualities o f response. For the individuals involved in rituals, the 
valued quality of response is one of com m itted participation. Successful rituals help their 
participants feel affirmed in their membership within the group; they generate feelings o f 
belonging and well-being, recreating through their forms the very world views they affirm 
and celebrate. In other words, for the individual participants, the qualities of response 
could hardly be more different than the detachm ent and disinterestedness so prized in 
W estern philosophical theories o f  the aesthetic.
But for the collectivity, we see that rituals serve a function analogous to the 
reflection that takes place when individual attention oscillates among self, symbol and 
referent. The liminal and bounded qualities o f  rituals provide a context in which groups 
can m anifest the various points o f view o f  their members, reflect on their circumstances, 
and experim ent with various innovative configurations and social arrangements. As Victor 
Turner (1986) put it, writing about the som ewhat broader category o f "cultural 
perform ances,"
[they] are not sim ple reflectors or expressions o f culture or even o f changing 
culture but may themselves be active agencies o f change, representing the eye 
by  which culture sees itself and the drawing board on which creative actors 
sketch out what they believe to be more apt or interesting "designs for living"
(P- 24).
...[T]he plural reflexivity involved allows freeplay to a greater 
variability of action: actors can be so subdivided as to allocate to some the 
roles of agents of transform ation and to others those o f persons undergoing 
transform ation (p. 25).
...Performative reflexivity is a  condition in which a sociocultural 
group, or its m ost perceptive members acting representatively, turn, bend or 
reflect back upon them selves, upon the relations, actions, symbols, 
m eanings, codes, roles, statuses, social structures, ethical and legal rules, and
other sociocultural com ponents which make up their public "selves." 
Perform ative reflexivity, too, is not m ere reflex, a quick automatic or habitual 
response to some stimulus. It is highly contrived, artificial, of culture not 
nature, a deliberate and voluntary work o f  art (p. 24).
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Thus we see that rituals create opportunities at the level o f the collectivity for a kind 
o f reflexivity that parallels what individuals can experience when creating o r reading a 
poem .
Dem arcating 'The Aesthetic' as a Quality of Collective Experience 
In this chapter I have analyzed how the material and perform ative expressive forms 
o f collectivities integrate the sensuous and the rational and create form al structures for 
participation. Building on Dessanayake's insight that the developm ent o f widespread 
literacy represents a watershed in the ways in which human beings create m eaning and in 
which cultures pass on accum ulated knowledge and wisdom, I have focused on the folk 
arts and rituals o f  pre-literate cultures. In this concluding section, I sum m arize both the 
ways in which the aesthetic experience of pre-literate collectivities can be understood in 
relation to the three clusters o f  ideas that demarcate the aesthetic dom ain in W estern 
philosophical literature, and also the ways in which analysis o f 'the aesthetic' as collective 
experience points up limitations in the W estern philosophical view.
The Integration o f the Sensuous w ith the Rational
In the expressive forms o f pre-literate collectivities, the sensuous and the rational 
are integrated in several different ways. As we saw in the Y ekuana culture, the rational 
elem ents—i.e., the beliefs, values, cosmology, cultural narrative, etc.—are enacted in daily 
routines and in specially marked rituals. They are made available for apprehension through 
all of the senses, through stories, songs, im ages, food w ays, body decor, architecture, etc. 
T he sensuous and the rational are integrated within the expressive forms, and inscribed in 
and on the bodies o f  the people: both in how they decorate and adorn them selves and also 
in how certain perceptual capacities are promoted through, fo r instance, the shim m ering 
bichrom atic designs woven into the Yekuana's ubiquitous baskets.
In relation to  ritual, w e considered this integration from  another point o f view. 
Sensuous elem ents—the m usic, dance, rhythms, colors, sm ells, e tc .—are understood to be
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imbued with symbolic meanings. In other words, they "resonate within a fram ework that 
is cognitive."
Also, neuropsychological theory proposes that pleasurable rhythmic synchronies 
between the left and right hemispheres o f  the brain are set in motion by rituals because of 
their intense sensory stim ulation tied to narrative meanings. The integration o f the 
sensuous and the rational, then, m ust be occurring on a neuropsychogical level as well. In 
any case, in ritual settings, values and beliefs are em bodied in, enacted through, and 
perpetuated by expressive forms that engage the senses. Rituals simultaneously reflect, 
em body, perpetuate, construct, and make available for reflection the group's beliefs, values 
and cosmology.
In non-literate cultures, the sensuous and the rational simply are integrated: 
mutually referential, symbolic cultural form s make beliefs, values, cultural narratives and 
cosm ologies available to the senses. There is no distinction between "meaning" and 
"doing."
In literate societies, aesthetic forms and processes seek a re-integration o f  the 
sensuous with the rational—an integration that is the prevailing circumstance o f pre-literate 
cultures. As Dessanayake argues, literacy promotes detached, isolated experiences o f  
meaning-making; alphabetic literacy, in particular, appears to give the reader direct access 
to the subject with little attention to the symbols and to processes o f interpretation.
Through reading and writing, individual persons can analyze information, for instance by 
noticing analogies and discrepancies, constructing arguments, creating hierarchically 
organized categories, and undertaking conceptual analysis. M eaning-m aking is often a 
cerebral, individual endeavor.
In literate societies, then, the aesthetic is the dom ain in which the sensuous and the 
rational are re-in tegrated-through the use o f pre-conceptual schem ata that preserve aspects 
of sensory perception and em otional response in the developm ent o f organizing patterns;
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through cognitive attention to one's sensory impressions; and through m eta-cognitive
aw areness o f one's own processes of sensing and inteipreting.
In non-literate tribal societies, such as the Yekuana o f  South America, the Bedouin
o f the Sinai, the Ilongot o f the Philippines and the African cultures described by Gottner-
Abendroth (1986), Lom ax (1968) and Richards (1993), com m unal life is inform ed by a
single cosmology, a consistent set of narratives and related symbolic forms. W hen
referring to the "aesthetics” o f such a group, then, w e refer to the em bodied, enacted beliefs
and values that are reflected in and peipetuated through temporal and spatial forms. Pierre
Bourdieu (1977) argues that to understand such a culture,
is not, as idealism supposes, to seek in the conscious m ind the universal 
structures o f a "mythopoeic subjectivity” and the unity of a spiritual principle 
governing all empirically realized configurations regardless o f social 
conditions. It is, on the contrary, to reconstruct the principle generating and 
unifying all practices, the system  o f inseparably cognitive and evaluative 
structures which organizes the vision o f the w orld in accordance with the 
objective structures o f  a determ inate state o f the social world: this principle is 
nothing other than the socially inform ed body, w ith its tastes and distastes, 
its com pulsions and repulsions, with, in a word, all its senses, that is to say, 
not only the traditional five senses—which never escape the structuring action 
of social de term inism s-but also the sense o f  necessity and the sense o f duty, 
the sense of direction and the sense of reality, the sense o f balance and the 
sense o f  beauty, com m on sense and the sense o f the sacred, tactical sense and 
the sense o f responsibility, business sense and the sense o f  propriety, the 
sense o f hum our and the sense of absurdity, moral sense and the sense of 
practicality, and so on (p. 124).
Collective expressive forms, then, reflect, em body, and engender sensibilities— 
preferences that can be understood to be com prised o f both sensuous (embodied) 
dim ensions as well as cognitive or rational dimensions. As w e have seen in the examples 
explicated earlier in this chapter, these sensibilities are reflected and peipetuated when 
culturally valued capacities and proclivities are promoted through participation in the 
creation, beholding and enactm ent o f cultural forms. These form s, and the sensibilities 
they reflect and engender, can be said to com prise a  culture's "aesthetic."
Form  and the Apprehension of, and Engagem ent with, Form al Qualities
In W estern philosophical theory, the 'aesthetic dom ain' is also dem arcated—in 
addition to the integration o f the sensuous and the ra tio n a l-in  by perceivers' attention to
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formal qualities. 'Formal qualities' refers to relationships am ong elem ents in a w hole, and 
between each elem ent and the whole. In contrast with the non-utilitarian, detached 
apprehension o f form al qualities that is evoked in individuals w hen they behold w orks of 
art, or that they bring to perceptions of, for instance, a natural scene, it is through engaged 
em bodied participation that collective expressive forms convey the groups' sensibilities to 
its m em bers. In other words, the "work" of both individual and collective aesthetic 
expressions is accom plished by virtue o f  their formal qualities. They both convey meaning 
and engender sensibilities by engaging people in their forms.
The key difference in the apprehension o f individual and collective expressive 
forms can be found in the faculties that each engages and the extent to w hich the process is 
conscious. In individual aesthetic experience, expressive forms tend to be perceived 
through the m ore distant sensory faculties o f  sight and hearing. Perceivers tend to 
consciously suspend o r m odify attention to the content in order to appreciate and find 
pleasure in the form al relations. The sensibilities inherent in the form , and the qualities o f  
attention and response their engender, then affect perceivers’ understandings of and 
responses to the content.
In the case o f collective expressive form s, very often the creators and the perceivers 
are the sam e persons; people experience the forms through active engagem ent in singing, 
dancing, m oving, tasting, feeling, and smelling as well as hearing and seeing. The form s 
are thus enacted, inscribing themselves more directly on the bodies of the participants, who 
may or may not be conscious o f the effects o f their engagem ent w ith the expressive forms.
B oth individual and collective expressions acquire their form al structure in part 
through the sense o f boundedness. The finiteness o f expressive form s—the fact that the 
ritual has a beginning and end, and that the canvas has borders~can  support 
experim entation and innovation.
It appears, then, that both individual and collective expressive form s mediate 
tensions betw een innovation and conservation. W estern aesthetic theory em phasizes
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innovation, but the innovation nevertheless takes places within the constraints of a  genre. 
Folk arts and rituals often play a conservative role, but, as we saw in the case o f the 
Bedouin storytelling, the Pueblo ceramic sculpture and the Trinidadian carnival, they also 
can reflect and generate new relations and social experiments.
Individual and Collective Reflexivity
The third cluster of ideas that demarcates the aesthetic domain in W estern 
philosophical conceptions o f  the aesthetic refers to the non-utilitarian response, and the 
resulting shim m ering o f the perceiver's heightened attention among self, symbol and 
referent. Some philosophers refer to an aesthetic attitude as one of disin terestedness- 
appreciating som ething for its ow n sake, for its beauty, not for its functional or com m ercial 
value.
W e might say that collective aesthetic forms evoke desired qualities o f response: 
they evoke passionate, com m itted engagem ent, and a sense of familiarity and well-being.
It is a bit awkward, though, to speak o f "evoking desired qualities o f response" w hen the 
creators, perform ers and beholders o f  the form are in fact the sam e people. In relation to 
such forms, it is in the doing itself that is meaning is enacted; m eaning is not constructed in 
some reflective response after the event itself.
However, in collective form s such as the Palestinian em broidery patterns that were 
im provised as women reacted to the insinuation o f British weapons onto their land, or in 
the shifting patterns of the Trinidadian carnival, groups can engage in what Turner (1986) 
refers to as "plural reflexivity." "Plural reflexivity" is analogous to, at the collective level, 
the enhanced awareness of both self and other that individuals can achieve when their 
attention oscillates between a poetic im age and their own feelings and responses. In other 
words, although individuals who participate in a ritual may be far from contem plative as 
they becom e sw ept up in its moods and rhythms, such events create opportunities for the 
stable and shifting sensibilities o f  collectivities to becom e apparent to the group as a whole.
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Innovations in expressive forms both reflect and engender shifts in the sensibilities o f the 
group.
New configurations o f elements within the social structure, such as experim ents in 
new social relationships, are made possible by the bounded and liminal qualities of ritual 
events. For the collectivity, these new configurations are analogous to the innovations that 
result from  the pre-conceptual schematic patterning o f the individual imagination.
Collective expressive forms can also help groups respond to external threats to their 
integrity—as they use traditional forms to "comment" on new circumstances, incorporate 
new elem ents into existing forms, and/or adapt the forms themselves in accordance with 
new social, political, economic, and cultural realities. Contact between and among diverse 
cultures is mediated and made apparent in part through transformations in cultural forms. 
W hether these transformations take the form  o f  appropriations, reciprocal innovations, or 
com pletely new inventions seems to relate, in part, to the dynam ics o f power inherent 
political circumstances o f  the contact itself.
In the conception of the aesthetic dom ain constructed from W estern philosophical 
sources in Chapter 7, a conceptual pattern em erged of a dialectical integration o f opposites, 
o r tendencies toward the mean, along three different dimensions: the integration o f the 
sensuous and the rational; a dynamic equilibrium  o f form  that avoids the extremes of 
random  chaos and unchanging rigidity; and the oscillation o f  attention that allows for new 
understandings of both self and other. This conceptual pattern can also be discerned in the 
preceding analysis of 'the aesthetic' as an experience o f collectivities. For instance in 
discussing the potential of the carnival to revitalize com m unity life and to generate new 
social relations, the anthropologist Jam es Stewart (1986) rem arked that the Trinidadians 
appeared to resist on the one hand too bold a m anifestation o f underlying tensions and, on 
the other, overem phasis on the ideal o f harm onious integration. Trinidadians desire "a 
voluntary experience o f the tensions between ideal and real, balance and excess, 
perm issiveness and control, and various o ther oppositions" (Stewart, 1986, p. 313). The
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form becom es vital and generative when it avoids the extremes o f violence (chaos) and 
idealized harm ony (rigidity).
O ur conceptual analysis o f the expressive forms o f  collectivities also reveals an 
additional dim ension along which aesthetic forms and processes tend towards the mean. 
W hile we can acknowledge that material and performative folk art forms in general serve a 
conservative function, w e also see that in times of changing circum stances they do serve to 
mediate tensions between innovation and tradition. Similar to the ways in which genres 
create structures within which individual creativity can em erge, traditional form s serve as 
structures w ithin and against which collectivities experiment and innovate.
Summary
To sum m arize, then, we see that the aesthetic experiences o f literate individuals and 
o f  pre-literate collectivities are similar in the following ways: they both integrate the 
sensuous w ith the rational; they both engage participants in form al qualities of objects and 
events; the both provide opportunities for reflexivity; they both m ediate tensions between 
innovation and tradition; they both appear to promote tendencies towards the mean, along 
several different dim ensions.
On the o ther hand, the aesthetic experiences of pre-literate collectivities are different 
from those of literate individuals. Although they both integrate the sensuous and the 
rational, they do so in different ways. In the expressive form s o f pre-literate groups, the 
sensuous and the rational are integrated in the forms themselves and also in the bodies and 
perceptual apparatus of the perceivers. W estern aesthetic theory em phasizes the integration 
o f the sensuous and the rational w ithin the apprehending, perceiving and interpreting 
capacities of the individual perceivers and creators, and also in the m etacognitive awareness 
o f  sensory perception.
As we noted above, the "work" of both individual and collective aesthetic 
expressions is accom plished by virtual of formal qualities, and how these both reflect and 
engender desired patterns o f perception and response. The key differences are the degree
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to which engagem ent w ith formal qualities is conscious and the senses through which they 
are apprehended.
Finally, while W estern aesthetic theory emphasizes non-utilitarian and 
disinterestedness o f response, collective expressive forms tend to engage people in active, 
com m itted participation, sometimes of an ecstatic nature. Paradoxically, these very different 
kinds o f individual response can both create opportunities for reflexivity. Non-utilitarian 
response creates a space for the oscillation o f  individual attention am ong self, symbol and 
referent, while the active participation engendered through collective forms creates 
opportunities for plural reflexivity.
W ith this summary of the similarities and differences between the individualist and 
collectivist conceptions of the aesthetic domain, we have com pleted a  theoretical trajectory 
begun in Chapter 8 w ith Ellen Dessanayake's theory about the transform ation in patterns o f 
artistic expression and response that accompanied widespread literacy. W e have explored 
at some length her challenge to the conception o f the aesthetic that has evolved in W estern 
philosophical literature-considering both feminist and Africanist aesthetic theories as well 
as the material and perform ative expressive modes and related patterns o f  participation and 
response of non-literate groups. The analysis of the aesthetic dom ain that em erges from the 
experiences o f  collectivities points to important limitations of the conception of the aesthetic 
that we articulated in Chapter 7. An overarching conception o f  'the aesthetic' w ill have to 
account for both the sim ilarities and the differences w e noted above.
Before articulating such an overarching view, I will first very briefly consider a 
second set o f com parisons that will help to assess the strengths and lim itations o f  the 
conception o f the aesthetic that emerges from  W estern philosophical literature. W e now 
understand that the W estern philosophical conception will need to be expanded to cover the 
experiences o f non-literate collectivities. W hat can we leam from  an analysis o f the 
aesthetic theories that emerge from  non-W estern literate cultures?
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In the next chapter, I address this question, and then propose an overarching 
conception of the aesthetic domain.
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CHAPTER 10
TW O  EASTERN AESTHETIC THEORIES 
A N D  AN INTEGRATIVE CONCEPTION OF TH E AESTHETIC DOM AIN
Introduction
Ellen Dessanayake (1988, 1992) argues that the developm ent o f w idespread literacy 
and related transformation in patterns o f human attention and perception account for the rise 
o f  the aesthetic domain as it has been understood by W estern philosophers: as an 
experience of individuals, paradigmatically associated with a non-utilitarian mode o f 
engagem ent and disinterestedness on the part o f the perceiver. Following her insights, I 
analyzed the expressive form s o f non-literate collectivities and compared them  and the 
responses they evoke w ith W estern philosophical ideas about the aesthetic. I drew  two 
conclusions about the relationship between the aesthetic understood as an individual 
phenom enon and as a quality of collective experience. First—these two kinds o f 
transactions between expressive form s and their perceivers are closely enough related to be 
considered part of the same domain. S econd-to  em brace the aesthetic experiences of pre­
literate collectivities, the clusters of ideas that em erged from  W estern philosophical 
literature on the aesthetic need to be modified, expanded, and made more abstract.
Dessanayake's challenge to W estern aesthetic th eo ry -i.e ., that it based on a limited 
view o f  patterns o f hum an expression and response that arise from  lite racy -is  only one of 
m any possible challenges that have been and could be made. W e might ask, for instance, 
w hether there are other cultural biases embedded within this theo ry -b ased  on other features 
that are distinctive to W estern modernity. Since this dissertation is not devoted solely to the 
generation of a  culturally-nuanced aesthetic theory, it is im possible to consider in depth the 
aesthetic theories and practices o f  several world cultures and to contrast them  with each
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other. How ever, to acknow ledge the importance of this line o f  inquiry, and to inform  the 
overarching conception o f the aesthetic to be proposed at the conclusion of this chapter, I 
will consider very briefly the aesthetic theories that emerge from Eastern philosophical 
literature.
The cursory view presented in this chapter lends support to D essanayake's theory 
that literacy itself accounts for m any o f the features o f the aesthetic as the concept has 
evolved in W estern philosophical traditions. On the other hand, the aesthetic theories of 
different literate cultures are also distinctive. An analysis of how two particular Eastern 
theories differ from  the W estern conception expands upon the dichotom y between 
individualist/literate cultures and collectivist/non-literate cultures suggested in the previous 
three chapters. The Eastern theories, consistent with the approach o f most W estern 
philosophers, privilege a kind of non-utilitarian response; but the desired qualities o f 
response are im bued w ith religious significance and are them selves signs o f  a shared 
cosm ology. This suggests that the demarcation o f an aesthetic dom ain distinct from  the 
spiritual may itself reflect the cultural bias o f secularism.
In this chapter, I present brief highlights from Japanese and Indian aesthetic 
theories, and then com pare and contrast them with the understandings o f  the aesthetic 
dom ain that have em erged in the previous three chapters. Then, I propose a conception of 
the aesthetic dom ain that arches over and integrates the theories arising from  Eastern and 
W estern philosophical literatures and the patterns of expression and response prevalent in 
non-literate collectivities as well.
Japanese Aesthetics: Seeking Beauty in Darkness and the Hidden
B oth C hinese and Japanese aesthetics incorporate understandings o f  The Tao, or 
T h e  W ay,' a construct that refers to appropriate relationships am ong all things, both  
natural and hum an-m ade. W ithin the fram ework o f the Tao, and in East Asian aesthetics 
generally, the dem arcation between society and nature is less distinct than in the W est. 
U nlike in the w est, w here 'art' is related etym ologically to 'artifice' and 'artificial,' in
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Japan, writes aesthetic historian Kenneth Dewoskin (1996), "aesthetic undertaking itself is
a natural and organic activity for humankind, a part of self-realization and self-refinement,
practices that resonate with things in nature, [and] proper adaptations to the physical and
social landscape" (p. 73).
U nder the influence of Confucianism  and Taoism, Buddhism  and Shintoism,
aesthetic sensibilities in East Asia generally:
incline towards the understated, the evocative, the lyrical, with an interest in 
negative capability and quiet surface. The ideal in painting is the hidden and 
obscure, in music the inaudible, in acting the m otionless, in poetry the 
unstated. Painting is best in m onochrom e, music best in song for one or two, 
poetry best in the fleeting sigh o f  the brief lyric. The aesthete refines the 
human capability to live artfully, to create art and to perceive the true and 
beautiful in art and nature-som eth ing  always there, but rarely perceived 
(D ew oskin, 1996, p. 69).
Also unlike the originality and individuality emphasized within W estern aesthetic
theory and practice, Japanese traditions em phasize
perfection of skills...and subm ission to the inner order o f the world.... The 
artists and their efforts are a  more crucial locus of the aesthetic than the 
outcom e — that is, the perform ance or objects themselves. H ence the focus o f 
much writing on aesthetics is on innate endowm ents, inner self-cultivation, 
reclusive lifestyles and the interactions between the artist and his media and 
betw een the artist and the outside world" (Dewoskin, 1996, p. 69)
An example o f this can be found in the w riting o f  Zeami M otokiyo (1363-1444), a
playwright and actor, also considered a brilliant theorist. It is the actor's a rtfu lness-
qualities of being cultivated in life as well as in one's professional role—that allow the
stylized Noh play to have the desired impact on the audience:
The seed of the flower that blossom s out in all works o f art lies in the artist's 
soul. Just as a transparent crystal produces fire and water, or a colorless 
cherry tree bears blossom s and fruit, a superb artist creates a m oving work of 
art out o f a landscape w ithin his soul. It is such a person that can be called a 
vessel. W orks of art are m any and various, som e singing o f the mood and 
the breeze on the occasion o f  a festival, others adm iring the blossom s and the 
birds at an outdoor excursion. The universe is a vessel containing all th in g s-  
flowers and leaves, the snow  and the moon, m ountains and seas, trees and 
grass, the animate and the inanim ate—according to the seasons o f  he year.
M ake those numerous things the material of your art, le t your soul be  the 
vessel o f the universe, and set it in the spacious, tranquil way o f the void.
You will then be able to attain the ultimate o f art, the M ysterious Flower (pp. 
68-69, cited in Turner, 1986b, p. 120).
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One o f Zeami's central concepts is yugen, derived from Japanese words meaning 
"deep, dim , or difficult to see," and "the dark, profound, tranquil color o f the universe; the 
T ao ist concept of truth" (Uedo, 1967, p. 70, cited in Turner, 1986b, p. 118). Yugen 
(i.e., the 'm ysterious depth o f things') becam e for Zeam i a unifying aesthetic principle, 
underlying all aspects o f  highly stylized Noh theater, in which "the most important actions 
w ere not represented but suggested. The main character is often a ghost or spirit from 
another world. Dance and gesture may suggest the distance o f the world o f the dead and 
the anguish o f being born" (M unro, 1965, p. 46).
The perform ance theorist Richard Schechner (1993) describes the proper attitude of 
people in a noh audience. Sharing in the experience of noh dram a definitely requires a shift 
in the quality o f  attention away from  the perceptual mode o f everyday life, but, according to 
Schechner's description, the desired qualities are som ew hat different from  the 
'disinterestedness' or 'rapt attention' that characterizes W estern conceptions o f  'aesthetic 
response ':
Japanese say that the proper way to "watch" noh is in a state betw een waking 
and sleeping. Among the noh audience are many w hose eyes are closed, or 
heavy-lidded. These experts are "paying attention" by relaxing their 
consciousness, allowing material to stream  upward from  their unconscious to 
meet the im ages/sounds stream ing outward from  the stage. In this state o f 
porous receptive inattention, the spectator is canned along in noh's dreamlike 
rhythm s. O ften the images and sounds are shared by shite, chorus and 
musicians so that the principal character is distributed am ong a num ber of 
perform ers (Schechner, 1993, p. 315).
Schechner (1993) quotes the Japanese theorist Kunio Komparu:
The viewer participates in the creating o f the play by individual free 
association and brings to life internally a dram a based on  individual 
experience filtered through the em otions o f  the protagonist. The shared 
dram atic experience, in other words, is not the viewer's adjustm ent o f him self 
to the protagonist on stage bu t rather his creation o f a separate personal drama 
by sharing the play with the performer. Indeed, he becom es that protagonist 
(K om paru, 1983, p. 18, quoted in Schechner, 1993, p. 315).
T he qualities o f  mystery and hiddenness that inscribe noh dram a inform  another
concept central to Japanese aesthetics, mitcite. M itate pertains to the display o f  objects, in
everyday contexts, in cerem ony and as art. It refers to techniques "used to associate
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objects o f ordinary life with mythological or classical images familiar to all literate people," 
Masao Yam aguchi (1991), a contem porary sociologist from the University o f Tokyo, 
explains that:
Japanese use m itate  to extend the image of an object. By so doing they 
transcend the constraints o f time. Yama for example is a popular word in the 
Japanese vocabulary o f the imagination. The word yama  originally denoted 
mountain, but becam e associated with and assimilated to the place where 
deities reside. In this way yam a  took on the sense of a mediating space 
between humans and gods. A physical representation o f yama  can be either 
a  small m ound o f sand or a  cart with a stage on it that is carried by 
participants in a festival procession (p. 58).
In traditional Japanese homes and communities, objects, events and places m ediate 
between hum ans and the gods, bringing a quality of reverence and mystery to daily life. In 
all traditional Japanese hom es, for instance, a display space called the tokonoma  is 
m aintained with decorated objects, wall hangings (changed with the seasons) and ikebana 
or flow er arrangem ents. "The art o f  flow er arrangement," writes Yam aguchi (1991), 
originally "was m eant to astonish gods with its ingenuity. It is the adding o f som ething 
d iffe ren t-an  act of eccentricity." It is through the mediation o f  exhibition that "sacred 
reality is m anifested" (Y am aguchi, 1991, p. 65).
The qualities of hiddenness and mystery, originally emerging from  the linking of 
objects and events on the physical plane with invisible spiritual underpinnings, results in 
artistic expressions that are evocative and subtle, suggestive rather than explicit. One 
quality particularly valued in Japanese art is aware, or "sensitivity to the beautiful sadness 
o f  things" (M unro, 1965, p. 45), o r "m elancholy elegance" (D ew oskin, 1996, p. 72). 
Artists focus on the m om ent o f the falling cherry blossom  or the unw ept tear, the sadness 
o f an autum n evening. A  contem porary Japanese aesthetic theorist, Jun'ichiro Tanizaki, 
(1886-1965) in his book  In Praise o f  Shadows, describes a 'propensity to seek beauty in 
darkness' (Tanizaki, 1977, p. 30).
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Rasa  and the Experience o f Self Itself as Pure Bliss
Satish Kumar is a native of India, a student of G handhian non-violence, and the
founder and director o f  Schumacher College, a center for the study o f ecology located in
England. From an Indian perspective, he said in an interview,
[w]hen you have a sense of art--w hich means a sense o f aesthe tics-it means a 
sense o f the sacred...because aesthetics and the sacred are two sides o f the 
sam e coin w ith us, or even interchangeable....W hen you set out to do a 
painting o f  the landscape....you have a feeling of reverence for nature, a 
reverence for the environm ent and for the landscape, and that is the spiritual, 
sacred point o f  view. In Indian thinking, we w ould say the earth is sacred 
and the trees are sac red -a  tree is not just useful because it will make a nice 
beam  for our house, or nice planks for our furniture, bu t it is a divine 
manifestation. It is the hom e of God, and therefore the tree is sacred...The 
artist's role is to create, am ong people, and to som ehow  be the bridge, or the 
instigator, for developing a sense of reverence and beauty. Beauty and 
sacredness go together. Because if som ething is natural, then it is beautiful 
(K um ar, quoted in Gablik, 1995, p. 139).
Indian theories of art refer to "pure aesthetic experience" or "aesthetic delight" with
the w ord rasa. According to early H indu writers, the capacity to experience beauty, or "to
taste rasa ," is a reward for merit in past lives. The theory o f rasa was articulated in relation
to dram a by B harata (c. 500) and then developed in relation to poetry and other theatrical
arts as well by Abhinavagupta (c. 1000). A key elem ent in Indian aesthetics, the term  rasa
has translations at many levels. T he contem porary Indian art theorist and curator, B. N.
G osw am y (1991), writes that:
at the physical level the word rasa means sap or juice, extract, fluid. It 
signifies, in its secondary sense, the nonm aterial essence o f  a thing, the best or 
finest part of it—like perfume, which com es from  m atter but is not easy to 
describe or com prehend. In its subtlest sense, however, rasa denotes taste, 
flavor, relish; but also a state of heightened delight that can be experienced 
only by the spirit (ananda)....ln  the singular, the w ord is used in the absolute 
sense, "with reference to the interior act o f  tasting flavour unparticularised." In 
the plural, the word is used relatively w ith reference to the various, usually 
eight or nine em otional conditions that may constitute the burden of a  given 
w ork and that the listener o r viewer can experience. These conditions, or 
sentim ents, are the erotic, the com ic, the pathetic, the furious, the heroic, the 
terrible, the odious, the m arvelous, and the quiescent.
The notion is that rasa, or aesthetic delight, is a  unity, but com es within 
the reach of the view er through the m edium  o f  one of these sentiments. A t the 
sam e time, rasa being essentially an experience, it does not inhere in the art 
object; it belongs exclusively to the view er o f listener, who alone can 
experience it.... [Ejach rasa  has its counterpart in w hat is called a bhava, a 
dom inant feeling or mood. Thus, the erotic sentim ent has love as its
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corresponding bhava; the com ic sentiment has mirth or playfulness as its 
bhava, and so on. Bhava  belongs to the work, and can be consciously aimed 
at by its maker o r perform er (p. 71).
W e see, therefore, that, like W estern aesthetics, which addresses relationships 
am ong the artist, the object or performance, and effects on the sensibilities of the view er or 
listener, the concepts of rasa and bhava  are used to address the relationship among these 
three elem ents o f an artistic/aesthetic experience. Unlike the W estern notion, however, the 
experience of rasa clearly has inherent mystical and spiritual dim ensions, in which beauty is 
explained "in terms of the enjoym ent of perception or a state of sublim e com posure or 
blissful serenity which was a  reflection, intimation, image, or glim pse o f the enduring bliss 
o f the spirit" (Raghavan, in M unro, 1965, p. 39). This aesthetic/spiritual experience 
em erges from a quality of detachm ent from the everyday (not unlike the non-utilitarian 
response o f  disinterestedness): "Rasa  is realized when an em otion is aw akened in the mind 
in  such a m anner that it has none of its usual conative tendencies and is experienced in an 
im personal, contem plative m ood" (Chaudhury, in M unro, 1965, p. 37). As in A ristotle's 
poetics, the sensibilities engendered through the experience of w orks of art is understood to 
affect people's ethical capacities and choices.
In this cursory review, Indian aesthetics appear to com bine the religious/spiritual 
d im ension of African aesthetics with the value on individual transform ation and 
disinterestedness o f  response associated with W estern aesthetic theories. In fact, it is 
precisely the disinterestedness o f  response and detachment from  the everyday w orld that 
H induism  elevates to a spiritual plane. In a passage that could have been written in 
anticipation o f the "shimmering" o f attention associated w ith G aston Bachelard's (1994) 
poetic transsubjectivity, the Hindu aesthetic theorist Abhinavagupta w rote nearly ten 
centuries ago that
the aesthetic experience at the highest level is the experience o f  S elf itself as 
pure bliss. At this level the duality o f subject and object disappears through 
intense introversion and the basic mental state sinks back into the 
subconscious because it is utterly disregarded... T he universalized  'this' 
shines against the universalized 'I'..." (quoted in M unro, 1965, p. 32).
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It is telling that the W estern aesthetic theorist and expert on "oriental aesthetics" Thom as 
M unro (1965) appears to apologize for Abhinavagupta by commenting: "In passages like 
this, one is rem inded that A bhinavagupta wrote in the eleventh century and in terms which 
would have been congenial to W estern mystics o f  that period" (p.32). In fact, throughout 
his study o f 'oriental aesthetics,' M unro consistently looks for ways to circum vent, or 
minimize, the spiritual dimensions o f the aesthetic theories and practices of India, China 
and Japan, assum ing that they are "unacceptable" to the W estern aesthetic theorist.
The theory o f rasa , then, describes expressive forms that engage not only the 
sensuous and the rational, but the spiritual as well. Art also engages the em otions o f the 
viewer or listener, but transforms them  according to the particular "flavor" o f the particular 
rasa. "These qualities are mixed as in a dish at the table, w hich differs from each ingredient 
when taken separately" (M unro, 1965, p. 35). Like the theory and practice o f African 
cultures and other pre-literate collectivities, and in contrast with W estern aesthetic theory, 
the Indian theory of rasa refers to the refinem ent of all the senses, including touch, taste 
and smell.
Citing A nanda Coom araswam y, Satish K um ar emphasizes the Indian view that the 
capacity to create art is a birthright o f all people, not, as is com m on in both W estern and 
Japanese theory and practice, the rightful dom ain of a  select few  geniuses. "The artist is 
not a special kind of person, bu t every person is a special kind of artist....[T]hat represents 
truly the traditional Indian way o f thinking" (Coom eraswam y, paraphrased by Kumar, 
quoted in Gablik, 1995, p. 136). K um ar acknowledges that m odern art in India is 
influenced by the W est, and, in particular, two hundred years o f education under the 
British system. He lends his personal support, however, to w hat he calls "traditional 
Indian art," that never came from the "ego-centered individual," but rather from the 
community. He argues that "the great body of works of art in museum s and galleries" has 
resulted in an "ugly world."
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That vast ugliness, the desert o f ugliness all around us, w ith then a little 
bit o f oasis consisting o f these few, special works of art — it's not 
right....O ut o f the ten thousand students going into art college, ten might 
becom e the masters. W hat a waste o f energy and money and time! In 
India, we want all ten thousand—every single one o f them --to become 
artists, and therefore, no single m aster (Kum ar, quoted in G ablik, 1995, 
p. 145).
Although formal theories o f  Indian aesthetics emphasize a spiritualized detachment
from everyday life (especially for m em bers o f elite castes), there are aspects of Indian
folklore and philosophy which maintain deep appreciation for the connections between the
aesthetic and the spiritual within daily life and the "living process" o f human creativity.
Linking Coom eraswam y's insights w ith those o f his own m other, Kum ar says:
She was a very great craftswom an. She used to make beautiful embroidery 
work, beautiful m irror w ork on shawls, skirts, blouses—anything she made.
And when she'd give it to m y sister, som etim es m y sister w ould say,
"M other, this shawl is too beautiful. I can't w ear it. I m ust put it on the 
w all." And m y m other's answ er w ould be, "D on't put it on the w all—it's for 
you. I made it for you to wear. The day you start to put beautiful things on 
the wall, you start to put ugly things on your body. And that is not right"
(Kum ar, quoted in Gablik, 1995, p. 138).
Theoretical Insights from Japanese and Indian Aesthetics 
Eastern Aesthetic Theories and Literacy
The brief inquiries into Japanese and Indian aesthetic theories offer several insights 
that will be useful in constructing a theory o f the aesthetic domain that corresponds to a 
distinctive kind o f pleasurable interplay between expressive forms and hum an perception 
and sensibilities, as that interplay m anifests itself in all cultures. First, these theories 
support Ellen Dessanayake's claim  that, in contrast with the collective expressive forms 
typical o f non-literate cultures, aesthetic theories that arise in literate cultures refer to the 
experiences of individuals. The aesthetic theories arising from both the literate elite o f both 
India and Japan clearly refer to transactions among individual artists or ensem bles of 
individuals, objects and events, and viewers.
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D isinterestedness
Also, in both o f these Eastern cultures, aesthetic perception is understood to include 
a transform ation in attitude, similar although not identical with the non-utilitarian and 
disinterested response theorized by W estern philosophers. Those w ho w atch noh  plays 
enter a state o f  "porous receptive inattention" so that they can allow "material to stream 
upw ard from  their unconscious." Indian aesthetics also refer to a kind o f  disinterestedness; 
in this case a m ystical state of blissful serenity.
Reciprocity between the Perceiver and the Forms of the Expression
In each case, w e can discern a kind o f reciprocity betw een the sensibilities of the 
perceivers and the sensibilities em bedded into the spatial and tem poral forms o f the 
expression itself. There is a match between the plays "dream like rhythms" and what is 
understood to be the "proper," half-waking, half-sleeping state in which to approach the 
theater. A  sim ilar kind of reciprocity can be seen in the pairing o f the Indian concepts o f 
bhava  (a m ood that "belongs to the work") and rasa (a kind of delight that inheres in the 
experience o f  the listener).
Inter Subjectivity
A t the sam e time that these Eastern aesthetic theories focus on the experiences o f 
individuals, from  the perspective o f  cultural outsiders, it is clear that the "individual 
perceivers" are, in fact, members o f  their cultures. In fact, their sensibilities have been 
inform ed precisely by their engagem ent with, their dw elling w ithin, the expressive forms 
o f their cultures. A lthough in the preceding chapters it has been helpful, for the purposes 
o f analysis, to distinguish between the aesthetic experiences o f individuals and 
collectivities, the Japanese and Indian aesthetic theories serve as rem inders o f  inter 
subjectivity—the interem beddedness of individuals and collectiv ities-noted  in Chapter 4 of 
this dissertation, in the section on 'reconciliation.' Here w e see that in addition to ethical 
and epistem ological relationship between individuals and their groups, and the political 
allegiances and regional dialects Elaine Scarry (1985) understands to  be inscribed into the
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bodies of citizens, aesthetic sensibilities and perceptual proclivities are also inscribed into 
the bodies o f all those who are shaped by, and becom e bearers of, cultures. As Pierre 
Bourdieu noted, these bodily sensibilities becom e so deeply insinuated into one's 
understanding o f  the world, so m uch a part of the fiber one's being, that they becom e 
ineffable, and difficult to bring to conscious awareness for reflection.
The Relationship between the Aesthetic and the Sacred
Implicit in both Indian and Japanese aesthetic theories is an overlap between the 
aesthetic and the religious/sacred domains. In India all life and all that is natural is assumed 
to be sacred. In Japan, all of creation, including both the animate and the inanim ate, is 
assum ed to reflect the way o f The Tao. It is logical, therefore, that related patterns o f 
expression and response w ould be understood to have spiritual and sacred dim ension as 
well.
Of course many works o f art and aesthetic experiences in W estern cultures 
incorporate religious ideas, sentim ents and sensibilities. This has been the case especially 
in earlier centuries, when religious institutions maintained political and cultural hegemony. 
These brief inquiries into Japanese and Indian aesthetic theories raise a  question at the 
deeper categoreal level: they seem to imply not just that the aesthetic domain can be 
brought to bear on the religious and the spiritual, but that there is no m eaningful distinction 
between the aesthetic dom ain and the spiritual domain. This contrast points to another 
possible lim itation to universal application of W estern philosophical aesthetic theory, which 
has arisen from  a society that is not only literate but also, to varying degrees, pluralistic and 
secular. The assum ption in W estern ph ilo sophy-in  some cases m ade explicitly and in 
some cases im p lic itly -o f a clear distinction between an aesthetic dom ain and a 
religious/sacred domain may need to be revised in order to generate a conception o f  the 
aesthetic that reflects that the reciprocal relationships between expressive form  and 
perceivers' sensibilities as these experienced in many o f the world's cultures.
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These very brief forays into the aesthetic theories o f  tw o entire peoples can never 
do justice  to the richness, com plexity and subtlety o f these philosophical and artistic 
traditions. The preceding discussion m erely marks a trajectory for future inquiry.
Nevertheless, this brief analysis has expanded upon the dichotomy between 
individual and collective aesthetic experience which will be useful to the development of an 
overarching aesthetic theory. It is w ith that task, then, that this chapter concludes.
An Integrated Conception o f the Aesthetic Domain
In the present and previous chapters on the aesthetic dom ain, we have considered 
several distinct conceptions o f the aesthetic. One arose from 18th and 19th century 
W estern philosophical traditions. It describes a dom ain o f human endeavor—including 
forms o f  expression, reception, pleasure and resp o n se-in  term s o f the experience of 
individuals. The second conception, im plicit in the work of fem inist and Africanist 
scholars, as well is in the discourses o f  A nthropology, Folklore and Perform ance Studies, 
refers to  the expressive forms and related sensibilities of collectivities. Finally, we briefly 
considered aesthetic theories arising from  two Eastern philosophical traditions, Japanese 
and Indian, noting the necessarily intersubiective nature o f aesthetic perception and 
response.
Here we propose an overarching conception o f 'the aesthetic' that generalizes from 
and takes account of the differences in the various concepts o f this com plex and 
m ultifaceted aspect o f  human experience.
The w ord 'aesthetic' is used in two different ways. As a categoreal term, it 
dem arcates a dom ain of hum an experience. As a normative term , it refers to preferences, 
judgm ents and standards about experiences within that dom ain. The w ord functions, then, 
sim ilarly  to the w ord 'moral'. For instance, w hen 'm oral' is used in the categoreal sense, 
i.e. w hen w e say a dilem m a is a 'm oral' one, we m e a n -to  put it s im p ly -th a t it is a 
question that pertains to judgm ents o f right and wrong. W hen used in the norm ative sense, 
i.e., when we say an action w as the 'm oral' thing to do, the w ord refers to a substantive
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judgm ent or sense that the action is right, or justifiable according to a set o f  ethical 
principles to which we subscribe. Similarly, in its categoreal sense, when we say that a 
question is 'aesthetic' we mean that it is a question about m atters of taste and beauty, or, 
m ore technically, about the degree to which spatial or temporal forms are pleasing those 
who engage w ith them. In its normative sense, when we say, fo r instance, that a scene is 
particularly aesthetic, we are making a judgm ent that scene is beautiful, that the 
arrangem ent o f  spatial and temporal forms in fact does please, and that others will or ought 
to find it beautiful as well.
W e see already that, whether understood in the categoreal or norm ative sense, 
em bedded within the notion of 'the aesthetic' is a transaction betw een forms and the 
responses o f those who engage with th em -as  creators, or spectators, or participants. In 
o ther words, w e can describe an 'aesthetic object,' but not w ithout reference to the kind of 
perception or participation it either requires or evokes. W e can also speak of 'aesthetic 
apprehension,' but it only makes sense in terms o f the form al relationships that are either 
incorporated within its object or that become apparent in response to the special qualities of 
the perceptive attention. The phenomenologist Mikel Dufrenne makes a distinction, using 
this line o f  argum ent, between a  work o f art, which is constant, and the 'aesthetic object,' 
w hich is variously created in each instance of perception. "The aesthetic object," he writes, 
"is com pleted only in the conciousness o f the spectator" (D ufrenne, 1973, p. 204).
Incorporating insights from our analyses o f the various aesthetic theories, then, I 
propose the following conception:
The aesthetic domain refers to (1) pleasurable kinds of hum an apprehension 
and (2) the form s and processes that reflect, em body and engender them. The 
aesthetic dim ension of an experience refers to, and aesthetic pleasure results 
from , the reciprocity between the form(s) being perceived and the perceptual 
capacities and sensibilities o f the perceiver(s).
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Reciprocity o f perceiver and perceived results from  (1) intense 
engagem ent with a bounded form, (2) the integration o f  the sensory and 
rational, and (3) the m ediation o f tensions-betw een, for instance, 
random ness and order, tradition and innovation, and the im pulses o f 
individuals and the im peratives of the group.
Aesthetic experiences can generate, for both individuals and 
collectivities, qualities of attention and response (such as disinterestedness, 
com m itted participation, metacognitive alertness, receptiveness, and blissful 
serenity) that afford unique opportunities for learning, reflexivity, creativity, 
innovation and experimentation.
One o f the key words in the first part o f  the definition is 'reciprocity.' It can 
perhaps best be understood by considering it as a median point betw een two other kinds of 
transactions betw een perceivers and objects of perception. 'Reciprocity ' is m id-w ay 
between analysis, in which the perceiver "controls" the object by com partm entalizing it into 
preconceived categories, and propaganda, in which the expressive form  has been designed 
to m anipulate, seduce or coerce. In the case of aesthetic apprehension, whether in the case 
o f ecstatic participation in rituals or non-utilitarian contem plation o f a poem , the forms of 
the expression are synchronized w ith or attuned to the perceptual apparatus of those who 
apprehend them .34
The 'reciprocity' between an aesthetic subject and aesthetic object can be 
characterized as a relationship of respect, in which neither term  overpow ers the other. The 
perceiver is (or the perceivers are) invited by the pleasures inherent in apprehending the 
configuration o f formal elem ents in itself—to attend, to feel, to interpret, and to reflect.
And, conversely, in attending to these formal elements and their reverberations and 
resonances w ithin them , perceivers (or participants) allow an 'aesthetic object' or 'aesthetic 
event' to em erge from  a w ork o f art or from, for instance, a ritual form.
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The attunement or synchronicity between aesthetic subject and aesthetic object that 
can be characterized as 'reciprocity' does not, however, imply a perfect match, in w hich the 
form to be perceived matches all expectations. To the contrary, as perceivers o f and 
participants in formal expressions, hum an beings seem to find, to greater or lesser degrees, 
pleasure in innovations, in em bracing the unexpected, in stretching to accom m odate what at 
first seem ed jarring. Hum an percpetual capacities and proclivities, as well as the forms 
that reflect, em body and engender them, vary to some degree in different historical and 
cultural contexts. Nevertheless, in general, both the familiarity o f the expected form, and 
the measured challenge to integrate som ething new are sources o f aesthetic pleasure.
The 'm eaning' o f an aesthetic expression can be found partly or, in some cases, 
com pletely, in the sensibilities engendered in the processes of expression and perception 
itself. If the expression includes a narrative o r discursive dim ension, the significance o f  
that content depends in part upon the qualities of the forms through which it is presented.
Because o f  their integration o f the sensuous with the rational, and the nature o f the 
engagem ent with bounded and formal qualities they promote, aesthetic experiences can 
bring to awareness information that previously had not been available to consciousness.
This conception of the aesthetic dom ain is one that embraces the aesthetic 
experiences o f  both individuals and o f collectivities, and acknowledges the dynam ics o f 
inter subjectivity. It allows for distinct m odes of aesthetic expression and response which 
will them selves have distinguishing features, including, for instance, the extent to which 
the integration of the rational and sensuous dim ensions takes place in the consciousness of 
individuals or is encoded within the expressive forms, the range of responses form s are 
designed to evoke, and the nature o f  the reflexivity involved.
Does this Conception of the Aesthetic "Beg the Question" of the Dissertation?
In choosing to conceptualize 'the aesthetic' as I do, am I prejudicing this inquiry by 
defining 'the aesthetic domain' arbitrarily in a way that predisposes it for the w ork of 
reconciliation? Am I, in effect, begging the question by building our conclusions into the
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prem ises o f the argum ent? I do not think so, for two reasons. First, the condition or 
characteristic of universality itself, while possibly a necessary condition for a human 
capacity to be useful for the work o f  reconciliation, is certainly not sufficient. The capacity 
to inflict harm  is a universal human capacity; it's ubiquity hardly makes it a candidate for 
such work. And related to this point, it is important to clarify that simply by proposing a 
conception o f  the aesthetic that does not exclude any cultures, we are not intending to imply 
that all such forms and processes are necessarily reciprocally intelligible.
Secondly, the conception I propose is not arbitrary: it builds on established 
understandings o f the word, as articulated by analytic, pragm atist and phenom enological 
philosophers, theorists arising from the disciplines o f  sociobiology, folklore and 
perform ance studies, and scholars o f artistic expression o f many different cultures. I have 
not accepted limited definitions proposed by form alist theorists, whose ideas are 
understood by m any to be unnecessarily narrow and to apply only to the experience of a 
privileged elite.
Som e notions central to W estern aesthetic theory, m ost notably the concept o f 
disinterestedness of response, have been associated by som e with ethnocentrism  and 
dom ination. The definition proposed here em braces the concept o f disinterestedness, 
because it is a kind o f  aesthetic response, com m on in literate cultures. However, including 
it w ithin this definition o f  'the aesthetic,' rather than m aking it in itself definitive of 'the 
aesthetic,' som e of the harshest criticism s o f  the concept—i.e., that it is inherently 
ethnocentric and dom inative—are allayed. O ther concerns about disinterestedness—i.e., 
that it is impossible or undesirable to ach ieve-w ill be addressed in the next chapter.
The creation and appreciation o f objects and events deem ed to be beautiful is a 
universal hum an capacity. In every culture, spatial and temporal form s are elaborated 
beyond the m inim um  required for utilitarian function alone. Therefore, the need for a 
conception of 'the aesthetic1 that can potentially include all o f the distinct cultural
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m anifestations o f universal human proclivities for em bodied expression, apprehension and 
interpretation arises from our inquiry into the aesthetic domain itself.
To sum m arize this chapter, then, we have briefly considered aesthetic theories that 
have em erged from  two Eastern, literate cultures. This analysis pointed us towards the 
necessarily intersubjective nature o f aesthetic experience, expanding upon the dichotomy 
that had em erged between individualist and collectivist conceptions.
W ith that insight, I proposed an integrated theory o f  the aesthetic dom ain -one  that 
is still useful in distinguishing the aesthetic from other domains of experience, but 
nevertheless is broad enough to account for the experiences of individuals and groups of 
very different cultural and historical contexts. Finally, I argued that the proposed 
definition, although it intends towards universality, does not "beg the question” o f  this 
study. It is a definition that em erges from an interdisciplinary study of the aesthetic domain 
itself.
In  the next chapter, the final chapter o f this section on the aesthetic dom ain, I briefly 
consider several ethical risks and possibilities associated with aesthetic experience 
according to the conception I have proposed.
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CHAPTER 11
TH E INTER-RELATED ETH ICA L A N D  EPISTEM IC POSSIBILITIES AND RISKS 
ASSOCIATED W ITH TH E AESTHETIC DOM AIN
Overview
In this chapter, I begin an assessm ent o f the ethical possibilities and risks inherent 
the aesthetic domain according to the conception just proposed. First, I sum m arize the 
work o f several moral philosophers who argue that the qualities o f attention made possible 
by the non-utilitarian response (typical of aesthetic experience in literate societies) enlarge 
our capacities to (1) respect and understand others (especially in how they are different 
from  us; (2) m eet the needs o f self-consciousness and increase self-awareness; and (3)
"feel into" the experience of others in an em pathic way. These philosophers argue both that 
specific aesthetic encounters can lead to these kinds of awareness and that on-going 
engagem ent w ith the aesthetic domain can enhance in a general way morally significant 
perceptive capacities.
Following an analysis of these three ethical and epistemic possibilities, I respond to 
a set o f  concerns, raised prim arily by fem inist scholars, about the dangers of 'disinterested 
response.' They are critical o f  disinterestedness not only as definitive of the aesthetic 
dom ain. They claim  that disinterested response may be impossible and in any case is 
m orally suspect.
Having considered several W estern ethical assessments o f  the aesthetic, I then 
propose possibilities associated w ith the integrative conception o f the aesthetic domain 
articulated in the previous chapter. I consider how the qualities of respect, self-awareness 
and em pathy can be brought to understandings of the expressions o f diverse cu ltu res-b y
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appreciating both their folk arts and the work of individual artists who are intersubjectively 
linked with the sensibilities of their groups.
I also propose a set of ethical possibilities associated w ith ritual. First I make 
reference to theories about ritual's role in the sublimation o f  violence and the mediation of 
conflict. Then I return to the E laine Scarry's theories, first addressed in Chapter 6. She 
argues that large-scale human creations (such as new configurations of nation-states) must 
not only be imagined; they must be substantiated, or made believable to all parties of a 
conflict. Currently this substantiation usually takes places as the "compelling certainty" of 
the pain of wounded bodies is appropriated to the as-yet uncertain construct. I propose 
here that the visceral and embodied nature o f ritual offers a  non-violent alternative through 
which hum an communities can substantiate their large-scale creations.
This necessarily partial and prelim inary discussion of ethical possibilities o f an 
inclusive conception o f the aesthetic domain ends w ith a brief assessm ent of the surfacing 
o f "inform ation" from  pre- or non-conscious sources—a feature of both individual and 
collective aesthetic experience.
The chapter ends with a brief acknowledgm ent of the related ethical and 
epistem ological risks o f the aesthetic domain, and a rationale for considering them only 
briefly.
Aesthetic Engagem ent and Respect for Others 
Two contem porary moral philosophers, Iris M urdoch (1985) and M artha 
Nussbaum  (1986, 1995), argue that moral sensibilities and capacities are linked to the non­
utilitarian response associated with aesthetic experience in literate societies. Non-utilitarian 
or disinterested response allows us to apprehend som ething "for its own sake," 
independent of our own interests o r will. M urdoch argues that aesthetic perception 
involves suppressing the distorting aspects o f  self and will. Therefore, it allows us to 
apprehend the w orld more clearly that w e do in m ore usual perceptual modes. "The chief 
enem y o f excellence in morality (and also in art)," she writes,
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is personal fantasy: the tissues of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and 
dream s which prevents one from seeing what is there outside one...The 
appreciation of beauty in art or nature is not only (for all its difficulties) the 
easiest available spiritual exercise; it is also a completely adequate entry into 
(and not ju st analogy of) the good life, since it is the checking of selfishness 
in the interest o f seeing the real... The greatest art is 'im personal' because it 
show s us the world, our world and not another one, w ith a clarity  which 
startles and delights simply because w e are not used to looking at the real 
w orld at all...G reat art teaches us how real things can be looked at and loved 
w ithout being seized and used, without being appropriated into the greedy 
organism  o f  the self (M urdoch, 1985, pp. 59-66).
In insisting that aesthetic perception is more than "an analogy" of morality,
M urdoch is linking the aesthetic and moral domains more closely than did Kant. In a
sense, M urdoch elaborates moral implications of Kant's aesthetic theory that he
acknow ledged in only a  peripheral way. Clarity o f  perception, in M urdoch's view, is an
act w ith m oral significance, because it makes possible respect fo r the other.
In thus treating realism, whether o f artist or of agent, as a moral achievem ent, 
there is of course a further assumption to be made in the field o f morals: that 
true vision occasions right conduct. This could be uttered sim ply as an 
enlightening tautology: but I think it can in fact be supported by appeals to 
experience. The more the separateness and differentness of o ther people is 
realized, and the fact seen that another man [sic] has needs and w ishes as 
dem anding as one's own, the harder it becom es to treat a person as a thing 
(M urdoch, 1985, p. 66).
In Kantian terms, M urdoch is arguing that the greater our capacity to see persons separate
from the im position o f the constructs of our pre-existing concepts, the greater the likelihood
that we w ill act tow ards them  w ith respect (i.e., not only as m eans tow ards our ends, but
as beings w ith  their own purposes, as ends-in-them selves). M urdoch also extends Kant's
suggestion that there is a relationship between the disinterestedness o f  aesthetic attention
and capacity  to 'love.'
The great artists sees his objects (and this is true w hether they are sad, 
absurd, repulsive or even evil) in a light o f justice and m ercy. The direction 
o f  attention is, contrary to nature, outward, away from self w hich reduces all 
to  a false unity, towards the great surprising variety of the w orld, and the 
ability  so to direct attention is love (M urdoch, 1985, p. 66).
W hat is it about the aesthetic domain that nourishes our capacity to love? The
capacity o f art to lift us above our eg o s-ab o v e  the "proliferation of blinding self-centered
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aims and images" o f  which, according to M urdoch, "willing" is most often a p a rt- th is
capacity is derived from our attention to formal qualities. M urdoch (1985) writes that,
although much art can serve self-indulgent fantasies, great art, like nature, is able to
nourish this capacity to love, by virtue of "the perfection of its form." Such "perfection of
form ...invites unpossessive contem plation and resists absorption into the selfish dream life
o f the consciousness" (p .85-86).
M artha Nussbaum  (1990) arrives at similar conclusions in an essay entitled
'Literature and the M oral Imagination.' Novels can elicit within us moral attention, or "the
loving scrutiny o f appearances" w ith "intensely focused perception." The reading o f
novels supports us to develop moral capacities beyond those we use to exam ine our own
lives, she argues, because our understanding o f the characters' em otions and the moral
dilem m as they encounter is not obscured by the jealousies and personal interests that often
obstruct our perception o f  ourselves. As w e read, w e are shown what it w ould be like to
take up, in our own lives, a stance that allows us to experience "love w ithout
possessiveness, attention without bias, involvem ent w ithout panic" (N ussbaum , 1990,
p. 162). Even the child who delights in stories and nursery rhym es "is getting the idea that
not everything in human life has a use. It is learning a mode o f engagem ent with the world
that does not focus exclusively on the idea of use, but is capable, too, of cherishing things
fo r their own sake" (Nussbaum , 1990, p. 42).
Does literature allow us, as M urdoch suggests, to see the w orld m ore clearly than
attending to life itself? N ussbaum  argues that we do come to see m ore clearly. In her
view, though, what we see more clearly is not some "world-in-itself" but a  world already
shaped by human concepts and interpreted through human culture. W ith artists as "guides"
w e see more clearly:
The objectivity in question is "internal" and human. It does not even attem pt 
to approach the world as it m ight be in itself, uninterpreted, unhum anized. Its 
raw material is the history o f hum an social experience, which is already an 
interpretation and a measure. But it is objectivity all the same. And that is 
w hat m akes the person w ho does the artist's task well so im portant for others.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
254
In the w ar against moral obtuseness, the artist is our fellow fighter, frequently 
our guide. W e can develop, here, the analogy w ith our sensory powers that 
the term perception already suggests. In seeing and hearing we are I believe, 
seeing not the world as it is in itself, apart from hum an being and human 
conceptual schemes, but a world already interpreted and hum anized by our 
faculties and our concepts. And yet, who could deny that there are some 
among us whose visual or auditory acuity is greater than that o f others; some 
who have developed their faculties more finely, w ho can make 
discrim inations of color and shape (or pitch and tim bre) that are unavailable to 
the rest o f  us? W ho m iss less, therefore, of w hat is to be heard or seen in a 
landscape, a sym phony, a painting? Jam esian moral perception is, I think, 
like this: a fine development of our hum an capabilities to see and feel and 
judge; an ability to miss less, to be responsible to more (N ussbaum , 1990, 
p. 164).
In the conceptions of both M urdoch and Nussbaum , then, the quality of perception 
associated w ith aesthetic experience is understood as having both epistem ological and 
ethical implications. They do not claim  that the beautiful, the good and the true are 
identical; but they do maintain that aesthetic perception can lead both to knowledge about 
the (hum an) world and to sensibilities that, in M urdoch's view, have moral significance in 
them selves, and in N ussbaum 's, have moral significance because they increase the 
likelihood o f  moral action.
A nother philosopher, Roger H epburn (1984), finds ethical value in wonder, an 
inquisitive m ode of apprehension made possible by the unusually concentrated, rapt 
experience associated with the non-exploitative and non-utilitarian aspects o f 
disinterestedness. An attitude of wonder can em brace appreciative, contemplative, 
inquisitive, interrogative and som etim es restless dim ensions. W onder has a "life- 
enhancing character," Hepburn writes, because it is "appreciative and open, opposed to the 
self-protective and consolatory" (1984, p. 144). W onder is "notably and essentially other- 
acknowledging, " and it is in this quality that we find its ethical value. Like M urdoch, 
quoted above, H epburn em phasizes the links betw een an appreciation o f otherness that 
derives from  the openness o f aesthetic response (in this case, wonder) and a K antian notion 
o f respect:
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
255
Som e philosophers have thought that moral solidarity w ith others was 
best prom oted by a metaphysic which denied the ultimate separation o f 
individual se lv es ...!  should w ant to argue on the contrary that the task and 
distinctive point of view of m orality are obscure until the otherness o f  one's 
neighbor is realized, and realized with it is the possibility of action purely and 
sim ply on another's behalf...
There is...a close affinity between the attitude o f wonder itself—non- 
exploitative, non-utilitarian—and attitudes that seek to affirm and respect other- 
being.... The nearer the object of wonder com es to having the life, sentience, 
and rational powers proper to moral person-hood, the more the elem ent of 
respect in w onder takes on the Kantian quality. The more intense a person's 
w onder at the hum an brain...the less bearable becom es the thought, for 
instance, o f  wantonly putting a bullet through it or crushing it w ith a rifle-butt 
(H epburn, 1984, p. 145).
Paul Crow ther (1993a) analyzes the elem ent of respect in aesthetic transactions in 
terms of the non-coercive dim ension of a  beholder's engagem ent with a w ork of art. 
Em bodied within a work o f  art is an artist's sensibilities. It gives us access to a sensuous 
awareness o f an aspect of the w orld, but generally without the artist's physical presence, 
which otherwise could pressure us "into sharing the vision exactly on his or her term s." 
O ther modes o f d iscou rse-such  as written political analysis and philosophical 
argum entation-w hich can also allow us to engage with a set o f ideas free from  the 
pressures of face-to-face contact, have the disadvantage of being abstract and, according to 
Crowther, potentially "alienating." It is through "the experience of art," he claim s, that "we 
recognize ourselves in and through the Other, with a degree of freedom that is foreign to all 
other modes o f discourse" (Crow ther, 1993a, p. 141).
The freedom  inherent in the apprehension of works of art is especially im portant in 
understanding the nature o f  the aesthetic transaction when a work o f art has political content 
or significance. Crow ther notes that W alter Benjamin (1977) feared that the "aesthetic 
contem plation o f a  work prevents it from  becom ing a vehicle for 'com pelling' political 
decision" (Crow ther, 1993b, p. 91). It is precisely the freedom  inherent in our 
engagem ent w ith works o f  art, however, that distinguish such works from  propaganda, 
and m ake them  suitable for processes that aspire to the standards o f  'education,' w hich
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must, as we recall, respect the integrity o f the student. Crow ther (1993b) m akes the
following distinction:
The problem  with propaganda is that it is something to be seen through— 
either in the sense o f recognizing it as 'm ere propaganda', or in the sense of 
being forced to go beyond the w ork by taking up the political stance which it 
thrusts towards us. To experience political meaning as a necessary feature in 
the original aesthetic unity of an artwork, in contrast, is to encounter that 
meaning at an equalizing distance. W e are not simply being preached at by a 
superior being who know w hat is good for us. Rather, we see the political 
content as som ething which contributes to the distinctive vision of this 
particular artist o r creative ensem ble....W e are, in other words invited to 
share the artist's political values. They are not ram m ed down our throats.
Aesthetic experience can allow us, therefore, a freedom to make political 
decisions which propaganda cannot, and decisions made freely, o f course, 
are alw ays the m ost com pelling....
[I]t is this very dim ension o f  respect for the recipient which enables 
the w ork to be all the more readily and deeply assimilated within his or her 
experience...(em phasis added; pp. 91-92).
W orks o f art engage their viewers by invitation rather than coercion. The artists' 
strug g les-b e  they political, or cultural, or ex isten tia l-are  incorporated within the work, 
available for our apprehension and interpretation, but not forced upon as, as in propaganda, 
or argued, as in political or philosophical discourse. Upon beholding a w ork o f art, we 
may engage in criticism , or in political or philosophical reflection, informed by the 
awareness that results from  the aesthetic encounter. In these instances, however, as 
Crow ther (1993b) sum m arizes, "[i]t falls upon the consum er to generate political m eaning 
from  clues—intended or unintentional—which the artist provides. This, I w ould suggest, is 
the only way in which... the aesthetic, political, and indeed, moral integrity of both parties" 
can be presented (p. 92).
In this section, then, we have considered how the non-utilitarian, disinterested 
response associated with aesthetic experience in the theories o f literate societies is related to 
respect. D isinterestedness o f  response is also associated by some philosophers w ith related 
increases (1) in our understanding and awareness o f  ourselves and (2) in the w ays in w hich 
w e are similar to others. They argue that aesthetic response increases our capacity to 
em pathize with others. W e turn our attention to these claim s in the next two sections.
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Aesthetic Engagem ent and the Needs o f Self- Consciousness
In addition to his theories about respect, Paul Crow ther offers another view of 
related ethical and epistemic possibilities inherent in the aesthetic domain. In his ecological 
theory o f art, he argues that the disinterested and heightened qualities o f attention associated 
w ith aesthetic perception expand our intellectual capacities. Drawing on theories o f 
M erleau-Ponty (1995), Kant (1966[ 1790]) and Hegel (1975 [1835-8]), C row ther claims 
that aesthetic modes of perception m eet the conditions for and needs o f self-consciousness.
W e can briefly summarize Crowther's argum ent as follows. A t a very basic level, 
to be conscious of one's self requires the capacities o f attention, com prehension and 
projection: the capacity to be receptive to sensory stimuli, to organize these stimuli by 
discrim inating sameness and differences among them, and to rem em ber and imagine. In 
addition to capacities for attention, com prehension and projection, consciousness o f self as 
a hum an being requires us to em ploy these capacities to further our awareness of ourselves 
in relationship w ith perceiving subjects (i.e., as the objects o f their attention), to recognize 
and be  recognized by others, and to enjoy the freedom associated w ith "inaugurating] 
action on the basis of [our] own choices and decisions" (Crow ther, 1993a, p. 151). In 
aesthetic perception, these capacities are brought into relationship w ith each other, in ways 
that w e experience as enlivening and pleasurable (totally apart from  any practical needs that 
m ight be met). It is the pleasure that we take in aesthetic perception that keeps us alert and 
engaged beyond those moments in w hich we are perform ing tasks needed for survival. 
O ur capacities for attention and comprehension develop through use, facilitating "the 
pursuit o f  knowledge and experience for its own sake, thus m assively expanding the 
general intellectual resources available to a culture in its struggle for survival" (Crowther, 
1993a, p. 161).
Aesthetic experiences enhance our capacities fo r attention, com prehension and 
projection, stimulating to an unusual degree "the reciprocal interaction o f the necessary 
factors in self-consciousness." They also reflect back to us, in the form  o f "concrete and
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
258
sensible objects o f  experience....in symbolic form at the level o f  perception itself"
(Crowther, 1993a, p. 154) the relationship am ong the necessary factors o f self-
consciousness. As w e create and appreciate the artifacts o f unalienated labor, for instance
self-consciousness is able to articulate and comprehend itself in a way that 
draws on both the senses and cognitive powers functioning as a unified field.
It com prehends itself, in other words, at the level which is m ost fundamental 
to us -  that o f  our reciprocal interaction with the world as em bodied subjects 
(Crow ther, 1993a p. 154).
Although we may recognize this only on an intuitive level, a hum an-m ade artifact is an
embodied connection to both past and future, and an "objective realization o f our capacity
to act on our own volition and exercise choice" (Crowther, 1993a, p. 161).
A lthough he does not articulate these explicitly, I believe there are moral
implications in Crow ther's analysis of the importance o f aesthetic experience in addressing
the needs self-consciousness and in enhancing our capacities for self-consciousness. There
is pleasure in enlivening and enhancing our capacities to attend and to com prehend, to
rem em ber and to  im agine—i.e., to be present to the world, to m ake m eaning of our
experiences and perceptions, and to remember the past and im agine a different future. In
this, his argum ent is related to Nussbaum 's and M urdoch's: w e are more alert and we see
m ore clearly. He then takes a  different turn, however. He doesn't focus on the
disinterestedness evoked by our perception o f the beautiful and how it can aid us in seeing
the reality o f other people. Rather, he argues that in the space created by our
disinterestedness, we experience ourselves in relation to the natural world and other people,
and experience our freedom  and our interconnectedness reflected back to us, in the
em bodied form s of nature, artifice and art. In this way, we can com e to feel more at home
in the world, less isolated in our grappling with the moral com plexities of our hum an-ness,
and for these reasons, more able to make choices about when and how to act.
Paradoxically, according to Crowther, it is in the aesthetically-evoked solitary
wondering about the hum an condition that art create possibilities for em pathy w ith others:
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An artwork is experience becom e concrete, and intersubjectively accessible. It 
is a m icrocosm  o f the artist's own being..,.[T]he experience o f an artw ork 
can bring a unique reflective awareness of the nature of the human condition 
itself. This moving revelation and celebration o f the enigma o f embodied 
consciousness is what I shall call em pathic experience. ...-W o rk s of art m ake 
us stop for a m om ent to see and w onder at what we have created, at what 
surrounds us, and w hat we, in essence are. This fundam ental awareness is a 
simple but potentially shattering experience that is the proper root of the... 
em pathic... (C row ther, 1993a, p. 46).
'Empathy' is a concept that has received considerable attention from aesthetic 
theorists. The next section presents a sampling o f their perspectives.
Aesthetic Engagem ent and Empathy with Others 
'Em pathy' is a translation o f the Germ an 'Einfuhlung,' or 'feeling into,’ first 
coined by Theodor Lipps (Langfield, 1953, p. 317). Technically, it refers to a kind o f 
m otor response in perception, in which w e feel in our own muscles the sense o f the object 
or action being perceived. Em pathic response is the opposite o f a defensive or reactive 
response. To give an exam ple, if  upon seeing the outstretched arm  (of a person o r of a 
statue) w e feel in the m uscles o f  our own arm the tensions associated w ith being 
outstretched, then the response is empathic. If, on the other hand, we react to the 
outstretched arm by blocking it, our response could be called defensive or reactive.
W riting in 1920, Sidney Langfield argued that
during aesthetic contem plation such experiences are not felt as sensations 
w ithin the body. In fact, they do not com e to consciousness as sensations of 
our own m ovem ents at all, but influence the perception in such a way that the 
lines and figures them selves seem  to have the force which is actually in us. As 
soon as w e are conscious o f our own sensations, we are no longer 
contem plating the beauty o f the object (p. 317).
In the W estern philosophical tradition, the capacity of aesthetic engagem ent to 
evoke em pathic awareness o f the suffering o f  others is an idea o f long standing, articulated 
first by Aristotle in his Poetics. W e referred briefly to Aristotle's theory in C hapter One.
In "Tragedy and Self-Sufficiency," M artha N ussbaum , (1992) discusses the 
relationship am ong em pathic feelings o f pity and fear, on the one hand, and ethical
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responsiveness on the other, specifically in terms of com ing to  understanding the suffering 
of the other, of one's enemy:
...In pity, the hum an characters draw  close to the one w ho suffers, 
acknowledging that their own possibilities are similar, and that both together 
live in a w orld of terrible reversals, in which the difference between pitier and 
pitied is a m atter far more o f luck than o f deliberate action. This is where fear 
fits in: for often the thought of general hum an vulnerability is accompanied 
by fear—which, as the expectation o f bad things to com e, may be directed at 
the person pitied, if  his or her sufferings are thought to be still in the future, 
but w hich is often self-regarding as well or instead, as the pitier trembles for 
his o r her own possibilities.
And it is in this that the poets see, I believe, the social benefits of 
pity.... Through his pity, Achilles arrives at a new understanding o f the 
shared vulnerabilities o f  hum an beings, and becom es able to think o f  his 
enem y as a hum an being like himself...
[In Philoctetes,] the language of the play closely connects the painful 
experience of pity with a new dimension of ethical responsiveness: for 
Neoptolem us uses the language of physical suffering to describe his own 
response, and even calls out with the interjection, papai, that the poor man 
had used in the throes o f his to rm ent-as the pain o f pity causes, in turn, the 
pain of moral distress that leads, eventually, to his generous and noble choice 
(N ussbaum , 1992, pp. 267-268).
In the same essay, in a later section in which she explicates Aristotle's notion
katharsis (a "clearing out" or "cleaning out" of the emotional im pedim ents to moral action)
N ussbaum  refers explicitly to the educative importance o f tragedy, noting its particular
relevance in the context o f war:
...N eoptolem us is good, but capable, as nonom niscient good people are, of 
m aking mistakes. W ithout realizing it, he has diverged from  his good 
character. The sight o f Philoctetes' pain removes an im pedim ent (ignorance 
in this case, rather than forgetfulness or denial), m aking him  clearer about 
w hat another's suffering m eans, about what his good character requires in 
this situation, about his ow n possibilities as a human being. T he audience, in 
the m idst of wartime, is recalled to awareness of the m eaning o f  bodily pain 
for another, for themselves. Even good people do  need to be rem inded— 
especially in time of war, w hen military passions run high and awareness o f 
the enem y's sim ilar humanity is easily lost from  view in the desire to inflict a
punishm ent Forgetfulness, ignorance, self-preoccupation, m ilitary
passion—all these things are obstacles (fully com patible w ith general goodness 
o f character) that are "cleared up" by the sharp experience of pity and fear... 
(N ussbaum , 1992, p. 282).
Through their fear and pity, indeed in those responses, spectators attain a deeper 
understanding o f  the world in which they m ust live, the obstacles their goodness faces, the 
needs each has for the help o f others (Nussbaum , 1992, pp. 282, 287).
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In theories o f the aesthetic based in the Aristotelian tradition, works o f  art are
understood to help us see more clearly in part because they allow (and som etim es prod) us
to do em otional work. In the space created by disinterestedness, in this case in the
em otional space created by our awareness that we are viewing a  representation of events
and not "real life," we em pathize with the suffering of the character enacted in the drama,
feel pity for him  or her, and fear for our own vulnerability. The formal qualities o f the
play, which Aristotle describes in detail in his Poetics, evoke em otions as well as moral and
cognitive judgm ents, in an intense and concentrated way. According to Richard Janko
(1992), the em otions experienced during tragedy have salutary effects in two ways. First,
dramatic mimesis leads us to  the correct emotional response to the characters' 
p light via our moral and cognitive judgments about them, since their 
personalities and actions are vividly represented as universal patterns of 
action. O ur enhanced perceptions can improve our capacity for moral 
judgm ent, practical w isdom  and virtue. ...[Fjeeling such appropriate 
emotional reactions can habituate us to achieve and maintain the proper 
standard in our moral choices... (p. 352).
But more than our cognitive capacities for moral judgm ents benefit from the
experience o f  theater. Some theorists emphasize the ways in which both com edy and
tragedy can clarify our em otional responses, "leading them toward the mean." For
instance, Richard Janko (1992)writes that:
[tjhe catharsis o f the pleasant emotions in comedy offers sim ilar benefits: we 
learn to laugh at the right objects and to the proper degree. M oreover Aristotle 
w ould add, with his usual optimism, that we learn not to  laugh at actions 
w hich cause excessive pain to others, whereas the buffoon does not mind 
w hether his jokes injure their object. For the m ature citizen, both tragedy and 
com edy are a civilizing force. The pity and fear aroused by w atching Oedipus 
the King  m ight lead a timorous man to realize that his ow n fears are 
exaggerated, and that his own misfortunes are not so terrible; yet the sam e play 
m ight arouse in a powerful and confident person, prone to feel and behave 
arrogantly toward others, the thought that even the m ightiest ruler m ay one day 
need the sym pathy and help of those weaker than himself. Sim ilarly, 
laughing at a com edy m ight make a real-life buffoon realize how foolish he 
seem s at the dinner-table, bu t might m ake a prude relax from  his prissiness.
All these reactions conduce to the mean. (p. 352).
A ccording to som e philosophers, then, engagem ent w ith aesthetic form s and 
processes create opportunities for viewers, as individuals, to understand m ore about 
ourselves and others as w e "feel into" the experiences o f others. T hese 'others' include the
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artist w hose work we might be view ing, as theorized by Crowther, or the characters within 
a play we are seeing or a novel we are reading, as theorized by Aristotle and Nussbaum.
In either case, our insight into these others enhances our capacities as moral agents in the 
world. Engagement with the aesthetic enhances our perceptual capacities and refines 
em otions, allowing us to understand both ourselves and others more clearly. This clarity 
o f perception-especially  perceptions about our own vulnerability and our interdependence 
with others--can lead to moral action.
Responding to Fem inist Critiques o f 'D isinterestedness'
It is striking, and at first surprising, especially in light of the positive moral 
consequences many moral philosophers attach to it, that contemporary critics of aesthetic 
theory have targeted 'disinterestedness' as an especially dangerous and offensive concept. 
The fem inist aesthetic theorist Hilde Hein (1993) writes that the "disinterestedness thesis" 
entails "somatophobic and m ysogynist" biases, and that feminists "have a special mission 
to expose" it (p. 12). According to  several contributors to the recent anthology Aesthetics 
in Fem inist Perspective, the notion o f  'disinterestedness' is suspect because it "obliterates 
distinctions among perceivers" (K ornm eyer, 1993, p. viii).
Part of the fem inist critique o f  'disinterestedness,' then, is that it represents an 
ethnocentric bias because it rules out the expressive forms and patterns of response of 
m any o f the world's cultures. It com pletely excludes the utilitarian and em bodied 
expressive forms typical o f tribal cultures, such as those described in Chapters 8 and 9. 
This criticism  is important: m uch harm  has been done to the non-W estern people because 
o f the arrogance of colonizers; their dism issal o f indigenous cultural form s has been bound 
up in patterns o f domination and oppression and have contributed to enorm ous cultural 
degradation and hum an suffering.
The conception o f  the aesthetic dom ain proposed in the previous chapter addresses 
this particular concern. I propose there that what distinguishes an experience as aesthetic is 
the reciprocity between the subject and the object, not any particular pattern of response.
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By m aking this reciprocity definitive of the aesthetic, we give equal weight to  the 
expressive form s and patterns o f response o f  every culture.
In addition to concerns about ethnocentrism , however, feminists raise other 
reservations about the ethical implications o f  a disinterested stance in and of itself. 
'D isinterestedness,' they argue, removes from aesthetic attention concern for social and 
moral values as well as truthfulness (Keller, 1993; K ornm eyer 1993) and, m ost 
problem atical, is linked to the segregation o f the aesthetic from  everyday, or lived, life 
(Donovan, 1993; Hein, 1993; Lauter, 1993; W alker, 1974). Josephine D onovan (1993) 
argues that the entire W estern conception of art is "dominative," because it views art as 
"material that has been extracted from the real world" (p. 53) to be governed by apolitical 
aesthetic laws that are im posed upon it as the artist endow s it w ith form. Drawing on W oolf 
(1985), Adorno (1980, 1984), and W alker (1974, 1975), D onovan calls for an aesthetic 
em bedded in the everyday, that is infused with personal and local history. A s we 
elaborated in Chapter 8, Estelle Lauter (1993) argues for a fem inist theory in which 
"aesthetic value arises in relationship to moral and cognitive values," and the status o f  art 
"depends on its effectiveness in making life sensible to an audience for which it is produced 
or by w hich it is received" (p. 31).
In contrast w ith N ussbaum  and M urdoch, w ho link the aesthetic with m orality 
precisely by virtue o f  the 'disinterestedness' of aesthetic response, K orsm eyer (1993),
Hein (1993), and other feminists (who wish for a conception o f  the aesthetic in which 
moral values play a strong part) eschew  'disinterestedness' as 'dom inative.' H ow  are we 
to m ake sense o f the disparity in assessments of the ethical significance o f this concept?
The fem inist criticism  of disinterestedness is based, in part, on the m eaning o f  the 
concept that arose in the form alist philosophy o f art. Form alism  prom otes a strict 
segregation between art and life and privileges a elitist contexts for aesthetic experience. It 
is true that advocates of the form alist, art-for-art's-sake, philosophy did find support for 
their view in a particular interpretation of disinterestedness; nevertheless, as it is clear from
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N ussbaum 's and M urdoch's work, inteipretations o f disinterestedness are not lim ited to the 
formalist view. They describe one o f  the many paradoxes o f aesthetic experience as it has 
evolved in literate cultures: it is, in fact, precisely by virtue of their autotelic nature, i.e., 
their being appreciated as ends in themselves, that works o f art and scenes o f beauty have 
been understood to serve ends beyond themselves, namely the moral developm ent of their 
hum an beholders.
A lthough the notion of 'disinterestedness' has been used in support o f  aesthetic 
theories that are elitist, and although it is linked to Kant, whose theory is tainted by 
misogyny, I do not think that the concept itself is without merit, both descriptively, as a 
defining dim ension o f som e kinds o f  aesthetic experience, and also norm atively, as a 
description o f a quality of attention with positive moral value. Critics o f Kantian-derived 
W estern aesthetics may be correct in doubting that human beings are able totally to separate 
our perceptions from  our political and personal interests. The very constructs through 
which we m ake m eaning o f our sensory impressions are saturated w ith ideology and 
cultural beliefs and values. Yet the fact that our capacities to perceive in a disinterested 
fashion may be lim ited does not lead to the conclusion that we are unable to extend them  to 
a useful degree,
T o the extent that engagem ent with works of art can engender within perceivers 
critical self-aw areness, respect for differences and feelings of em pathy, (as suggested 
earlier in this chapter), aesthetic experience may facilitate knowledge o f person's o f other 
cultures better than other kinds of exchange. Encounters m ediated through aesthetic forms 
and processes help us learn m ore than information about the circum stances o f  another's 
life. W e can apprehend their sensibilities, made intersubjectively accessible to us through 
the m edium  o f the w ork o f art.
Nevertheless, there is m erit in the feminist argument that there are many 
circum stances in w hich adopting a disinterested stance could be dangerous to the perceiver, 
especially w hen she is in a less powerful position. It m ight be argued, for instance, that the
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very energy consumed to perceive openly a narrative or a drama that expresses an 
oppressor's point o f view can interfere w ith an oppressed group's capacity for effective 
action on its own behalf. However, it is hard to imagine a political struggle in which the 
capacity to understand deeply and perceive clearly w ould be a liability. Furthermore, there 
is epistemological and ethical value in expanding our capacity to perceive in a disinterested 
way, so that we are free to choose to do so when we wish. In overtly politicized contexts, 
this ability may be important for those on both sides of a  power divide who wish to relate 
respectfully across differences. Given the com plexities o f power relations that inscribe 
virtually every political struggle—for instance w om en who form coalitions to confront 
sexist bias m ust still confront inequities am ong themselves based on class, race, and sexual 
orientation, etc. - I  think it is difficult to defend the notion that expanding our capacity to 
see som ething for its own sake, separate from  our interests, is necessarily and inherently 
m isogynist. Understanding the felt experience o f a m ore powerful adversary can help 
those representing disenfranchised groups to negotiate m ore effectively.
O ne of the most im portant concerns raised by the feminist critique of 
'disinterestedness' refers to characterizations o f  the attitude and response evoked by 
beautiful objects and events—i.e., objects and events that we could perceive in terms of 
their form al qualities-that are nevertheless a part o f  every day life. Does 
'disinterestedness' apply with equal appropriateness to the attitude evoked in us by 
paintings in a m useum and plays in a theater, on the one hand, and by quilts on our beds, 
and the lighting of Sabbath candles or preparation o f the feast m arking the end of Ramadan, 
on the other? Understanding the im plications o f 'disinterestedness' in relation to 
expressions o f "vernacular aesthetics" is im portant, because, whether due to the constraints 
o f  stereotyped gender roles o r by choice, it is through the creation and appreciation of 
ephem eral forms such as gardens and meals, that wom en have often found aesthetic 
pleasure and expressed themselves artistically.
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Let us consider closely the question o f w hether including 'disinterestedness' in our 
conception o f  the aesthetic domain eliminates or minimizes the significance o f  formalized 
expression within the domestic sphere. Form alist theories of art have used the criterion o f 
'disinterestedness' to privilege aesthetic experiences that are segregated from  every day life, 
asserting that the viewing of artwork in a museum, for instance, is optimal for aesthetic 
response. Is the segregation o f  the aesthetic from every day life necessarily implied by the 
notion o f'd isin terestedness,' as some fem inists claim  (Hein, 1993, p. 12; K neller, 1993, 
p. 181; K orsm eyer, 1993, p. viii; Lauter, 1993, p. 28; Lorraine, 1993, p. 44)? W e can 
approach this question by considering different responses to an object such as a beautiful 
qu ilt-p erh ap s the quilt described in Alice W alker's often-quoted story, "Everyday Use."
In keeping with the formalist paradigm , we m ight wish to remove the quilt from its every 
day use, hang it on a wall, or perhaps even find a  venue for it in a m useum  o f fabric art or 
folk art. (In the story, this was the intention of the older daughter who returned to her rural 
family hom e after a her "education" in an urban university.) B ut suppose, like the m other 
in W alker's story, we decide that the quilt w as made for every day use, and keep it at 
home, in  use as a quilt. W e can im agine a range of responses to the quilt. On som e days, 
we m ight barely notice it as we m ove through the busy routines of life. O ur engagem ent 
with it m ight be more bodily and less conscious, similar in som e ways to the engagem ent 
of the Y ekuana people with their painted baskets. B ut on other days, there m ight be 
m om ents where we focus our attention on the quilt separate from  its usefulness, noticing 
the colors and shapes, the consistency o f  the stitches, the repetition o f patterns in different 
scale. As w e focus our attention on  the formal features o f  the quilt, we m ight notice the 
w ay its rough and sm ooth textures seem  to echo the qualities o f our em otions. O r w e 
m ight rem em ber the grandm other who m ade it, and w onder about her intentions. W e 
m ight pause to reflect on the rhythms o f  our daily life, and the pressures that m ake it 
difficult to notice the beauty o f  the quilt, and reaffirm  our appreciation o f the quilt's grace.
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An object or event can be part of every day life and still occasion attitudes o f 
disinterestedness. M eals are a part o f  every day life; when we eat foods we incorporate 
material into our bodies for the sake of our nourishm ent and pleasure. It is possible, 
however, to pause to appreciate the colors, textures and placement o f  foods; to step back 
for a moment from the utilitarian purpose of the food, allowing an appreciation o f beauty, a 
quality o f reverence, to inform daily life. We sometimes wonder at the excellence of a 
utensil's form in relation to its purpose, and at the human capacity to create such exem plary 
objects. W e might experience what some aesthetic theorists refer to as ’alethia,' o r the 
"wonderous apprehension o f thinghood," when the forms o f objects capture our attention, 
engaging our senses as well as our rational faculties (Crowther, 1993a, p. 44). Som etim es 
objects o f everyday use are em bellished with colors and textures beyond the requirem ents 
of their use. In these instances, according to M orawski, when an object's structure is 
"rendered conspicuous, it acquires an autotelic function" (M orawski, 1974, p. 106). In a 
book-length study of ornam entation, the Islamic art historian Oleg G rabar (1992) argues 
that our experience of everyday objects can be modified through the emotions or stances 
evoked in us by the repeated patterns of ornamental designs. The forms used to em bellish 
objects—including shapes o f  letters, architectural structures, geometrical designs and 
elements of na tu re-serve  as "intermediaries." They evoke non-utilitarian responses, such 
as feelings associated w ith of forcefulness, order, boundedness and vitality, that becom e 
attached to the utilitarian function o f  the object itself (Grabar, 1992, p. 230).
From  all these exam ples, it becom es clear that whereas formalists may have linked 
the attitude o f  disinterestedness w ith the segregation o f  the aesthetic from the every day, 
this separation is not inherent in the concept. In itself, then, 'disinterestedness' is does not 
require segregation o f the object of attention from  everyday life. As long as it is not 
understood to be definitive of all aesthetic experience, I do not think that it is an inherently 
dominative concept, either.
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In defending the ethical possibilities inherent in a response o f disinterestedness, I 
do not intend to argue that it is a better or more moral mode o f aesthetic response that other 
kinds of aesthetic reaction. Each m ode of aesthetic response contains both possibilities and 
risks. 'D isinterestedness of response' describes one kind o f aesthetic engagem ent that has 
particular value for the individual moral agent who m ust not only participate in, but also be 
able to criticize, the symbol systems of her own community. This idea is developed in the 
next chapter, where we consider the most important contributions of the aesthetic dom ain to 
the w ork o f reconciliation.
Intersubjective and Collective Aesthetic Experience and the Sensibilities o f The Other
To this point, we have considered the ethical possibilities associated with the 
aesthetic as it has been dem arcated in W estern philosophical literature. These theories refer 
to moral possibilities inherent in engagem ent with artistic forms such as the novel and 
tragedic dram a, because of the kinds o f attention and perception such forms invite. The 
conception of the aesthetic dom ain I proposed in Chapter 10 is not lim ited to 
disinterestedness and non-utilitarian resp o n ses-b u t it does include them. For this reason, I 
have responded to criticism  o f disinterestedness, not just as definitive of the aesthetic, but 
as inherently dominative. I have argued that disinterestedness does not necessarily rule out 
an aesthetic dim ension to everyday life, and that it can be a useful capacity, even for those 
who may be in subordinate positions.
Several feminist critics o f  W estern aesthetic theory cited above argue, in part, that 
(even if desirable) it may not be possible for individual persons to shed their subjectivities 
to understand how other persons—especially those who belong to different social g ro u p s- 
experience the world. It is in addressing this difficulty that I believe the aesthetic d o m a in - 
understood as the experience of collectivities and o f  individuals in intersubjective 
relationships w ith their ow n groups-finds a portion o f its epistem ological and ethical 
prom ise.
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Crow ther and other W estern aesthetic theorists claim that as individual artists work 
in a m edium not just their ideas but their embodied sensibilities are incorporated into the 
work, thereby becom ing intersubjectively accessible to the public. As it has becom e clear, 
however, from  our brief consideration o f the aesthetic theories form Japan and India, artists 
also carry w ithin them, to greater and lesser degrees, the sensibilities o f their cultures. In 
many cases, then, when attending to  the expressions of a group of artists o f different eras 
or cultures or genders, I may be able to discern not only the individuals' idiosyncratic 
sensibilities, but also the sensibilities o f  their groups. In the case o f art forms that include a 
narrative elem ent, we may be able to discern the sense of shared m orality that binds a group 
together. M any different form s-including both spatial and tem poral a rts -m ig h t give us a 
feelingful awareness o f the sensibilities of a collectivity, including, as Bourdieu (1993) 
suggested, their shared sense o f hum or, sense o f the absurd, sense of the sacred, sense o f 
responsibility, etc.
If  w e engage w ith these works o f art with the qualities of reciprocity that 
characterize an aesthetic transaction (as opposed to analyze them) then we can enter into 
relation with a m anifestation o f another culture with all o f the qualities that are, by 
definition, part o f  the aesthetic dom ain—the respect associated w ith the reciprocity o f the 
subject and the object, the feelingful awareness associated with the integration o f  the 
sensuous and the rational, the enlivening of the perceptual and cognitive capacities 
associated w ith aesthetic experience in general.
W e can becom e aware of the sensibilities (and in some cases the history and 
culture) of a collectivity not only by engaging with the expressive form s o f individual 
artists intersubjectively bound to a particular group, but also by  attending to the folk art 
produced by a collectivity. In the case of perform ed folk expression—folk songs and 
dances, for instance—our aw areness can be experienced bodily, as we feel in our m uscles 
the tensions of m usical cadences and the rhythmic intricacies o f a pattern o f  steps.
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None o f these kinds o f aesthetic engagem ent will afford us 'perfect' know ledge of
the other, as if  we ourselves could experience the w orld exactly as they do. Still,
understanding by way o f  aesthetic engagem ent-read ing  the corpus o f  its literature, or
learning to perform its m usic-has the potential to lead to understanding qualitatively richer
than understanding by way of philosophical or political texts alone. Aesthetic forms and
processes give us access not just to inform ation about a group, bu t to the sensibilities o f a
group. W e can begin to imagine how  it feels to be a part o f the other group, how the world
appears and is experienced.
Collectivities, too, not just individual perceivers, may be able to understand
som ething of other collectivities by engaging with their expressive forms. This is the view
o f Susanne Langer (1953), an aesthetic theorist who placed little em phasis on the
com m unicative importance o f works of art. Nevertheless, she believed that the sensibilities
em bodied in works of art can prom ote understanding between and am ong collectivities.
"W orks o f  art," she writes, can:
"make a report" of one age o r nation to the people o f  another. No historical 
record could tell us in a thousand pages as m uch about the Egyptian mind as 
one visit to a representative exhibit o f Egyptian art. W hat would the European 
know o f Chinese culture, w ith its vast reach into the past, if Chinese feeling 
had not been articulated in sculpture and painting? W hat would w e know o f 
Israel without its great literary w ork -qu ite  apart from its factual record? O r of 
our own past, w ithout m ediaeval art? In this sense, art is a com m unication, 
but it is not personal, nor anxious to be understood (Langer, 1953, p. 410).
Ritual Form s as an Alternative to Violence 
Ritual forms can be used to construct and substantiate social realities, a 
phenom enon imbued with enorm ous ethical risk and possibility. In the hands of despotic 
leaders and bigots, ritual enactm ents-such  as the cross-burnings of the Klan or mass rallies 
held in support of H itle r-can  play on fears so com pellingly and can be so consum ing that 
they appear to override individual moral reasoning. O n the other hand, rituals can give 
im agined human constructions-such  as a  peace treaty signed in the m idst of w a r-a n  aura 
o f reality until such time as the im agined forms are realized in the artifacts of political, 
econom ic, and cultural production.
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According to both Eric Gans and Barbara Ehrenreich, human beings are the only
species for w hom  the greatest threat to survival is intraspecies violence (Gans, 1993, p.2;
Ehrenreich, 1997). A  large body o f theory addresses the relationship o f ritual to managing
this dangerous species trait.
V ictor Turner (1974), for instance, argues that rituals can play a critical role in the
redressive phases of social dramas, "disharmonic" or "crisis" situations that ultimately lead
to transform ation and human cultural growth. He writes that:
Social dram as.... [t]ypically... have four m ain phases o f public action... These 
are 1 .Breach  of regular, norm -governed social relations...2 .Crisis during 
which there is a tendency for the breach to w iden...Each public crisis has 
what I now call liminal characteristics, since it is a threshold between more or 
less stable phases of the social process, but it is not a sacred limen, hedged 
around by taboos and thrust away from the centers o f public life. O n the 
contrary, it takes up its menacing stance in the forum  itself and, as it were, 
dares the representatives o f  order to grapple w ith it...3.Redressive action  
[ranging] from personal advice and informal mediation or arbitration to formal 
juridical and legal machinery, and, to resolve certain kinds of crisis or 
legitimate other modes of resolution, to the perform ance o f public 
ritual...R edress, too, has its lim inal features, its being ’betw ixt and between,' 
and, as such, furnishes a distanced replication and critique of the events 
leading up to and com posing the 'crisis.' This replication may be in the 
rational idiom  o f a judicial process, or in the metaphorical and symbolic idiom 
o f a ritual process....4. The final phase...consists either o f the reintegration  
o f the disturbed social group or of the social recognition and legitimization o f 
irreparable schism  betw een contesting parties (Turner, 1974, pp. 34-41).
Richard Schechner, extending the work of V ictor Turner, and integrating insights
from  Rene Girard, claim s in fact that ritual finds its raison d'etre in the sublimation of
violent impulses. Citing rituals as diverse as American sporting events and tribal initiation
and exorcism  rites, he proposes that violence, sexuality, theater and ritual converge.
Displaying if  not celebrating violence o f  a sexual kind is a chief intercultural 
characteristic of theater and ritual. Such perform ances suggest that all 
violence is sexual and experienced as dangerous, crying for som e m eans of 
control....[Rene] Girard believes (and I agree) that ritual sublim ates violence:
"The function o f ritual is to 'purify' violence; that is to 'trick' violence into 
spending itself on victim s whose death will provoke no reprisals" (Schechner, 
1993, p. 303).
The relationship of theater to ritual is complex and multifaceted, and cannot be 
explored adequately in this context. Richard Schechner (1977) suggests, however, that "it 
is at the level o f  performance that aesthetic and social dram a converge. The function of
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aesthetic dram a is to do for the consciousness of the audience what social dram a does for 
its participants: to provide a  place for, and a m eans of, transformation" (p. 124).
H istorically and cross-culturally, rituals have played a role in helping com m unities 
both resolve conflicts non-violently and reflect on violent impulses and the likely 
consequences of retaliatory exchanges. Perhaps they serve to interrupt the addictive nature 
o f violence, noted by Sissella B ok and Sim one W eil, in Chapter 6. Elaine Scarry 's 
theories suggest that rituals could play an even more important role in reducing violence in 
the future.
W e recall that Scarry argues that the human body is used in political conflict not just 
instrumentally, to staff outposts, injure enemies, and claim  land. The b o d y -in  particular 
the injured bodv—functions also as a  sign. The felt attributes o f  p a in -its  certainty, its 
compelling vibrancy, its incontestable reality, Scarry (1985) writes, can "be lifted into the 
visible world" and attached to beliefs or constructs that lack substantiation (p. 13). In war, 
in which two or more com pleting fictions seek to legitimate themselves and delegitim ate 
others, what m akes the outcom e abiding, according to Scarry, is this quality o f hum an 
injury. The incontestable realness o f  the pain of the wounded bodies is appropriated to the 
victor.
Large scale patterns of hum an social organization cannot remain fixed. A s in any 
organic or dynam ic process, the fram ing pattern m ust shift or the organism  will die. As a 
human com m unity, w e have recognized only a few non-violent processes through which 
the boundaries o f em pires and nation-states can be either transform ed or substantiated.
However, as we could see at a small scale in the exorcism  rituals o f Sri Lanka, 
described by Bruce K apferer (1986), it is through the formal features o f m usic, dance and 
their dram atic elements, that rituals can construct social realities for their participants. In 
the liminal spaces of collective rituals-som etim es recreated, elaborated and intentionally 
lengthened in the w orkshop space o f  theater rehearsal-new  social arrangem ents can
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em erge, as groups can see and reflect on the current configuration and experim ent with 
others.
Form er adversaries can construct new rituals, through which they can com e to 
understand each other and reflect their understanding back to each other. W e recall from 
the previous section o f the dissertation, for instance, B jorn Krondorfer's (1995) 
reconciliation work with young Am erican Jews and non-Jew ish Germ ans, whose sessions 
together culm inated with a visit to Auschwitz. There, through rehearsal, perform ance and 
ritual, they were able to imagine, enact and substantiate their reconciliation.
I believe that it is in these small-scale examples that we can discern, in nascent 
form, the most significant ethical possibilities of the collective aesthetic domain. Rituals are 
com prised of compelling, em bodied interaction. They offer possibilities for the m ulti­
m odal sensory stimulation and the intensity that human collectivities apparently need to 
create and substantiate new fictions, new creations, new hum an-constructed overarching 
fram eworks. W e need to discover how to construct them  to m ove enough people as 
viscerally, and to transform  us as profoundly, as does the feel, the sight and the m em ory o f  
the w ounded body.
Aesthetic Engagem ent and the Non-Conscious
Aesthetic forms of expression-both  those o f individuals and collectiv ities-can , by 
virtue o f their integration o f the sensuous with the rational, reveal inform ation and 
sensibilities that were previously held outside of or beneath conscious awareness.
Aesthetic engagem ent can allow that which was non-conscious to becom e available for 
conscious reflection—we becom e aware o f ideas, perceptions, feelings, intuitions, etc., that 
previously were not articulated, and in some cases were ineffable (unable to be articulated 
in language). This is particularly important in the case of traum a victims who may be able 
to ex p ress-an d  therefore heal-m em ories that have been suppressed to conscious memory 
and/or linguistic recall.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
274
It is by bringing underlying and unspoken social dynam ics into conscious 
aw areness that rituals, for instance, can promote the kind of collective reflexivity and 
innovation that V ictor Turner emphasized, as we noted in the previous chapter. In 
individual artistic creation, the tangible expression o f the im agination's pre-conceptual 
schem ata in perceivable forms also can make non-conscious apprehensions available to 
awareness. This aspect of aesthetic creativity gives art is innovative character: rather than 
im posing pre-form ed concepts and constructs that are already available to the conscious 
m ind, the individual and collective imagination patterns the w orld of sensation through new 
schem atic configurations.
A ccording to Gregory Bateson (1972), an anthropologist w ho specialized in 
cybernetic theory, the expression and apprehension of non-conscious m aterial—referred to 
variously as inform ation, or knowledge, or w isdom -has im portant related epistem ic and 
ethical dim ensions. He argues that hum an beings develop in part by transform ing that 
w hich they first learn consciously into habitual or non-conscious "knowledge." In fact, 
those actions and values that we know best are thos.e w e learn "by heart."
The ability to act out of habit, to function from levels of our being deeper than 
consciousness, is, according to Bateson, adaptive. An individual organism  could not 
m anage to  be conscious simultaneously o f all that is needed for survival. Conscious 
aw areness, then, represents only a narrow slice o f all the inform ation an organism  m ust 
utilize.
A m ong the "knowledge" held in the non-conscious realms o f human beings is the 
inform ation required for the survival of the group. Evolution and processes select for the 
capacity to internalize these patterns.
B ateson theorizes that the knowledge necessary for species survival m ay, in fact, be 
relatively inaccessible to conscious awareness through the channels o f rational discourse. 
"M ere purposive rationality," writes Bateson (1972),
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unaided by such phenom ena as art, religion, dream and the like, is necessarily
pathogenic and destructive o f  life [I]ts virulence springs specifically from
the circum stance that life depends on interlocking circuits of contingency, 
while consciousness can see only such short arcs of such circuits as hum an 
purpose may direct (p. 146).
Bateson defines "wisdom" in cybernetic term s, as knowledge required for the survival of
the system  as a whole. In contrast to conscious purposefulness and individual intention,
Bateson argues that decisions about questions pertaining to peace and war should be made
through processes that access the "wisdom" o f the unconscious: processes such as art,
rituals and analysis of dream s. "Love can survive," he writes, "only if w isdom  has an
effective voice" (Bateson, 1972, p. 147).
Risks Associated with the Aesthetic Domain 
Philosophers o f many eras and cultures have theorized not only about the related 
ethical and epistemological promise o f the aesthetic domain, they have also had much to say 
about its risks. In banishing poets from  his Republic, Plato warned that the pleasures o f  art 
w ould seduce citizens away from  rational reflection. In the contemporary context, as we 
have seen, many post-m odernist and feminist thinkers argue that entire notion of an 
aesthetic dom ain is inherently 'dom inative' (Donovan, 1993, p. 53)
The conception of the aesthetic dom ain proposed in the previous chapter, 
accounting as it does for historically and culturally distinct aesthetic sensibilities, addresses 
m any im portant concerns about the ethnocentric bias o f 'the aesthetic' as it has been 
theorized within W estern philosophical traditions and enacted by the elite art w orld. It 
incorporates the W estern philosophical aesthetic conception as one o f many, w ithout 
assum ing that it is either universally applicable or paradigmatic.
The aesthetic theory proposed here does not, however, dem arcate a dom ain that is 
free from  political and ethical dangers. Aesthetic pleasures can, and have been, used to 
indoctrinate and to manipulate, just as Plato feared. They can also distract attention from 
injustice and other problem s requiring political remedies. In fact, elite art institutions are 
often organized to protect and advance the interests of the privileged. Aesthetic forms and
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processes—both individual and collective—have been used in the service o f evil regimes, 
and to soothe the conscience o f perpetrators o f crimes. Ritual forms can have the effect of 
perpetuating ethnocentric loyalties, often accom panied by the irrational hatred o f outsiders.
Aesthetic representations o f w ar and other form s of suffering present a particular 
moral dilemma. On the one hand, the very pleasures associated w ith a particular form—the 
novel, the play, the p o em -can  support us to attend to difficult but necessary content. On 
the other hand, as is argued persuasively by Law rence Langer (1995), critic of literary and 
other artistic representations of the Holocaust, artistic conventions can themselves 
"sweeten" the legacy of atrocities, obfuscating the very history such works appear to 
m em orialize. Attending to such a version of an unspeakably horrible era o f hum an history 
can delude us into feeling as if we have engaged in the moral w ork o f bearing witness 
while actually buffering us from grappling with the moral problems inherent in the atrocity 
it purports to represent. (Langer, 1995) This is but one exam ple o f how the forms o f 
expressions can them selves, by the force o f convention, distort w hat is understood and 
represented according to tradition and their own imperatives.
The interface and interplay between and among the aesthetic form s of different 
cultures present another set o f  risks. One danger—the appropriation o f cultural expressions 
into the form s and meanings of a dom inant culture—was illustrated in Chapter 8, in the 
G uggenheim  M useum 's display o f  traditional A kan paperweights. (It is no coincidence 
that m useum s arose simultaneously w ith m odem  nation states, both to consolidate and 
am plify national culture and to flaunt the bounty from colonial conquests. Political and 
econom ic inequities create contexts for unwanted appropriation and inadequate sensitivity— 
dynam ics that have become apparent in recent efforts o f Native A m erican tribes to reclaim 
from  m ainstream  museums cultural artifacts and ancestral remains.)
The risks briefly mentioned here m erely suggest the moral dangers inherent in the 
aesthetic dom ain in general, and, in particular, in cross-cultural engagem ent with 
expressive forms. It is a topic that w arrants m ore attention. N evertheless, throughout
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most o f this chapter I have chosen to focus on theories about the ethical and epistem ological 
possibilities inherent in the aesthetic domain. My rationale for doing so arises from  the 
purpose of the dissertation as a whole. I do not seek to dem onstrate that aesthetic forms 
and processes inevitably result in sensibilities or understandings that are useful to the work 
of reconciliation. M y purposes rather is to argue that inherent in aesthetic forms and 
processes are ethical and epistem ological possibilities that can be crafted to further the 
work o f reconciliation. Part o f "the crafting" of the form and the related processes include 
minimizing the ethical risks.
In the next section of the dissertation, I discuss the uses o f aesthetic form s and 
processes in the w ork of reconciliation. I include examples of ethical dilem m as and how 
they can be addressed.
In this chapter, we have culminated our analysis o f the aesthetic domain by 
considering som e of the ethical possibilities and risks inherent in its forms and processes. 
First, w e considered three related ethical and epistemic possibilities related to  the W estern 
philosophical notion o f disinterestedness: respect for others, self-aw areness, and em pathy. 
Then we responded to  concerns raised by feminist theorists that disinterestedness in itself is 
inherently dominative.
The next sections o f the chapter considered the ethical possibilities inherent in 
aesthetic forms and processes as these are understood to be qualities o f collective and 
intersubjective experience. W e argued that the respect, self-awareness and em pathic 
understanding o f others associated w ith disinterestedness can also be used to m ediate 
individual's understanding of o ther cultures.
Then, we considered the im portant possibility that ritual may afford human 
com m unities non-violent means o f  substantiating new overarching social fram ew orks. W e 
may discover ways to make em bodied participation in rituals as com pelling and vivid as the 
w ounding o f  human bodies in contexts of injuring known as war—still the prevailing means 
through which w e decide and substantiate changes in overarching political fram ew orks.
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In the last several sections o f this chapter, the discussion of risk and possibilities 
inherent in the aesthetic domain has shifted close to the question that frames the dissertation 
as a whole: W hat are the distinctive contributions that aesthetic forms and processes can 
make to the educational w ork o f reconciliation? In the chapters that follow, I integrate the 
analysis o f  the related epistemological and ethical challenges of reconciliation with the 
epistem ological and ethical possibilities inherent in the aesthetic domain. There, I will 
dem onstrate not only why aesthetic form s and processes are particularly useful for such 
work, but offer exam ples o f how the they have been and m ight in the future be used.
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CHAPTER 12
TH E CONTRIBUTIONS O F TH E AESTHETIC DOM AIN 
TO THE W O RK  OF RECONCILIATION
Integrating 'Reconciliation' with 'The Aesthetic:' An Overview o f Section Three 
Aesthetic forms and processes—including the aesthetic transactions o f both persons 
and coilectivities--are uniquely well-suited to accomplish the educational tasks, and to meet 
the educational challenges, inherent in the work o f reconciliation. Before I began the 
present inquiry, I believed this to be the case, based on m y experiences as a community 
oral historian, folklorist and cultural worker. I had witnessed artistic renderings of oral 
narrative reach diverse audiences beneath the categories and stereotypes em bedded in the 
discourses o f their respective communities. I had also experienced a loosening of 
stereotypic rigidities in m y own perceptions of "others"—when, fo r instance, I read novels 
by African-Am erican women or fingered the em broidered fabrics belonging to Palestinian 
friends and colleagues.
Now, having analyzed the educational tasks and challenges inherent in the work of 
reconciliation, and having constructed a conception o f the aesthetic that includes both 
individual and collective experience, I am in a better position to articulate why aesthetic 
form s and processes can be such important tools in the work o f  peace-m aking. This section 
o f the dissertation is devoted to that task.
In arguing that the aesthetic domain is uniquely w ell-suited to the educational tasks 
and challenges inherent in the work of reconciliation, I do not intend to imply that other 
forms o f exchange—such as political debate, philosophical argum entation, or even business 
partnerships and athletic com petitions—are ineffective or unnecessary. In som e cases, the 
arts are useful precisely because they create contexts for and engender exactly these sorts of
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conversations and debate when they otherwise might not have occurred. Som e aspects of 
reconciliation-the negotiation o f  boundaries, for instance, or the articulation o f  policy 
agreem ents-require  the precision o f legal discourse. Philosophical inqu iry -in to  
conceptions o f justice, for example, or the implications of invoking individual or collective 
notions o f equal rights—may help adversaries choose among possible resolutions to  their 
dispute.
Reconciliation is extremely difficult to accomplish; it is the highest ethical standard 
to which those involved in the resolution of conflicts can aspire. It m akes sense to seek 
resources for such a difficult task in all o f  the non-coercive communicative and interpretive 
capacities available to hum an beings. Hopefully, understanding the relationships between, 
on the one hand, the educational tasks and challenges inherent in reconciliation, and, on the 
other, the educative potential o f the aesthetic domain will allow educators, artists and 
practitioners o f conflict resolution (and related scholars, activists and policy m akers) to 
m ake better use o f cultural and artistic resources in the practical and theoretical work 
associated w ith peacem aking.
In the present chapter, I explicate the conceptual connections between those features 
that are definitive of the aesthetic dom ain with the educational requirements o f  
reconciliation. Then, in the following two chapters, drawing on my ow n experiences as a 
com m unity oral historian/folklorist and as a co-existence facilitator, I will give exam ples o f 
how, in practice, the resources o f the aesthetic can be brought to  bear on peacem aking 
efforts. In C hapter 13, several b rief examples illustrate how aesthetic form s and processes 
can be used (1) to restore the capacities needed for the work o f reconciliation; and (2) to 
help adversaries im agine and substantiate a future relationship characterized by trust and 
respect. In C hapter 1 4 ,1 conclude the dissertation w ith an extended exam ple o f an 
aesthetic mediation o f  a conflict, illustrating how narrative, poetic and folk art forms can be 
interwoven to cultivate attitudes of reverence and respect as adversaries learn about their 
ow n and each others' history and culture.
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To begin making the conceptual links between reconciliation and the aesthetic 
dom ain, I will review the educational tasks and challenges inherent in reconciliation, as we 
cam e to understand them  in Chapters 2 through 6.
The Educational Tasks and Challenges Inherent in Reconciliation 
In Chapter 2, 'reconciliation' was defined in terms o f the creation o f a moral 
relationship between individuals and groups who had becom e morally alienated from each 
other:
Reconciliation refers to the re-creation and/or creation o f  the moral 
fram ework o f a relationship through which individuals and groups overcom e 
alienation by engaging in transform ative processes that in themselves embody 
the norms o f respect and fairness intended for their new relationship.
Through the on-going processes of reconciliation, the parties to 
conflict becom e increasingly trusting and trustworthy as they understand each 
other's suffering, acknow ledge injustices, and strive to address both 
unresolved and emerging conflicts in ways that m eet their underlying needs.
W ith this definition as a guide, we cam e (in Chapter 3) to see that reconciliation 
actually refers to a particular sub-set o f all conflict resolution processes: those that m eet a 
num ber of ethical criteria. These criteria include:
• disputants' understanding of their own and each other's suffering, as experienced and 
interpreted by those who suffer;
• adversaries acknowledging, and w hen possible and appropriate redressing, past 
injustices; and
• enhancing disputants' capacities to trust and be trustworthy, how ever gradual that 
process m ight be.
These three criteria, then, can be translated into three of the m ost im portant 
educational tasks that are necessary to achieve reconciliation: the understanding of 
suffering, the acknowledgm ent o f injustices, and the achievem ent of reciprocal trust and
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trustw orthiness. Furtherm ore, these tasks m ust be accom plished through processes that 
also m eet two additional criteria. The processes of reconciliation must:
• em body the norms o f mutual respect and fairness intended to characterize the 
adversaries' future relationship; and
• recognize participants' integrity as moral agents, and, w hen necessary, restore the 
moral capacities required for the work o f reconciliation.
These two criteria can be understood as meta-level educational tasks inherent in the 
w ork o f  reconciliation. The processes through which disputants' com e to understand 
them selves and each o ther-includ ing  understanding suffering, acknow ledging injustices, 
and becom ing m ore trusting and trustw orthy-m ust in themselves be educative.
Specifically, they must give participants practice in relating respectfully, fairly, and in ways 
that acknow ledge and enhance each other's agency and integrity.
T hese already daunting tasks are made more difficult by virtue o f  the related ethical 
and epistem ological relationships o f disputants (1) with the groups w ith which they 
identify; and (2) w ith their "enemies." We referred to these relationships in terms o f 
"intersubjectivity" and "transsubjectivity" in Chapters 4 and 5. As adversaries begin to 
engage each other with respect-i.e ., as they begin to listen to how others understand their 
ow n circum stances, to grasp the narrative frames others use to m ake sense o f their l iv e s -  
they inevitably confront the lim itations of the system of sym bols, the conceptual 
fram ew orks, through which their own communities have constructed m eanings. In some 
cases, these sym bols and fram eworks previously were accepted tacitly, assum ed to be true 
w ithout question or awareness. In other cases they have been celebrated, even experienced 
as sacred. The need to bring one's own sym bols and conceptual fram ew orks into question 
can often create resistance to hearing, or believing, or giving due w eight to, an adversary's 
story. It can prevent us from  believing they have suffered, or from  feeling their suffering. 
W e m ight, for instance, accuse our enemy o f telling stories ju s t to win sym pathy or to
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accom plish political ends. (That these accusations plausibly might be tru e-an d  in some 
cases are true—only complicates the situation further.)
Furtherm ore, as adversaries becom e aw are~in a  feelingful w ay—o f each other's 
suffering, and as they strive to acknow ledge past hurts and injustices, they m ust confront 
the com plicity of their own people in contributing to the other's suffering and to the unjust 
situation. This often brings people up  against another kind o f resistance: the em otional 
resistances associated with guilt and shame, and with the fear that accom panies awareness 
o f one's own wrong-doing. These feelings are often an im portant source of resistance in 
m embers o f the group with more political and military power. But even a less powerful 
adversary almost always will have inflicted pain on its enemy. Complicity in the very 
suffering that requires one's own feelingful presence represents an enorm ous emotional 
challenge—a challenge that has educational implications as well. In order for disputants to 
understand clearly each other's circum stances, facilitators often m ust create some kind of 
em otional distance and/or enough safety for people to w ork through their shame, guilt and 
fear.
According to psychosocial theories o f  enmity, there is an additional reason for the 
fact that acknowledging the hum anity o f an enemy often can result in resistances to 
learning. In the processes o f  dehum anization and dem onization of an enemy, the negative 
traits attributed to the other are precisely those that are the least desirable traits of one’s own 
group. A s we begin to see a form er enem y more com pletely, therefore—as a person or 
group with both positive and negative traits—we are required to acknowledge a more 
com plete picture o f ourselves and our ow n people as well. This m ore complete view of 
one's se lf can shatter sacred beliefs and m yths that have constructed one's world view. 
People often resist awareness w hen its consequences are so painful.
The em otional and intellectual resistances associated w ith questioning the symbols 
of one's ow n group, acknow ledging one's ow n com plicity in another's suffering, and 
recognizing the m orally questionable dim ensions of one's own people's actions: these are
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am ong the distinct challenges, then, confronting educators and facilitators as they support 
form er adversaries to accomplish the educational tasks inherent in the work of 
reconciliation.
Much o f  the work of reconciliation takes the form o f inquiry. W e seek to 
understand our former adversaries, the dynamics o f  the conflict, the points of possible 
agreem ent. The qualities of presence we bring to this inqu iry -w hether we are open or 
skeptical, w arm  or cool, engaged or detached, anim ated or sluggish, judgm ental or 
com passionate—in themselves can affect our adversaries' capacities to be expressive, to act 
ethically, and ultim ately, therefore, the outcome o f the process. For instance, if  we are able 
to attend in a feelingful way to the suffering o f our form er enem y, we may relieve one o f 
the most aversive aspects of that suffering: the isolation it can create. If w e are able to 
apologize in a feelingful way for the harm inflicted by our own people, we may facilitate 
our form er enemy's ability to forgive. The challenge here is that just at those moments 
when we are trying to be receptive, trying to understand, we are also confronting emotional 
and intellectual resistances. W ithin the constraints o f our habitual discourses, we have 
every reason to be skeptical about the ideas and images we are being asked to engage with 
w arm th, openness, vitality and com passion.
Resolving conflicts in contexts of v io lence-including  both the structural violence of 
oppressive systems and the physical destruction o f life and property -crea tes another 
d ifficult challenge for educators and mediators. As we considered in Chapter 6, the very 
circum stance that gives rise to the need for reconciliation, i.e., violence, can im pair the 
faculties needed by adversaries to resolve conflicts peacefully. Am ong the capacities that, 
to varying degrees, might be impaired, are abilities to listen, to express som e experiences in 
language, to im agine, to trust, to feel, and to think. In m any cases, for reconciliation to be 
possible, such capacities will need to  be restored o r regenerated, on both personal and 
collective levels.
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Elaine Scarry argues that w ar destroys not only the objects created by human 
com m unities, it deconstructs the process o f creating itself. In many cases, to engage in the 
work o f  reconciliation, to believe in the possibility o f  creating a new social order, form er 
enemies need help to restore their belief in the potential benevolence and vitality of human 
creativity. They need not just to learn to trust, but to regain faith in the possibility o f 
trusting.
Although it does not take place in a linear process, reconciliation can be 
conceptualized logically in three stages: (1) the restoration or enhancement of needed 
capacities; (2) learning—about one's enem y and one's self and one's own group as well as 
about this history o f the conflict, as it has been experienced on all sides; and (3) imagining 
and creating the moral fram ew ork for a new relationship, based on respect and trust. W e 
have ju st considered briefly the first two stages. In relation to the third stage, we recall the 
theory of Elaine Scarry (1985), w ho argues that all human creativity consists o f two 
phases: making up and m aking real. In her theory, the "making real" of large scale social 
constructions, such as nation states, has historically been substantiated through the 
wounding o f the hum an body.
A final challenge for reconciliation, then, is how to substan tia te-to  make real and 
believable-the large scale creations such as those that result from and embody 
reconciliation. For obvious reasons, the w ounding of human bodies as a m ode of 
substantiation is inappropriate. H um an com m unities must find other ways of legitim ating 
their invented overarching moral frameworks until they can be made real through political 
docum ents and organizations, and em bodied in and enacted through new patterns o f 
cultural, political and econom ic reciprocity.
The Aesthetic Dom ain and the Educational W ork o f Reconciliation
As conceptualized in Chapter 10, the central and defining quality o f aesthetic 
transactions is the reciprocity between the perceiver and the perceived. This reciprocity 
refers to an alignment between the formal organization o f the elements of the object or event
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being perceived and the perceptual capacities and sensibilities o f  the perceiver. It is made 
possible, in part, by three additional defining features o f the aesthetic domain. They are:
(1) the intensity o f engagem ent with a bounded form; (2) the integration of the sensory with 
the rational; and (3) the mediation o f  tensions-fo r instance between tradition and 
innovation, the individual and the collective, and random ness and rigidity.
These three defining characteristics o f  the aesthetic domain are not different from 
the reciprocity between the perceiver and the perceived; rather they comprise part of the 
substance o f  that reciprocity. In other words, perception becom es pleasurable when we 
attend to a bounded form with intensity and focus; when the rational and the sensuous are 
integrated in one or more o f a variety o f ways; and when the form avoids extrem es along 
several dim ensions. There are wide ranges along these continua--of random ness and 
rigidity, innovation and tradition, individual impulse and collective im perative-w ithin 
which hum an beings will experience perceptual pleasure; and tolerance for the extremes 
varies in the organization o f perceptual apparatus associated w ith different historical and 
cultural contexts. Nevertheless, in all cases, the requirem ents that aesthetic forms and 
processes be attuned to human perceptual capacities and sensibilities in itself exerts a 
pressure towards the m ean along several dim ensions.
Each of the defining qualities o f aesthetic transactions contribute to the domain's 
distinctive usefulness in accomplishing the educational tasks and meeting the educational 
challenges o f reconciliation. W e will consider first the educative value inherent in the 
reciprocity o f  subject with object.
Reciprocity o f Subject and Object
The reciprocity o f aesthetic transactions implies an extension o f oneself towards the 
other party. Em bedded within aesthetic experience is the quality o f  other- 
acknow ledgem ent. A s a perceiver, for instance, when I bring an aesthetic sensibility to a 
story being told by a friend, I enter into a state o f  receptivity, an appreciation o f the m any 
levels on which the words, sentences, im ages and m etaphors convey m eaning, an active
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listening for the patterns of meaning within the elements of the story itself and between the 
narrative and w hat I know o f  my friend's life. As a storyteller, if I shape my narrative with 
an aesthetic sensibility, I would look for opportunities to create pleasing configurations of 
sound, images that are vivid, sym bols that are resonant. B u t-p leasing , vivid and resonant 
to whom ? To the audience, whose sensibilities I know, or imagine, or guess.
The other-acknowledgm ent inherent in aesthetic transactions m ight be intended or 
experienced as a kind o f respect or care; in a sense it is a precursor to, or an ingredient of, 
both. In an aesthetic transaction, the subject does not try to analyze the object o f  perception 
according to pre-existing concepts or categories; nor are the formal qualities o f  the object 
designed to m anipulate or coerce. The formal elements are designed to give p leasu re-and  
in this way, their beauty issues an invitation, as it were. In the case o f folk arts or rituals, 
the forms are consistent w ith the sensibilities o f  the community, and while individuals may 
for m oments be  drawn in, the collectivity itself is afforded opportunities for reflexivity, 
precisely because collective sensibilities are acknowledged (even as they may be 
challenged).
An aesthetic object, by definition, then, is a collaboration between perceiver and 
perceived, in w hich the subject respects the integrity of the object and the object is designed 
with aw areness o f the subject.
To imbue an object or event with the capacity to "respect" its perceiver may at first 
seem  to be m ere anthropom orphizing. As Elaine Scarry (1985) notes, how ever, w e expect 
human-made objects o f  all kinds to reflect within their structure and design awareness of 
hum an proportions and vulnerabilities. As evidence she cites the safety devices on irons 
and furnaces, or child-proof caps on m edicine bottles, as well as an abundance o f personal 
injury case law in w hich inventors o f products are held liable for the harm  caused by the 
"stupidity" o f  their inventions. In Scarry's view, the aw areness of hum an proportions and 
vulnerabilities em bedded in artifacts can be understood to comprise a kind of objectified 
com passion, the beneficial effects o f which am plify the effort expended on their creation.
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A work of art also has embedded within it the sensibilities and intentions of its 
maker. The m eaning o f an artwork's "respect" for its audience can be understood, 
perhaps, by contrasting a work o f  art with an instance o f propaganda. Both art and 
propaganda work by  w ay o f illusion. But, as C row ther (1993b) points out, they differ in 
the extent to which they make the devices o f the illusion available for scrutiny. Propaganda 
tends to hide its devices, to draw us into the illusory world as if it were real. Art, on the 
other hand, simultaneously draws us into the illusion and also directs our attention to the 
sym bol itself, as well as to the processes o f our interpretation. (This tacking back and forth 
o f  attention between symbol and illusion, artistic device and interpretation, as well as our 
m eta-level awareness o f this oscillation, accounts for Bachelard's [1994] notion of 
transsubjective "shimmering.") In an aesthetic transaction, then, while the object is 
designed to draw  perceivers into a world o f  illusion, it m akes the devices o f illusion- 
m aking and illusion-perceiving themselves available for reflection and even scrutiny.
In contrast with propaganda, works o f art m eet standards that parallel two o f R. S. 
Peters' criteria for 'education': nam ely, that learners can gain "know ledge and 
understanding and som e kind of cognitive perspective" and that the processes of 
transm ission respect the "wittingness" o f the learner (Peters, 1966, p. 45). In his view , we 
recall from Chapter 3, processes that m eet the criteria o f  education m ust support learners to 
understand the nature o f evidence that leads to their beliefs, and the processes through 
w hich those beliefs can be criticized and revised. Furtherm ore, learners m ust at least in a 
m inim al way act as "voluntary agents" (Peters, 1966, p. 42).
Sim ilarly, at least on some accounts, works of art (as opposed to propaganda) 
allow  those who perceive them to understand the nature of the sym bols and sym bolizing 
that evoke their response and interpretation. In  this way, works of art respect the 
"wittingness" o f their audiences and allow them  to assess the "evidence" that leads them  to 
certain perceptions.
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W ith these distinctions in mind, then, it seems fair to conclude that the collaboration 
between perceiver and perceived that characterizes aesthetic transactions is one o f reciprocal 
respect.
W hether or not the other-acknowledging reciprocity that defines aesthetic 
transactions is understood as respect, several western moral philosophers, as we saw in 
Chapter 11, link the non-utilitarian and disinterested nature o f aesthetic response with 
respect for the other. W ith slight variations, M urdoch (1985), N ussbaum  (1990, 1995), 
H epburn (1984) and Crow ther (1993a, 1993b) all argue that aesthetic responses engender 
sensibilities that allow us to perceive more clearly-especially to perceive an other 
independent o f  our own interests or will. M urdoch and H epbum  link the clarity of 
perception to K antian notions of respect for others as beings w ith their ow n purposes, as 
ends-in-them selves. The 'wonder' associated w ith aesthetic response is understood to 
have an  affinity w ith affirm ation and respect for "other-being" (H epburn, 1984, p. 145).
In relation to  the educational work of reconciliation, the other-acknow ledging 
quality o f aesthetic reciprocity is important for several reasons. In the context o f recent 
enm ity, where adversaries have been intent on destroying each other, or dim inishing each 
other's capacities for agency and disregarding each other's needs and sensibilities, 
messages that are other-acknowledging in their form (even to the point of giving pleasure) 
in themselves interrupt the disregard and violation definitive o f enmity. And because 
aesthetic form s are accessible to the senses, they communicate this regard for the other in 
ways that m ight overcome the defensive mechanisms em bedded within com m unities' 
everyday discourses and in the skepticism  that often accom panies rational analysis.
A t least some m inim al form  o f respect for the o ther-respect for the other's right to 
exist, to live free o f  fear, to enjoy basic forms of individual and collective self- 
determ ination—is the basis for virtually all forms o f non-violent conflict resolution. For 
those conflict resolution processes that aspire to the ethical standards associated with 
reconciliation, the respect that is sought as an 'end' of the process m ust also be em bedded
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in the means through which the conflict is resolved and the new moral com m unity is 
established. Furthermore, the respect that is required for reconciliation (as opposed to 
more distant kinds of coexistence) is of a quite profound nature. W e respect not only our 
form er adversaries' rights to exist, but also their rights to agency, their capacity for growth 
and transformation, even when these must be preceded by healing and restoration. The 
inherently other-acknowledging quality o f aesthetic form s and processes--the collaboration 
between perceiver and perceived that we might characterize as reciprocal respect—can be 
mobilized to address this meta-level educational task of reconciliation. In the work o f 
reconciliation, members o f each of the adversarial groups are both perceivers and 
perceived, subject and object. If  learning is skillfully mediated through aesthetic forms and 
processes, we might simultaneously experience being respected and being invited to 
respect. As we are learning about each other's suffering, as w e are acknowledging 
injustices, as we learn to trust and be trustw orthy we can do so through processes that are 
respectful and engender the non-utilitarian and other-acknow ledging sensibilities upon 
which respect is based. Interestingly, this capacity to respect the other is linked with 
awareness o f ourselves and the processes through which we interpret sym bols and 
construct meaning.
The Pleasure of Aesthetic Experience
The reciprocity between perceiver and perceived, just assessed in terms o f  its 
relationship w ith 'respect,' is defined also as a source of pleasure. T hat aesthetic 
experience is, in itself, pleasurable has im portant implications for reconciliation.
As noted above, among the greatest educational challenges inherent in reconciliation 
are the em otional resistances to learning caused by the circumstances o f the conflict itself. 
People may be weary of focusing on a war, with its m any losses and all its suffering.
They may, as Scarry suggests, have lost faith in the possible benevolence o f hum an 
creativity or the possibility of hum an trust.
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The vitality of aesthetic creativity, the pleasure to be experienced in aesthetic 
expression and perception can help to overcome these initial resistances. Engaging with the 
arts can enliven perceptual, interpretive and imaginative capacities. It can remind those 
who have been depleted by violence of a zestful way o f engaging with problem s. Energy 
can be m obilized in expression itself, even when what is expressed is filled with sorrow. 
The Integration o f the Sensuous with the Rational
As we discovered in the previous section, aesthetic forms and processes can 
integrate the sensuous with the rational in a variety of different ways. In the aesthetic 
experiences o f  persons, theorized in literate societies, the integration of the sensuous with 
the rational takes place both in the creator and the perceiver, as they use im aginative pre- 
conceptual schemata that have the pattern-generating capacities associated with rational 
thought but that rem ain close to the sensuous apprehension of form s. It is here that the 
creativity and innovation associated with the aesthetic finds its roots. B ecause 'aesthetic 
ideas' can be fee o f  the concepts that are familiar in existing discourses, new configurations 
o f meaning can arise—configurations that might allow us to move beyond stereotypic 
responses em bedded within linguistic codes.
By way o f illustration I offer a small example from  my experience as a coexistence 
facilitator w orking with Israeli and Arab teenagers at the Seeds o f Peace International 
Cam p. A  14-year -old Palestinian boy, when asked to create a visual image representing 
his hopes for the future drew an unlabelled map o f  Israel-Palestine, accom panied by a flag 
that incorporated elem ents from both the Israeli and Palestinian national flags. The cities in 
the land w ere m arked, not by the usual black dots, but by colorful hearts, indicating, he 
said, both people's love for the land. His creative rendering is not, o f course, a political 
solution, but it m ight open hearts and minds to options not yet nam able in the discourses of 
national self-determ ination, security, or even mutual respect.
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Before something can be made real, as Elaine Scarry argues, it m ust first be made 
up. Images that arise from the preconceptual imagination can serve as a source o f new 
ideas, even in the context of apparently intractable conflicts.
A second way in which the sensuous is integrated with the rational relates to the 
focusing o f conscious attention on the im pressions o f  our senses. Sensory impressions 
and the feelings they evoke can be brought into awareness, an awareness infused with 
qualities of feeling. Such feelingful awareness will have many uses in the w ork of 
reconciliation, but it is particularly important, we recall, as a quality of presence to bring to 
our inquiry into the suffering of another. Feelingful awareness of another's suffering can 
prom ote the depth o f contact that removes a degree o f  the aversiveness of such suffering— 
that part of suffering that amplifies itself because of isolation. Feelingful awareness of 
another's suffering might create opportunities for grieving, and therefore for healing and 
transformation. Feelingful awareness o f  a form er enem y's suffering (especially when it is 
achieved in spite of resistances to understanding caused by our own complicity in their 
losses) opens the possibility for m eaningful, heartfelt apology.
The third way in which the sensuous and the rational tire integrated within W estern 
aesthetic theories is in the m etacognitive awareness o f our own processes o f sensing and 
interpreting. In other words not only is my conscious attention focused on the impressions 
and apprehensions o f senses, but I becom e aware o f  m yself as a sensing, feeling, meaning- 
m aking being. The capacity to becom e aware o f  (and on occasion, therefore, to become 
critical of) the sym bol system  of one's own com m unity is the key to addressing the 
educational challenge to reconciliation inherent in the intersubjective ethical and 
epistem ological bonds that link a person to her culture.
How might this feature of aesthetic experience be brought to bear on the educational 
work o f  reconciliation? Here again, an exam ple w ill prove useful. In A Passion fo r  Life, 
Stories and Folk A rts o f  Palestinian W omen, the folk arts and crafts o f two peoples 
engaged in long-standing reciprocal dem onization were exhibited side by side in a small,
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yet professional, com m unity arts gallery. Each artifact was accom panied by the life stoiy 
o f its maker. Em bedded within the artifacts were many symbols through which each group 
m ade sense o f  its own history, and legitim ated its claim  to contested land. For instance, 
Palestinian em broidery included sayings from the Koran along with schem atic 
representations o f the flora and fauna of Palestine. Jewish works included Biblical 
references to the land o f Israel and images of Jews praying in Jerusalem . M etacognitive 
awareness of these com peting symbol systems was invited in three ways: (1) by the mere 
juxtaposition o f two divergent sets o f symbols, each offering a distinct interpretation o f the 
same history and geography; (2) the contemplative and reverential sensibilities cultivated by 
the gallery context itself, which invited receptivity and reflection; and (3) the printed text o f 
relevant portions o f w om en's life stories, used as a kind of extended label, highlighting the 
meaning o f each artifact in for its maker.
It was, o f course, som ewhat paradoxical to exhibit folk art (dresses and amulets, 
cookie presses and family photography, which, like the Akan paperw eights discussed in 
the previous section were clearly m eant to be touched and used) in a traditional gallery 
setting. The exhibition designers com m ented on their own inconsistency by suggesting in 
the center of the gallery a living ro o m -a  soft and quiet place where viewers w ere welcomed 
to sit on pillows, finger fabrics, read and write and to contem plate an im aginary dom icile 
em bellished by the folk arts of two enemies.
Collective aesthetic expressions integrate the sensory with the rational in som ewhat 
different w ay s-th e  integration takes place more in the spatial and temporal form s and on 
the bodies o f participants than in the conscious awareness of a separate perceiver. These 
collective expressions are useful to the educational work o f  reconciliation in at least two 
im portant ways. First, m em bers o f different cultures, including form er adversaries, can 
com e to appreciate each other's skills and sensibilities by engaging w ith their collective 
forms. T hey m ight attend each other's meals and religious rituals, or take special effort to 
appreciate the rhythm s and sensibilities em bodied in a lace tablecloth or in a woven basket
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or mg. Even more valuable, in educational terms, m ight be attempts to join in the singing 
and dancing; to learn to cook the foods and em broider the dress. In these instances, 
adversaries can begin to understand each other's cultures in a visceral, em bodied way.
They can honor a kind o f collective expression that does not have the defensive, and often 
subtly belligerent, overtones evoked by overtly nationalist symbols. The folk arts and the 
art o f one era or culture can "report" (Langer, 1953) to another, by virtue o f the sensibilities 
and values that are embodied in collective and intersubjective expressive forms.
The integration o f the sensuous and the rational in collective aesthetic experience 
has another important role to play in the work o f  reconciliation. We alluded to this briefly 
in the previous chapter, when we noted Elaine Scarry's theory about the im portance of the 
wounded body in substantiating large scale human fictions. Rituals, in particular, and 
perhaps other em bodied perform ances, can be m arshaled for just this substantiating 
purpose. As we saw in the exam ples exam ined in Chapter 9 , rituals can engage people in 
multiple modalities over extended periods o f time. They are capable not only o f reflecting, 
but also constructing social realities, so that participants can experience an imagined future 
in their senses and their bodies as if  it were real now, in the present. W hen Krondorfer's 
(1995) non-Jewish German and Jew ish American students created rituals at Auschwitz they 
used music, poetry, movement, stillness and silence to transcend the limiting "victim"/ 
"victimizer" discourses of their respective com m unities. As noted in Chapter 2, their 
rituals acknowledged the distinct w ays their shared historical legacy had informed them; as 
they found ways to be present to their similar and divergent feelings, their reconciliation 
was sim ultaneously constructed, enacted and substantiated.
Gregory Bateson (1972) suggests that there is "wisdom" in the enactm ent of 
subconsciously held ritual form s—know ledge that is necessary for the survival of the 
group, as distinct from the purposive intention that m ost often fills the screen o f individual 
consciousness. M uch o f the w isdom  of collective rituals may pertain to the survival o f  the 
tribe, and be at best irrelevant, at worst dangerous, for the survival o f  the species. But
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there are exam ples o f transgroup and transnational rituals, such as the shared peace pipe of 
Native Am erican cultures, the potlaches and competitive games in many tribal regions, the 
passing of the torch at ancient and modern Olympic Games, that m ight be utilized in the 
service of reconciliation (Goldschm idt, 1994, pp. 109-131).
Finally, rituals do not need to be sensational to be effective. Conflict resolution 
practitioners may find it sufficient to engage adversaries in a shared meal, a toast, o r a 
repeated song, to draw on the substantiating power o f ritual.
Intensity o f  Engagem ent w ith Bounded Forms
A third characteristic of the aesthetic domain as defined in Chapter 10 is the 
intensity o f perceptual and/or participatory engagement with bounded forms. This 
characteristic refers both to the "frames" that surround composed expressions as well as the 
selective attention o f a perceiver's gaze.
This quality o f the aesthetic can make two important contributions to the educational 
work o f  reconciliation. The first derives from the boundedness o f aesthetic form  itself. 
Because an aesthetic ev en t-an  exhibit or a play, for instance—intentionally is fram ed and 
set off from  the surrounding conflict-ridden context, the form itself can be com posed to 
enact or display features of the hoped-for future that are not yet possible given the political 
status quo. In particular, an aesthetic event can be constructed to em body norms of equity 
and fairness that m ight be impossible to manifest in the society at large. In an exhibit, for 
instance, each party 's "story" and "culture" can be given equal w eight, or the underdog's 
story can even be enhanced in som e kind o f symbolic com pensation. (For instance, in A 
Passion fo r  Life, we exhibited the stories and artifacts o f an equal num ber of Palestinian 
and Jew ish wom en, and w ere careful to mount exhibits o f relatively com parable emotional 
and visual impact. To acknowledge the discrepancy of power betw een the tw o groups, 
however, w e listed "Palestinian" before "Jewish" in the project's title, contrary to what 
would have been the neutral alphabetical sequence.)
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Similarly, efforts can be m ade to com pensate for unequal access due to econom ic or 
linguistic barriers by translating outreach material, targeting specific audiences, selecting 
accessible venues, and/or arranging transportation. By virtue o f the boundedness o f 
aesthetic forms, they can anticipate in their conception, content, creation, production and 
presentation norms of fairness that the society as a whole has yet to manifest.
In addition, the boundedness o f  the forms invite intensity of perceptual engagem ent 
and response. W e m ight be able to focus on a particular story or play that deals with the 
consequences o f  w ar long after we have becom e num bed by daily news reports. T he fact 
that the elements o f works o f  art are com posed to capture our attention and to please our 
perceptual sensibilities—even when they invite us to acknowledge su ffering-m ay make it 
possible for us to attend, with awareness that is more focused as well as more feelingful, 
than if I were reading a factual report or listening to political debate. There are risks 
associated w ith this sort of pleasure, as we noted in Chapter 11. How ever if they are 
acknowledged and addressed, the educative potential here is substantial, because o f  the 
difficulties inherent in bringing adversaries to focus on each other's history and culture, 
and in some cases, to bring war-w eary enem ies to deal with the conflict at all.
Tendencies towards the Mean
The pleasure afforded by aesthetic perception results in part from the m ediating role 
they can play in relation to chaos and order, individual impulses and the im peratives of 
collective life, and innovation and tradition. It appeal's that ritual may find its raison d'etre 
in the direct sublim ation of violent impulses.
In this regard, w e can sim ply note that there appears to be some kind o f 
resemblance betw een on the one hand, aesthetic forms and processes and, on the other, 
reconciliation. Reconciliation itself is artlike, in that it is a "form" that gives order to 
"elements" that once were in  chaotic and destructive relationships with each other. The 
"form" is a new moral relationship; the "elements" it orders include individuals, collective 
action and consciousness, cultural narratives, political entities, etc. R econciliation work
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creates an overarching frame so these disparate or conflicting elem ents can be perceived in 
relation to each other. It then seeks to organize these elem ents into some kind of balance 
(that is, into a  relationship in which it is possible to perceive the unity within their diversity) 
and harm ony (diversity in unity).
In m ost works of art, the illusions of tension and resolution are created by the 
rhythm ic array o f spatial and temporal elements. Reconciliation, too, unlike mere 
tolerance, recognizes the vitality inherent in conflict, and structures processes and 
institutions and cultural norms to support their peaceful and generative resolution. As with 
works o f  art and all living forms, the forms that result from the processes of reconciliation 
are dynam ic, animated by patterns o f  tension and resolution.
As w e have noted, aesthetic forms and processes conduce towards the mean, along 
several different dimensions. Reconciliation, too, is a  kind of m ean point in human 
relations, between the intrusions of violent contact and the detachm ent associated with mere 
tolerance. Reconciliation allows for people and groups in conflict to transform  each other, 
not through destructive acts o f violence and oppression, but in ways that are respectful of 
integrity and nourish the capacity for agency among all parties. W e might say that 
reconciliation is itself an aesthetic form, or, at least that it represents an artful way for 
divergent com m unities to coexist and to grow through the resolution o f their conflicts.
These qualitative affinities between the aesthetic dom ain and the processes o f 
reconciliation do not comprise a precise argum ent for the distinct contributions o f the 
aesthetic domain to the work o f  reconciliation. N evertheless, it seems logical that 
reconciliation, as a form o f conflict resolution that seeks to produce a conflict-embracing 
unity, can be achieved at least in part by engaging adversaries in m odes of expression and 
response that are, them selves, conflict-em bracing unities. Such form s and processes may 
cultivate within us the sensibilities and capacities-to  m aneuver within ambiguities and to 
accept the inevitability of paradox—necessary to live peacefully w ith those who have once 
been our enemies.
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Summary
In this chapter, I outlined som e of the potential contributions o f the aesthetic domain 
to the work o f reconciliation, organized according to the qualities that are definitive of the 
aesthetic. W e saw that the very qualities that make a transaction aesthetic-the  pleasurable 
reciprocity of subject and object that derives from the integration of the sensuous with the 
rational, intense engagem ent w ith bounded forms and the m ediating nature of aesthetic 
forms and processes-correspond to the educational tasks and challenges inherent in the 
w ork of reconciliation. Aesthetic forms and processes are, by nature, other-regarding and 
creative; they tend to m ediate tensions, enhance self-awareness, and engender em pathic 
responses. These characteristics of the aesthetic dom ain and typical effects o f aesthetic 
transactions make the aesthetic uniquely well-suited to facilitate educational processes 
which m ust engender respect for others and the feelingful aw areness o f suffering. It also 
can make distinctive contributions to addressing the resistances to learning and to 
overcom ing or circumventing the damage to moral capacities that almost accompany 
violence and oppression.
In the next two chapters, I present several exam ples that illustrate how aesthetic 
mediations o f conflict have worked and m ight work in practice. There w e w ill consider the 
conciliatory and educative potential o f the aesthetic domain not just by virtue o f  its inherent 
qualities, but because its forms and processes can be crafted w ith sensitivity both to the 
requirem ents o f reconciliation and to the dynamics of particular conflicts.
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CHAPTER 13
AESTHETIC M EDIATIONS OF VIOLENT CONFLICT:
RESTORING CA PA CITIES AND SUBSTANTIATING IM AGES O F  A NEW  FU TU RE
In the previous chapter, I outlined at a conceptual level some o f  the links between 
the defining qualities of the aesthetic domain and the educational work of reconciliation. In 
this chapter and the next, I show how aesthetic forms and processes can be crafted to meet 
the educational challenges that present themselves at different stages o f the reconciliation 
process. I do not intend to demonstrate, empirically, that the particular interventions I 
describe were transform ative. Although I do believe that the activities were, to varying 
degrees, educationally effective, they were constrained by extremely lim ited resources, and 
their effectiveness was assessed only anecdotally, if  at all. This dissertation's claim  is a 
conceptual one, and the exam ples are offered as illustrations rather than as evidence.
At the m ost general level, the educational tasks o f  reconciliation can be divided into 
three stages: (1) restoration and/or enhancem ent o f the necessary capacities; (2) lea rn in g - 
about oneself and one's form er enem y, as well as various viewpoints on the history of the 
conflict; and (3) im agining and substantiating a new configuration for the future, based on a 
new moral relationship and an intention to resolve conflicts in ways that m eet the 
underlying needs o f  all parties. T hese "stages" are not at all lin ea r-as  adversaries deepen 
their understanding o f the conflict new resistances are often encountered that then require a 
corresponding deepening o f capacities. Also it may be that a single activity can address 
m ore than one task. N evertheless, these three broad stages are helpful fo r purposes o f 
analysis.
In this chapter, I will present illustrations prim arily from  my ow n w ork as a co ­
existence facilitator along w ith some examples of the work o f colleagues. These
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illustrations are presented in terms o f  'reconciliation' and 'the aesthetic' as these have been 
conceptualized in previous chapters.
M y own work as a co-existence facilitator often incorporates elements of a 
com m unity-based oral history m odel developed in collaborations among artists, scholars 
and com m unity people affiliated w ith The Oral History Center (OHC) in the Boston area. 
The OHC model is based on the idea that every person has a story to tell and that stories 
can be im portant vehicles for education.35
Stories can be important resources for facilitating com m unication across differences 
for several reasons. First, people in every culture tell stories, and narrative is one of the 
easiest form s to translate from one language to another. Also, stories generally chronicle 
both actions and consciousness, and for this reason give w indow s onto ethical dilem m as 
and the m oral dim ension o f  hum an choices (Bruner, 1990, p. 51). Stories are used to  pass 
on values from  one generation to another, and also to construct meaning and to explicate 
"the mitigating circumstances surrounding conflict-threatening breaches in the ordinariness 
of life." (Bruner, 1990, p. 95) In a sense, even personal narratives are expressions o f 
collective forms: people tell stories within the forms and using sets of sym bols made 
available to them  from  their culture (Linde, 1993, p. 11). N evertheless, individuals do 
com pose their own life stories, im provising on cultural patterns and, in some cases, finding 
unexpected m eanings. (Bateson, M ., 1990, p. 16)
The OHC model places an equal emphasis on the im portance o f attentive, focused 
listening in eliciting the stories that people need and want to tell. In many ways, the quality 
of listening is like aesthetic a tten tio n -in  that in this kind of oral history work, interviewers 
are asked as m uch as possible to suspend their ow n points o f view, their own fram ew orks, 
and to listen for the patterns that em erge from  the teller's rendition. Interviewers seek to 
d iscover the teller's m ap o f  her ow n story.
In addition to the language of story and the im portance o f listening, the O H C model 
em phasizes the use o f a variety of artistic m edia, in order to present stories back to
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com m unities from which they are gathered in formats that are engaging and accessible, and 
that dignify the narrators and honor the history and culture their stories reflect and sustain. 
Stories gathered in oral history interviews have been synthesized, for instance, in quilts, 
slide show s, m urals, plays, exhibitions o f  photographs and stories, books, ballads.
The OHC model was developed to document, validate and analyze stories o f groups 
that rarely have been highlighted in traditional history sources, including women, people of 
color, im m igrant groups, w orking people, children, and religious minorities. Projects are 
designed both to encourage awareness o f one's own history and culture and to strengthen 
understanding across differences in age, class, race, gender and sexual orientation.
A m ong the settings in which I have used this m odel are two that involved people 
from  groups engaged in overt, violent conflict. In both cases, the conflict addressed was in 
the M iddle East. The first project w as A Passion fo r  Life: Stories and Folk Arts o f  
Palestinian and Jewish Women. In it I w orked with a Palestinian fabric artist to create an 
exhibition o f the life stories and folk arts of eight wom en, both Jew ish and Palestinian, 
then living in the Boston area. The exhibition, which opened in 1989, was accom panied 
by a series o f  public events, including a w orkshop on stereotypes, a theoretical inquiry into 
folk arts in com m unities in crisis, an evening of stoiysharing, and a music and dance
festival. 3 6
The second setting involved workshops w ith teenagers currently living in Israel, 
Palestine, Egypt, and Jordan, and sm aller num bers from  other Arab countries as well, who 
attended Seeds o f Peace International Camp, located in M aine, in the sum m ers o f  1996 and 
1997. In  1996 I w orked w ith nine groups for ju s t one session each; in 1997 I w orked with 
tw elve groups for three sessions each.
W hile these two settings m ade use o f the sam e basic com m unity oral history m odel, 
they w ere adapted in different w ays, especially in terms o f  the relative em phasis placed on 
product and process, and the directness o f  contact betw een m em bers o f the adversaiy 
groups. At Seeds of Peace, the teenagers interacted directly, through jo in t participation in
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oral history activities and visual art projects, interspersed with a great deal o f  conversation, 
and, on many occasions, heated argum ents. In A  Passion fo r  L ife , participants' contact 
with each other was mostly indirect; they learned about Palestinian and Jewish history and 
culture (as did members o f  the general public) primarily by viewing an exhibition of edited 
life stories, juxtaposed with objects of related folk art. Only a few Palestinian and Jew ish 
people, those who participated in the project's Directions Committee, interacted directly for 
any length o f time.
M ost of the exam ples in this chapter and the next are drawn from either A  Passion  
fo r  Life or from Seeds o f Peace International Camp. I do, however, also illustrate points 
using examples from  two com m unity oral history projects that were efforts at reconciliation 
am ong people divided by the structural violence of oppression (as opposed to the direct 
violence that defines the M iddle East conflict). I will describe these projects in the body of 
the chapter, as m aterial from  them  is introduced.
Circum venting or Restoring Impaired Capacities
In this section, I will illustrate how aesthetic forms and processes can be used to 
restore and/or enhance the communicative capacities needed for reconciliation. In 
particular, I will illustrate how aesthetic engagem ent can be used to support adversaries to 
circum vent or overcom e (1) intolerance; (2) the inability to listen; (3) the inability to speak; 
and (4) consum ing rage.
Overcoming Intolerance
A Passion fo r  Life  w as planned in the m id-1980s, but did not actually get underw ay 
until 1988 and 1989, the years during which the Palestinian intifada  was at its m ost active 
and the Israeli governm ent's response at its m ost brutal. A lthough the project took place 
am ong Jewish and Palestinian people living in the United States, it w as nevertheless 
difficult to find people w illing to participate, especially in face-to-face m eetings. In fact, 
m y Palestinian co-director found herself so distraught over the televised im ages of 
Palestinian children being injured by Israeli soldiers that she was unable to listen to  Jewish
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
303
w om en's stories and, therefore, to con d u ct jo in t interview s, as we had planned. One o f  the 
Jew ish w om en, an American citizen w ho had im m igrated from Europe at the end o f W orld 
W ar II, was willing to have her story in the exhibit but unw illing to meet directly with 
Palestinian women. She held her position  in support o f  the Israeli governm ent, which at 
that time decreed that it was illegal fo r  Israeli citizens to  m eet with Palestinian people.
W e might say, then, that the ability  o f these w om en simply to tolerate each other's 
presence—indicative also of the capacities of members o f  their com m unities-w as impaired 
by their responses to the violence, by  the history o f  enm ity  and by their unquestioning 
allegiance to the rules o f  relevant governm ents. In  this case, the inability of Palestinian and 
Jew ish wom en to meet each other face-to-face was tem porarily circumvented by having 
their "conversation," their learning ab o u t each other's cultures, mediated through a variety 
o f art forms. At a small gathering, b o th  Palestinian and Jew ish women listened to each 
other's folk music; at another they observed  dem onstrations of Eastern European Jewish 
papercutting and Palestinian em broidery. Finally, they attended an exhibition of each 
other's stories and folk arts. Those w om en  who rem ained  unable to converse directly, 
beyond in some cases polite greetings, were able to learn something of each other's 
perspectives, sensibilities, history an d  culture by attending these events and viewing the 
exhibition. They were able to m ove through a range o f  em otional responses, unconstrained 
by expected interactions with either th e ir  adversaries o r  m em bers of their own 
com m unities.
It might be argued that adversaries can access indirectly each others' points o f view 
by reading history, or commentary b y  each other's philosophers and political scientists. 
T his is true, and some people do m ak e  use o f these resources. Life stories and folk arts are 
different however, in that they em body  not ju s t ideas, but the sensibilities o f  both 
individuals and collectivities. Furtherm ore, by jux taposing  the stories and folk arts o f 
people on both sides o f  the conflict, A  Passion fo r  Life  w as crafted to support people who 
could witness their own history and culture celebrated and validated at the same tim e they
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w ere being asked to extend themselves towards their perceived enem y. Som e p e o p le -  
Palestinians in  particular, whose stories and culture receive so little exposure in the 
A m erican con tex t-focused  most o f  their attention on the stories o f the w om en from  their 
ow n com m unity. B ut several who made repeated visits throughout the two m onths o f  the 
exhibit could  be seen glancing at and beginning to confront the Jew ish w om en's stories and 
folk art as well.
T he stories o f  each o f the wom en whose work was exhibited in A  P assion  fo r  Life  
w ere selected and sequenced to  counteract the most com m on stereotypes and to highlight 
cultural com m onalities, o f  which there are many. A lthough each w om an's section o f  the 
exhibit included stories related to the conflict that would be challenging for m em bers o f the 
adversary group, we began each sequence with stories about daily  life and children 's 
gam es, stories about rituals surrounding healing and childbirth, and stories that revealed a 
sense o f  hum or and the ability to laugh at oneself.
H ere are two stories from A  Passion fo r  Life. Both em erge from  the dom ain that is 
d istinctly  w om en's, in  each culture. The first is told by an o lder Jew ish  A m erican 
w om an w ho had grown up in a  Lithuanian shtetl. The second is from  a  Palestinian 
A m erican w om an w hose family had fled from Israel/Palestine in 1948 and w ho grew up in 
Jordan and S y ria  Both stories include reference to the "evil eye" and rem edies against it. 
T he  "evil eye" is a  belief construct shared by Jewish and A rab/M uslim  cultures.
Em bedded w ith each story is a  bit o f  history that is im portant fo r Jew ish and 
Palestinian people to understand about each other. T he first story m akes subtle references 
to tensions betw een Jew s and their non-Jewish neighbors in Europe. A t the sam e tim e, it 
show s European Jew s as resourceful and valuable m em bers o f  their com m unities, not the 
child-m urderers m any Palestinian women believed them  to be, based on  the "history" they 
had been taught in A rab schools. The Palestinian wom an's story includes an understated 
reference to  the losses incurred by her family when they fled from  Israel/Palestine in 1948. 
H er m other's em broidered gameboards had been left behind, and it took her m any years to
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begin to em broider again, to com e back to normal. The very understatem ent o f  this 
com m ent may have allowed som e Jewish exhibition viewers to begin to im agine the 
pervasiveness o f the losses experienced when Palestinian people were uprooted.
The Sam e Prossik
M y grandm other used to take care o f the medical part o f her town. 
There were no doctors. T here  wasn't even a  veterinarian. I rem em ber my 
grandm other used to buy by the pound all kinds o f things, m edicine and w ith 
a shtaysl -  you know w hat a  shtaysl is? a m o rta r-an d  I alw ays used to  help 
her. She used to  have three, four, five mortars: bigger ones and sm aller 
ones. And I as a  little girl, I used to com e in, she used to  give me the pestle 
and say, "Reib. Klapp." I used to  help her. A nd w hen she used to  finish, 
she used to put it  into square little pieces o f paper, to  m ake proskes.
W e used to m ake jokes about it. W e used to say that som ebody 
com es and tells B obbe that they can't have a  baby. T hey want to have a baby, 
and they can't have it. She used to give them a  prossik. And the sam e day, 
som ebody else cam e, and said she had too m any children, she would like to 
stop having children. She used to give her a  prossik too. T he sam e prossik! 
T hat was a joke, but m aybe i t  was true. W ho knows?
Farm ers used to com e to her and buy the m edicine for their cattle.
That was the only w ay they could treat their cattle from disease, from 
infections. A nd it helped. W ithout Grandm other, I don 't know w hat they 
w ould have done. B ut in som e cases, w here nothing helped, you know w hat 
they used to do? They used to  com e to the rabbi to oyfshprefchin ayin ha-ra- 
you know w hat that m eans? T hey believed that if  nothing helped, they could 
com e to  the rabbi and he w ould chase away the evil eye. I don 't know  even if 
the rabbi believed in it o r not, but the farmers used to com e to  him.
A nd when they cam e to him , they were asham ed from  one another; the 
next-door neighbor shouldn 't find out. So they used to bring a chicken f o r -  
they d idn 't have any m oney to  pay, so they used to bring  a chicken fo r the 
rabbi, for his services. So they used to  hide the chicken som ew heres, so that 
nobody knows they're going to the rabbi. T hey used to run around 
backalleys, back yards. A nd everybody did it, but they w ere afraid o f  one 
another, because they w ere asham ed.
A Catholic farm er going to  a  rabbi, to get help for his cattle! Does that m ake 
sense? But they had no alternative. There was nothing else to do, so they 
used to  com e to him.
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M y Father W ouldn 't E ven K now
T his is a  traditional Palestinian wom en's gam e called Bargheese. I 
m ade it especially for A PA SSIO N  FO R  LIFE, but I m ade it in the traditional 
way. The nam e Bargheese com es from an A rabic word referring to one o f  the 
stars in the sky. A nd every gam e should have som ething written on it. This 
one says: "Flowers are beautiful! How beautiful are the flowers!"
Sometimes people write "A stick in the eye o f the devil" to protect you from  
the evil eye.
A nd the m ost interesting thing is that the gam e uses the nam es of parts 
o f  the house. T he center square, w here you have to get to to w in the game, 
w e call it "The Kitchen." So when you m ove a  m arker into the kitchen, we 
say "it's cooked." A nd in order to get into the kitchen, you have to have 
exactly the right com bination o f shells, so w hen we are stuck in  that place, we 
say, "it's like being stuck in the bathroom ." So we use everything from the 
hom e to  m ake the game m ore interesting; it shows a  wom an's life.
T he gam e uses six shells, w hich are thrown; different com binations 
indicate different moves. Y ou can knock the other players o ff  the board. So 
it's not ju s t luck; you have to be sm art enough to  m ake the right choices.
Before '48, every Palestinian w om an used to m ake several of these 
games before her m arriage. T hey w ould m ake several so that on the days 
w hen w om en gathered a t each others' houses there w ould be enough gam es 
to go around. A nd they w ould  put their names on  the back, because 
som etim es they needed to  borrow  from  each other. In  '48, m y m other left 
several fancy Bargheese gam es in Safed. She left so m any em broidered 
things there—that's w hy it took m any years for m y m other to com e back to 
normal and start to em broider again. That's when she made a  new set of 
Bargheese.
I've been playing this gam e since I was e igh t years o ld -w h e n  I was a 
child, I thought it  was the only gam e in  the world. I played it w ith m y sisters 
and m y step-sister and m y mother. M any tim es w hen I cam e hom e from 
school they w ould be playing, and m any tim es they w ould forget the food 
cooking on the stove. T he food w ould get burned, and they w ouldn 't notice 
until they sm elled it, and then they w ould rush around....So m y father used to 
try to hide the game from m y mother, because he knew about this problem.
T hey used to  look everyplace: under the bed or under the mattress. They 
w ould play w ith it and then pu t it back so m y father w ouldn't know they had 
found it.
C ircum venting and Overcoming D ifficulties in Listening
In a  recent interview , I asked Elise Boulding, a  revered elder o f  the peace studies 
and conflict resolution professional com m unities, w hat capacities she would hope to  find in  
a  novice conflict resolution practitioner, one w ho m ight be ju s t graduating from  a  m asters'
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program . "If I had to sum up peacem aking in just o n e  word," she said, "it w ould be 
'lis ten in g .'"
Even in what appear to be the most intractable o f  conflict situations, one kind of 
intervention is alm ost always possible: listening to the stories, the suffering, the 
com plaints, even the defensive rhetoric of the adversaries on both sides. People who have 
been involved in longstanding violent enmity, often need to be listened to extensively.
They need to have their suffering acknowledged, they need to tell the stories of the traumas 
they have w itnessed and experienced. To heal their w ounds they need to vent their rage, 
grieve their losses and relive their terror. To construct the m eaning o f their experiences, 
they have to revisit what was incomprehensible at th e  tim e it occurred and also to integrate 
new  realities.
L istening can be transform ative also for those in positions of relative power for
w hom  reconciliation requires a re-examination of their ow n stereotypes. For instance, in
T he L istening Project, a B uddhist-inspired anti-racism project in rural North Carolina, an
activist described the following experience:
Active listening allows a greater truth to em erge. I rem em ber listening to one 
w om an who was being surveyed about the relationship betw een racism  and 
poverty. She started off by calling Blacks inferior. I didn't judge her or 
react to her. I asked her to com m ent on the fact that m any Blacks are highly 
respected doctors, lawyers and professors. T his led her to  talk about the 
im portance of education, and we soon began talking about the effects o f 
slavery and unequal opportunity. Eventually she disagreed w ith her own 
statem ent o f Black inferiority and ended by acknow ledging a need in the 
U nited States to make equal opportunity for education a national priority.
This transformation was possible only because m y listening made her feel 
safe to risk examining her ideas on race, perhaps for the first tim e in her life 
(W alters, 1993, p. 24).
It is the rare circumstance in which one's fo rm er adversary is able to afford this 
kind o f  listening. It would be unreasonable to expect m ost African-Am erican people to 
subject them selves to this kind o f rhetoric (although there are m any m em bers o f  oppressed 
groups w ho are able to listen with generosity of spirit and belief in the possibility o f 
change). B ut in most cases, the enem y herself is filled  w ith her ow n need to tell, to heal, 
and to construct meaning. Furtherm ore, the stories one adversary needs to  tell are those
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which are likely to raise the resistances o f the other--who, after all, may have been 
com plicit in the first's suffering, and who will likely take offense at the very constructs 
used in the telling.
For instance, m ost of the Palestinian teenagers who participate in Seeds o f  Peace 
w itnessed m any horrors during the intifada. Some had been wounded o r imprisoned 
themselves; m any witnessed the death o f  friends and family members. T heir need to tell 
about these experiences is enorm ous. Israeli teenagers, on the other hand, who have been 
socialized to revere the image o f the just and m oderate Israeli soldier, w hose older brothers 
and sisters are now soldiers, and w ho will, them selves be soldiers in ju s t a few years, can 
barely stand to hear the Palestinian's stories. They look for every possible reason to 
discredit their narratives, challenging inconsistencies in small details or trying to discover 
what unnam ed Palestinian aggressions could reasonably have justified the Israeli violence. 
M any Israeli young people were sure that the Palestinians w ere highlighting rare incidents 
of violence for the politically-m otivated purposes of gaining sympathy and deliberately 
inflicting discom fort upon the Israelis.
The Palestinian teens also have difficulty listening to Israeli stories. H ow ever much 
they might sym pathize w ith Israeli's fears about traveling on buses, or what they endured 
during the G ulf W ar, they fee l-o ften  with ju stifica tion -that their own suffering has been 
m uch m ore profound and pervasive. Israeli's do need to tell these stories, as well as stories 
about personal connections to the Holocaust. B ut it is difficult for the Palestinian young 
people to give their Israeli counterparts the quality of attention they need to feel validated 
and heard.
The em otional difficulties on both sides are further exacerbated by discrepancies in 
language. W hen a Palestinian refers to "Palestine" the Israelis feel threatened that they are 
referring to the w hole piece o f land in question, leaving no room  for an Israel. They argue 
"There is no Palestine; say Palestinian Authority!" T he Israeli insistence that there is not, 
as yet, a Palestinian state underm ines a portion o f  the pride Palestinian teens can claim.
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I believe that in situations like these, there exists what we might call a "systemic 
deficit" in listening capacity. It is here that facilitators, mediators, and artist/mediators can 
play a crucial role. M ediators have traditionally found listening to  be among their most 
important activ ities-listening to one side and interpreting motivations and meanings and 
experiences of suffering in terms understandable to the other side. Artist/m ediators can 
deepen and expand on this role in two important ways. First, they can listen w ith a quality 
o f  attention they have cultivated as a rtis ts-w ith  the alert calmness, engaged detachm ent and 
feelingful awareness that are needed to elicit the stories with a quality of integrity that has 
the potential to be healing and transformative. As Dori Laub (Felman & Laub, 1992) 
noted, the calm  anim ation o f  a certain kind of listening can infuse energy into the silences 
o f  trauma victim s, in w ays the support them  from sinking into the abyss o f their own 
despair. Listening is one important way in which capacities that have been eclipsed by 
violence can begin to be restored.
It has been my experience that the stories that em erge into the respectful, animated, 
and attentive (i.e., aesthetic) receptivity often exhibit unusual integration o f feelings and 
thoughts as well as wholeness o f form. Listening to another's story takes on aspects o f 
aesthetic perception when w e listen for the meanings that em erge from a com plete rendition 
(as opposed to interrupting, questioning or challenging a particular statem ent). Listening 
also has aesthetic dim ension when w e attend to the patterns that unite even seemingly 
disparate elem ents. The listener responds to the emotions o f the story as it is being told, 
reciprocating them  by way of body language and tone o f voice. The listener brings an 
eagerness to hear, a belief in the importance o f the story to be told, a reverence for the teller 
and the telling. It often happens then that the teller reciprocates the qualities that pervade 
the presence o f  the listener.
An artist/m ediator w ho gathers such stories can then shape them  for presentation to 
various publics, including the adversaries of those telling the stories. This is the second 
im portant way in which the work o f  an artist/mediator can deepen and extend the carrying
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or interpreting o f  messages between adversaries that is com m on to most mediation. The 
stories can be sequenced, edited, crafted, and presented to those who may otherw ise be 
resistant to hearing the story, with awareness o f the sensibilities both o f those who have 
told them  and those who need to hear them. The artist/m ediator has a range of reso u rces- 
including a variety o f aesthetic forms—that can be used to transm it the qualities o f reverence 
and respect for the storyteller that anim ated the original conversation. W hat is being 
m ediated, in these cases, is not just inform ation, but qualities o f  listening, attention and 
response as well.
In the Seeds o f Peace context, where I was co-leading process-oriented co­
existence sessions, I structured this kind o f m ediation in the follow ing way. After a series 
o f warm -up activities, participants were asked to create visual images. The images were 
usually about how the conflict in the M iddle East had affected them  personally. At various 
stages o f  the cam p experience, cam pers also had other choices: to draw images o f their 
fam ily and com m unity, o f  a time w hen they or someone they knew  "took a stand" for a 
heartfelt belief, or what they anticipated w ould happen when they returned home. Their 
pictures were drawn on foam -core cut to resem ble hexagonal tiles, which were later arrayed 
as a mosaic.
A fter the images were com pleted, my co-facilitator and I chose two to four 
participants to interview as the group observed. W e used the visual im ages on their "tiles" 
as starting points. In part, we were m odeling interview ing skills, which, in m ost sessions, 
the participants later could practice w ith each other. At the sam e time, we w ere also 
allow ing the whole group to hear several im portant stories, told into the receptivity o f our 
listening. It often was the case that the teenagers told stories in this context that they had 
not yet shared with each o ther-particu larly  stories about losses w ithin their own families. 
In som e cases, several hours were required to process the feelings, reactions and questions 
raised in response to ju st two model interview s.
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These interviews did not automatically and immediately transform skepticism  into 
respectful curiosity. Nevertheless, they did allow the cam pers to hear stories that they 
w ould not have otherwise heard, and/or to hear stories with a  depth o f feeling that they 
m ight not have heard. Over time, I believe, telling and listening to such stories contributed 
to the cam pers' understanding of each other and their ability to becom e more trusting and 
trustw orthy.
A m ong my colleagues at Seeds of Peace, several use aesthetic forms and processes 
to address the ubiquitous communicative problem s raised by the young people's inability, 
especially at the beginning o f  their cam p experience, to listen to each other. Left to their 
ow n devices, the cam pers would spend hours sim ultaneously yelling at each other, shifting 
from  topic to topic, hurt to hurt, myth to myth. Som etim es we w ould allow this angry 
yelling  to continue for a half hour or so, so the young people them selves could reflect on its 
value and w hether it in fact helped them  to feel understood or to understand.
O ne team o f facilitators from the Creative Arts Team  (CAT) at New York 
U niversity used the techniques of educational dram a to create enough distance for the 
cam pers to  reflect on their own feelings and experience. The facilitators acted out a scene 
betw een two cam pers arriving at Seeds of Peace from  New Y ork City, one African- 
A m erican (Tisha) and one white (Jolie). A t first their two characters are delighted to find 
som eone from  home (especially am idst all these "terrorists" from  the M iddle East, about 
w hom  they com plain and express their fears), but all too quickly they discover they are 
from  neighborhoods-B edford-S tuyvesant and B ensonhurst—w here Tisha's brother had 
been killed, and Jolie's m other had been mugged. The scene they act out is crafted 
brilliantly to parallel the feelings that the Israeli and Palestinian young people encounter as 
they m eet each other at cam p -to  serve, according to Linda Carole Pierce o f CAT, as both a 
distancing device and sim ultaneously as a mirror. T isha and Jolie becom e immersed in a 
violently angry fight, and then turn to the real Seeds o f Peace cam pers w ho take on roles of 
counselors and bunkm ates in order to mediate their conflict.
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The Arab and Israeli teenagers are extremely skillful in helping Tisha and Jolie find 
a way o f  com m unicating with each other. These skills do not im m ediately transfer to their 
argum ents about the M iddle E ast-b u t their experience in the dram a does become a 
touchstone for them. W hen they (frequently) reach the point where they are unable to 
listen, they som etim es recall the scene with Tisha and Jolie and remind each other to take a 
breath, to listen, not to continuously change the subject.
In relation to A  Passion fo r  Life, I have in the past several years experim ented with 
poetic form  as a way o f inviting the adversaries to listen to each other's stories with the 
qualities of reverence and respect that animated the initial interviews. As a form, the poetic 
renderings o f  the narrative have important educative potential. For instance, historical 
material can be stream lined, so people are able to absorb and com pare several different 
aspects o f the conflict within a relatively short period of time. Also, the poetic forms invite 
the shim m ering o f  attention between self and other, hopefully engaging those who hear in 
attending both to the poetic image as well as to its reverberations and resonances within 
them selves.
Here are examples of poetic renderings o f small sections o f two narratives collected 
during A  Passion fo r  Life. Each one represents a part of the history it is particularly 
difficult for those on the other side o f the conflict to acknowledge. One is a story about 
A uschw itz; the H olocaust is a part o f Jew ish history that m any Palestinians have great 
difficulty in acknowledging, in part because it has been offered inappropriately as an 
excuse for their own suffering and because its legacy has been politically abused by leaders 
on both  sides. The second is a  story about Israeli brutality in the im prisonm ent of 
Palestinians during the intifada. These stories are extrem ely difficult for many Jewish 
people to hear, including m any Jewish Americans whose im ages o f Palestinians have been 
shaped by the m edia's representation o f "terrorists" and whose capacity to criticize the 
Israeli governm ent is im paired by a  sense o f unquestioning loyalty.
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These poem s have embedded within them the pow er of life stories on which they
are based-personal narratives that allow us to consider m ajor historical events at the level
o f hum an experience, suffering and resilience. The poetic form attempts to capture the
intensity o f  the personal encounter, paradoxically less available through reading transcripts
o f oral narrative verbatim .
To Tell the Story  (excerpts)
W hen I returned to the barracks 
A hunched little figure filled my spot on the floor 
Arye, my brother! A miracle!
"I'm  not Arye, I'm Eva, your sister"
H er voice and her eyes were ghosts
Eva didn't want to eat 
she'd lost everything by then 
So I stood in line 
filling her coffee can with food:
"Take this sip for Father, this sip for M other 
Just another sip."
Every day 
day by day 
I was strong 
for her
They marched us three miles 
for delousing.
A fter the shower, w e grabbed for dresses 
m y sister didn't get one 
Three miles she marched 
naked
back to Birkenau
As we walked by electrified wire gates 
two inm ates were looking for us 
one with a ball in his hand 
and all at once 
he threw it
It was a pink cotton dress 
crust o f bread 
in the pocket
W hat mortal person would stand there?
If  the SS saw them  they w ould have been shot.
It was another Elijah
Hum an Elijahs
claiming their lives
by risking their lives
pink dress tossed
in the grey, grey, grey desolation
o f  the camp.
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Taking a chance
I volunteered to work in the ir factory 
Naked, we marched in a circle 
SS watching to see w ho w as strong 
I pinched redness into E v a 's  cheek 
on her head I tied the sca rf from Elijah
Somehow I held her arm  
And somehow we w alked around 
And somehow we w ere chosen
Each morning
in the corners of the factory 
a German worker 
hid onion or potato 
breadcrust or apple 
for Eva
the gaunt slave girl
who swept shattered g lass from the floor 
At Christmas
with threads pulled from  blanket
black wool cut from coat
needle begged from guard
the shattered glass girl
stitched him a bookcover
corners embellished w ith  yellow  flowers
- based on interviews w ith  'Sara'
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To Cry Palestinian Tears (excerpts)
Even if you are in heaven 
you will dream  of Palestine
N ablus rests on two mountains 
the downtown between 
the sun rises 
the sun sets
houses o f white stone glow golden and red 
I cry when I rem em ber
At seventeen 
my brother lay flowers 
on the gravestones of martyrs 
seized from our nest 
he was flung into jail
C old pre-daw n darkness 
paw ed at my soul
each m inute choked back an hour of rage
Soldiers searching our parcels, our bodies 
until we no longer felt we were real
Through the fence between me and my brother 
M y finger sought his on the other side 
I brought him rainbows of threads and strings 
escape routes he could em broider
Once, when three o f my brothers all were in chains 
the young soldier who cam e for the fourth 
pushed papers in my father's face:
'S ign that we haven't taken anything from your hom e.' 
M y father refused.
W hat can I say?
Y ou want me to sign that you didn't take a couch?
You took the best thing in my home
the best thing in my life
Y ou took everything that I want
Everything that I love.
For years my father refused to see them 
refused the sham e of the prison guard's search.
Sitting on the couch 
he w ept like a woman.
H is sons all in prison 
and he sits alone.
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You could see the prison from our house 
and I cried every minute 
After eleven years they let him go free 
but his youth and his joy 
had long since been lost
I'd love to return his em broidered purse
the bird filled with song and the red, red rose




W hen my father died 
he left me many things 
but not being Palestinian 
I cannot inherit them.
I cannot sell 
I cannot buy 
I cannot do anything 
as Palestinian
except cry Palestinian tears, 
-b a s e d  on interview s w ith Jehad
So far, in this chapter I have presented examples of how aesthetic form s and 
processes can be used to overcome or circumvent im pairm ent to two com m unicative 
capacities critical to the work of reconciliation: the capacity to simply tolerate interaction 
w ith another, and the capacity to listen. In the next two sections, I w ill offer exam ples in 
which two additional kinds o f  capacities are addressed: the capacity to speak and the 
capacity to overcom e consum ing rage.
O vercom ing the Inability to Speak
People who have been directly involved in violent conflict are often unable to speak 
about their experiences. W e exam ined this phenomenon in considerable detail in Chapter 
6 , w hen w e considered Elaine Scarry's theories about the political im plications of the 
inexpressibility of pain, and Dori Laub's conclusion that the silence o f traum a survivors is 
both sanctuary and bondage.
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The aesthetic dom ain offers enorm ous resources for those who are unable to speak 
about their experiences. Feelings and actual accounts of events can be expressed first 
through visual art, dance, m ovem ent, puppetry, dram a, etc. Rehearsal sessions and 
im provisatory w orkshops can be structured to create safe spaces in which feelings that 
might otherwise be deem ed inappropriate can be expressed, and experiences that have been 
repressed, can be brought to aw areness, and integrated into one's self-concept. T here is a 
whole literature based on the experiences of and therapeutic interventions (including art 
therapy) for victims o f  sexual abuse, trauma, and post-traum atic stress syndrom e.
In the context o f this dissertation, it is possible only to m ention briefly two practical 
ways in which the Oral H istory Center's model has been adapted in working w ith people 
who have been unable or reluctant to speak about their experiences. The first instance is 
drawn not from the M iddle East conflict, but from work with Haitian children living in 
Cambridge. Many o f these children had witnessed political atrocities enacted by Jean 
Claude Duvalier's militia, the Ton Ton M akout. Others had been transplanted by airplane 
from rural Haitian com m unities where they had never seen a toilet or a clock into the middle 
of a m ajor urban metropolis. M any of these children were also separated from  parents and 
other family members.
In addition to these traum as, the Haitian children in the grade 5-8 bilingual program 
at the Graham  and Parks Alternative School in Cam bridge were at the bottom  o f the social 
hierarchy in their school. They did not speak English well, if at all. They w ere teased 
about body odor and about being carriers o f AIDS. T heir already low self-esteem  took a 
bruising every day, and their teacher, Pat Berkeley, felt frustrated in her attem pts to have 
them  share their experiences or discuss their lives in Haiti.
Pat decided to engage the class in an oral history project. The H aitian children 
chose careers they w ere interested in learning about, and interviewed H aitian adults 
successfully em ployed in those occupations. The adults told stories not only about their 
jobs, but also about traum as they had experienced in Haiti and also about how difficult it
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had been to adjust to the cold Cam bridge winters and the peculiarities o f American culture. 
W ith help from a Harvard intern, they transcribed the tapes of these interviews and created 
a slide-tape show called "We Are Proud of W ho We Are" where took the roles o f  the 
successful adult they had interviewed.
Once the Haitian children saw that the stories o f the adults o f their com m unity were 
validated in the school setting, pictures and stories from their own experiences began to 
pour out of them. They drew pictures o f harrowing experiences with the TonTon M akout 
and with voodoo practitioners. They wrote about their longing for the island, its bounty 
and its beauty.
Pat created a gallery o f  the children's artwork in the school corridor, across from 
the principal's office, where they w ould be noticed by other teachers and children as well. 
These im ages created a context for other teachers, at first, to ask the Haitian children about 
their experiences and their stories. Ultimately, through a series of several projects, the 
Haitian children led the whole school in creating notecards to sell to raise m oney for an eye 
clinic in Haiti. They had com e a long way from being unable to name their own 
experience.
At Seeds o f Peace, too, som e o f  the teenagers were reluctant to speak, especially 
about particularly painful stories. As I noted above, in these w orkshops the oral history 
m odel was adapted so that stories and experiences were first expressed in visual form. It 
was in this context that several of the cam pers were first able to express im portant 
experiences. I don't think that in any o f  these instances the stories had been suppressed 
beneath language. They m ight have em erged with attentive listening, w hether there were 
opportunities to draw first or not. However, the opportunity to express them selves in a 
visual m ode offered each of the cam pers the chance to focus solely on their own story for 
fifteen m inutes o r so, w ithout having to fight for airtime or worry about how  others w ould 
respond. It is not totally a coincidence, I think, that it was in this form at that during the 
fourth and last w eek of cam p, H iba from Gaza was able to tell her co-existence group for
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the first time that nine years ago her older brother had been accused o f fighting during the 
intifada, and that he had left the country rather than risk arrest by the soldiers who came 
searching for him on a daily basis. She has not seen him  since that time. It w as also in this 
form at that Dana from Egypt told her co-existence group that her grandfather had been 
killed in a war with Israel and that her uncle had been held in an Israeli prison for two 
years. Torture had left him  blind and som ew hat deranged. Dana's family had hidden these 
stories from her until they knew she was com ing to Seeds o f Peace, when they made a 
point of informing her o f the impact o f the Arab-Israeli conflict on her own family.
These small examples are noted here sim ply to mark the enormous potential of 
aesthetic form s and processes to create opportunities for expression, even when experience 
is not accessible to language or when discursive language alone is insufficiently nuanced to 
capture the import of an experience that needs to be expressed and shared.
Overcom ing Consum ing Rage
It is often the case that people who have been involved in violent conflict are scarred 
by their suffering, unable to feel at all, or unable to em pathize to any meaningful extent 
w ith the suffering o f their form er adversaries. Several o f the Palestinian teenagers I 
w orked with at Seeds o f Peace appeared to fall in this category. M any had witnessed the 
deaths o f several young friends and relatives; m any had suffered humiliation at the hands o f 
Israeli soldiers; many had lost years o f schooling because o f curfews; many were still 
unable to visit relatives in nearby towns and cities. "W e have had no childhood," they 
said, frequently.
The Israeli young people faced another challenge. They are the children o f 
occupiers, yet they themselves nevertheless live in fear. Unquestionably, though, the 
general tenor of their lives is one of norm alcy, w ith access to amenities unim aginable to 
som e o f their Palestinian peers. But the Israeli youngsters m ust contend w ith shame, with 
resisting first the suspicion and then the conviction that the policies o f  their governm ent
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have inflicted enormous pain on the families of these young Palestinians, the very people 
who are becom ing their friends.
In the m id-point o f  the cam p, Abd-El-Salaam told his coexistence group the story of 
his experiences during the intifada. At the age o f 9 he was caught throwing stones by 
Israeli soldiers and im prisoned overnight. He saw a fifteen year old friend and a twenty- 
three year old uncle killed. Abd-El-Salaam  was filled with rage. W hen the Israelis in the 
group questioned him —"Well, what did you expect if you were throwing sto n es?"-h e  
lashed out. "You Israelis are a people with no history and no culture," he spat out, 
apparently referring to the fact that Israel has been a state for only fifty years. "I don't care 
if you are scared to ride in your busses. W e deserve to be on this land and we will fight for 
it. I am proud to fight for it."
Abd-A l-Salam  was one of the young people who made me wonder whether 
coexistence sessions were appropriate for all the kids. I w anted to spend hours with him 
alone, listening and listening and listening to  his stories, allowing him  to rage and to weep 
and to m ove through his experiences at his own pace. O f what use is it to the Israeli kids to 
hear this rage, I w o n d ered -a  w onder that was sharpened as one Israeli girl got up in tears 
and w alked out o f the co-existence session well before it was over.
A t the end o f our three sessions with each of the tw elve co-existence groups, my 
co-facilitator and I asked each participant to spend a few minutes w riting a letter to the 
group or to any m em ber o f  the group, expressing anything that they had not had the time to 
say during the sessions, or that rem ained unspoken for w hatever reason. M ost o f the 
cam pers finished these letters in five or ten minutes. Abd-A l-Salam  was writing in a very 
focused way, however, and requested to continue to work on his letter after the session 
ended. He brought it to m e during a m eeting a couple o f hours later. H ere is w hat he 
wrote:
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To all Israelies in my group:
1 - You are very angry about what I said yesterday and about the way which I 
spoke but this is m y way which I learned from your soldiers and your 
governm ent because your people tought [taught] me to be  always angry and 
because my heart was broken a lot of time and until now my heart is broken 
so when I said that your country without culture or without history because 
your goverm ent try to burnt my culture and my history
2 -You are very angry when someone say that is from Palestine and you 
understand that he is from Jaffa or Hifa [Haifa—i.e. from inside the 1967 
boundaries of Israel], I think you do that because you know  that this land 
(which ocupied in 1948 and 1967) is Palestine from the beginning o f life
3 - About suffuring you said you are scared in bombing and you can 't find the 
safe [safety] in buses but you must know that hamas activities started [four 
years ago] and I agree with you that you can't find safe in buses but I can't 
find in my home in my school and in my hospital. The only place I find safe 
in cem etery and you must know that hamas is a very small part in Palestinian 
people but your governm ent who make troubles in my side was elected by 
52%  from your people. And you must ask about the reason w hich control 
ham as to m ake like these things.
4  - A bout what you said to m e you must forget the past my answ er that I m ust 
rem ind you about m y past because I'm  afraid that what your governm ent did 
with my uncle and my friend maybe your government will m ake it to me or to 
m y father. I need to live in peace with my family with my friend and maybe 
with my sons and m y daugters and my wife and the main im portant thing that 
I will to say is that I'm not talk about my past to make your heart broken but 
you m ust lesson [listen] to m y past to understand my life and my story 
because w e m ust make peace.
A bd-A l-Salam  wrote this letter during the third of his three sessions with me; from 
that point he m oved on to other facilitators. I actually never had an opportunity to talk with 
him again in depth. But the facilitators who led his group at the end of the cam p reported 
that in the final session Abd-Al-Salam  was strongly appreciated by all the m em bers o f his 
group, Israelis and Arabs alike, who all felt that they had learned from  w hat he had shared. 
For his part, he indicated that he counted as among his dearest friends one o f  the Israeli 
boys in his group.
W hatever progress Abd-Al-Salam  made, and however lasting it turns out to be, it is 
attributable to the seriousness with which he approached the w ork, his w illingness to be 
vulnerable, and the support he received from all o f  the coexistence facilitators and the entire 
cam p program . I w ould not be surprised, however, to learn that these sessions in which he
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
322
told his story and wrote this letter—in w hich his anger was acknowledged and honored, and
in which he focused all his attention on expressing it, giving it shape in the forms o f story
and le tter-p layed  a part in healing his wounds and in helping him overcom e his
understandable, all-consum ing rage.
Im agining and Substantiating a New Future
In the previous section, we considered several ways in which aesthetic form s and
processes can be structured to help restore capacities that are needed for the work o f
reconciliation, but, w hether due to  the effects o f  the violence or for some other reason,
have been impaired or are insufficiently developed. Many o f those same exam ples also
illustrate how adversaries' learning about them selves and each other can be m ediated
through aesthetic forms and p ro cesses-a  phase of the w ork o f reconciliation to which we
return in the next chapter. In the present section, I will illustrate several different ways in
which the aesthetic can be used to help adversaries imagine and substantiate a new future.
Im agining a New M oral Fram ew ork for Future Relationships
In 19 9 2 ,1 w orked for a w eek in a "cultural camp" for A frican-Am erican, Viet
N am ese and white young people sponsored by a neighborhood house in Biloxi,
M ississippi. I was part o f  a team  o f cultural w orkers from The Center for Cultural and
Com m unity Developm ent (CCCD), including, among others, the African-Am erican
m usician Jane Sapp and the C hinese-A m erican muralist, W en-ti Tsen. In the w ords of
CCCD 's m ission statem ent, our w ork was guided by the belief that
the historical and cultural roots of grassroots com m unities provide a powerful 
base from which com m unities can determ ine and shape their struggles, their 
developm ent, their institutions and their visions.... W e believe that a strong 
sense o f cultural integrity is necessary in order for people to overcome 
feelings of pow erlessness and to understand that there are resources and 
possibilities created by their own lives, histories and struggles.... CCCD 
connects com m unities w ith the power o f  their own creativity to mobilize their 
efforts and their vision into powerful forces for social transform ation (Center 
for Cultural and Com m unity Developm ent, 1991).
Throughout the week, I spent each afternoon w orking with the oldest participants, 
a group o f teenagers, all of w hom  w ere African-American. Their work illustrates the
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potential in aesthetic form s and p rocesses-in  this case, storytelling and d ram a-to  help 
people imagine transforming relationships inscribed by patterns of dom ination and 
oppression to relationships of reciprocal respect.
Although in many cases, aesthetic mediations o f conflict involve people from  
opposing groups interacting directly with each other, this example illustrates the usefulness 
of w orking in hom ogeneous groups. In cases where people have been oppressed, or 
where they are fearful of retribution or retaliation, working in uni-national or single­
community settings may be a necessary prelude or accompaniment to activities with the 
m ixed group.
On the final day o f the cultural camp, the Biloxi teenagers shared stories w ith each 
other about m oments when they had experienced discrimination. They used these stories 
as the basis for a dramatic presentation that they performed for their parents, for the 
younger children, and for m em bers of the church that hosted us. During the m orning, the 
twelve teenagers shared thirty-three stories about experiences with racism -prim arily  about 
tim es when they were mistrusted or humiliated by white teachers at school, and also about 
incidents in stores owned or operated by either white or Viet Nam ese adults, who either 
kept them under surveillance or made them  wait while white customers were being served 
out of turn. Their stories m ade it clear that racism  is pervasive in their lives. Their stories 
also revealed the extent to which they feel unsupported by adults in dealing w ith this 
problem: their parents are equally likely to be victims of racist incidents in com m ercial 
settings and equally likely to feel trapped by their own rage and their feelings of 
powerlessness. In relation to problem s at school, their parents generally w ould take the 
teacher's side o f  a d ispute, adm onishing them  to refrain from  being 'd isobedient.1
The dramatic representation o f their stories was set in a public school classroom . 
Each o f  the twelve perform ers w ore a sign indicating the race o f the person they 
represented. Kim, who portrayed a white teacher, set the scene by instructing the class to 
take out papers and pencils for term  exams.
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The teens portrayed five incidents in which the teacher discriminated against the 
A frican-Am erican and Viet Namese students in the classroom , all of which were based on 
the stories they articulated earlier in the day. In the first incident, the teacher invites the 
students to move around the classroom  to do anything they need to do prior to the test.
After allowing a white girl to get up a discard som e trash, the teacher admonishes Dandrea, 
a black student, for being up out of her seat. She dem ands that Dandrea retrieve her paper 
from  the trash. "I ain't no trashdigger," D andrea refuses. "Now you go and sit down," 
instructs the teacher. In an aside to the audience, Dandrea holds her own: "I'm sitting 
dow n because I  w ant to."
In the next incident, the teacher simultaneously allows white kids to talk with 
im punity, but disciplines the African-Am erican children. Referring to the white students, 
she justifies her actions: "Well, they are pulling A 's in this class." Then she accuses 
D arius o f cheating. She tears his paper and sends him  to the o ffice -a ll enacted while two 
w hite students are visibly and audibly com paring answers w ith each other, to no 
consequence. Darius' body jolts w ith frustration that is all too real.
The teacher offers help to a white student while denying it to a Viet Namese student; 
and then allows a w hite girl extra time to com plete her exam , making excuses for her when 
the other students complain.
In the final moments of their presentation, the students portray a scene that was not 
anticipated in any o f their stories. Through an invention of their imagination, they 
collectively confront the teacher, pointing out the unfairness o f her prejudicial attitudes and 
racist behavior. And then, with a generosity o f  spirit I found quite m oving, they imagine 
the white teacher as someone capable of reconciliation. She apologizes to Dandrea in front 
o f the class, and offers Darius the opportunity to take the exam  again. She ends the play 
prom ising that "in the future I'll treat everyone equally."
As the teenagers leave the stage, Darius says under his breath, "W e should take this 
play to the school board."
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Before the cultural camp, the African-American teenagers in Biloxi understood the 
dynam ics o f  racism that pervaded their lives. They were also im pressive storytellers, 
exploiting the vibrant colors and syncopated rhythms of African-Am erican vernacular to 
full advantage. W hat they were m issing was support to take each others' stories seriously, 
the opportunity to hear their stories as part o f  a larger whole, a structure that calls for a 
resolution, and an adult audience capable o f and willing to take them seriously. Had their 
perform ance been part o f an on-going program, or even a m onth-long program , and if the 
adults did not interfere, perhaps Darius would have led his friends in perform ing for the 
school board.
In any case, these teenagers from Biloxi now have in the repertoire o f  imaginable 
responses the possibility o f supporting each other to confront racist behavior, even when 
they experience it at the hands of an authority figure. They and their audience also have an 
image o f  a white person capable o f  apologizing, of com m itting herself to changing her 
racist ways. Hopefully, these constructs o f their imaginations will serve them well in the 
future.
Substantiating the New Future Being Imagined
In addition to imagining a new future, people involved in the work o f  reconciliation 
need som e way o f substantiating w hat they have imagined. A t Seeds o f Peace, during the 
early days o f  cam p, m any children and adults com plained, "This isn't the real world.
W hen these kids go hom e, they will face a different reality."
Throughout the m onth of the cam p, there were many opportunities for the cam pers 
to experience their emerging respectful relationships as reliable, as real, on a visceral level. 
Israelis and Arabs slept in the same bunks (no small traum a for the first few nights), ate at 
the sam e tables, went on canoe trips and clim bed mountains together. At news of the 
bom bings in Jerusalem  they grieved together and com forted each other. A  symbol of the 
harm onious future they were anticipated em erged in a cam p "anthem," composed for the 
cam p by a m usician who incorporated words written by one o f the campers.
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The Seeds of Peace anthem is unusual for a camp song. Its harm onies are complex 
and subtle; the four lines o f  its chorus can be sung in a canon. There were m om ents during 
coexistence sessions, w hen Palestinian and Israeli campers were engaged in angry shouting 
m atches--over the future o f  Jerusalem, o r whether the actions o f  a soldier could ever be 
considered terrorism  for instance-the  strains of the Seeds o f Peace anthem overheard as it 
was rehearsed in the distance seem ed almost laughable.
B ut as we repeated the song day after day, as people becam e fam iliar w ith its words 
and its melodies, the music itself could sometimes create for a few m oments the experience 
of harm ony that its words anticipated. I came to understand that the peaceful harm ony of 
the Seeds o f Peace anthem  wasn't "fake"; it allowed us to m omentarily experience a hoped- 
for future we w ere still in the process o f  creating.
D uring the last few days of the camp, all o f the cam pers are divided into two teams 
for "Color G a m e s" -a  variation for obvious reasons on the typical A m erican cam p's "Color 
W ars." In 1997, the colors were green and blue. For three days, the team s com peted: in 
every sport im aginable, in art contests, in memorization o f poems, in singing national 
anthems, in a  talent show. The entire event has a tribal ritualistic feel: team s are chosen 
around the cam pfire; bodies and hair are streaked with green and blue paint; by the end of 
the first day everyone is hoarse from chanting and shouting in support o f their team m ates. 
Color G am es ends w ith an awards cerem ony, where coaches and leaders give their own T- 
shirts to cam pers who have dem onstrated desired qualities of persistence, generosity, 
sportsm anship and risk-taking.
It is an event about which I was very skeptical at first. W ouldn’t it have been 
terrific, I thought, to have a more arts-focused camp, and to have a culm inating celebration 
with concerts, plays, exhibits, and publications? W ouldn't it b e  better to pour our energy 
into som ething creative that wasn't of such a  competitive nature? W hile I still believe that 
the arts program m ing could be strengthened in various ways, and w hile I still have som e 
reservations about their com petitive underpinnings, I have com e to see som e virtues in the
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C olor Games. The most important aspect of the event is that cam pers forge extremely 
strong bonds across national lines. They depend on each other in an intense and visceral 
way. They stretch them selves, trying out new sports, for instance, or perform ing even 
when they are shy. Its very ritualized and visceral nature gives it the power, I think, to 
impress upon the campers the "realness" o f  the relationships they are creating with each 
other.
This year, Noa, one o f the Israeli cam pers, allowed the entire cam p to make use of
Color Games for m ore reflective purposes as well. Noa, at thirteen, is a gifted musician
and com poser. For her contribution to the talent show, she com posed a song, a meta-level
com m entary on Color Games:
W hen I look into your eyes 
I feel like part o f the Green team 
And then I ask m yself 
W hat does it really mean?
Because a few days ago you w ere a Seed o f Peace like m e 
B ut now things have changed, can 't you see?
W e belong to different sides 
I am  green and you are blue.
And during color games 
I behave as if I didn't know you.
Because a few days ago you were a Seed o f  Peace like me 
But now things have changed, can't you see?
Now the game is com ing to an end 
A nd the whole thing is through 
I want you back as m y friend 
Even though you are blue
Because a few days ago you w ere a Seed o f Peace like me 
And how things have changed, can't you see?
The lyrics o f Noa's song w ere discussed during m any o f the post-Color G am es 
final coexistence sessions, where cam pers reflected on the similarities between the intensity 
o f their allegiance to their teams and their feelings about their nations and their people. If 
we can feel so strongly about a group that had been contrived in a m atter of hours, no 
w onder people's feelings about their religions, nations and cultures can be so pow erful that 
they are willing to die for them. On the o ther hand, if  that w hich we felt so strongly about, 
so w illing to take risks for, to lose our voices for, to go w ithout sleep for, had been a
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
328
group coalescing around a color w ith no particular m eaning-perhaps we can step back 
from our unquestioning allegiance to the symbols o f our nations as well.
Noa's meta-level, reflective com m entary on the m ost ritualized and collective of 
aesthetic experiences o f  Seeds o f Peace points towards a generative interplay between the 
two versions o f  aesthetic experience explored in the previous section of the dissertation. 
Reconciliation engages us both as m em bers o f  our groups and as persons with individual 
moral capacities and responsibilities. Aesthetic mediations of conflicts can engage people 
in celebrating their own and learning about each others' collective aesthetic expressions, 
and at the sam e time, invite the kinds of reflective awareness of self, symbol and referent 
that is invited in aesthetic transactions understood as experiences of individuals.
In A Passion fo r  Life, for instance, by exhibiting folk art in a gallery context, we 
invited an interplay between collective and individual collective experience. The next 
chapter presents an extended exam ple of a related aesthetic mediation, designed to invoke 
collective understandings o f  shared sym bols and sim ultaneously to nourish reflection, 
em pathy and individual moral agency among those who create and witness it.
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CHAPTER 14
LEARNING ABOUT OUR ENEM IES AND OURSELVES:
AN EXAM PLE O F AN AESTHETIC M EDIATION
In the preceding chapter, I presented exam ples o f  the crafting o f aesthetic forms and 
processes to restore capacities needed for the work o f reconciliation—capacities that had 
been im paired by violence. Other examples illustrated form er adversaries using aesthetic 
form s and processes to imagine, create and substantiate their future relationship. In this 
chapter, I end the dissertation with an extended exam ple o f an aesthetic mediation o f  a 
conflict. It illustrates how the learning required for reconcilia tion-learn ing  about one's 
ow n people as well as one's former enem ies-a lso  can be m ediated through engagem ent 
with the aesthetic domain.
Like several of the examples in the previous chapter, the 'aesthetic mediation' 
presented here is drawn from  A Passion fo r  Life: S to n es and F olk Arts o f  Palestinian and  
Jew ish W o m e n P  It rem ains, as of this writing, a w ork in progress. I include it here to 
illustrate how aesthetic forms and processes can invite adversaries to engage with their own 
and each other's history and culture w ith qualities o f receptivity, respect, em pathy, 
creativity, vitality, reverence and humor.
The stories told by the Palestinian and Jewish w om en in A  Passion fo r  Life are 
presented here as a script interweaving poetic renderings o f the narratives of six women, 
edited  and refined through several layers of aesthetic engagem ent. First, the wom en 
shaped their experiences into stories in response to the focused attention o f an interviewer. 
Then, the transcripts o f their oral history interviews were selected and edited for an 
exhibition that juxtaposed written text with objects of folk art, such as em broidered 
dresses, w oven baskets, family photographs, am ulets, cooking utensils and religious
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objects. Stories were selected for their coherence as stories, and also for their educative 
value. By educative value I refer to the potential of both the content and form  o f the stories 
to counteract stereotypes, to honor the collective suffering as experienced in individuals' 
lives, to celebrate cultural traditions, to acknowledge injustices, and to open w indows onto 
the impact o f major historical events on the lives of wom en and their families.
Years after the Passion fo r  Life exhibition, I used the text as the basis for rendering 
each wom an's story into a lengthy narrative poem, in some cases returning to the women to 
gather additional stories, or listening again to the taped interviews to rem em ber certain 
language or inflection. The poetic renderings, in themselves, are intended to capture some 
of the intensity o f  the face-to-face interview, an intensity that can be lost in lengthy edited 
transcripts o f  oral narratives. In some instances the "poem s'1 are actually ethnopoetic 
renderings o f  the wom en's ow n w ords—in which poetic devices such as line breaks are 
used to capture the rhythm  and m eaning o f the verbal expression. In m ost cases, however, 
my intention was to give a coherent shape to each wom an's story, using repetitions for 
instance to highlight paradox or to intensify the meanings of a phrase. These poetic 
renderings include im ages that em erged in my own im agination in response to the story as 
it was told by the women. I have since solicited and incorporate response from  the 
narrators, so the narrative poems represent a true collaboration.
In the version presented in the following pages, the poetic renderings o f  six 
wom en's stories have been m ediated yet again, this tim e juxtaposed w ith each other and 
woven into a new whole, a script that is intended to be perform ed by six voices. In 
perform ance, each o f  the six characters is identified by an icon, an image o f  a folk art object 
projected onto a screen at various points during the presentation. The icon serves to help 
the listener distinguish am ong the six characters, and also to em phasize certain segm ents of 
the story. O ther folk art im ages illustrate other segments o f the narratives. M usical 
interludes serve to cluster sets of stories together, and to provide for m om ents o f  
integration and reflection.
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The interweaving o f the poetic renderings of the women's stories invites the listener 
to notice juxtapositions, sim ilarities and differences am ong their experiences as well as the 
reverberations o f the historical events in Europe, for instance, on the lives o f  wom en in 
Palestine, Israel, Yemen and America. Audience members will likely feel som e resonance 
w ith their own history and culture, as well as experience resonances betw een the 
Palestinian and Jew ish wom en's stories and folk expression. H opefully the poetic form 
invites the shim m ering o f attention that allows for simultaneously deepening awareness o f 
self and other. The perform ance mode allows for reinterpretation and revision through 
rehearsal processes, and, im portantly, can invite audience response. This w ork resonates 
differently for listeners who are or are not connected to either o f the groups w hose history 
is represented here.
Versions of this script have been presented twice: once to participants in a joint 
H oward U niversity-U niversity of New Hampshire course on cultural diversity and 
com m unication, and once for a group o f  coexistence facilitators, including men and women 
both from the M iddle East and from the United States, w orking at Seeds of Peace. I 
consider this piece a w ork in progress because, based on the response prim arily o f M iddle 
Eastern members of the audience, I have come to believe that it requires several additional 
vignettes o f more recent Palestinian experience. As it stands, the piece could w ork well for 
American and Am erican Jew ish audiences, many of whose members need basic 
introduction to Palestinian history and culture, and who will be challenged to receive 
images of Palestinian people outside the media images o f  "terrorists" and "refugees."
M iddle Eastern audiences, however, will find it lacking in the ways ju s t m entioned.
I im agine proceeding with this w ork along several different trajectories. In one, I 
w ould w ork w ith Palestinian and Israeli advisors on slight revisions and additions to the 
script, and create a professional m ultim edia production, that w ould include perform ances of 
the words (perhaps w ith gesture and movem ent), carefully edited sequencing o f the visual 
im ages, perhaps on several different screens on an otherwise darkened stage, and m usic,
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perform ed not just as interlude, but supporting and amplifying the emotional resonances of 
the spoken words as well.
I also im agine revising this script through w orkshop and rehearsal processes w ith a 
group o f professional or am ateur actresses. Perform ers from the Middle East, or deeply 
fam iliar with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, could themselves decide upon necessaiy 
additions, deletions or revisions. Negotiating these changes would provide an opportunity 
for them  to leam  about each others' perceptions of the conflict, their feelings, their visions 
for the future.
This script or a performance o f  it could be used in facilitating coexistence or 
dialogue sessions with adversaries in conflicts in other parts of the world. It could be used 
to invite the sharing of similar stories or as a model for a kind o f  presentation they might 
create based on their own stories and folk art.
Finally, I w ould like to create a book o f these poetic renderings o f the w om en’s 
stories, each accom panied by visual images and annotated w ith explanations o f the 
historical and cultural references em bedded within the stories. W hile the performance 
creates the possibility o f a shared experience and possibilities for dialogue among members 
o f  its audience, a book would allow  the stories to be savored and studied, over time.
In the written version o f the script that follows, I have presented the Palestinian 
w om en's stories in plain type and the Jewish wom en's stories in italicized type, in order to 
help readers unfam iliar with the nam es and the cultural references within the stories. In 
perform ance, less intrusive and dichotom ized markers will be sought through variations in 
costum es and images o f  folk art (or actual objects). The wom en's nam es are pseudonym s.
As I noted in the introductory chapter, I end the dissertation with this extended 
exam ple o f an aesthetic mediation o f  a conflict, rather than with a more traditional chapter 
on im plications. I do believe there are im portant implications o f this s tu d y -fo r theorists, 
practitioners, activists and policy-m akers in the fields o f Education, the Arts, and Conflict 
Resolution/Peacebuilding. These im plications, m entioned in the Introduction, will be
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spelled out in detail in publications directed towards scholars and practitioners in each of 
the three fields.
I hope that by engaging with the following m odest enactm ent o f an aesthetic 
mediation, readers o f  this already lengthy analytic work will appreciate its implications—i f 
not with the precise clarity o f conceptual analysis, then with the feelingful awareness and 
imaginative reciprocity that aesthetic engagement invites.
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A Passion f o r  Life: 
Poem s in Six Voices
A presentation based on life stories told in 1989 by Jew ish and Palestinian women living in
the Boston area,
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T he follow ing scrip t is designed to  be read by six actresses. The characters, in order of 
appearance, are:
Sibyl: Palestinian-born Quaker woman who grew up in Ram allah on the W est 
Bank and m oved to the United States during W orld W ar II when she was 12 years 
old. H er icon is an embroidered bird on a tree, detail from a red and white 
Ram allah w edding dress.
Tamar, Israeli-born Yemenite Jewish woman w ho came to  the United States after
attending college in Israel. Tam ar's parents migrated to Israel from  Y em en in 1948.
Her icon is a  round woven basket in muted colors.
Jehad, Palestinian-born M uslim  woman who grew up in N ablus on  the W est Bank 
of the Jordan River. Jehad lived for eleven years under Israeli occupation before 
com ing to this country with her Palestinian husband. H er icon is an  old brass 
coffee-pot typical of those used by Bedouins.
Ruth, Jew ish woman born in Lithuania during the time o f pogrom s, when the 
Z ionist m ovem ent offered the poverty-stricken young Jew s of L ithuania the dream 
of a  hom eland in Palestine. H er icon is a brass candle-stick.
Hiba, Palestinian M uslim woman whose family fled from  Safed w hen Israel was 
created in 1948. H iba lived in Syria and Jordan and then cam e to the U nited States 
in the early 1980's. She is a traditional embroiderer. Her icon is a  b lack and yellow 
em broidered dress.
Sara, H ungarian-born Jewish woman who survived A uschw itz and then cam e to 
the United States with her husband, who was one o f the British soldiers who 
liberated Bergen-Belsen. Her icon is an old family photograph, depicting her 
parents w ith six children.
T he presentation is divided into four movements, divided by musical interludes.
I. O ur whole lives were built from these stories
II. I was always amazed at what she could cook
III. C hildhood was stolen from the faces of the children....
IV . A prayer for peace
T he poem s are to be accompanied by projected images o f folk art.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
336
M usical Prelude
I . Our whole lives were built from these stories.... 
Sibyl:
I love my grapefruit and orange trees.
Every sum m er I prune them 
and take them outside.
If aphids appear I get a sponge 
and bathe each leaf in water and salt.
The trees love being out in the sun: 
they become sturdy and tall and vibrant.
My citrus trees rem ind me 
of the family biyara  in Gaza.
Yehieh, the caretaker, had many m any children 
and we'd play together all day.
Twice a year we children watched
as water stream ed through channels and ditches
branching out to each o f the trees.
W e loved to run in the sand and then splash our hot feet 
in the sw irling, gushing w aters.
One time my brother discovered hiding in the groves
a wizened old man
eating tom atoes and onions.
He m esm erized us w ith stories
about sm uggling hashish from  Sinai to Gaza.
He was harm less, but hungry,
so w e'd sneak him  bread from  the house.
W e never told my father.
And there were foxes!
W e'd hear foxes and coyotes
when w e slept outside on hot, still nights.
0 0 0 0 0 0O O O O O O 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 0 OOO0 0 0 0 -0 0 0 0 OOOOOO0 00 0
'They're near! They 're close!" my brother w ould tease
and I'd go scram bling into the house.
W e thought the coyotes w anted us;
w hat they w anted w ere grapes from  the vineyard next door.
My grapefruit trees make it alive: 
coyotes and foxes
and the w rinkled smiles o f  the sm uggler of hashish; 
w ater swirling over the feet 
of Y ehieh's children, 
my friends.
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Tamar:
Rosh Ha-ayin, in Israel, where I  grew  up 
is like a miniature Yemen.
You've heard o f  Little Italy?
Rosh Ha-ayin is Sm all Yemen.
Every fe w  houses is a rabbi's house  
with one room used fo r  praying.
On Friday afternoon, when Shabbat arrives 
nothing in town is moving.
Even the M uslim s fro m  the nearby village 
selling vegetables fro m  horse-drawn buggies 
leave Rosh Ha-ayin by noon.
M y m om  woke up a t fo u r  in the m orning  
to prepare all kinds o f  breads: 
kubane, jihnoon and zalabia 
cooked outdoors on the round taboon.
In the evenings, m en would sit sm oking their water-pipe  
chewing on leaves o f  the gat.
They became very fu n n y  and told stories forever.
W omen weaving baskets and embroidering clothes 
sa t beside them and listened.
D ad told stories fo r  hours in Arabic.
F or us, a t that time, they were real.
W e'd perch on his lap, his shoulder, or head  
and hear about life in Yemen.
Sibyl:
M y father was an historian and geographer 
and the principal o f  the Ramallah Friends' School.
My m other arrived from South D akota in 1927
to teach for ju st a year,
but then fell in love with my father.
Raya, our nanny, sang lullabyes 
in the Arabic scale and all off-key.
M y m other would go into hysterics 
at m y renditions o f how Raya m ight sing.
At four every day
tea w ould be served
with breads to dip in lebene and oil.
A t bed-tim e Father would wear his cam el-hair coat 
and tell us about d'ubbe, the hyena 
and the tic, tic, tic o f its tail.
If  you rode on a m ule in the middle o f the night 
from  one village to another 
you 'd  have to be careful of the d'ubbe  
who w ould circle around, stunning the mule
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who'd follow  the d'ubbe  back to its den 
and then you'd get eaten up!
...unless, there was a miracle
like in one story the traveller fell down;
the jo lt to his head broke the d'ubbe's  spell.
1 believed everything.
It seemed so real because father 
set the scene on the outskirts 
o f R am allah near the radio station.
So w hen w e'd take walks on Radio Road 
in the lengthening shadows o f the softening dusk 
I'd see m yself riding a donkey 
and hear the tic o f hyena’s tail.
M y friends at school would laugh at me:
"Sibyl, that's ridiculous!"
I'd  say, "Don't you believe it? It's true!"
These stories were so vivid in my mind 
I believe them still, to this day.
Tamar:
M y fa vo rite  story was how m y D ad m et m y Mom.
When m y D ad was only eleven, h is fa th e r  passed  away.
A.? the o ldest son, D ad had to care fo r  the household,
breed the cows and fe e d  them
and  sell them to wealthy Jews and M uslim s
who lived a t a distance o f  fo u r  days' walk
in the city o f  Sana'a.
R ight before Passover,
he m et the fin e  fa m ily  o f  a jeweler.
H is one daughter was hiding, veiled except fo r  her eyes. 
"Those eyes told m e so m uch!" m y D ad would say.
So he went to her fa th er and asked fo r  her hand.
It was the luckiest trip he ever had made: 
he cam e hom e with so m uch money.
H is M om  gave him  a third o f  the dow ry  
and kept the rest fo r  her fam ily.
Then m y M om  would come nto the room  
and add  in her part o f  the story:
On the wedding night she  was dancing  
circling the groom three times.
She had  never even seen his fa ce!
She w as veiled, looking down; 
all she could see were h is fe e t  -  
w hich were huge.
"Who am I  marrying?" she trem bled with fear.
"Is this a man, or a monster?"
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Their f ir s t night together 
they were both really scared.
He was fifteen; she was eleven
h e 'd  seen only her eyes; she'd  seen only his feet.
A n d  they d idn't know  what to do.
"How was it?" the m en o f  the village whispered  
a week later to m y Dad.
"How w as w hat?"
So an uncle took him aside and explained the ways o f  marriage. 
A fe w  w eeks later, when they asked him  again 
still nothing had happened.
M om  had  pushed  him  out o f the bed  
and tried to beat him up.
So her m other had  a talk with her.
It took them  m onths to realize 
w hat marriage is all about.
Jehad:
Even if  you are in heaven 
you will dream o f Palestine 
N ablus rests on two m ountains 
the dow ntow n between 
the sun rises 
the sun sets
houses o f  white stone glow golden and red
I cry w hen I rem em ber
T his old, patched, sturdy brass pot 
crafted by Bedouins 
in cam el-hair tents 
to serve coffee to guests
the rim  o f the pot
bears designs o f  our fences
and partitions screening wom en and men at prayer
I rem em ber steam  rising 
soft curlicues o f aroma 
encircling guests 
w ho w ept and laughed 
and w aited
as my grandfather's century-old hands 
tilted the pot 
poured thick dark liquid 
in their small delicate cups
N ow  this old, patched sturdy brass pot 
decorates the hallway 
o f  my house




The whole town  
the whole life
was built fro m  these stories.
I f  I th ink o f  som ething, I  w ill tell.
O f course in Yiddish I  would tell it better.
D abeik was b o m  in Yiddish  
and died  in Yiddish.
It was a Yiddish town until its last breath.
Dabeik was a sm all town with small people: 
a cobbler, a glazer, a carpenter, and bakers. 
Peddlars travelled to villages, 
bought surplus onions and eggs 
to sell in town.
We lived in a house with one and a h a lf rooms 
my parents and  the nine o f  us kids.
One room, ten by fourteen ,
was the kitchen, the din ing room, the living room
and the bedroom  fo r  the children.
We also kept there fo o d  fo r  the cow  
fo r  when she cam e in fro m  the fie lds.
The other room was narrow  and small: 
a bedroom fo r  my parents 
and whichever children were still in cribs: 
two I  always remember.
This little home served  eleven people  
and also fiv e  or six  chickens -  
who spent nights in the poptsis  
a little tunnel under the oven.
In the summer, they'd  run around  
and share the house.
Hiba:
My true identity is inscribed in my dress:
I believe in it m ore than in scholars or books.
Em broidery is m y work
inherited from  ancestors
to be passed on to  my daughters
so they will know  w ho they are.
Books are easily tw isted and biased 
but dresses sew n by com m on people 
will always tell the tmth.
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Sara:
I  see M other
back in D ebrecen, in Hungary, 
lighting Sabbath candles
She took m e with her everywhere  
to the kosher butcher  
to the rabbi 
to the ritual bath
we were together 
in a room with two tubs 
She show ed m e  
how m y life w ould  be.
A nd  I  rem em ber Passover  
Father wearing the kittel, the pure white shirt 
M other embroidered  
fo r  him
fo r  their wedding  
Patiently he explained the Passover story 
like the rabbis o f  old.
Opening the door  
we welcom ed strangers  
Wine and song
longing fo r  Eliahu HaNavi 
m essenger o fm essia h  
"W henever yo u  need  him  
Elijah will com e," said my fa th er  
the P assover King.
In the fa ll, on the f lo o r  o f  the sukkah, 
we rolled walnuts
aim ed fo r  the largest in hopes o f  winning all 
When Father jo in ed  our game 
we were in heaven
A n d  so w ent the year  
M other cooking and  baking  
and lighting holiday candles 
In  shul I  sa t with the women upstairs
M y brothers p layed near m y fa th er  
dow n below
I  w ould w atch those special special moments 
when F ather wrapped them in his tallis 
and they davened together
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On T isha B 'Av
the very sad day
when twice the temple was destroyed  
I  would sit on a little stool 
and  in Yiddish, so she could really understand  
M other read about starvation and dying children 
and cried bitter bitter tears.
W as she w eeping only fo r  those o ld  tim e Jew s 
o r did she have an inkling already 
o f  w hat would happen to us?
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M usical interlude
II. I was always amazed at what she could cook.... 
Tamar:
M y M om  stood fo u r  feet, nine inches tall 
every inch pulsing with life.
She never knew how to read or  write; 
in Yem en she'd  never worn shoes.
In Israel my M om cleaned house 
fo r  the rich Ashkenazi ladies.
Every day when she came home fro m  work 
m y M om  sent us out to do chores.
She 'd  ga ther the hom ework we'd le ft on the table 
and bring it to the neighbor next door 
and ask i f  our papers were perfect.
A fter our chores she'd  be ready 
to tell us which problem s to fix , 
and where we needed more work.
W hen I  was twelve
I needed  m y M om  to sign a form
so I  could  go  on a two-day class outing.
"Sit do w n ," she said, "I need to tell you  
I  don 't know  how to w rite ."
"It can't b e !" I  argued; then m y mother explained  
she'd  hidden her ignorance 
no t out o f  pride
but to be sure we'd work really hard.
The Ashkenazi ladies set up groups 
to teach the Yemenite women to read.
"They treat us like we're stup id ," m y M om com plained  
and  then refused to go.
M om  w as only 44  when she died; 
then we realized her strength.
M y D ad had seemed as tough as a brick; 
when w e were in trouble we fe a re d  him.
B u t a fter M om  died  he lost his wind  
like a balloon pricked with a needle.
P roud o f  Yemen, her accent, her kids, 
she had held  the whole house in her hands.
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Hiba:
See this design? W e call it 'The B irds.1
The gold circle is the nest, and it stands for a home.
First the birds are facing each other, happy and friendly, 
and the next day they are back to back.
Just am ong wom en it has a special name:
'The M other-in-law  and the daughter-in-law .'
I will tell you a story about this design, 
about why I love it so much:
My m other's father ow ned an olive oil business 
with presses in  three or four villages.
He w ent from  one to another to check on his workers, 
how they are w orking and w hat they must do.
One time he w ent to a village and stayed with a friend 
w hose w ife w as also a friend o f my grandm other's.
The w om an's son had ju st gotten married
and m y grandm other w ondered w ere they happy or not.
Not wanting to involve the men in such matters 
but knowing that her friend could neither read nor write 
she em broidered a pillow cover w ith the design o f 'The Birds' 
and sent it along as a gift.
M y grandm other's friend understood right away:
"Are you happy o r are you fighting?"
Since her son had ju s t m oved to his new wife's house 
she w as not happy at all.
So she em broidered the part with the birds back to back 
with a line dividing the nest in two.
M en never listened to w om en's concerns 
so they stitched each other their messages.
This is how  the w om en 'wrote'
Even w hen they couldn 't write.
Jehad:
In w inter around a little hearth 
w e'd listen to m other tell stories
To teach my brothers to  be good to their wives
she rem em bered a cousin:
a w eek after his w edding he joined boyhood chums
for evening talk about bachelor things
very late, he w alked hom e through dark quiet streets
His w ife w aited at the roadside
in her long, em broidered w edding dress.
'You are late,' she called out, and fell in behind him  
in silence
the young groom  looked around 
his w ife was not nearby.
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Looking back further 
he saw her 
grow taller and taller 
and taller and taller:
a ghoul, hurling rocks and berating his name.
Heart pounding, he raced to his home 
opened the door, to his w ife inside 
and from that night on 




The rabbi with his long, long beard
long black robe and well-shined shoes
w ould walk through the streets, to every Jew s' house
announcing the time to light candles.
Tsayt likhtsebenschen!
Tsayt likhtsebenschen!
The women would rush to fin ish  their cooking;
The rabbi was their clock.
M y grandm other sent m e to the hom es o f  the poor  
with gefilte fish , chicken and challah.
H er life's greatest pleasure
was knowing all D abeik Jews
would at least have a good  shabbes dinner.
Sibyl:
Knowing my m other was American
and knowing we lived in a fancy house (with fancy plumbing and all) 
my aunts took it upon them selves to show us the life of Palestine.
A untie N im eh's house had only one room.
In the m orning she folded her thin mattress 
and stacked it against the wall.
She had no running water
and carried everything on her head.
In the garden was a well 
or maybe a cistern.
I rem em ber many urns, 
heavy urns, about four feet tall.
There was a special corner w ith a wonderful fragrance 
o f  raisins and spices and all kinds o f dried fruits.
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I was always amazed at what she could cook 
on her tiny Prim us stoves.
She baked cakes and boiled huge stews and soups 
on this one small burner.
In the sum m er she cooked outside in a shed 
but in the rainy season she made meals and treats 
all in her tiny room.
She baked her own bread 
som etim es on the oven in town.
Her yard was filled with lots o f  trees: 
walnuts and almonds, apricots and grapevines, 
and the garden was ringed with mint.
R uth:
You know w hat is a shtaysl? A  mortar.
G randm other had three, four, five.
I'd w alk in her door, she hand m e a pestle:
R eib, K lapp....K lapp.
/  helped her make proskes, bundles o f  medicine  
fo ld ed  in squares o f paper.
A  wom an came crying: "I want to get pregnant!" 
and Bobbe gave her a  prossik.
"I've go t too m any kids!" the next w om an complained; 
she got an identical prossik.
It w as a  joke , bu t who knows?
M aybe it was true.
Grandmother gave farm ers medicine 
to treat their cattle's infections.
I f  this d idn 't help 
they'd go  to the rabbi 
to oyfshprekhin ayin ha-ra -- 
to call o f f  the evil eye.
They had  no money 
so they'd  bring him  chickens 
hidden under their jackets.
Running through backyards and alleys 
they'd hide their shame fro m  their neighbors.
Catholic farm ers  
running to a rabbi 
hoping to heal their cattle.
D oes it make any sense ?
B ut they didn't have a choice.
There was nowhere else they could  go.
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M usical Interlude
III . Childhood had been stolen from the faces o f the children.
R u th :
The F irst W orld W ar took a whole year to get to Dabeik.
The cossacks cam e to our house
and saw  the com m ode where we kept N ikolayevski
and all our other treasures.
"Open it u p !" they demanded, but the key was stuck.
"Oh, no, don 't touch it!" M other warned  
"it's Pesadikh, kosher fo r  Passover!"
They got scared and  p u t back the key.
E verybody was running
and the cossacks were running after us.
I  w as six years old, in m y m other's ja c k e t  
with very long sleeves: 
it w as so m uch fu n !
We ran fro m  D abeik as fa r  as we could.
In Utian we stayed  in a fie ld  o f  potatoes 
that we dug and, ate fo r  breakfast.
There were a lot o f  fam ilies sleeping under the sky.
Little Hannah cried fo r  a whole night 
"Ikh vill m ayn vigele! I  want m y crib!"
We sang lullabyes all night 
but still she cried and cried.
M onths later, when we fin a lly  w ent home, 
they 'd  broken all o f  our furniture.
There were no  books, no nothing  
no place where to spend time.
I'd  s it  on the porch  
and wait.
The Christians had a library 
but a  Jew  could no t belong.
The librarian was a  friend  
a nice fe llo w  who came to our store.
From  time to time he'd  bring m e a book.
M y s is te r  and  I  wore hand-me-downs.
A n d  w hen we w ent to school in Utian 
w hich w as a lready a city, with all kinds o f kids, 
they would dance a circle around us 
their songs insulting our dresses.
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I f  there was m oney w e’d  buy our food;  
mostly, M other would send us bundles.
B u t when the snow  was heavy  
we would starve.
For dinner we'd have a little piece o f  bread  
dipped  in sugar.
A t lunch w e'd sit in our room  
ashamed
sugar on open notebooks  
We shut them fa s t  i f  anyone came.
For this, w e thought we were brilliant.
Sum m ertim e w e'd be home fo r  three m onths 
in heaven with enough to eat.
Finally Father and M other said we couldn't go to school 
the younger ones needed a chance.
Hiba:
In 1920 the British came
T heir m issiles descended on dresses
scattering flowers and upending trees.
W om en felt the danger o f  the weapons 
bu t it was unsafe to speak o f their fears.
F ingers, though, refused to be silent 
and raged at the foreign army: 
a m other's scream  in every stitch.
M y grandm other made a dress with this pattern 
bu t left it behind when we fled.
W hen I w as a child I thought bargheese 
w as the only gam e in the world.
I played w ith m y sisters, step-sister and m other 
tossing shells and m oving m arkers 
on the em broidered, velvet gam eboard.
It's not ju s t luck; you m ake choices 
try to knock others out o f the game.
T he center square (w here you must be to win) we call the kitchen 
W hen your m arker lands there 
w e say: "It's cooked!"
I f  the toss of the shells w on't get you to the kitchen 
then you get stuck in 'the bathroom .'
T hese words from  our hom es m ake the game fun; 
they show  us the life o f  a woman.
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Playing bargheese in the late afternoon- 
many tim es dinner w ould burn on the stove.
W hen father tried to  hide the game
W e'd look under beds and in betw een mattresses,
play with it and sneak it back
before he even knew!
W om en w ould stitch several of these games 
so w hen they gathered for coffee they'd have enough sets. 
In '48 my m other left bargheese  games in Safad 
along w ith em broidered dresses and capes.
It took many years for her to come back to normal: 
to start to em broider bargheese  gam es again.
Sibyl:
I have a picture of m yself at five
in full Ram allah costum e,
and one o f my sister, m y brother and me
dressed up as A rabs for our South D akota cousins.
W hen I was ten I studied piano in Jerusalem 
travelling alone each w eek by bus.
I always m ade sure I had exactly the fare—three piasters— 
so I w ouldn 't have to speak to any unknow n people 
in their strange Hebrew language.
I didn't know m any Jew s at that time; 
there w ere only a few nearby.
T ikvah, an orphan, was a friend at school 
but I never m et her relatives.
M y father was friends w ith Dr. M agnus 
a famous Jew ish man w ho respected Arab people.
B ut even then I knew there was turmoil; 
a  sniper's bullet once shattered the glass 
in my m other's library w indow.
R uth :
M other used to  stand fo r  hours 
over her big brass m ednitza
cooking cherries, strawberries, currants and raspberries 
skim m ing fro m  the top w hat was white like snow  
to make D abeik 's best preserves.
Women came fo r  cooking advice; 
one fro m  across the street 
w ould  borrow  m other's mednitzen.
Years later we learned that wom an's son 
helped  Nazis f in d  Jew s in hiding.
When I  le ft he w as ju s t  a little boy.
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In the twenties, business was bad.
The gentile fa n n ers  supported Lithuanian coops 
and tried to avoid our stores.
There was nothing fo r  young people to do 
and nothing enlivened our dreams
except the groups o /khalu tzim , pioneers, 
planning to go to Palestine 
to fa rm  on Jewish soil.
Sara and Shm uel went there 
and I  hoped to go to Israel, too, 
until Am erica became m y home.
Sara:
Three days and three nights 
we had been locked in the car.
The train halted 
Dogs barked  
Guards screamed  
"Stand in line!"
I gave my sardine to a man  
in fu n n y  striped clothes
The place was so empty, so desolate  
a sad, low building with a single, high chimney 
W hat could it be?
The SS  w atched  
as we marched  
show ered  
were shaved.
I  was lucky:
I  fo u n d  a soft wool dress  
grey, with three quarters sleeves 
fu l l  sk irt and two pockets.
B u t m y m other's picture  
all that I  had fro m  home 
disappeared
In  m y so ft w ool dress 
head ju s t shaved  
I  waited.
A  m an appeared
handed  m e ugly, grey, watery food .
N o t y e t knowing the hunger to com e  
I  refused.
H e insisted: "Here you eat everyth ing."
So I  ate it.
H e pulled  a kerch ief fro m  his pocket:
"This is fo r  your h ead ."
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"What kind o f  place is this?" I  asked.
"Is everyone here? Are M other and Father here?" 
"It's a p lace where you work 
and after the war, you go home.
Everyone is here. Soon you w ill see your paren ts ."
He vanished
I think o f  him  so m any times 
Elijah the Prophet
giving me fa ith  
to live
in that mom ent 
to go on 
in that place 
where I  was
I hope he survived
I f  I  hadn't wanted so desperately to live 
I  would have wanted, desperately, to die
Thank G od there was no mirror.
The fo o d  was so little 
We were hungry all the time 
We couldn't think o f  anything else 
not fa m ily  
not anything
In the sm allest trickle o f  w ater 
we tried to keep ourselves clean  
but the camp was dust 
everything was grey
the people were grey  
the ground was grey  
the soldiers were grey  
the camp was grey  
there was no blade o f  grass 
there was nothing
Som ehow  I  rem em bered the story
o f  a valley o f  dry bones
G od prom ised  they w ould  com e to life
and return to Israel
So I  knew G od w ould  take us hom e
We ju s t had to remember
who we really are
Instead o f smelling incinerated fle sh  
I  sm elled the acacia tree near my bedroom window  
and fresh  bread fro m  the bakery back home
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W ashing in the ravine
I  looked up into the barrel o f  the G erman's big gun  
"Schw einer," he was saying, "Pig Je w s ."
"Not me, not us. You 're the one.
I'd  rather be in my place than yo u rs ."
M y parents would die o f  heartache 
i f  they lost their child  
I  had  to sutvive  
to go home 
to tell
But I  would have wanted, desperately, to die 
I f  I  hadn't wanted so desperately to live.
When I returned to the barracks 
A  hunched little figure  fille d  my spot on the flo o r  
A  rye, my brother! A miracle!
"I'm not Arye, I'm Eva, your sister"
H er voice and her eyes were ghosts
Eva didn 't want to eat 
she 'd  lost everything by then 
So I  stood in line 
fd lin g  her coffee can with food:
"Take this sip fo r  Father, this sip fo r  M other 
Just another s ip ."
Every day 
day by day  
I  was strong  
fo r  her
They m arched us three miles 
f o r  d eb u sin g .
A fte r  the shower, we grabbed fo r  dresses  
my sister didn't ge t one 
Three miles she marched  
naked
back to Birkenau
A s we w alked by electrified wire gates 
two inmates were looking fo r  us 
one with a ball in his hand  
and all a t once 
he threw  it
It was a p in k  cotton dress 
crust o f  bread  
in the pocket
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What mortal person would stand there?
I f  the SS  saw them  they would have been shot.
It was another Elijah
H um an Elijahs
claiming their lives
by  risking their lives
p ink  dress tossed
in the grey, grey, grey desolation
o f  the camp.
Taking a chance
I  volunteered to work in their factory  
Naked, we m arched in a circle 
SS  w atching to  see who was strong  
I  p inched redness into Eva's cheek  
on her head I tied the scarf fro m  Elijah 
Som ehow  I  held her arm  
A n d  som ehow  we w alked around  
A n d  som ehow  we were chosen
Each morning 
in the com ers o f  the factory  
a German worker 
hid onion or potato  
breadcrust or apple 
fo r  Eva
the gaunt slave girl
who sw ept shattered glass fro m  the f lo o r  
A t Christmas
with threads pulled  fro m  blanket
b lack wool cut from  coat
needle begged fro m  guard
the shattered glass girl
stitched him a bookcover
co m ers  em bellished with yellow  flow ers
Liberation was something to deal with itself 
Losing our fam ily, our country, our people  
Terrible years o f  terrible nighttnares 
and  wondering how, possibly, to start a new life: 
A nother story fo r  another time.
I  conjured up moments
w ondering how m y fa th er  and  m other had  died.
I  see my fa th e r
holding close
m y two young brothers
imaginery tallis surrounding their small shoulders 
the m ourner's Kaddi 
silen t on his lips.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
354
M y mother, defiant 
railed against God:
"What d id you do to us? W hat happened to my children?"
It d idn 't m atter how long you were in Auschwitz: 
a h a lf a  day, an hour, a moment:
It was an eternity 
the end o f  the world  
We survived, bu t I  don't know why: 
m aybe ju s t to tell the story.
M usical Interlude
Hiba:
M y m other told me about the war in '48
and how  it happened that we fled from our home.
People w ere very scared.
Loudspeakers announced they should leave for three days 
and then the w ar would be over.
W e w alked from Safed to the border w ith Lebanon 
when w e reached a village it was already dark.
W e found a m attress in a  family's home 
and paid them  gold in exchange.
W e w ere five people, one mattress, one blanket 
w ith nine other families in the same room
It was dark.
T he kids w ere tired and hungry and dirty; 
they 'd  brought no changes o f  clothes.
A  cousin w ent back during one night 
ju s t to get clean clothes for the kids.
W e w aited and waited 
bu t he never came back.
W e felt so bad because his children 
w ere ju s t about our age.
M y m other remembered one woman 
w ho w as so scared 
she picked up her pillow 
instead  o f her baby.
A t the border she tried to look at her child 
and found, instead, the pillow.
Later, a m an w ho had heard its crying 
p icked up the child on his way out o f town 
and brought him  to the mother.
She had  alm ost lost her mind.
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H olding her child 
right there in her arms 
she still found it hard 
to believe he'd survived.
Tamar:
Life w as good  fo r  Jew s in Yemen 
according to my parents.
Their M uslim  neighbors came with live chickens— 
gifts fo r  our wedding feasts.
A n d  our fa m ilie s  would go to them  
with flo u r  or bread, m eat or cakes.
I f  a Jewish man went with a M uslim  girl 
then there would be big trouble.
The punishm ent wasn't ju s t  going to jail: 
there d  be a public stoning.
When num bers o f  Jew s left their villages 
to begin their journey to Israel— 
it was then the M uslim s attacked.
M aybe they knew  o f  the w ar in Palestine 
and how  their brothers were suffering.
So why did m y parents decide to leave ?
There really was no question.
They were gathered in the rabbi's house 
in the little room fo r  prayer.
M y D ad said, "A man arrived, 
dressed very weird, in pants, no t a dress.
He to ld  us 'Any minute, the M essiah is com ing!"'
M y parents believed with all their hearts:
" If this is w hat G od wants, this is w hat we will d o ."
This is the kind o f  story that hurts:
A t the time o f  their three-month journey  
m y sister Bracha was only three m onths old.
They were so long on the road, they ran out o f w ater and food , 
it w as desert, no rain.
They were taking a pa th  remote fro m  the villages 
to avoid  raids fro m  M uslim  marauders.
With no  w ater a t all, my m other's breasts became dry 
and she couldn 't fe e d  m y sister.
Bracha gasped fo r  breath; 
they thought that she m ight die.
M y parents and all their companions 
sto p p ed -a n d  called out to God:
"We can go no further. We pray You send us ra in ."
That night it poured  so hard donkeys were sw ept away.
Even som e o f  the people died.
B ut there was water enough to fe e d  little Bracha.
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W hen they fina lly  arrived in Aden
the travellers were m et by a creaky o ld  plane.
Officials hurried them.
"There's danger.
B ury yo u r belongings, your jew eliy , your Torahs—
The plane can hold  only people ."
M y M om  said  they were pushed like cows;
She barely was able to breathe.
So  the Jew s o f  Yemen left with nothing:
no  clothes, no jewelry, not even the handcrafted breastplates
that had  adorned their beloved Torahs.
A ll they had  was their vision o f  Zion; 
their fa ith  in the M essiah's return.
W hat the Yemenites fo u n d  in Israel 
resembled paradise not at all: 
twenty people in a tent, 
standing in line fo r  food, 
m onth after month in lice-infested camps.
Officials cu t the earlocks o f  many men
and assigned them  shorter, H ebrew-sounding names.
M alaria struck my sister Bracha, 
fro m  w ater she drank on the trip.
She w as in and out o f  the hospital fo r  three years.
M y M om  was scared  we would lose her.
There are stories now:
Parents were told their sick kids had died, 
and by  Jew ish law, they'd been buried  that day.
Years later Yemenite children appeared
in fam ilies all over the world:
they 'd  been given aw ay or sold
by those who fe l t  their fam ilies were too large;
these 'backward' peop le  should have fe w e r  kids.
I've also heard that the Torahs and jew elry  
buried  in Aden by those trusting souls 
had been unearthed by Israelis 
and  sto len  ju s t fo r  profit.
I've tried  to understand our story, 
w hy m y paren ts  w ere displaced.
W as the Yemenite ruler truly to be feared?
W ould Jew s have been harassed had they stayed?
O r d id  the European-born Jews im port their darker-skinned cousins 
to fig h t their wars and work fo r  low pay?
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Hiba:
It w asn't until '63 that Israel and Jordan agreed 
to arrange a place for families to meet.
So m any years had passed
at first her m other didn't know who Hanan was.
"Oh, m om m y, oh my mother," my step-sister cried, 
and stretched out her arm through the wire mesh fence 
that marked her side o f the border
From behind a second fence ten meters away 
Her mother, too, reached out her hand
They cried and cried
their wails higher and louder








A t school they taught us the w ar is coming, the war is coming. 
We had to d ig a trench in the backyard  
It had  to be above our heads.
I  remember digging all day 
thinking i f  I  don 't do it fa s t  enough  
They w ill see m y head, they will see my hair, 
they will ge t me.
A nd we learned to dig in a zig zag shape
to block the Ketushya rocket that comes in straight.
I  remember as a twelve year old running into the trenches 
with my grandfather and m y two brothers.
My grandfather ran with his cane, and flip p ed  in the trench.
He was too big f o r  us to move.
I was scared they would see his leg and get us all.
I  rem em ber hearing the whhhisshhhh o f  the ketushya  
The sound piercing through me.
M y three-year-old brother wondered why I  was sm othering him, 
covering him  w ith m y body.
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M om returned but refused to sleep in the trenches: 
too m any scorpions, too m any snakes.
Inside the house she p u t two beds together 
and covered the windows with black: 
no lights, no sound.
Four o f  us kids held on to M om:
one held a  leg, one her arm, one her hair.
I t  was too dark to see so we ju s t had to fe e l her.
We couldn 't w ait fo r  the light o f  day.
A  knock on the door.
Should  w e open it? Should we not? Who could it be? 
M om  peeked through the shutters and saw an Israeli car:
I t was a policem an ju s t checking that we were OK.
A nother night came a knock, but no car.
The more fran tic  the banging the more scared we became. 
Finally we heard our neighbor's voice wailing "Let me in!" 
She was locked out o f  her house.
A nother night a neighbor came screaming.
The assistant mayor on guard in the watchtower 
was fo u n d  dead, hanged by a sniper.
Ketushyas over the trenches with no parents around,
hearing neighbors wail:
seeing the guard w ho'd been hung
One w eek o f  living like that
and your whole life is shaped by fear.
Avi, m y brother's fr iend ,
was religious, respectful, hardworking:
One night when they were both thirteen 
A t seven they returned fro m  a m ovie.
A t ten his M om  came running to our house;
A vi still had no t arrived home fro m  the bus.
They called the police
and the whole village sta lled  searching.
A t 4 in the morning they fo u n d  him, butchered, 
arm s slashed and his head crushed in with a stone.
H e was fo u n d  in a cave on one o f  those hills 
Where I used to take our goats.
They fo u n d  knives and pieces o f  b lood-soaked cloth  
in the M uslim  village where our fr ien d  Abdallah lived  
in the home o f  a m an who had been a business partner  
with the fa th e r  o f  young Avi.
H ow  can we trust them?
H ow  can we trust?
The echo still rings to this day.
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Hiba:
A fter m any years 
my m other's aunt M ariam  
m anaged to travel to Safed.
W hen she returned
she knelt on the floor, faced towards M ecca 
and prayed.
In front of her were two small bags 
and a vessel made o f clay.
There was no furniture in the room, 
ju s t a carpet on the floor, 
and my m other and sisters 
and m any w om en friends 
ready to hear her stories.
W hen M ariam  finished her prayers 
the wom en rushed to hug her 
and smell her
so they could breathe in Safed's essence.
She told us she'd been on a pilgrim age 
to M ecca, and then, to the Dome o f the Rock.
Som ehow  she got a permit to Safed 
and w ent there in a taxi.
As soon as she could see the town 
she began to cry--and then, fainted.
"Passengers poured w ater on me 
and asked me w hat was wrong."
M ariam  was born in Safed 
and lived there til she was forty.
"There w ere m any new buildings," she said to her friends, 
"but I breathed the sam e air I remembered from before." 
She w ent directly to  her house 
built o f  stones that last forever.
"I felt as though I had returned to the past."
She knocked, and a  lady opened the door, 
and she fainted again, right there on the steps.
W hen she cam e to
the Jew ish people that lived in her house 
w ere w iping her face with water, 
w ondering  w ho she was.
"I told them  m y family built this house:
I 'd  lived there until '48.
'I ju s t need  to look inside,' I said,
'to bring  back all o f  my m em ories.'
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"In the living room  I saw the old, fancy frame 
but they'd thrown out the portrait 
I used to love.
In the place o f our family was a  picture o f  them, 
this Jewish fam ily that lived in our house.
In my son's room was the bed 
where he had slept for so many years.
I touched it's heavy wooden sides."
M ariam wept as she spoke these words 
and the listening women all cried too, 
because she was telling their story.
"My grandfather had planted 
almond and orange and olive trees:
I found them  there 
in the backyard garden."
And opening one of the two small bags 
M ariam gave an almond to each woman.
W ith our fingers alone we could open the almonds' tender skins.
Then she turned to the second bag 
filled w ith earth from  Safed's cem etery.
"It's nothing now, they've turned it into a park."
One woman began to cry
rem em bering the graves o f  her father and son.
M ariam  tried to soothe her friend:
"M aybe their spirit is here in this earth."
In the vessel there was cold, fresh w ater 
M ariam  had brought from the spring 
where fam ilies used to go for picnics.
Each wom an placed on her neck 
som e drops o f this precious perfum e.
M y step-sister Hanan had never heard from her mother 
w ho had stayed behind when w e left.
W ith tears stream ing down her cheeks 
she begged M ariam to tell her the truth:
"Is my m other still alive?"
"If this isn't the truth, may Allah take m y son from  me.
Y our m other lives in Romeh, w here I w asn 't allow ed to go.
But I m et som eone who had visited her ju st last week.
She is in good health 
but asks about her daughter 
and hopes to  see you 
before she dies."
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W ith tender almonds close to their hearts 
and fresh spring water perfum ing their necks 
at last the wom en left M ariam 's house 




on the gravestones of our martyrs
my brother was seized from our nest
and flung into jail
C old pre-daw n darkness 
pawed at my soul
each minute choked back an hour o f rage
Soldiers searched our parcels, our bodies 
until we no longer felt we were real
Through the fence between me and my brother 
M y finger sought his on the other side 
I brought him  rainbows o f threads and strings 
escape routes he could embroider
Once, when three o f  my brothers all were in chains 
the young soldier who came for the fourth 
pushed papers in my father's face:
'Sign that w e haven't taken anything from  your hom e.' 
M y father refused.
W hat can I say?
You w ant me to sign that you didn't take a  couch?
You took the best thing in m y home
the best thing in my life
You took everything that I w ant
Everything that I love.
For years m y father refused to see them 
refused the sham e o f the prison guard's search.
Sitting on the couch 
he w ept like a woman.
His sons all in prison 
and he sits alone.
I'd love to return his em broidered purse
the bird filled with song and the red, red rose
B ut I can 't
get them in
to the country
now. It's  forbidden.
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After 24 hours in flight to Amman 
I reached the A llenby Bridge, 
my six-m onth old in my arms.




ju s t soldiers who search you.
You take off your clothes, pass by a machine
its rays penetrate what might be hidden inside
your body
som ew here.
they search your clothes
they x-ray your shirt and your shoes
tax you on rings in your ears
o r a chain 'round your neck
Even the baby food they threw away.
W hatever you take 
it will all be a loss 
it will all be humiliation.
Let m e tell you a story 
I still feel bad about 
After I married I left Palestine 
but cherishing my people 
I didn't becom e an American.
I'd  get a perm it
leave the W est Bank
and then com e back to renew  it.
But my third child bom  very ill 
was in the hospital for the year 
my perm it expired
N o papers from specialists 
could buy me m ore time
'Y ou m ust go back to N ablus,' the agent insisted. 
D id they expect m e to leave my baby here, sick?
So, m y perm it expired.
I'm  a Palestinian no  longer.
It took more than four years to go back 
but only as an alien.
I did not let them  see m y tears,
but handing the guards my outdated ID
was the w orst m om ent o f m y life
I lost everything
I wasn't Palestinian any m ore
I wasn't yet Am erican
so w ho could I be
before God and the world?
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W hen my father died 
he left m e many things 
but not being Palestinian 
I cannot inherit them.
I cannot sell 
I cannot buy 
I cannot do anything 
as Palestinian
except cry Palestinian tears.
Hiba:
Childhood had been stolen from the faces o f  the children
They tried to be as clean as they could
but there wasn't enough water just for drinking.
They cam e to school chewing on bones 
w ith holes in their uniforms 
and lice in their hair.
I taught in the cam ps for twelve years.
The U.N. food lasted just a few  days 
not a w hole m onth as we'd been told.
They brought us powdered m ilk for the kids; 
we mixed it in a barrel on the playground 
and heated it over a Prim us stove.
As hungry as they were the kids couldn 't stand the smell; 
they poured the liquid from  their cups into the ground.
W hen I asked them to make a picture o f spring
they drew flowers
under a  plane dropping bom bs.
W hen I asked them  to show their m other 
they drew a wom an in the sun 
hanging laundry 
under a  plane 
dropping bom bs.
Sibyl
Am ong my treasures is a dress and shawl 
w ith dense, deep red em broidered designs 
feathers and pomegranites 
and w heat and peacocks, sym bols o f fertility.
It was a  gift to m y m other in 1928 
from  the wom en of Ramallah.
Every wom an there m ade her own dress; 
she cherished it for life.
A fter '48, w hen children w ere hungry 
many sold their dresses;
They'll never replace those trea su re s- 
there are no m ore threads this shade o f  maroon.
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This dress is not decoration.
It's the steadfastness o f a people 
expressed and nurtured in blood-red threads 
on linen the color o f stone.
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M usical Interlude
IV . A prayer for peace 
R uth:
Do /  m iss Dabeik?
Ooof: When I  think o f  D abeik I  can 't sleep 
that's how  bad I  m iss it.
I  should  tell you why?
We used to go sw im m ing there 
in a  round place
in a  little blotte, a little running river.
Piafkes—those things that bite and pu ll out the blood ? -  
we used to have them there.
W e'd go traipsing through the fa rm ers ' lawns 
and they'd chase us 
and w e'd run.
A n d  i f  young boys w ould  see that w e're swimming  
our clothes lying on the grass 
they'd take our dresses and  run away  
or hang them up high on a tree.
So why not m iss it?
We m iss it a ll the time.
W hat else is there to miss?
Jehad:
My mother loved to hear stories 
and she loved to visit her friends. 
Strangers knocked on our door 
asked for som ething to eat 
som ething to wear.
W e w ould open our closets 
and give them our clothes.
It's our habit there.
I've lived for eleven years here in Am erica 
where so much is so great 
I love this country.
But here you live like s tran g ers- 
You live a stranger and you die a stranger. 
A nd if you've ever lived a different life 
it hurts
Even if  you are in heaven 
You will dream 
about Palestine.
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Hiba:
If  my mother or grandm other w ould see my dress
they w ould say it is nothing;
the design is too simple, too sparse.
They could sit a w hole day and em broider 
but m y life is different from theirs: 
studying and teaching 
and now with my children;
I take three or four years to finish a dress.
But w hen I w ear this dress
with pine trees and feathers and kernels o f  wheat
in colors of Northern Palestine




I  loved m y brothers so dearly.
I  couldn 't think o f  them fo r  m any years  
not wanting to fe e l the loss.
I f  only Israel had been a state already 
in those years before the war 
m aybe m y brothers would still be alive.
Since I  survived, I  live as a Jew:
That's w hat they w anted to kill.
You choose life.
You m ust choose life.
There is no other way.
Tamar:
Who am I?
A bout being Yemenite there was never a doubt;
I  love every minute.
But Jewish and Israeli:
in college I began to ask questions.
W hat does it mean to be Jewish ?
Put me beside a Jew from  Europe 
and we look so different.
We call holidays by the same name 
but our celebrations are different 
and so are our prayers.
Once in M innesota I  was so lonely 
I  w ent to the Jewish Center looking fo r  friends.
I  o ffered to teach, anything to help.
"You don 't even look like u s ," one o f  them said. 
It hurt more that she could imagine.
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I  love Israel.
There's a spirit, a caring:
Until today, it is home.
I  love being p a rt o f  a Jewish nation
where the whole country celebrates at the same time.
A nd  when I  sing songs with other Israelis
I'm electrified; I  open m ore deeply to life.
But fo r  Palestinians, w hat is fa ir?
I  don't know  how to f in d  an answ er  
and what can I do  
by m yse lf 
as one?
Hiba:
My tapestry shows a wom an behind barbed wire
wearing a dress em broidered like mine
Around her neck is the flag o f my people
and from  her outstretched arm she releases a message
carried in the beak o f a dove:
W om en love peace to raise their children.
I as a  Palestinian know 
there are two kinds of peace:
Peace that is built on the bodies of those murdered 
to silence their calls for their just rights;
and peace which com es from  understanding a people's suffering, 
sitting down with them  to resolve their problems,
so that justice and equality, not death and suffering, can be the code o f the land.
I sm uggled m y dream s in m y hidden wishes
and crossed the ocean with hopes for peace;
for my Palestinian sisters who lost their children in wars
and w ho have been w idow ed at an early age.
I ask you for true peace for my people.
Sibyl:
W hen the pain in my body becom es too much to bear
I escape to a  secret biyara
an inner, sacred, orange grove temple
where children are playing
and my spirit is at peace.
As I listened to news of the w ar in the G ulf 
I wrote m ake-believe letters to  the men in charge:
D ear George,
D ear Saddam ,
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
368
Come visit my biyara\ you can relax and be safe.
No uniform s here: w ear your parka or your jacket. 
W e'll drink Arabic coffee and talk o f  your childhoods: 
W hat was it like to be little boys?
Here in my sacred orange grove temple 
You will see you have much in common.
N ow  I know that I'll never go back 
my time is too short; the cancer too strong.
B ut I rem em ber the stories about d'ubbe , the hyena
and the adventures o f the sm uggler w ith the wrinkled, tanned face.
I hear R aya singing lullabyes off-key 
and taste m y auntie's fresh w arm  breads.
Yehieh's children squeal in delight 
as w ater swirls over their feet.
The sturdiness of my grapefruit trees
and the steadfastness stitched in my m other's dress
sustain my will to live.
M y breath will sing a silent prayer 
for healing and for peace.
M usic
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FOOTNOTES
1R eaders interested in uses of 'poetics' to refer to the literary or aesthetic 
dim ensions o f phenom ena not typically characterized as aesthetic can refer to  the following 
sources for exam ples: Alcalay (poetics of disaster, o f  resistance, o f  indeterminacy);
Bogdan (poetics o f need, of ordinary existence, of pluralism , o f refusal, o f gender, o f 
engagem ent); Lavie (poetics o f  military occupation); M air (poetics of experience.)
2 joan  B ondurant (pp. 9-11) offers subtle distinctions am ong force, violence, injury 
and coercion: Force is "the exercise o f physical or intangible pow er or influence to effect 
change. Violence is the willful application o f  force in such a w ay that it is intentionally 
injurious to the person or group against whom it is applied. In jury  is understood to 
include psychological as well as physical harm. Non-violence  when used in connection 
with satyagraha means the exercise of power or influence to effect change w ithout injury to 
the opponent. Coercion  has been defined as the use of either physical o r intangible force to 
com pel action contrary to the will or reasoned judgm ent o f the individual or group subject 
to such  force."
3M ichael Hardimon (p. 85) writes that the process may be variously described as 
"... overcom ing conflict, division, enmity, alienation, or estrangem ent; the result, as the 
restoration o f harm ony, unity, peace, friendship, or love. The concept of reconciliation 
contains within it som ething like a story: two parties begin as friends, becom e estranged, 
and becom e friends again. The basic pattern is thus one o f unity, division, and 
reunification."
^D e W aal's research balances Konrad Lorenz's highly publicized findings on 
aggression in prim ates, findings that have been used to argue that hum an proclivities 
towards violence are evolutionarily determined and therefore inevitable.
5'Tolerance' could as easily refer to a situation in w hich som eone is reconciled to 
an unpleasant circum stance as to an openness that allows for interaction and exchange. But 
for people in conflict to becom e reconciled with each other im plies that (1) they have 
already engaged in some kind of conflict, and. (2) the rift has been healed and/or people 
have created relationships of sincere goodwill in spite of differences.
^T he notion o f "warranted trust" is developed by Trudy G ovier. See G ovier,
1992.
7Gulliver's prim ary purpose is to clarify that the distinction betw een negotiation and 
arbitration is one o f the locus of control: in negotiations, v/hether m ediated or not, the 
parties them selves decide how to resolve the conflict; in arbitration, a third party determines 
the outcom e.
8This idea o f transform ation is captured by Hardim on (p. 85), in his explication of 
the G erm an word for reconciliationVersohnung, which he says im plies a state o f  
transform ation even m ore strongly than does its English equivalent. H ardim on's "higher 
state" is sim ilar to the "synthesis" sought in Gandhi's satyagraha, or experim ents in truth. 
W hen two parties becom e genuinely versohnt, they do not resum e their old relationship 
unchanged. They becom e versohnt by changing their behavior and attitudes in fundamental 
ways. Parties w ho have attained Versohnung  do not have to decide to get along together;
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their getting along together is, instead, the natural result of their being in a new, 
transform ed state. The unity o f their new relationship may be described as 'higher' in the 
sense of being more flexible, complex, and stable than the unity that preceded it.
9Louise Diam ond's em phasis on the root issues and needs being expressed in the 
conflict situation, rather than the positions that parties in conflict might at first bring to the 
table, is a central idea among contem porary conflict resolution practitioners. Burton, for 
instance, argues that in m ost conflict situations, the m ost important needs being expressed 
through violent conflict are needs for identity, security of identity group, recognition, 
political participation, and distributive justice. They are not negotiable, not repressible.
They are needs "for which persons and com m unities will make endless sacrifices." W hen 
the underlying reasons for conflict are identified, Burton believes, remedies can be found 
that take them into account and resolve relationship problems.
l^F ram  the Christian perspective, "we shall be to one another what w e were 
before, save for one im portant difference. I know now that you are a person w ho can 
forgive, and that you prefer to have suffered rather than to resent, and that to keep me as a 
friend, or to avoid becom ing my enem y, is more important to you than to maintain your 
ow n rights. And you know that I am  a person who is not too proud to acknow ledge his 
fault, and that your goodwill is w orth more to  me than the maintenance o f  my own cause. 
....Forgiveness does not only forestall o r remove enmity: it strengthens love" (Burnaby, 
p. 87, cited in Brum m er, p. 442).
1 P e rso n a l correspondence from  Karen Sirker, conflict resolution practitioner.
12In the intensive, interpersonal sort o f reconciliation facilitated by Bjom 
K rondorfer, it is one's ow n em otions that m ust be m ade vulnerable. He writes, "[For Jew 
and G erm ans] to transform  their strained relations, they m ust learn to trust each other and 
allow their long-stored anger, guilt, grief, and pain to emerge. Reconciliation dem ands a 
w illingness to becom e vulnerable and honest in the presence o f  another. Honesty and trust 
are central to reconciliatory efforts."
13In the folklore/oral history project A Passion fo r  Life, for instance, Palestinian 
and Jewish participants often hurt each other because tney were ignorant of the m eaning o f 
particular words or historical references. For Palestinians, for instance, 1948 is the year o f 
the disaster. W hen Jews referred to  it only in terms o f  the return to their homeland, 
Palestinians rightly felt betrayed, wounded. On the other hand, when Palestinians were 
unable to hear stories about the H olocaust, Jew ish participants felt that a sacred m em ory 
had been violated. In neither case d id  the participants wish to hurt the other or to disregard 
im portant symbols. They w ere ignorant of the full meaning for the other of particular 
words and im ages, and their ignorance caused them  to unwittingly betray each other's 
trust. This exam ple illustrates that building trust in contexts o f mistrust often requires more 
than a change of heart. (See C ohen, 1994.)
14See Cordelia for discussion o f restorative justice in m utualist com m unity.
15For an exam ple o f "m oralizing" and w estern im position o f values, see Rodrigue, 
on Jew ish French "education" o f Sephardic Jewish children in M iddle Eastern countries.
16The frustrations o f the "cold peace" between Israel and Egypt underscore the 
lim itations o f changes in governm ental policy that are not m atched by corresponding shifts 
in consciousness.
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17See Cohen, 1994, for an analysis of the different m eanings associated w ith these
term s.
18A lthough pain is assessed differently in different cultural contexts, even in 
contexts in which the culturally appropriate response to pain w ould be stoic tolerance,
"w hen pain is perceived suddenly and unexpectedly, and when its impact is not anticipated, 
chances are that the individual's behavior will be characterized by uninhibited 
m anifestations of alarm and anxiety, with all their behavioral concomitants" (Zborowski, 
p. 29).
19One study, for instance, found that soldiers in field hospitals reported less pain 
than patients recovering from surgery, although the actual dam age to their tissues and 
organs was more severe. For the soldiers, pain was experienced as a reassurance o f life; 
the threat of annihilation was reduced. Their w ounds represented a respite in the relatively 
safe hospital and a reprieve from battle, with its ongoing terror o f death. For the patients 
recovering from surgery, the converse was true; their pain was generally experienced as an 
indication of their illness, and a source o f anxiety (Bakan, p .87). Pain interpreted as 
reassurance o f life may also help to account for the confusing phenom enon o f masochism. 
Persons who fear annihilation may seek the intensity o f  pain's sentience as a way o f 
averting the even greater discomfort o f  their anxiety.
do not m ean to suggest that the am eliorization o f  suffering is only a  matter of 
understanding or consciousnessness. Clearly, in m ost instances, action is required. But 
som e degree o f  suffering can often be  relieved through expression, understanding and 
reinterpretation. And action-changes in policies o r actual interventions, for in stan ce- 
undertaken in the absence o f understanding often have unintended harm ful effects.
21A kbar Ahmed (1992) refers to the conflict betw een Salman Rushdie and his 
prim ary British opponent, K alim  Siddiqui, as a "death dance." p. 174.
22At Auschw itz, some o f the young G erm an students appear stoic and indifferent. 
K rondorfer writes: "As I began to reflect on the students' responses, I realized that the 
vicious cycle o f  fear, anger, and ensuing guilt disguised another, much stronger feeling: 
sham e. 'G uilt is a reaction to a deed, shame a  reaction to a m ode of being,' the 
psychoanalyst Peer Hultberg writes (1987:85), "Third-generation G erm ans are not guilty 
o f  the deeds o f their forebears but can still be asham ed o f being German, especially at 
A uschwitz. Their intellectual detachm ent, the fear of being judged, the anger that defends 
against guilt feelings can actually be read as a giant m aneuver against shame."
23A classic study by JoAnn M . Eland and Jane E. L. A nderson, published in 1977, 
show ed that over 1/2 the children betw een the ages of four and eight who had major 
surgery, including amputations, received no m edications for postoperative pain. They 
attribute this, in part, to how easily, in the hospital setting, medical personnel dism issed 
childrens' lim ited vocabulary (cited in M orris, 1991, p. 146).
24Given that one o f the purposes o f torture is the obliteration of language, it is 
striking to note the extent to  which the destruction of language is a feature of a form  o f 
violence that m ight be construed as "less extrem e" than torture, oppression. Oppression 
could  reasonably be placed at the opposite end of a  spectrum  from  physical torture, in that it 
is a form  of collective, structural, long-standing violence, w hereas the violence o f torture is 
individual, bodily and immediate. Colonizing powers often forbid or constrain indigenous
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people from speaking their own language, as when N ative Americans were punished for 
speaking native languages in m andatory boarding schools run by the U. S. B ureau o f 
Indian Affairs. Sim ilarly, during the period p f  slavery, Africans who spoke the sam e 
languages were often separated from  each other, and also forbidden to use drum s that 
would have allow ed them to com m unicate from one plantation to another.
25Laub theorizes that the Holocaust was an event that defied w itness, because it 
was im possible to stay outside of the "trapping roles" that conferred the status o f either 
victim or victimizer. Furtherm ore, it perpetrated a world in which, as Laub writes, "the 
very im agination of the Other was no longer possible. There was no longer an other to 
which one could say 'Thou' in the hope of being heard, o f being recognized as a subject, 
of being answered." In the absence of the recognition that accom panies address and 
response, victim s becam e unable to bear witness even to them selves. The result is 
annihilation: "history is abolished" and "identity ceases to exist" (p. 82).
26The Am nesty International 1997 Annual Report cites w ell-docum ented cases of 
torture and other form s o f ill-treatment, including rape, in 124 countries.
27Elaine Scarry writes that "the moral and aesthetic value o f  a given creation does 
not just depend on the content o f the fiction but on the nature o f  the substantiation used in 
its confirm ation in the transitional period when it is between the states o f having been 
already made-up and not yet made-real; and far, far back in the m ost atavistic form  of 
substantiation that entails the use o f the injured hum an body, it will becom e strikingly clear 
that the m ot fundamental relation between body and belief turns on the question o f whether 
a person uses his own body in confirm ation o f a symbolic displacem ent of that body, or 
instead uses the body o f som eone outside the benefits of the invented construct in the 
confirm ation process" (Scarry, 1985, p. 150).
28This sum m ary o f  Peirce's theory o f  signification draws heavily on an 
unpublished paper, "The Sem iotics of Charles S. Peirce," by Peggy M urray and M eg 
Peterson, U niversity o f New  H am pshire, 1986.
29Johnson argues that metaphors that evolve from bodily experiences inform  the 
patterns of even our m ost abstract thinking, including the propositional structures of 
rational argum entation itself. So, unlike Kant, whose entire theory o f hum an rationality is 
based on an understanding of objectivity that separates the thinking m ind from  the feeling 
body, Johnson claim s that, in fact, "the body is in the mind" (Johnson, 1987, p. xvi.).
30The fourth dim ension o f Kant's understanding o f the im agination refers to 
im agination's creative function, i.e. to the hum an capacity for originality of expression-- 
capacities often associated w ith 'im agination' in everyday discourse. In "reflective 
judgm ent" the m ind does m ore than organize sensory data by way o f a fixed stock o f  
schem ata and concepts. I t "'plays over’ various representations (percepts, im ages, 
concepts) in search o f  possible ways that they m ight be organized" (Johnson, 1987, 
p. 158). Such "free play o f the imagination" is central to our apprehension o f beauty, 
when w e attend to the formal features o f an object to discern patterns o f  harm ony or grace. 
The notion "free play" refers to the idea that such reflections are not guided by any concept- 
-not o f the object itself, because w e are attending only to its formal features; and not of 
beauty, because strictly speaking, there is no concept of beauty. Johnson explicates one of 
the m ost d ifficult passages in Kant's aesthetic theory to explain how, in Kant's view , we 
can arrive at judgm ents o f beauty that might be universally shared:
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Kant describes this non-rule-governed conform ity o f imaginative activity to 
structures o f understanding as a special kind o f  "purposiveness" (Zw eckm assigkeit) 
that the object has for my cognitive faculties. M ore precisely, there is a 
"purposiveness w ithout any definite purpose," since there is no definite concept (of 
a purpose the object serves) guiding the reflection, and yet it is som ehow fitting 
(purposive) for mental activity that makes sense to me. Objects judged to be 
purposive or fitting in this way are called "beautiful," and we say that they put our 
imagination in a playful harm ony with our intellect or understanding (i.e., our 
conceptual faculty). Thus we judge objects to be beautiful by a free (non-rule- 
govemed) preconceptual imaginative activity that has a rational character and can lay 
claim  to the agreem ent o f  other judges, since it focuses only on the formal features 
o f the object, which im agination allows us all to experience in the sam e way 
(Johnson, 1977, 160).
The free play o f  imagination is engaged not just in the appreciation of beauty, but in 
the creation o f works o f  art as well. Johnson sum m arizes Kant's notion o f  genius as "the 
capacity to  initiate a free harm onious play of im agination that issues in a new ordering o f 
representations that make sense to  us without the use o f concepts." It is a faculty for 
"producing an aesthetical idea, defined [by Kant] as 'that representation o f  the imagination 
w hich  occasions much thought, w ithout however any definite thought, i.e., any concep t, 
being capable o f being adequate to it; it consequently cannot be completely com passed and 
m ade intelligible by language'" (cited in Johnson, p. 162). Aesthetical ideas "create new 
m eaning, new significance, by going beyond the confines o f  our established conceptual 
system " (Johnson), enlarging the concept in "an unbounded fashion" (Kant).
31Bachelard notes that the French philosopher Charles Nodier, wrote in 1828 that 
"the different names for the soul, among nearly all peoples, are just so many breath 
variations, and onom atopoetic expressions of breathing" (Bachelard, 1994, p. xx).
32For exam ple, see C ooper, 1996.
33Kapferer defines perform ance as a "unity between text and enactm ent, neither 
reducible to the other." In this regard, his definition parallels Dufrenne's theory about the 
nature o f works of art: they are irreducible to perform ances, yet "graspable only through or 
in them " (Kapferer, 1986, p. 192).
34For a related understanding of aesthetic reciprocity, see D ufrenne, p. xxxi.
35The Oral History C enter model has been described in detail in several 
publications. Thompson (1994) emphasizes the im portance of narrative in a project 
addressing urban violence in the United States. C ohen (1997) describes an effort to adapt 
the m odel to educate teachers about issues oppression.
36For a  description o f the project, see C ohen, 1994.
37T o read several o f  the narratives upon w hich these poem s are based, see Cohen,
1994.
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